The FASCIST Core Of The Euro-Atlantic Regimes | Dr. Niall McLaren

## The argument: pathology scaled up to geopolitics The central claim emerging from the conversation with Dr. Niall McLaren is stark: to understand the persistent push toward militarism and domination in the Euro‑Atlantic sphere, we must look beneath ideology and institutions to human psychology—specifically, to pathological forms of self-regard that, when left unchecked, institutionalize themselves as a political technology of power. In this view, war, expansionism, and the aggressive posture of states are not merely the products of strategic calculation or economic interest; they are the amplified consequences of individuals and groups whose narcissistic drives for status and dominance become embedded in political systems. The conversation reframes familiar debates about international anarchy and hegemony by treating politics as “individual psychology writ large.” That shift matters because it reframes prevention: if the problem is partly psychological and structural, remedies must be both institutional and cultural. ## The biological substrate of dominance A striking element of the discussion is the turn to biology to explain political temperament. Dr. McLaren emphasizes the “challenge hypothesis” discovered in ethology: facing challenges triggers surges of testosterone (or analogous hormones) that sharpen threat perception, promote boldness, and deliver immediate hedonic reward. Across birds, mammals, and Homo sapiens, this hormonal economy supports dominance hierarchies by rewarding winners and magnifying the salience of threats. Transposed onto politics, the effect is intuitive—political actors experience power as an intoxicating state that is reinforced by success, applause, and visible rank. Those who taste it seek more. This biological framing does not deny culture or reason; rather, it situates political behavior within a psychobiological feedback loop. Individuals from disadvantaged or broken backgrounds may be particularly susceptible to the upward mobility offered by institutions that supply recognition and bodily markers of status—uniforms, ranks, titles. Militaries and political movements can exploit this dynamic by institutionalizing the biochemical reward of dominance. Understanding this substrate helps explain why certain political forms repeatedly emerge across different cultures: they exploit conserved motivational systems that reward dominance and punish defeat. ## Narcissism as a political energy Rather than treating narcissism as a pejorative for personal vanity, the conversation reconstructs it as a dimension of self‑regard that ranges from clinical deficit to pathological entitlement. Healthy self‑regard is necessary for agency; pathology occurs at both ends—severe low self‑esteem that breeds submission or vengeful aggression, and extreme self‑entitlement that justifies seizure of resources and power. The dangerous political variant is where high, brittle self‑regard combines with a hunger for control: the leader who believes not merely that she deserves to govern, but that others must be subordinated to her will. Dr. McLaren’s clinical lens—drawn from decades of psychiatric practice—shows how institutions such as the military or populist movements can act as factories of narcissism, converting insecure young people into aggressively self‑assured agents of state power. Recruitment, ritual, and hierarchical validation produce psychological transformations that are then channeled into political ends. Narcissism, in other words, furnishes both the motive and the affective fuel for expansionist politics: it generates entitlement, diminishes empathy for rivals, and makes aggressive policies feel subjectively rewarding. ## Rethinking fascism: method not milieu One of the most analytically useful moves in the conversation is a reconceptualization of fascism. Rather than treating fascism as a historically bound form—an interwar ideology or a set of nationalist aesthetics—McLaren offers a functional definition: fascism is a means, a technology, for gaining, consolidating, and maintaining power. From this vantage, ideological content matters less than the structural operations that concentrate authority and abolish checks. Mussolini’s knack for “beating the drums” is exemplary not because his program was coherent, but because his method of mass mobilization and power seizure was brutally effective. This reframing carries two consequences. First, it explains why ostensibly diverse regimes—left or right, monarchic or nominally democratic—can produce identical outcomes when they adopt the same power‑concentration techniques. Stalin’s bureaucratic terror sits on the same functional shelf as interwar fascist parties when the criterion is accumulation and monopolization of coercion. Second, it sharpens diagnosis: democracy is less an ideological bulwark than an anti‑fascist technology insofar as it disperses authority with durable checks and