Proxy War Strategy Is Not Ending | Dr. György Varga

## Failure of Minsk & Causes of the War The conversation centers on a simple but unsettling claim: the Minsk process did not collapse by accident; it was systematically undermined and, for many actors, functioned as a strategic pause rather than a genuine pathway to peace. Observers who watched the implementation closely saw a different rhythm to events than the one often narrated in Western capitals. Minsk II, as conceived in 2015, required constitutional changes in Kyiv to provide a degree of decentralization and special status for the separatist districts. Those legal and political remedies were never fully enacted, and that failure was not a marginal procedural flaw — it went to the heart of the incentives that sustained the conflict. Dr. György Varga, drawing on his years as head of an OSCE mission on the border, frames the non-implementation of Minsk as one of the core motivations that made military escalation more likely. He links Minsk’s stalling to multiple complementary trends: Ukraine’s growing orientation toward NATO, the preparation of its structures for potential conflict, and, crucially, a rollback of minority rights inside Ukraine that affected millions of Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians. From this perspective, the combination of unfulfilled political promises and geopolitical signaling created a credible perception — especially in Moscow — that peaceful reintegration had been postponed to buy time while Ukraine strengthened itself militarily and politically. The consequence, the conversation suggests, was a predictable pathology: what should have been a set of confidence-building steps matured into a weaponized interval. If guarantors were content to let Minsk serve as a delay, then the window for a negotiated settlement closed as military preparedness and political polarization deepened. The discussion does not romanticize the Minsk accords as a perfect solution; it rather insists that once a framework exists and is ignored, mistrust ossifies into a pretext for more coercive measures. Thus, for many watching on the ground, the war that began in 2022 was not an unforeseeable rupture but the result of a long, cumulative failure of diplomacy. ## Hungary's Stance on the Ukraine War Hungary’s posture throughout the crisis emerges in the exchange as a mixture of principled neutrality and hard-nosed national interest. The conversation posits Hungary as a quiet outlier in a European context largely dominated by rhetorical absolutism: a narrative that casts one side as pure victim and the other as pure aggressor. For Hungarian policy-makers, according to Dr. Varga’s account, the priority has been to avoid that binary and to maintain channels of engagement that other capitals have allowed to atrophy. This approach combines two strands. First, a pragmatic assessment of domestic and economic stakes: Hungary’s trade links, energy dependencies, and transit routes make wholesale alignment with punitive measures deeply costly. Second, a normative insistence on diplomacy as the primary tool for conflict resolution. The Hungarian position, in this telling, is not a reflexive sympathy for any state but a sustained preference for de-escalation and negotiation. That stance has provoked criticism from other EU partners, yet it has also served as an example of a European actor attempting to preserve agency amid intense pressures to conform. Dr. Varga explicitly connects this posture to a broader belief that the “absolutization” of the conflict — the refusal to see legitimate interests or rights on either side — has fuelled the current destabilization of European politics. In short, Hungary’s policy has tried to keep options open: not isolation from either party, but active engagement with both, paired with a refusal to let sanctions and symbolic politics become substitutes for diplomacy. ## Active vs. Paper Neutrality in Europe One of the sharper threads in the conversation distinguishes “active” neutrality from what is termed “paper” neutrality. The former describes states that, regardless of formal alliances, conduct foreign policy in ways that engage with all relevant actors and protect national interests. The latter describes an empty formalism — constitutional declarations of non-alignment that, in practice, translate into near-total political alignment with a dominant coalition. The difference matters because it explains how two countries with similar legal positions on neutrality can behave very differently. Turkey and Hungary are held up as examples of active neutrality: even while formally engaged with Western institutions, they preserved interlocution with Moscow and maintained diplomatic channels. Austria and Switzerland, by contrast, have at times demonstrated a paper neutrality that aligns almost automatically with the Western consensus, including sanctions regimes that, from the perspective of their own constitutional traditions, are contradictory. That contrast is not merely semantic. Active neutrality requires the political will to analyze national interest independently, to accept the reputational costs of divergence, and to manage relations with multiple great powers. It is a practice demanding resources, resilience, and an institutional memory of what neutrality meant before it became a headline. Paper neutrality risks being subsumed by pressure to conform, yielding the form of independence without its substance — and thereby contributing to the homogenization of European foreign policy decisions. ## EU Sanctions, Vetoes & Sovereignty The conversation turns to the mechanics of European decision-making and the ways in which sanctions have become a contested instrument of sovereignty. Sanctions, in one reading advanced here, are an expression of a polity’s sovereign will; in another, they can function as instruments that centralize authority away from member states. The EU’s increasing tendency to layer sanctions — and to create packages that have far-reaching extraterritorial effects — raises questions about who really holds power in European foreign policy. Several dynamics are at play. First, the unanimity requirement in certain EU foreign policy areas gives single member states theoretical veto power. Yet, in practice, the cost of exercising that veto has been made politically expensive: states risk being accused of disloyalty or even expulsion from a shared project. Second, Brussels has used crisis conditions to expand competencies, arguing that coordinated action is necessary for effectiveness. That rationale