New Zealand vs. China? The Pacific Showdown Nobody Saw Coming | Eugene Doyle

## The Cook Islands in the crossfire: why a remote atoll matters A spat over a tiny Pacific polity has exposed a tectonic shift in how middle powers imagine their security and influence. What began as a news column posing the rhetorical question “Should New Zealand invade the Cook Islands?” has become a revealing stress test for New Zealand’s self-image, its regional role, and the wider great-power competition that is now playing out in the Pacific. The Cook Islands are small in population but vast in maritime reach, and that asymmetry—tiny communities, huge exclusive economic zones, and prospective seabed riches—helps explain why decisions made in Avarua now ripple through capitals from Wellington to Washington, Canberra, and Beijing. The conversation captured in the exchange with Eugene Doyle makes clear that the debate is not merely about an isolated news-provocation. It is a capsule of larger tensions: sovereignty and constitutional ambiguity, the scramble for maritime resources, the moral contradictions of foreign-policy rhetoric, and a domestic media-politics relationship that can quickly institutionalize alarmist frames into practical options. ## Constitutional limbo and the leverage of geography The Cook Islands occupy an unusual constitutional and diplomatic niche. Formally self-governing, they are not a UN member and remain tethered to New Zealand on certain security matters. Yet in practice they conduct their own foreign affairs and, as recent recognition by Washington shows, external actors can treat that autonomy as statehood when it suits strategic or economic incentives. Doyle flagged how the U.S. political calculus—prompted in part by revelations about polymetallic nodules in the Cook Islands’ seabed—appears to have accelerated diplomatic recognition. Whether recognition is motivated by principle, by minerals, or by geopolitical counter-pressure, the effect is to complicate New Zealand’s traditional custodial claims and raise questions about who legitimately negotiates resource access. Two facts are decisive here. First, the Cook Islands controls roughly two million square kilometers of exclusive economic zone (EEZ), an acreage of ocean comparable to entire countries’ territories. Second, deep-sea mineral deposits—cobalt, nickel, manganese, and copper concentrated in polymetallic nodules—are now commercially and strategically attractive. The intersection of immense maritime claims with high-value seabed assets creates an incentive structure in which major and middle powers alike will invest diplomatic, economic, and even security capital to secure preferential access. Geography has turned this small polity into a potential bargaining chip and flashpoint. ## Resources, recognition, and the mechanics of competition The Cook Islands’ move to sign a strategic partnership with China (details still under wraps) crystallized anxieties in New Zealand and among its Anglophone partners. For Beijing, the partnership is an example of measured, patient engagement—economic ties that can gradually cement influence. For critics in Wellington and Canberra, it is a potential breach in a regional perimeter they hoped to maintain. Doyle’s commentary highlights how Beijing’s approach has been deliberate and non-escalatory, while Western responses have oscillated between alarm and coercive suggestion. Deep-sea mining is a central prism through which this competition should be read. Whoever secures the legal, contractual, and technical means to exploit polymetallic nodules stands to gain both material wealth and leverage over supply chains essential to electric-vehicle batteries and other green-tech industries. That makes the Cook Islands’ choices attractive to Washington as well as Beijing. The result is a form of diplomatic leapfrogging: recognition, investment, and partnerships are deployed not primarily to project deep cultural affinity but to secure economic footholds and future bargaining chips in a rapidly transforming global resource landscape. ## Media frames and the militarization of debate The shock value of an editorial asking whether New Zealand should invade a neighbor is instructive in itself. It exposes how media frames can escalate a diplomatic incident into a security narrative. Matthew Hooton’s column—cited in the conversation—animated a public appetite for muscular, punitive measures, while other outlets followed in alarmed chorus. Doyle describes this as part of an ideological current that blends media sensationalism with an official foreign-policy line increasingly aligned with Washington. This militarized reflex—imagining special forces operations against a tiny, self-governing neighbor—reveals two unhealthy dynamics. First, it normalizes belligerence as a legitimate public-policy option for extra-constitutional intervention. Second, it reveals an impatience with subject polities’ right to exercise diplomatic independence. The paradox is