balances. Where institutions break down and power flows upward into a narrow pyramid, the mechanics of fascism can take hold regardless of rhetorical packaging. ## Emergence, anarchy, and the international system The conversation challenges an orthodox claim in international relations scholarship: that anarchy produces struggle. Instead, McLaren reverses the causal arrow: domestic struggles for status and dominance produce states whose external behavior is competitive and hegemonic. The anarchic structure of the international system, in this view, is an aggregate effect of many polities that institutionalize internal dominance contests. This is not a refutation of structural realism per se, but a demand to incorporate the microfoundations of state behavior—psychology, socialization, and institutional reinforcement—into any convincing macro theory. Emergence complicates simple reductionism. While individual psychology can explain mass politics in principle, emergent properties—institutions, norms, economic structures—transform and sustain tendencies at higher levels. McLaren acknowledges that emergent phenomena are real and mathematically nontrivial. Yet the crucial insight is that certain psychological dispositions become stabilized through institutions: rituals, promotion mechanics, electoral incentives, and media environments that reward bluff, domination, and threat amplification. Once stabilized, these dynamics acquire resilience and can appear independent of individual actors—even as they originated in human dispositions. ## Democracy as an anti‑fascist architecture If fascism is a method for consolidating power, then democratic design is an explicit countermeasure. The conversation makes a normative claim with empirical bite: a functioning democracy is anti‑fascistic insofar as it disperses power, institutionalizes accountability, and erects robust channels for contestation and grievance redress. The presence of checks, diffuse political authority, an empowered civil society, and transparent procedures dilutes the biochemical gratification of dominance and channels ambitions into regulated competition rather than seizure. This does not mean democracies are immune. The decorations that make a regime fascistic—charismatic spectacle, conspiratorial scapegoating, legalistic erosion of rights—can be applied to democratic trees as readily as to any other. The difference lies in institutional resilience. When electoral rules, independent judiciaries, and civil liberties are hollowed out, the path to pyramidization becomes dangerously short. The American example discussed in the conversation illustrates how administrative maneuvers that remove citizens from the franchise or weaponize institutions can re‑calibrate incentives in favor of accumulation and dominance. ## Implications for policy and research The synthesis offered in the discussion has immediate implications for both scholarship and policy. For researchers, it is a call to break disciplinary silos: international relations must

The FASCIST Core Of The Euro-Atlantic Regimes Can we explain the relentless drive toward warfare of the Euro-Atlantic collective by way of individual psychology? Is at the core of the warmongering actually a psychological malfunction? Yes, indeed, says my guest today. If we pare up psychiatric diagnosis with the functioning of societies, we find that in the absence of moderating domestic political mechanisms, states will tend toward fascism as those are the natural inclinations of power-seeking narcissist who will float to the top if not prevented from getting there alone. How this impacts international relations is our topic of today. Dr. McLaren wrote—among other works—the insightful book “Narcisso-Fascism: The psychopathology of right-wing extremism”, in which he explores in great detail the connection between pathological narcissism, fascism as a societal phenomenon and the role of dominance in state systems. Links: Niall McLaren Substack: http://NiallMcLaren.com Book Links: Theories in Psychiatry: https://www.amazon.co.jp/Theories-Psychiatry-Building-Post-Positivist/dp/1615998225 Natural Dualism and Mental Disorder: https://www.amazon.co.jp/-/en/Niall-McLaren/dp/1032025328 Anxiety: https://www.amazon.com/Anxiety-Inside-Story-Biological-Psychiatry/dp/1615994106 Narcisso-Fascism: https://www.amazon.co.jp/-/en/Niall-McLaren/dp/1615997547 Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 Fascism, to me, is not a form of government like socialism is a form of government or libertarian capitalism is a form of government. Those are forms of government based in economies, but they've got that basis. Fascism is simply a means of getting power and consolidating it. So the person doesn't actually have to have much of a program. Mussolini didn't really have much of a political program, but he knew how to beat the drums and get everybody involved. That's the point: fascism is the means by which somebody gains power, consolidates it, and holds it. