Update: US Middle-East Bases DESTROYED. Israel Defenseless | Larry C Johnson

The unfolding campaign in the Middle East has revealed an unexpected and brutal inversion of strategic assumptions: a state long portrayed as vulnerable and isolated has, over weeks of kinetic exchange, asserted a capacity to inflict systemic operational paralysis on the very forces that launched the initial assault. The conversation collected here, led by analyst Larry C. Johnson, sketches a picture in which precision strikes and asymmetric tactics have not only blunted the attackers’ edge but have exposed deep weaknesses in Western and Israeli force posture — physically, technically, and politically. What was advertised as a decisive decapitation operation now looks less like a clean victory and more like the opening of a protracted, costly campaign in which control of critical chokepoints, sensor networks, and escalation thresholds matters far more than headline body counts. ## Iran’s operational resilience and the reversal of initiative A recurring theme in the discussion is Iran’s ability to absorb significant blows to infrastructure while retaining and even escalating operational capacity. Despite losses to airbases and selected facilities, the country’s command structures and weapon employment systems appear to have continued functioning; salvoes of missiles and drones have been both timely and destructive. That resilience is not merely about surviving damage. It is about shaping the battlespace — shutting down or degrading adversary capabilities so that U.S. and Israeli forces can no longer rely on the prewar assumptions of freedom of movement or assured logistics. Johnson emphasizes that Iran’s attacks targeted not just personnel or fixed installations but the architecture that enables power projection: long-range strike assets, air refueling tankers, and multi-billion-dollar radar nodes. Destroying persistent surveillance and command-and-control platforms does more than create tactical gaps; it forces a reallocation of scarce assets, slows response times, and magnifies risk for aircraft and ships that can no longer operate under the umbrella of robust, land-based sensor coverage. The practical upshot is operational paralysis: bases that once supported forward sorties become liabilities, and remaining platforms — such as AWACS aircraft or refueling tankers — are stretched thin and increasingly vulnerable. ## The chokehold: Strait of Hormuz, maritime denial, and food security One of the clearest strategic effects being felt is Iran’s leverage over maritime traffic, especially in the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent waterways. The conversation documents a deliberate effort to disrupt not just oil shipments but a wider set of commodities—including liquefied natural gas and agricultural inputs like urea fertilizers—that underpin global food production. The strategic math here is simple but stark: constrict a few key exports and the ripples propagate through supply chains, driving energy and commodity prices up and straining critical national economies. Iran’s use of stand-off missiles, drones, small, tunnel-protected boats, and possibly mines turns geography into a weapon. By threatening or interdicting traffic, its forces have compelled commercial and military ships to keep a far wider berth, and have signaled that routine escorts and strikes will not alone guarantee safe passage. That raises the likelihood of prolonged global economic pain—rising inflation, reduced fertilizer availability that depresses yields, and a cascade of secondary crises for countries highly dependent on Gulf flows. In short, the Iranians have converted what are conventionally battlefield effects into broad geopolitical leverage. ## Radar losses, early warning gaps, and the myth of impenetrable air defenses The conversation unpacks the reality that cutting-edge missile defenses and surveillance platforms are neither invulnerable nor infinitely scalable. The strike on high-value radar systems — multi-hundred-million- and billion-dollar installations — immediately degraded early warning times and forced reliance on airborne alternatives, which are expensive, scarce, and themselves high-value targets. Where previously overlapping networks gave commanders minutes or longer to react to inbound threats, that window is now measured in as little as sixty to ninety seconds in some areas, a reduction that has cascading operational consequences. Johnson also challenges several public assumptions about layered defense systems. The aggregate inventory of interceptors, launchers, and missile interceptors is finite, and attrition matters. When defenses require multiple interceptors per incoming threat and adversaries can mass a far larger quantity of missiles and drones than defense stocks can handle, the calculus shifts: saturation become the strategic method. The result is a sobering practical lesson — that widely touted missile defenses