stark: New Zealand foregrounds rules, norms, and respect for small states when it suits its rhetorical posture, yet the same polity can tolerate—and sometimes indulge—threats that would, if acted upon, violate those principles. The media’s role here is not neutral; by amplifying extreme takes, it tests whether coercive options can be normalized in public opinion and thus made politically available. ## New Zealand’s foreign-policy drift and the democratic contradiction Doyle’s critique is pointed: New Zealand has drifted toward becoming, in effect, a regional adjunct of U.S. strategic posture. He notes a growing congruence among political leadership, foreign ministry machinery, and mainstream media that leans steadily anti-China. The deeper worry is not merely ideological alignment but the erosion of an independent foreign policy that once prided itself on principled stances—nuclear-free declarations, anti-apartheid solidarity, and a measured, middle-power diplomacy. This alignment creates contradictions. New Zealand projects itself as a champion of small states and rule-based order, yet increasingly channels policies and practices reminiscent of the very great-power politics it once resisted. Domestic politics matters here: shifts in Wellington’s government and public sentiment—where debates over indigenous rights and the Treaty of Waitangi show the country is ideologically split—feed into an external posture that is simultaneously assertive and insecure. When foreign policy becomes a mirror of domestic polarization, it can become unmoored from coherent regional strategy and vulnerable to rhetorical pressures and opportunistic narratives. ## A Pacific-centered alternative: respect, climate, and decolonization If anything constructive emerges from this crisis, it is a reminder of an alternative policy script: a genuinely Pacific-centered approach. Doyle and interlocutors in the exchange emphasize that Pacific states—small, vulnerable, and disproportionately exposed to climate impacts—prioritize environmental security and decolonization more than proxy contests between great powers. For many island leaders, rising seas, fisheries management, and economic resilience are existential concerns that dwarf the strategic narratives being advanced in distant capitals. A Pacific-first policy would mean New Zealand stepping away from the reflex to mirror U.S. strategic anxieties, and instead investing in partnership models that elevate local agency, pay attention to climate adaptation, and honor constitutional and diplomatic autonomy. That requires reframing security beyond kinetic options: supporting maritime surveillance for fisheries protection, capacity-building for environmental management, equitable commercial partnerships for resource extraction, and a renewed commitment to the principles behind a nuclear-free Pacific. It would also demand humility: accepting that Pacific states will make sovereign choices that do not always align with Wellington’s preferences. ## What the Cook Islands

New Zealand vs. China? The Pacific Showdown Nobody Saw Coming | Eugene Doyle Should New Zealand invade the Cook Islands? Believe it or not but that is now part of the public debate in New Zealand. The country’s largest newspaper just published an article with that title suggesting military intervention to halt the cooperation of the self-governed islands with China. What is going on in this supposedly peaceful nation next to Australia and why are cook islanders now not save anymore from a country that de jure is supposed to protect them? To discuss this I’m joined by Eugene Doyle, a friend of this show and a writer, based in Wellington, New Zealand. Eugene's Blog: https://www.solidarity.co.nz Check out also Pearls and Irritations: https://johnmenadue.com #M3 The New Zealand government has this policy where we want to increase our trade with China, and we depend tremendously on China for trade, at the same time as joining an anti-Chinese military alliance, AUKUS. So if I were the Chinese, I'd rightly be very irritated at this. The Chinese have just operated in a very measured, steady manner, quietly pushing back against this. And I admire them for it. #M2 Should New Zealand invade the Cook Islands? Believe it or not, that is now part of the public debate in New Zealand. The country's largest newspaper just published an article with that title, suggesting military intervention to halt the cooperation of the self-governed islands with China. What is going on in this supposedly peaceful nation next to Australia, and why are Cook Islanders now not safe anymore from a country that de jure is supposed to protect them? To discuss this, I'm joined today by Eugene Doyle, a friend of this show and writer based in Wellington, New Zealand. Eugene, welcome back. #M3 Hi, Pascal. Great to be back. I'm a keen follower of the show. #M2 Well, thank you for that. And you wrote this article, actually, and brought to my attention that New Zealand now has a public discourse