is compelling for actors who favor deeper integration, but it is deeply problematic for actors that prioritize national sovereignty and prefer differentiated responses. Dr. Varga warns that the current drift could amount to a “silent sovereignty grab,” where Brussels accrues covert powers without full democratic legitimation. The problem is not coordination per se; it is the instrumentalization of crises to alter the balance of decision-making without transparent debate. From the Hungarian vantage, this process compounds the material harms of sanctions by removing the very institutional mechanisms through which national governments might pursue more nuanced, interest-aware foreign policies. ## US Foreign Policy & The Proxy War The conversation reframes the conflict as a proxy war in which U.S. policy plays a central, structuring role. The term “proxy” is not used casually; it signals that much of the conflict dynamics are shaped by external support, strategic signaling, and the use of local actors to pursue broader geopolitical aims. From this perspective, Western support for Kyiv — militarily, economically, and politically — has turned the theater of war in Eastern Europe into a staged contest between great-power interests. This assessment challenges two comfortable narratives. One is the portrayal of the conflict as purely bilateral, reducible to Ukrainian resistance against external aggression. The o

Proxy War Strategy Is Not Ending | Dr. György Varga Did peace deals fail by accident, or were they just used to buy time for war? Is the European Union using this crisis to take power away from its own member states? And why does admitting this is a proxy war actually offer the best hope for peace? I dig into these questions with Dr. György Varga, a Hungarian diplomat who saw the build-up to this fight with his own eyes. As the former head of the OSCE mission on the Russian border, he spent four years watching the situation get worse before the invasion started. He brings a rare, on-the-ground view of why diplomacy failed and what the West got wrong. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 The OSCE Mission on the Russian Border 00:06:48 Failure of Minsk & Causes of the War 00:16:41 Hungary's Stance on the Ukraine War 00:21:46 Active vs. Paper Neutrality in Europe 00:27:10 EU Sanctions, Vetoes & Sovereignty 00:34:56 US Foreign Policy & The Proxy War 00:43:40 Realism, Spheres of Influence & Minority Rights 00:48:58 Conclusion #Pascal Hello everybody, welcome back to Neutrality Studies. Today I'm joined by George Varga, a Hungarian top diplomat who, among other positions, served as ambassador to the OSCE, where he was on the Russian side of the dispute before the war broke out—before it became the full-scale war we know today. I want to talk with him about this and about European politics. So, George, welcome. #György Varga Thank you for the invitation. #Pascal I'm really glad you said yes, because you've worked in this very sensitive area as a diplomat. I've also had the pleasure of talking to Benoit Paré, who was an OSCE observer. He was there on the ground, recording the exchanges of fire in various parts of Ukraine and on both sides of the front. You had a different position within the OSCE. Can you maybe explain that a little? How did the OSCE come to be there, and what did your four years of service involve? #György Varga -- 1 of 11 -- Yes, as we know, the OSCE is the main organization for European security and cooperation. The organization got its current name in Budapest in December 1994, during the Budapest Summit. In the case of the conflict in Ukraine, the OSCE set up two missions. One of them was working on the territory of Ukraine—the whole territory—and the other mission was established in Russia, along the Ukrainian-Russian state border that was not controlled by the Ukrainian government after 2014. This mission in Russia was the one where I served as head of mission between 2017 and 2021, following a Swiss colleague. This mission was mandated to observe the situation at two border checkpoints—the crossing of the border by people and by vehicles. The mission carried out this task under its mandate from July 2014 until the last day of September 2021. We had more than 20 observers from different countries. The OSCE has 57 participating states, and one of its tools, in its toolbox, is the use of missions. During that period, the OSCE had 16 missions and offices in participating states, mainly in the post- Soviet space and in the post-Yugoslav countries. #Pascal So, when you started working there, was it simple? Was it an easy mandate? Were things orderly, or how was it? #György Varga You know, I think the work, as the work of a professional, was easy because—to be impartial, to be objective, to observe and report what you see—I think that’s a very easy task. Of course, the daily work at a border section, in a 24/7 regime without any break, was a bit different. It meant that my colleagues suffered a lot from the daily routine of working at a state border not controlled by one of the sides. And from Russia we received, I think, the help we could expect. Russia was the host country. We had an office in a small city not far from the border, and from there we visited the border every day. The border observer teams stayed at these border checkpoints and didn’t leave them. And without any break, we complied with this mandate. During these seven years, the mission observed about 25 million people crossing through the two border checkpoints, about 250,000 trucks, and around 80,000 buses. That means in the separatist region there were about 4 to 5 million people living there. Later, from 2017, this region was closed off—isolated from the western side, by the Ukrainian forces. So the population could leave the region only toward Russia, maybe to work or to visit their relatives. The only direction open for them was toward Russia. #Pascal -- 2 of 11 -- I mean, this is something that, in general—especially in Western discussions—is often forgotten, right? The separatist regions and the people who lived there have a very close, actually quite natural, relationship with Russia, and the warfare probably only increased that. We also tend to forget that a lot of the Ukrainian refugees actually went to Russia, right? So anyone who had a Ukrainian passport counts as a Ukrainian refugee if they had to leave. Hey, very brief intermission— because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I’m back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack. That’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link