USA Wants to DESTROY The ICC. Attacks Global Community | Prof. Yusra Suedi

The recent public campaign by the United States to “dismantle” the International Criminal Court has ripped open a fault line in contemporary international law: do courts deliver justice, or do they primarily generate political pressure? The exchange at the heart of this conversation exposes both the deep value and the profound fragility of international judicial institutions. It also shows how power politics, legal design, and the expectations of victims and small states interact—sometimes productively, sometimes destructively—to shape whether international law can curb impunity or merely serve as a tool in geopolitical contests. Listening to the legal reasoning and on-the-ground experience brought forward in the discussion, one comes away with a clear sense: international courts matter, but they are not magic. Their strength lies equally in the law they pronounce and the political energy that either enforces or undermines those pronouncements. ## Courts as Justice and Political Pressure International courts were conceived as instruments to move disputes off the battlefield and into reasoned adjudication, but their effectiveness depends on two interlinked dynamics: legal reasoning and political follow-through. The conversation underscores that courts perform dual roles. On the one hand, they render authoritative legal determinations that clarify states’ obligations, establish narratives of wrongdoing, and create formal records that victims and advocates can use. On the other hand, courts often function as catalysts for political pressure—vehicles through which civil society, states, and international bodies mobilize to pursue accountability. Prof. Yusra Suedi stresses this duality. She describes “strategic litigation law,” where judges clarify obligations and, in doing so, invite other institutions to act. The ICJ’s opinion that a particular occupation was illegal, for example, did not end the occupation; yet that opinion became an “authoritative tool” for advocates and diplomats. The legal pronouncement created a new political baseline: states and organizations can now point to a judicial finding when demanding compliance. That capacity to shape political discourse is one of international courts’ most concrete contributions. But the process-driven nature of international law imposes limitations. Many international courts lack enforcement arms; they do not have police forces to execute arrest warrants or compel compliance. This structural shortcoming turns judgments into instruments of persuasion more often than coercion. In highly charged cases—those involving great powers or their close allies—formal legal findings are only part of the story. They can create moral and diplomatic pressure, but whether that pressure yields concrete consequences depends on political alignments, the resolve of states and international organizations, and the appetite of domestic publics to sustain costly confrontations. Small and medium states, and victims within them, therefore treat courts as tools rather than miracles. Suedi emphasizes that many communities see courts as their only hope when national systems have failed. Strategic litigation by small island states on climate or by states bringing cases on occupation and alleged genocide is not merely about legal victory; it is about building leverage and shaping international norms. The value is practical: even when enforcement is unlikely, a court’s opinion can be used domestically to galvanize public opinion, to shape diplomatic strategy, and to lay the groundwork for longer-term change. This reality invites a recalibration of expectations. Judicial rulings should be judged on both legal criteria and their capacity to shift political incentives. For victims, even a “symbolic” judicial win can be life-changing if it reframes narratives, unlocks funding for humanitarian relief, or sparks sanctions and other diplomatic measures. For great powers facing adverse findings, those same rulings can be irritants that prompt aggressive countermeasures, including legal and diplomatic campaigns aimed at weakening the courts themselves. ## Can the US Dismantle the ICC The United States’ recent declaration—characterizing the ICC as a threat to American sovereignty and announcing a campaign to “disable” its operational capacity—dramatically illustrates how powerful states can weaponize political and material levers against international courts. The conversation makes plain that this posture is not new; Washington has historically viewed the ICC with suspicion, and at times with hostility. What is striking now is the intensity and breadth of measures signaled: coordinated diplomatic pressure, public delegitimization, sanctions on judges, and a reminder of domestic statutes that theoretically permit extrajudicial action to protect nationals. Suedi situates this hostility in historical context. The U.S. participated in Rome Statute negotiations early on, seeking protections for its personnel, but never ratified the treaty. The oscillation between engagement and opposition has left the ICC structurally vulnerable: it depends on state cooperation for arrest warrants, evidence collection, funding, and access. When a superpower mobilizes against it—diplomatically, financially, or through direct intimidation—the court’s work becomes materially and politically harder. The recent suspension of the ICC prosecutor over internal allegations, the sanctioning of judges, and the broader delegitimizing campaign demonstrate how external pressure and internal turbulence can combine to erode capacity. Yet the idea that the U.S. can unilaterally “dismantle” the ICC underestimates the court’s embeddedness in a broader web of legal actors and political constituencies. Many states—both small and large—continue to use the ICC and other judicial mechanisms as levers of accountability. Suedi notes the widening geographic spread of ICC investigations beyond Africa, pointing to inquiries in places as diverse as Myanmar, Ukraine, and Venezuela. That diversification has increased the institution’s legitimacy among many constituencies. Moreover, courts are adaptive: they respond to criticism and evolve through practice. Improper political attacks may strengthen rather than eliminate the institution if they provoke international counter-mobilization in defense of rule-of-law principles. The broader risk lies less in a single campaign’s success and more in its corrosive effects. When a global hegemon openly frames an independent