about what to do with the Cook Islands, including using military -- 1 of 12 -- force against them. I think it's important to note that the Cook Islands are in a kind of limbo state. They are self-governed, but they're not part of the UN. They're not independent. They're not de jure an independent nation, but they do have self-government, including a foreign policy and the freedom to decide what they want to do with international relations while being tied to New Zealand for security purposes. What's going on? #M3 Yeah, actually, the way you expressed it was quite accurate, but it shows you how messy this whole thing is because the Cook Islands were recognized in 2023 by Joe Biden as sovereign and independent, right? So there's quite a bit of discussion about the constitutional status of the Cook Islands. Joe might have been influenced slightly by the fact that, and this is rather important, the Cook Islands has billions of tonnes of what are called polymetallic nodules. So they're like potatoes, but they're made up of cobalt, copper, nickel, and manganese—billions of tons of them. And strangely enough, shortly after Marco Rubio realized that the Cook Islands could actually be a source of a tremendous amount of minerals for whoever can lay their hands on them, America ended up recognizing the Cook Islands as sovereign and independent. The Chinese are interested. The New Zealand government has had a long and close association with the Cooks since even before 1901, when the British government was kind enough to transfer the Cook Islands to us. So the first question you almost need to ask is, good grief, where are the Cook Islands? Most people don't even know where New Zealand is. So where are the Cook Islands? Well, you've got Australia here, you've got New Zealand down here at the bottom of the South Pacific, and 3,000 kilometers up to the northeast is this little group of islands called the Cook Islands. And they are little, but with one really interesting factor: they have 2 million square kilometers of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Now, New Zealand's got, I think, the fifth largest in the whole wide world. We've got 4 million; they've got 2 million. So the Cook Islands are tiny in terms of population, but you can actually see why major powers are taking an interest in the Cook Islands. #M2 Yeah, this is quite interesting because the exclusive economic zone is a concept that is defined in UNCLOS, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. And the whole point there is, well, any kind of territory that protrudes out of the water then generates an EEZ. And even some territories under the water, depending on how shallow it is, produce an EEZ. And that's the kind of wealth or that's the ocean floor that is not just the ocean floor, also the ocean, also fishing is part of that, right? That is under the purview of that state. So you think that actually the United States too has intentions of exploiting the fact that whoever is closest with the government in the Cook Islands can probably get contracts in order to use those natural resources or to exploit those natural resources. Is that what's going on, a competition? -- 2 of 12 -- #M3 I think it's just one of a number of factors. But, yeah, we shouldn't downplay the significance of this. Deep-sea mining is definitely part of what's involved here. And who gets to exploit that resource, control that resource, will be of great interest. As I said, it was really interesting that Marco Rubio, currently a U.S. Senator, was terribly interested in the Cook Islands. Joe Biden was interested enough to actually declare it sovereign. And so I'll just jump into that rather sort of provocative headline that the New Zealand Herald actually launched into a couple of days ago. And they said, ask the question, should New Zealand invade the Cook Islands? Because the Cooks had failed to consult us over a deal that has been signed right now. The Prime Minister, Mark Brown, of the Cook Islands is in Beijing at the moment and is going to sign a strategic partnership with the Chinese government. Now, he assures us, but we haven't seen the details of the deal, that it does not impinge on security and defense arrangements and that New Zealand doesn't have anything to worry about. I kind of have a level of sympathy for the New Zealand government position that, you know, we have got a very close relationship with the Cooks. We do put a lot of money into the country, so I don't want to take a sort of good guy, bad guy position on this. I think these things are quite nuanced. But New Zealand should step lightly and use our diplomatic skills, not our bullying skills. The New Zealand Herald story was written by Matthew Hooton, who gets all sorts of coverage and has spent years on our national radio and all sorts of commentating. So I'll just quote one little bit from his article: Cook Islands Prime Minister Mark Brown's dealings with China are clearly about secession from the realm of New