provide protection only up to the limit of their supplies and that adversaries who can generate volume or exploit gaps can render those systems ineffective. ## Tactical incidents with strategic weight: tanker escorts, refueling losses, and battlefield narrative The loss of a KC-135 tanker in Iraq — discussed as likely shot down rather than accidental — crystallizes how tactical incidents can reshape strategy. Tankers are force multipliers; they extend the range and loiter time of combat aircraft. Their loss is not simply a personnel tragedy (though it is that), but a logistical inflection point: fewer tankers mean shorter mission radii, reduced sortie rates, and diminished deterrence. Similarly, reports of multiple KC-135s destroyed on the ground at a base further degrade expeditionary aviation capacity. Once forward basing is compromised, options narrow: aircraft must operate from more distant airfields, with attendant political and operational complications. These losses also have a narrative effect that cannot be ignored. Public claims of victory, magnified by political theater, are undermined when widely visible and costly assets are lost in the weeks after those claims. That mismatch between public messaging and battlefield reality drives domestic political pressure, complicates coalition cohesion, and feeds adversary propaganda — which in turn may stiffen resistance and prolong conflict. ## Nuclear signaling, escalation dynamics, and the logic of deterrence The discussion turns next to a fraught yet unavoidable subject: nuclear signaling and its role in shaping adversary calculus. Johnson raises the prospect that Iran might accelerate a drive toward a deliverable nuclear capability as a means of deterring existential strikes against its leadership or critical infrastructure. In a region where nuclear ambiguity, asymmetry, and existential fears already interact in combustible ways, anything that narrows the threshold between conventional and nuclear options raises the stakes dramatically. Two points deserve emphasis. First, nuclearization is not just a technological problem; it is a political and psychological one. For an adversary under existential stress, claiming or demonstrating a retaliatory capability can be a powerful bargaining chip. Second, moral constraints cited in historic Iranian behavior—such as restraint regarding chemical weapons in the 1980s—do not guarantee future restraint under unprecedented pressure. The calculus of retaliation, perceived humiliation, and leadership survival can erode previously observed limits. That does not mean nuclear use is inevitable; rather, it means the probability of highly consequential escalation has risen materially. ## Geopolitics in motion: Russia, China, and the fracturing of international consensus Beyond the battlefield, the exchange underscores a shifting geopolitical landscape in which Russia and China are maneuvering to exploit the crisis. While Security Council actions and diplomatic statements may carry procedural rationales, the substantive alignments are shifting toward a b

Update: US Middle-East Bases DESTROYED. Israel Defenseless | Larry C Johnson Operation Epic Failure is unraveling in front of our eyes. While the US managed to kill over 1000 Iranians in the first 10 days of it‘s mass-slaughter, it is failing massively at constraining the country‘s second strike capabilities. Every attack by the US/Israeli alliance is met with an immediate response. The US radar system in the region has been whipped out and no US navy vessel dares to come within striking range of the IRGC. And Tehran is not signaling any willingness to stop before its demands for reparations and a complete US withdrawal from the region are met. Trump‘s team is visibly panicking. Support us on substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz, and today I’m joined again by Larry C. Johnson for an update on everything about the Iran war. Larry, welcome back. Hey, Pascal. Good to join you. Thank you for taking the time. I really wanted to talk to you about your assessment, especially about the kind of operational or kinetic effects of the war that we’re seeing. Just before this, I talked to Stephen Starr, and he gave an update on all the destroyed radar systems and the capacity that Iran still has. I really wonder about your assessment of where the war is going now, after two weeks. #Larry C Johnson Well, if you're on the Iranian side, they're pretty pleased with how it's going. They've really taken some blows to their infrastructure, but they've also accomplished significant military objectives that have hurt U.S. operational capabilities. Number one, as Stephen mentioned, the destruction of those radars — you know, those are billion‑dollar systems. One was around $500 million, and a couple of others were over a billion each. They were critical for identifying threats, both maritime and aviation, coordinating air movements, and deconflicting airspace. And