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Literality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Niall McLaren, commonly known as Jock, an Australian psychiatrist, author, and critic. Dr. McLaren wrote, among other works, the very insightful book *Narciso: The Psychopathology of Right-wing Extremism*, in which he explores in great detail the connection between pathological narcissism, fascism as a societal phenomenon, and the role of dominance in state systems. This is what we want to discuss today. So, Dr. McLaren—Jock—welcome. #M3 -- 1 of 25 -- Thank you very much. Thank you. #M2 Great having you. You reached out to me and sent me your book, actually, and I'm very grateful for that because I've been looking for somebody who has studied psychology, knows psychology, and has also practiced it, and tries to connect it with society. And you're doing exactly that. Could you maybe first give us a little bit of background about yourself and how you came to do this? Because it doesn't often happen that psychologists go into the societal sphere. #M3 No. Well, I graduated in medicine in Western Australia, and my original plan was to specialize in neurosurgery. So I started the surgical training program, but they gave me a term in psychiatry, and I realized that was what I actually wanted. So I jumped from surgery to psychiatry, and within two days in psychiatry, I realized that all of this talk the professors were going on about—brain enzymes and chemistry and stuff like that—was all wrong. They didn't know what they were talking about. Not a bit. And that got me into—well, telling them got me into a lot of trouble. Perhaps if I'd kept quiet, it would have been different, but that's not part of me. So I went through psychiatry and very quickly realized that none of these people knew what they were talking about. They didn't have a theory of psychiatry. They didn't have a theory of mind. They didn't have a model of mental disorder—anything. So, four days after I graduated in psychiatry, I went across to the medical library, which was just behind my office, and sat down and thought, "I am going to write the definitive theory of psychotherapy. It should take me a year or two." Youthful idealism. Forty-four years later, I published this: "Natural Dualism and Mental Disorder." This is the biocognitive model of psychiatry—my integrative model of mind and body. Now, you have to understand that psychiatry doesn't like talking about minds. They only want to talk about brain enzymes, genes, brain scans, and all that sort of scientific stuff. #M2 The reductionist approach assumes that every emotional state is just the product of something "lighting up." #M3 It's a brain state. It's a brain state. And therefore, an abnormal mental state or emotional state is an abnormal brain state. And our job is to discover that and find a way of correcting it. That's psychiatry's role in the modern world. And there's no truth in any of this—none at all—which is not a popular point of view. So I've actually gone a bit further. I'm going to pull out all my books; I -- 2 of 25 -- published this last year. So, this is "Theories in Psychiatry." The first section looks at every available theory in psychiatry and concludes that it's no good—an absolute waste of time. The second section looks at a range of modern philosophers like Chomsky, Dennett, Davidson, Chalmers—all of these very big names—and points out that none of their theories can be developed to the point where they can give an account of mental disorder. #M2 This is very interesting because Dan Dennett and the others are philosophers of the mind, right? They try to explain the mind, and Dennett is famous for explaining the mind away. That's correct. #M3 That's absolutely correct. That's exactly what he did. And in the last instance of his work—as you know, he died last year—in the last instance of his work, he invoked what he called a "virtual machine" to complete the causal chain. And what's a virtual machine? Well, it's insubstantial, unlocalized, doesn't follow the laws of the physical universe, and it's causally effective in the physical universe. That's the design criteria for a mind. So he failed. Dennett's life's work failed. I did point this out in a paper, but he never saw it. He was too ill. Anyway, so that led me to write what I call a definitive theory—an integrative model of mind and brain. And in order to do that, you must show how the mind emerges from the brain, which I've done on a mathematical basis, starting with George Boole's algebra—his dual-valued calculus—and building it up from there. So there's all sorts of interesting stuff. It's very interesting. And as part of that, it led me to look at something called the challenge hypothesis in biology. This was first discovered in birds in the 1970s, and they found that it studies the testosterone economy. When a bird is challenged, it responds with a surge of testosterone, which gets it ready to meet the