Neutral Beyond the Cold: Neutral States and the Post-Cold War International System

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the wars in Yugoslavia radically changed the security environment in Europe and Central Asia. Some predictions assumed the emerging unipolarity of the liberal world order would end neutrality policies in East and West, but, as this volume shows, this was not the case. While some traditional Cold War neutrals like Sweden and Finland have been edging closer to security alignment with western institutions, there are others like Austria, Switzerland, Ireland, and Malta that remained committed to their traditional nonaligned foreign policy approaches. More importantly, there are areas of Eurasia that developed new forms of neutrality policies, most of them only noticed on the margins of academic discourse. This is the first book to systematically explore this “new neutralism” of the Post-Cold War. In part one, the book analyzes contemporary neutrality discourse on several levels like international organizations (UN, ASEAN), diplomacy, and academic theory. Part two discusses neutrality-related policy developments in Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Serbia, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Mongolia. Together, the 15 chapters show how on this vast, connected landmass references to neutrality have remained a staple of international politics.

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The decline of neutrality in world politics has been proclaimed several times over the past century. In the 1930s, Nicolas Politis thought the Great War had “dealt the death blow to neutrality” because “it showed the impossibility of neutrals escaping the effects of hostilities.” In 1953, Nils Ørvik published his famous treatise on the same topic, including why World War II had significantly added to the demise. And after the Cold War some historians like Switzerland’s J. M. Gabriel even opined that in the realm of political science and international law, the neutrality topic was ausgeforscht—researched to the end. His country, too, he thought, should overcome the outdated foreign policy. At the same time, though, there always were voices that defended neutrality politics and its law, arguing that there would be new life in the old concepts. Read more….

Geopolitics and neutrality have a common past: Neutrality emerged out of specific geopolitical considerations, which lead certain states to decide that abstaining from war would best serve their interests. As geopolitics developed, so did neutrality. But neutrality was not just a “recipient” of geopolitics. Neutral states also had an impact on geopolitics: Through their abstention from war, they showed alternatives to traditional power politics. Beyond this, European neutral states developed policies, which aimed at containing international conflicts through various means. These policies became part of the respective states’ national foreign policy identities and had the effect that changes in geopolitical constellations did not automatically lead to a weakening of neutrality. The emergence of collective security might have led to the disappearance of neutrality, but it did not. On the contrary, neutral states played important roles from the onset of the architecture of the United Nations. The same proved true for the liberal world order, which followed the end of the Cold War. In the emerging post-liberal order, neutrality became even more prominent again. So, neutral states adapted their policies to changes in their international environment. Doing so, they in turn contributed to the transformation of the international order and they also influenced the significance of  geopolitics. The argument details how this should, in addition to neutrality’s realist and idealist core functions, be interpreted as an emerging new function of neutrality providing states beyond security and identity with a space to cope with internal and external transformations. Aggregating this function to a higher level would allow flagging neutrality as a concept prioritizing global policies over traditional power games. The chapter briefly introduces the concept of geopolitics, then reverts to some historical facts about European neutral states, before it moves on to sketch alternative views on geopolitics and new functions of neutrality in the post-liberal world. Read more….

The burgeoning literature on small states studies, particularly from the realist school, has identified the development of so-called “small state mentalities”, which shape the ways and means small states use to tackle the problems arising from their participation in international relations. In 1998, Goetschel summed up the strategic dilemma of small states as striving for two ideals, difficult to reconcile: autonomy, which small states seek to maintain, and influence, which they seek to increase. This, he holds, is the essence of the small state national interest. To analyze these two ends, much of the scholarly attention to the foreign policy options for states in international relations focuses on their security in relation to their alliances with other states, typically interpreted as balancing or bandwagoning, depending on their national interests. Yet, there is another route that some small states preferring to avoid the risk of entrapment may take. Since power rivalries increase the vulnerability of small states and threaten their security, choosing to remain neutral allows them to better sustain their autonomy. Moreover, neutrality constitute what Wivel deems a “smart state” strategy for small states because it allows them to self-position and self-promote themselves as honest brokers, leveraging their inherent weaknesses by presenting themselves as mediators who will not take advantage of negotiations for their own vested interest; in so doing, they can exert influence over international conflict resolution (typically the reserve of great powers) and accrue increased ‘status” and prestige. Read more….