then we’ve learned tonight that CENTCOM announced, about two hours ago, a KC‑135 was shot down. Now, I guess they may come out and try to say it was accidental, but it wasn’t. #Pascal What is a KC? Is that a transport plane or a refueling plane? #Larry C Johnson -- 1 of 15 -- It's a refueling plane. A KC‑135 can refuel up to five F‑35A jets. From the bases where they're taking off, the F‑35s have to be refueled even to get back to base, because they don’t go too deep into Iran. Anyway, there were reportedly two of these KC‑135s returning. What I’ve learned is that the second plane saw a surface‑to‑air missile fired up. The second plane took evasive action, hit the first plane, and it’s unclear whether there were five or six people on board, but they’re all dead. I mean, you hit a fuel tank, that thing explodes. They don’t have time to put on parachutes and jump out. #Pascal But would that have been shot down over Iran, or would Iran have managed to hit it over someone else’s airspace? #Larry C Johnson It was shot down over Iraq, of all places. Iraq, okay. But again, some of the Iraqi groups that are aligned with Iran — you know, there’s a Hezbollah element — they probably took the shot. So right there, you know, the administration’s only reported eight KIA. That’s another five or six, potentially doubling that. And I firmly believe the Trump administration is lying about the number of actual casualties. They’re hiding it. But that’s not all. There have been a large number of KC‑135s destroyed on the ground at one of the bases in the region. I’m not going to say which base, but basically what Iran is doing is preventing the United States from using these different bases. There are 13 locations — you know, from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, even Oman — that have been hit. So the U.S. ability to keep operating in those areas is being reduced dramatically. They’re being forced to flee. And once they’re forced to leave, where are they going to go? Even if they go to Israel, they’re being targeted there. So it’s almost like they’ll be forced to move somewhere like Cyprus — the Turkish part of Cyprus — or maybe to Turkey. But again, once they show up in Turkey, that becomes a threat. So from Iran’s standpoint, they’re doing great with their missile and drone strikes. The United States hasn’t been able to stop them. I know in one particular case the U.S. defenses have been depleted — there’s no more air defense at that location. By contrast, in Iran, they’ve got the strategic initiative. They’ve taken control of the Strait of Hormuz and shut down all traffic. It’s not just oil; it’s liquefied natural gas and urea fertilizer. In fact, 30% or more of the world’s fertilizer comes out of the Persian Gulf. I didn’t realize that until I started looking into it the other day. So by shutting down the flow of oil, liquefied natural gas, and fertilizer, Iran is, at a minimum, causing a global recession — and there are likely to be food shortages because farmers won’t get the fertilizer they need to plant crops and have them grow properly. #Pascal -- 2 of 15 -- Right. Unless this stops soon — which it doesn’t look like at the moment — and, you know, the way in which Iran not only survived the initial blows… of course, Ayatollah Khomeini is dead, but, you know, the Ayatollah is dead, long live the Ayatollah, right? I mean, we’ve got the next one. The Iranians proved that their governmental structures survive all of this. Of course, the United States — Donald Trump, sorry — announced, basically, victory, saying we struck them. He did these stupid speeches like, “On a scale from one to ten, I’ll give our operation twelve to fifteen,” which is ridiculous, childish talk. But it looked, in the first couple of days, as if the United States and Israel were achieving a lot of their initial goals, including the killing of the top leadership. But it turns out Iran seems to have been prepared for this. #Larry C Johnson Yes. No, they're very much prepared for it. And that's the thing the West has been unable to get its arms around. It's a combination of arrogance and hubris. Shutting the Persian Gulf right now has— well, it's a crude term, but it captures the power—the Iranians have the United States by the balls. What's the United States going to do? Drop bombs along the shoreline there? That's not going to open the Strait of Hormuz. Not at all. Because the Iranians have drones, they have missiles. They don't have to be right on the shore; they can stand off. In addition, there are a lot of caves all along that coastline that can hide and protect Iranian units. And it's been reported by CBS that they’ve mined the Strait. I don't believe that, for the simple reason that Iran continues to have its ships load up at Kharg Island, sail out, and some Chinese ships are sailing out with oil. They may even allow Pakistani ships. So it's not a complete freeze. But it is serious enough that it’s really disrupted the