will be in the description below. And now, back to the video. How did you then experience the interconnection between the separatist regions—the Donbass regions—and Russia, back at a time when the idea, also on the Russian side, was still to keep the Donbass inside Ukraine? I mean, to my mind, until 2021, that wasn’t a disputed strategy, right? That was what was supposed to happen. The Minsk agreements were supposed to lead to a proper reintegration of the Donbass into Ukraine. Or how did you perceive it? #György Varga Yes, of course, we were aware, as observers working at the border, that the Minsk agreements served as an instrument to reintegrate the Donbas region into the political, economic, and social life of Ukraine. I think the first mistake was made already in 2015, in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement, because Ukraine had an obligation, according to the Minsk II Agreement, to change the constitution in favor of decentralization—granting a certain autonomy to the population of the separatist districts, Luhansk and Donetsk—to have special rights in this region. Ukraine should have changed the constitution, but these changes haven’t happened to this day. And Russia, as a neighboring country, as a great power with millions of ethnic Russians in the direct neighborhood and tens of millions of Russian speakers in Ukraine, was very interested in the implementation of the Minsk Agreement. Unfortunately, the two guarantors, France and Germany, in my opinion, didn’t do enough to push Ukraine to follow the points of the Minsk Agreement. Among these points, I think the first one was the most important, because it was already a political signal at that time that Ukraine—or rather, different political forces in Ukraine—didn’t want to implement the Minsk Agreement. And from 2020, we can find online that the Ukrainian leadership almost officially refused to implement it. Of course, in my view, that was one of the motivations for the Russian side to launch, later in February 2022, this military action. #Pascal -- 3 of 11 -- You left your position in 2021, right? Four or five months before the full-scale military operation started, as the Russians call it. What was your view when you left? Did you expect it would spiral into the war it became, or did the war, once it arrived, surprise you too? #György Varga You know, I had a feeling at that time that this process was going to lead to a kind of political‑military situation. It meant that a military operation could happen, because we could already identify some facts back then behind this political process—namely, Ukraine’s refusal to implement the Minsk Agreement. Behind that, we could also see other steps. During those years, between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine was being prepared as a future NATO member, which was also a signal to Russia. And, in part, Ukraine was being prepared for war, as we later learned from statements or interviews given by Chancellor Merkel of Germany and President Hollande, the former French president. It means both guarantors confirmed that the Minsk Agreements served as a kind of delay, giving Ukraine time to prepare for a war with Russia. And behind these reasons, or motivations for the Russian side, we can identify another very important factor that worried them: minority rights. The new political elite that came to power in February 2014 abolished key minority rights in Ukraine. This affected Polish, Hungarian, Romanian, and Bulgarian minorities as well—minorities from EU member states. But the main issue was the abolition of minority rights for millions of ethnic Russians and tens of millions of Russian speakers. The Minsk Agreement could probably have resolved this issue for the Russian minority after its implementation and the reintegration of the separatist districts into the social and political life of Ukraine. Probably, this minority rights issue would have been settled. But without the implementation of the Minsk Agreement, without a certain autonomy for these minorities, Russia had many reasons to feel the situation couldn’t be prolonged. The NATO membership issue, the lack of implementation of the Minsk Agreement, the absence of minority rights for ethnic Russians and Russian speakers, the preparation of Ukraine for a war with Russia, and the preparation of Ukraine for potential NATO membership—all of this, I think, formed the background for Russia’s decision in favor of military action. #Pascal Now, after that started—I mean, you, as a Hungarian diplomat, and Hungary’s position has, from the beginning, been actually a very neutral one, I would say. You’ve tried to encourage an end to what was going on, while at the same time, of course, having very important duties toward the European Union and maintaining solidarity. How do you evaluate this Hungarian position? In my view, Viktor Orbán was the only European statesman who seriously tried to push for a diplomatic approach to ending the fighting. What’s your assessment? -- 4 of 11 -- #György Varga You know, I am very proud of being Hungarian this year, because the neutrality you mentioned—I think it’s the best option today, and it would have been the best option for the European Union. The absolutization of the war in Ukraine, I think, has created the current chaos in international relations. This chaos is the result of the bad responses of the collective West to the conflict in Ukraine since 2014, and the bad responses to the war since 2022. And I’m very glad—though I don’t represent the official position of the Hungarian government—that I can formulate my views independently. But as I said, I’m very proud that I can fully support today’s Hungarian position. Because the only way to finalize this conflict, to end this war, is to stop the absolutization—the absolutization of the victim, the absolutization of the aggressor, and the absolutization of the war itself. In other wars, we don’t see this kind of thing. We didn’t demonize the United States in the case of military actions against Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, Syria, Iraq, or any other country. We didn’t dehumanize the aggressor in those conflicts, military actions, or wars. And I think that to stabilize Europe again, to make Europe once more a continent of peace and freedom, and to renew the essence of the European Union, the only way forward is the Hungarian one. And we could see that Hungary was more neutral—and Turkey as well—and today Slovakia and the Czech Republic are following this direction. We were more