challenge. And if it beats the other bird off—these are males—it gets a further surge of testosterone, so he struts around feeling really good. If he's beaten, his testosterone level goes right down very, very quickly, in minutes, and he slinks off and hides. Now, this has been investigated in all mammals—not every possible mammal, but all major mammal groups—as well as reptiles, fish, and birds, and Homo sapiens. And it's true across the board: either testosterone or one of its very close analogs in biology, which implies that testosterone is a very old hormone. And the important thing about it is it's a feel-good hormone. It's great. You get a blast of testosterone, you feel good. And this is very quick—you know, we're talking minutes. It's a powerful anabolic hormone, but it also has this wonderful property that makes you feel good, and you strut around and you're ready to take on all comers. And the other thing is, it makes you see challenges; it makes you see threats. So this is an integral part of the threat -- 3 of 25 -- response. We've always talked about the adrenaline response, but a very large part of that is, in fact, the testosterone response, and it's been ignored. And so that's what led me to look at this in human affairs. And when you look at human affairs from the point of view of humans trying to become dominant, the dominant male feels good. If he's knocked off his perch, he starts to feel bad. And the further he goes down the hierarchy, the worse he feels. So the humans or the animals at the base of the hierarchy feel bad, and they want to get back up it. So they are going to try and knock this top dog off—the alpha male. They're either cowed into submission and just walk around like hunched slaves, or they're plotting and planning: "How are we going to get rid of this bloke?" They're going to attack him. And this is across the board. Now, this is very important because if you want to explain mass psychology—which is a polite word for politics—then you must drop down a level and explain it on the basis of individual psychology. And this becomes very important when you look at somebody like John Mearsheimer, the American political scientist. Now, Mearsheimer says that international relations are anarchic. Therefore, every nation must struggle and fight to establish dominance in its local area. He calls it local hegemony, but I don't. I call it dominance, because that's the word we use across biology. And I think it's important to make everybody realize we are talking about dominance—mass biology. #M2 This is fantastic, and this is very, very important. Before we go into the different concepts that you explain in your book, let me ask you this, though. If we do explain society, or society's function— society's workings—as a function of individual psychology, then we also engage in a reductionist approach, right? And we go to the smaller entity. Are there, in your view, emergent properties to a system that are not exhibited on a lower level, but that, out of the way the system interacts, start emerging on the higher level? Is that a factor or not? #M3 Yes, that is a factor. I cover that in detail—the concept of emergence—because it's critically important. And it's also very difficult. There is a mathematical theory of emergence, which I have to admit I don't actually grasp. #M2 Because for people like Mearsheimer, this is, of course, very important, because they explain international relations only as a function of the external world. And he says so. He also says this theory is sometimes wrong, but 70% right. That means he ignores not only individual psychology, -- 4 of 25 -- but also local politics. He says it doesn't matter. Yet he's also honest enough to admit that he wrote an entire book about the Israel lobby that basically uses a completely different approach. So, in your view, the emergent properties are crucial for the whole system, I suppose. #M3 Yes. And what we can call mass psychology or politics is, in fact, individual psychology writ large. And that's very important. Now, the problem with Mearsheimer's work is that he says international relations are anarchic, therefore nations must struggle to establish dominance—local dominance. I say he's wrong. He's completely wrong. He's got it back to front. The reason international relations are anarchic is because individual nations are all struggling for local dominance. And the reason they're all struggling for local dominance is because that's what Homo sapiens does. That's us. We all struggle for dominance. And it's just, you know, the politicians get themselves onto bigger stages. I mean, they love it. Politicians are fascinated by this. They love power. That's why they're in politics. And so then you get people who—well, look, Trump is a perfect example: totally devoid of any talent or any interest, but with this absolute fascination with power and dominating people. And he was glowing earlier this year when he said, you know, "There are 1