oil market. Oil today was back up close to 100 dollars on Brent futures. Trump had driven it down the other day by claiming that, oh, we're near the end, this is almost over. He was lying. It's not almost over. What Iran is going to—well, Iran will, I believe, continue to keep this closed. And the economic impact is huge. I wrote a piece talking about the chokehold—it’s a choke point—and went through the countries most likely to be the most severely affected: Japan is one, Taiwan is another, India is another. But generally, it's going to have a negative effect on the global economy. It's going to spike inflation because the price has doubled. And we're seeing it, you know, like here in Florida where I live—the price of oil, the price of a gallon of gasoline—from a week ago Monday until last Sunday, it went up 50 cents. Then from Sunday to Wednesday, it went up 15 more cents, so that's 65. And then between yesterday and today, Thursday, it went up 5 cents more. Now, we're a country that's, quote, energy independent. We get very, very little oil out of the Persian Gulf. If that's happening here, I can only begin to imagine what's happening around the world. I don't know—in your area, have you seen any change in gasoline prices? #Pascal -- 3 of 15 -- Not myself, but I'm not keeping a close watch on it because I don't have a car. But the Japanese government has already decided they're going to release some of their strategic reserves. And the number 254 is floating around a lot over here, because that's the reported number of days Japan has in its strategic reserve—apparently the largest per capita in the world. I don't know how true that number actually is, 254 days. It strikes me as very long, but Japan is extremely vulnerable to oil and gas interruptions because it has almost none of its own. Actually, the only potential field they can tap is in the Sakhalins, and that's a joint project with the Russians. So I really wonder if the Japanese might reach out to Moscow and say, “Hey, how about we restart this thing?” They didn’t freeze it to the extent the Europeans did—they put it on hold, but they never shut it down, never completely abandoned it. But, well, that’s a completely different discussion. The thing is, the hurt is real, and it’s going to get more real over time for all the advanced Western economies, including the United States. And what you’re saying is very interesting. So if the Iranians are actually able to guarantee passage to the ships they like and say, “Guys, you can go through”—you know, they already made the announcement that they would allow passage to ships from countries that expel, I think, U.S. and Israeli diplomats, right? I read this comment—I’m not entirely sure if it was really from an IRGC account or just a hoax—but one said the Iranians would guarantee safe passage to any tanker that manages to convince the Americans to create a patrol for them through the strait, because they’d love to sink them. But what we see is that U.S. shipping isn’t going close to the strait. They’re not. Can you maybe speak to that a bit? #Larry C Johnson Well, it looks to me like the Chief of Naval Operations got the trumpet and said, “No, we’re not doing that, because the ships would be sunk.” You’d use cruisers, maybe destroyers, but even then—it’s very risky. There’s nothing they can do to prevent the drones or anti-ship missiles. And the Iranians have these small boats called Boghammers that are kept in tunnels, so they’re protected. So although the U.S. has said, “Oh, we destroyed the Iranian Navy,” no, they haven’t. What Iran has is basically a kind of coast guard that can operate and swarm U.S. forces with literally hundreds of boats. It’s sort of like water—and then they’ve got the water drones. So it’s not just aerial; it’s in the water too. Iran is in a very, very strong position. They can resist U.S. efforts, militarily, to try to guarantee safe passage in that waterway. And they can compound that by working with the Houthis to fully shut down the Red Sea. #Pascal Right. Hey, very brief intermission—because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I’m back, this could happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack. That’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s going to be in the description -- 4 of 15 -- below. And now, back to the video. So, how devastating is the loss of the U.S. radar system in the region? I mean, Stephen Starr pointed out that this basically reduces the response time of the U.S. and Israel to incoming missiles to about 90 seconds. Is that realistic? #Larry C Johnson Ninety seconds to a minute. The compensation for this is to use AWACS—airborne platforms—to try to make up for the loss. Because without those radars, the U.S. and Israel are blind. It’s blinded them, and it’s not like it’s a $50,000 system where you just replace a component and you’re ready to go. No, these are $500 million—half a billion dollars—and up to a billi