court as illegitimate and marshals allies to boycott cooperation, the practical consequences ripple: evidence-gathering stalls, prosecutions slow, and victims’ faith in legal remedies erodes. The conversation highlights that, for many victims, the ICC remains a glimmer of hope; depriving them of that avenue would have real human costs beyond the institutional chessboard. The corrective here is political as much as legal. Sustained support from coalitions of states, civil society, and international organizations is necessary to maintain the ICC’s operational space. Equally important is improving the court’s internal governance and transparency to reduce vulnerabilities to legitimate critique. The interplay between external defense and internal reform is the only realistic path to preserving an independent judicial mechanism in a fractious international order. ## The Legal Test for Genocide One of the most conceptually and emotionally charged parts of the exchange concerns the legal threshold for genocide. The conversation clarifies why proving genocide is unusually difficult: it requires not only demonstrating horrific acts but also establishing a specific intent—dolus specialis—to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group. This intent element distinguishes genocide from other grave crimes such as crimes against humanity or war crimes and makes mens rea the decisive legal hinge. Suedi, drawing on case experience, expl

USA Wants to DESTROY The ICC. Attacks Global Community | Prof. Yusra Suedi The contempt with which the US is treating international law has found a new low point. The State Department now officially says it wants to dismantle the ICC. Dr. Yusra Suedi, an international law scholar at the University of Manchester and founder of SAIL, joins Pascal Lottaz to examine the US campaign against the ICC, the limits and value of international courts, pressure on smaller states, and Europe’s role. They also discuss the Gaza case at the ICJ, why proving genocide is legally difficult, and why international law still matters. Links: SAIL Simplified Approach to International Law: https://www.learnsail.org/ Yusra Suedi on Bluesky: https://bsky.app/profile/yusrasuedi.bsky. social Yusra Suedi on LinkedIn: https://uk.linkedin.com/in/yusrasuedi Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 International Law and Its Courts 00:07: 03 The US Campaign Against the ICC 00:19:42 Courts as Justice and Political Pressure 00:34:00 Can the US Dismantle the ICC 00:43:31 The Legal Test for Genocide #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today we have a countrywoman of mine, Dr. Yusra Swedi, an Associate Professor of International Law at the University of Manchester. She's running the Simplified Approach to International Law, SAIL, Substack at LearnSail.org. Yusra, welcome. #Yusra Suedi Thank you very much, Pascal. It's so nice to be here. #Pascal It's nice having you here. I mean, you also grew up and studied in Switzerland, like me. You're from the French-speaking part, actually. So English is also a way for us to bridge the fact that we have two different languages, even though we're from the same country. And now you are teaching in the UK. How is that going? #Yusra Suedi I am. It's a really exciting time to be teaching international law, and I'm really grateful that the UK is a big advocate of academic freedom. That means we have passionate, interesting conversations with students about all the things there are to talk about in international law in the headlines today. -- 1 of 17 -- #Pascal Yeah. And, you know, it's interesting that you're saying that you're happy about the UK, because the UK at the moment, in my corner of the Internet, is not that famous for being a big advocate of journalistic freedom. We've seen how the UK is trying to impose very, very, very harsh prison sentences on Palestine Action. And I know that you yourself have actually been involved in the genocide case against Israel, in the legal team. Can you give us just a little bit of background on this one, and how you are also looking at, you know, the UK being on the other side of the fence when it comes to this one? How are you looking at the whole thing? #Yusra Suedi Yeah. So in the last couple of years, there have been a series of cases that have come before several international courts and that have revolved around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but each addressing a different dimension of it. So you were right to mention the genocide cases — the main one that was brought by South Africa against Israel in December of 2023. And the other one that I've actually been involved in was a request for the International Court of Justice, which is the world court, the UN's principal court, to make an assessment about whether the Israeli occupation is illegal. And so I was involved in that case, and the court actually did decide, in an opinion, that the occupation is absolutely illegal. Unfortunately, that has not led to the end of the occupation, but it has served as a really important authoritative tool for further political and diplomatic advocacy on the international and domestic level. But I'm happy to also talk about the genocide cases, because I know that has been such a source of interest over the years. #Pascal Do you think that the genocide cases, and in general the approach of international law, are still something that can help us in 2026? Because it seems that we are going through an intense phase of, you know, might makes right. #Yusra Suedi Yeah, I think that in the current era that we're in, which certainly reflects might makes right by several great powers, one source of solace for many people, including lawyers, is international courts. There's something growing that is called strategic litigation law. It's the ability of judges to actually do their best to clarify but also remind states of their legal obligations and to encourage other relevant institutions, for example, UN institutions, to enforce as best as they can these important international laws. So I still think that even though they're not free of their own limitations, the institutional structure is an important kind of source of hope for many people, especially during these difficult times. -- 2 of 17 -- #Pascal Can you just give us a very short rundown of these international courts? Because while international law is about 400, 450 years old, depending on where you set the starting date, the court system itself is relatively new, right? We have the International Court of Justice under the United