Ukraine Is Doomed. Russia Wins Multipolarity | Dr. Nicolai Petro

## Introduction The conversation captures a striking reversal: after years of stalemate, a credible pathway to ending the fighting in Ukraine appears to be taking shape — and it is unnerving Europe. What has shifted is not only the battlefield calculus but also the balance of political pressures inside Kyiv and among its backers. The exchange outlines how military momentum, corruption revelations, and an emergent U.S.–Russia diplomatic process have combined to produce a 28-point framework that could become the skeleton of a final settlement. Whether that framework becomes durable peace or merely another temporary cessation will depend as much on politics in European capitals and Kyiv as on the provisions themselves. ## Why Peace is on the Table Now Three interlocking dynamics have created the opening for negotiations. First, the military picture has changed: sustained Russian advances have placed Ukraine under pressure across broad stretches of the front. As noted in the discussion, Russian forces have been replenishing personnel and materiel at a pace Ukraine cannot match; battlefield momentum, therefore, has shifted in Moscow’s favor. Second, internal political vulnerability in Kyiv has intensified. Leaked recordings alleged to show kickbacks and corruption among senior Ukrainian officials — potentially implicating figures close to the president — have eroded domestic legitimacy and constrained the leadership’s room for maneuver. Third, external actors recalibrating their interests have mattered: the United States, in particular, appears willing to entertain a proposal that hews closer to Russian security demands than Europe has been prepared to acknowledge. Taken together, these forces create incentives for a deal. Military setbacks make continued resistance costlier; political scandal saps popular support for prolonged conflict; and a major power willing to broker and underwrite guarantees provides a viable alternative to open-ended war. The conversation stresses that the convergence of these pressures, rather than a single dramatic event, explains why a negotiated settlement is back on the table. ## Inside the 28-Point Peace Plan At the heart of the exchange is a granular reading of the so-called 28-point plan — a working document that, while still fluid, sets out three central baskets: security, reconstruction, and human-rights guarantees. Its core innovation is an attempt to reconcile Russian demands for a formal security architecture with Ukrainian needs for sovereignty and external assurances. On security, the plan would enshrine a non-expansion commitment: Ukraine would not join NATO, while receiving externally backed security guarantees. Those guarantees would be conditional and could be revoked if either party violated the settlement — including by launching an invasion or, in a striking clause, even in the event of an “unintentional” Ukrainian missile strike on major Russian cities. The text tries to split the difference: non-alignment in formal terms, but robust assurances short of alliance membership. Reconstruction is organized around frozen assets and commercial mechanisms. The proposal allocates substantial sums for rebuilding, with a notable role for U.S.-led projects and private-sector participation; a significant portion of frozen Russian assets would be channelled into reconstruction and joint investments. The economic architecture put forward would give American firms a major role in Ukraine’s reconstruction economy — a detail that explains part of Washington’s enthusiasm and Europe’s unease. On social and legal matters, the plan envisages IAEA oversight of critical infrastructure like the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant, equal access for Russian and Ukrainian media, and legislative steps aimed at banning extremist ideologies and promoting minority protections. Some of these clauses are symbolic; others are potentially intrusive. The requirement for shared media access and the insistence on prohibiting “Nazi ideology” would be particularly sensitive, since they touch on contested narratives and identity politics in Ukraine. The draft is explicitly transactional: territory and demilitarized zones set against guarantees, money, and legal commitments. Equally important, it turns the abstract notion of “security” into a negotiable, enforceable set of obligations — precisely what Russia has insisted on for years. Yet the package’s durability hinges on how these technical clauses are policed and whether the supervising mechanisms can withstand political pressure. ## Europe's Opposition vs. US Realism One striking theme in the discussion is the divergence between European political posturing and American willingness to bargain. Many European leaders have publicly insisted on maximalist outcomes — the full withdrawal of Russian forces, the return of Crimea, reparations, and, in some rhetorical registers, the criminal accountability of Russia’s leadership. That posture has hardened the European public and political expectation that the war’s acceptable outcome must amount to a near-total Russian defeat. This position, however, has a costly logic: it