As of early 2022, it seems that Washington and its allies (NATO) need to contend with Russia’s resurgence to reestablish its traditional great power aspirations and staggering acts of aggression against Ukraine. Its invasion is ruthless and bold in substance and style. Though Russian president Vladimir Putin is known for taking calculated risks, he has now taken a “world-shaking gamble whose ultimate implications neither he nor anyone else can foresee.” Already in 2008, Russia took control of Georgia’s provinces Abkhazia and South Ossetia to recognize their independence, as did Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru, and Syria. Six years later, after a coup d’etat in Ukraine in early 2014, Moscow, despite international outcry, annexed Crimea, thereby violating the political agreement known as the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, which was concluded in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United States, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom had pledged assurances to uphold Ukraine’s territorial integrity without imposing a legal obligation of military assistance on its par- ties. Neither the George H. W. Bush nor the Clinton administration was pre- pared to extend a military commitment to Ukraine—and both felt that, even if they wanted to, the Senate would not produce the needed two-thirds vote for consent to ratification of such a treaty. Stephen MacFarlane, a professor of international relations, stated, “it gives signatories justification if they take action, but it does not force anyone to act in Ukraine.” In 2022, Moscow repeated its actions by recognizing Ukraine’s two breakaway regions of Donetsk and Luhansk in the Donbas. Read more….

From a (mostly) liberal perspective, this chapter analyzes Austrian neutrality as to how it has developed, its current limitations, and future expanded scope of activities to enhance policies for peace. It considers how neutrality could promote nuclear disarmament and play an active role as a bridge-builder and shaper in international peace processes and civilian missions beyond the European Union’s foreign and security policy framework. In this context, special attention will be paid to Austria’s role in international organizations and vis-a-vis non-state actors. Consideration is also given to Austria’s diverse domestic policy objectives that limit the possibilities of this foreign policy instrument. Read more….

Few people are as familiar with the ins and outs of foreign policy as diplomats. The men and women tasked with executing their home countries’ national strategies abroad and in international organizations have an intimate relationship with government policies. For the representatives of permanently neutral states that entails a practical understanding and, in most cases, an affinity for the principles of neutrality. Their insights can be academic if they engaged with the topic theoretically, or it can be purely personal if they were the representatives of a neutral state for many years. Either way, the understanding gained from diplomatic practice is an invaluable perspective for scholars of international relations. The following excerpts are speeches of two former Austrian top diplomats. Eva Nowotny served her country among other positions as Ambassador to France, (1992–1997), the United Kingdom (1997–1999), and the United States (2003–2008). Peter Jankowitsch was a member of Parliament (1983–1986, 1987–1990) and Foreign Minister (1986–1987). He later served as State Secretary for European Affairs to the Federal Chancellery and in various other posts related to Austrian diplomacy. In the following paragraphs, Eva Nowotny first reflects on the changing role of neutrality in her diplomatic work, before Peter Jankowitsch discusses the role of the nonaligned movement (NAM) over the past decades. Read more….

Googling “neutrality” and the United Nations (UN), one mostly finds entries on carbon neutrality but nearly nothing on geopolitics. Neutrality is often defined as a legal status arising from a state’s abstention from all participation in a war between other states, the maintenance of an attitude of impartiality toward belligerents, and the recognition by the belligerents of this abstention and impartiality. As a concept of international relations, neutrality was at its prime in the nineteenth century, at a time when absolute sovereignty and the idea of states’ unconditional right to go to war were hallmarks of the interna- tional system. Nevertheless, while going to war constituted a sovereign right, there was a deeply felt desire for peace. The same desire prevailed when the United Nations was founded after World War II. The term “United Nations” was coined in early 1942 when US President Franklin D. Roosevelt convened a meeting of twenty-six allied countries in Washington D.C., three weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, to unite coun- tries that were at war with the Axis powers. Hence, the UN Declaration dealt with war goals and included an agreement not to make a separate peace with the enemy and a pledge to fight for unconditional surrender. From the begin- ning, Roosevelt wanted to create a new international collective security orga- nization to replace the failed League of Nations. This should be done before the end of the war, while the iron was still hot, so to speak. Consequently, the UN Charter was first drafted by the US State Department. Read more….

In 1971, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) established a foreign policy principle called “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” (ZOPFAN). It was the first articulation of what this chapter calls “ASEAN neutrality,” with the purpose of protecting the five founding members from external interferences and safeguarding their sovereignty. Some analysts have concluded that ZOPFAN was a failure because Southeast Asia was never free from interferences.1 Others have argued for the possibility of revitalizing the concept,2 which, however, has been criticized as unrealistic due to the grow- ing US-China tensions polarizing the region and placing pressure on ASEAN to pick a side.3 It thus seemed for a while that ZOPFAN and ASEAN neu- trality would bear little relevance to the future of the region. Nevertheless, in 2020, at the thirty-seventh ASEAN Summit in Ha Noi, ASEAN publicly reaffirmed its commitment to ZOPFAN.4 Singapore’s ambassador-at-large, Tommy Koh, warned that “ASEAN will lose its edge the moment it is dis- united or starts to take sides.”5 Clearly, the group has not given up on the idea of neutrality, which begs two questions: Why is the concept still en vogue in the capitals of Southeast Asia, and what does ASEAN neutrality mean today? Read more….