Nations, but then also the International Criminal Court and the different ad hoc courts. So the system that we have today with the courts—how old is that, and how robust would you say it is? #Yusra Suedi Yeah, so the idea of international dispute settlement—states or even an individual against a state basically resorting to a third party to resolve some kind of conflict they have in a peaceful way, as opposed to going on the battlefield—is something that has existed for actually many, many decades, possibly as long as international law itself prevailed. But this modern form of brick-and-mortar international courts scattered across the world, each dealing with their own areas or having their own realms of competence, that's a little bit more of a recent idea. So the International Court of Justice—before that, we had kind of a similar body that existed post- World War I. And I think a newer and a lot more controversial one, which we may have the opportunity to talk about later in this conversation, is the International Criminal Court, which really, you know, has only existed for about 25 years. And so each of these has kind of come up against a significant amount of challenges, and also has its limitations in terms of how they were designed and what they can and cannot do. But I still think that we are better off having them than not having them. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. I mean, I completely agree. I think we're better off with them. But there are people who disagree and people who strongly disagree. And as a matter of fact, just today or yesterday, the U.S. came out with a note to the media informing everybody that they are from now on going to fight the International Criminal Court with all they have. Let me just read to you maybe the first passage of the statement that they made. It's called “State Department Launches Campaign to Dismantle International Criminal Court's Threat to American Sovereignty.” Today, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a sweeping campaign to dismantle the threat posed by the ICC to U.S. sovereignty. The campaign will feature a whole-of-government response to systematically disable the ICC's ability to operate, target American servicemen or officials, or otherwise threaten American sovereignty. And then it lists a couple of things that it will do, including diplomatic calls from the Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary, and Ambassadors to members of the -- 3 of 17 -- senior leadership of foreign nations, highlighting the abuse of the ICC. Nations that partner with American law enforcement and the U.S. military, or that enjoy the benefits of the U.S. security umbrella, are called upon to reject the ICC's purported authority—blah, blah, blah, yada, yada, yada—basically saying that they are going to put, at this point, only diplomatic pressure. Because we know that the United States actually also has a law on its books that would allow it to go into The Hague and physically take out Americans if there was ever somebody imprisoned there through the ICC—the so-called Hague Invasion Law. It's quite insane. And they've had that for a while. So the U.S. opposition to the ICC is not new. And the U.S. is, of course, not party to the Rome Statute, the founding document of the ICC. But this kind of bellicose language against an international court is something that, at least, I haven't seen yet to that level. How does this strike you? #Yusra Suedi I can't say that it's surprising. The U.S. has always had a very strong position when it comes to the ICC. Interestingly, it was quite actively involved in the negotiations of the Rome Statute, which is the ICC's founding document. And I suspect that this was more to kind of ensure that it would be designed in a way that would not harm the U.S. or the U.S.'s interests. But increasingly, with time, you know, I think the approach of the U.S. has been very clear towards the ICC, especially under the Trump administration, where we've seen the U.S. sanctioning judges on the bench who have moved forward with an arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant. And I think that was definitely a moment, a more intense moment where we realized the extent to which the U.S. is very much against the ICC. But there were earlier episodes as well, when the ICC opened an investigation in Afghanistan, which obviously involved the U.S. It's very unfortunate, and it also showcases the limitations that I mentioned earlier of some of these courts that are very vulnerable to states' funding and support in many ways. #Pascal You know, one of the criticisms about the current international system to which the ICC belongs is that it was basically shaped along the lines of Western states and that it represents, just like the Bretton Woods system, just like other systems like the international banking system, the structural power of the West against the rest. And if you look at the record, the track record, especially of the ICC, of who they actually convicted for war crimes, they're all Africans. They're all heads of state or officials of African nations. And there are famous quotes of people who said, like, yeah, the ICC is there for us to use against Africans and so on. Not a single Western leader had been indicted until the indictment of Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, which is, of course, what made the U.S. extremely angry. But that only came after, at the same time, Hamas leaders were listed by the ICC. And of course, that came two years after the ICC -- 4 of 17 -- issued an arrest warrant against Vladimir Putin and one more Russian official. And the West was applauding this. We remember very strong words of support by then President Joe Biden. And then, when the arrest warrants against Mr. Netanyahu came, all hell broke loose. So what do you make of this accusation that the ICC overall is one of these instruments against the rest of the world, although we're seeing that now one of the architects is actually not happy with it at all? #Yusra Suedi Yeah. Well, I think if we look at the current investigations that are open before the ICC, there are actually quite a few that extend beyond the African continent. So there are investigations that are open in, for example, Myanmar, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Venezuela, Ukraine, Lithuania. So there is, I think, a greater balance that the ICC has sought to achieve. Look, I think that the International Criminal Court is actually a necessary idea. I think the history of geopolitics has indica