Zealand, Putin said, you know, without substantiation. And as I pointed out with considerable colonial hauteur, very 1940s, very, very British almost, quote, his illegal moves cannot stand. It would be a relatively straightforward military operation for our SAS, you know, our special services, to secure all key government buildings in the Cook Islands' capital of Avarua. Now, that was possibly the most outrageous thing a journalist said this week in New Zealand, but the whole media are sort of frothing over this and talking about the Cooks being a renegade government and, you know, that people are furious and, you know, TVNZ editorialized that, you know, New Zealand is rightly furious about this, etc. #M2 Just a second, just to ask. So, in New Zealand, the discourse right now is not outraged with this article. The discourse, or the general public or the media, is actually outraged with the audacity of the Cook Islands to have a security agreement with China. That's what the outrage is about. #M3 Not a security agreement, but yes, a strategic partnership. -- 3 of 12 -- #M2 Sorry, strategic partnership. Yeah, which is definitely not the same. And we don't know what's in that deal at the moment, but it's probably going to be economically centered. #M3 Yeah, I think it'll largely be centered around economic development issues. And one should say, partly this is all about argy-bargy between the great powers and the medium-sized powers. So New Zealand is very firmly in the American camp. And unfortunately, we've had this astonishing drift in recent years; our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and now our current government, you know, really are behaving as little more than branch offices of the Pentagon. And there are quite a few political people in this country who aren't happy with that, who think New Zealand should be friendly with the United States, certainly a long-term relationship, but should strike a more independent foreign policy. #M2 But where's this coming from? Because I do remember that three years ago, precisely three years ago to the month, we had all of these newspaper articles for months after February, right? They were saying that every nation has the right to choose its own security partners and its own partners in general. Again, the Cook Islands are now making a strategic partnership agreement, not a "we are hereby joining the territory of China" agreement, right? And after the Ukraine invasion, we had all of these articles in the liberal media, in these mainstream media journals, telling us that every single nation has the right to decide who it wants to deal with when it comes to Ukraine, when it comes to dealing with the West. We had all of these articles also about Georgia, how Georgia has the right to choose a European path, although no other path. And we are learning again that the mainstream media is actually really fantastic at conjuring up principles that only apply in certain circumstances, but not in others. So is this actually because the phrasing is fantastic? You quoted it, you know, the Cook Islands are clearly about to secede from the realm of New Zealand. I mean, it doesn't get more imperial, the idea of, OK, these are ours. And even though they have self-government, that self-government ends where we tell it ends. #M3 Yes, I think New Zealand has to tread lightly here because it's no good preaching the rights of small nations, and New Zealand most certainly is a small nation that's vulnerable to the machinations of either the United States or China. So we promote the idea of respecting small nations, and we most certainly shouldn't be going around throwing our weight around in respect to our neighbors, you -- 4 of 12 -- know, smaller ones like the Cook Islands. And I'll give you a delicious example. There was a military coup d'état in Fiji some years ago, and the prime minister, our prime minister at the time, David Lange, decided that he would send the SAS and storm our way into Fiji and overthrow this coup. Um, and apparently, I've spoken to a number of people who actually worked in that government. Lange was overruled by the army. The army said, we're not going to do it. You know, like the Fijians, who have, a bit like the New Zealand Maoris, an incredible warrior tradition, a great tradition in those areas, and also have a cracking modern military army, would have given us all sorts of grief if we tried to wade in there and impose our will on them. And I think the trouble with a smaller place like the Cooks is they really are small. You know, they really could be pushed around. #M2 It's roughly 10,000 people, right, the population? Yeah, about 15,000 people live there and about... #M3 I think it's about five times as many live here in New Zealand. Yeah, yeah. So I think our role, we've actually got an opportunity to be real leaders and partners in the Pacific, but that really would suggest that we should stop this business of trying to be mini-me's to the United States and tha