privileges moral clarity over achievable settlement, effectively ruling out compromise that would recognize any of the territorial changes on the ground. The conversation highlights the paradox: Europe demands security but balks at the arrangements that Russia considers necessary to secure its perceived interests. As a result, many European politicians find themselves in an anti-peace stance — insisting that no treaty would be trustworthy even if Russia were to sign it. By contrast, the United States as described in the exchange is operating more pragmatically. Washington’s posture reflects two calculations. First, a durable settlement that reduces the risk of direct confrontation with Russia is in American strategic interest. Second, reconstruction and security guarantees present commercial and geopolitical opportunities for U.S. firms and investors. That dual logic — stabilizing Europe while creating lucrative reconstruction roles — underpins Washington’s readiness to be the primary guarantor and broker. The split matters because credibility and enforcement are central to any treaty. If the U.S. commits security guarantees backed by clear conditionality and enforcement mechanisms, the gap between Europe’s maximal demands and the practical requirements for peace narrows. But if European opposition hardens into active sabotage — refusing to participate in monitoring, blocking financial arrangements, or refusing to normalize relations — the treaty’s practical viability will be compromised. The discussion underscores that European politics, not just battlefield lines, may be the real obstacle to a lasting settlement. ## A New Global Security Architecture Beyond the immediate terms, the plan gestures toward a larger reordering of regional and global security norms. If non-expansion and formalized spheres of influence become part of a negotiated settlement, they would set a precedent: multipolarity would be institutionalized not only in rhetoric but in treaties. The architecture implied by the 28 points would recognize differentiated security arrangements across Europe, backed by bilateral and multilateral guarantees rather than a single universal security umbrella. This recalibration has broader implications. First, it would mark an American reassertion in Eurasian diplomacy — not by extending alliance membership, but by providing binding guarantees outside the NATO framework. That posture favors flexible, transactional security commitments over formal alliance enlargement. Second, it could normalize a world in which great powers negotiate overlapping security zones, each with its own enforcement mechanisms and economic strings attached. Third, it tests the limits of European strategic autonomy: if Europe lacks the political consensus to accept such a settlement, its influence in

Ukraine Is Doomed. Russia Wins Multipolarity There is, once more, hope for peace in Ukraine, and it is—once more—freaking out the Europeans. The US and Russia are nearing a proposal for cessation of hostilities along a so called 28-point peace plan. Here to discuss this with me is Dr. Nicolai Petro, Professor for Political Science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of “The Tragedy of Ukraine”. Links: Kremlin Readout that Nicolai mentioned: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/78524 Nicolai's Homepage: http://npetro. net/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:47 Why Peace is on the Table Now 00:14:52 Inside the 28-Point Peace Plan 00:30:55 Europe's Opposition vs. US Realism 00:51:28 A New Global Security Architecture 01:00:15 Will Russia Rejoin the G8? #Pascal There is once more hope for peace in Ukraine, and it’s once again freaking out the Europeans. The U. S. and Russia are nearing a proposal for a cessation of hostilities under a so-called 28-point peace plan. Here to discuss this with me is Dr. Nicolai Petro, professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island and author of *The Tragedy of Ukraine.* Nicolai, welcome back. #Nicolai Petro Thank you, Pascal. Nice to be with you again. #Pascal Well, thank you very much for making time on the weekend, because I just needed an expert like you to dig into how it is that we’re now nearing the prospect of a proper peace. And I think it really is a prospect this time, because it seems that on all sides the pressure is increasing toward that end. Can you walk us through what happened last week, and how it is that now Mr. Zelensky seems to be in a corner that’s difficult to get out of? #Nicolai Petro Well, there’s a combination of notable Russian military successes on the battlefield—not just in one location or two, but along the entire front line. That’s due to the overwhelming Russian forces, which are able to replenish both personnel and weaponry at a rate Ukraine is no longer able to match. That’ s one aspect military analysts have been pointing to for a while. The second component—the second punch, if you will, to Zelensky’s regime—is, of course, the corruption scandal, which is not at all -- 1 of 15 -- finished. In other words, it’s perhaps just at the beginning, because we have some fifteen hundred hours of tapes that are slowly being leaked. And why would they be leaked slowly? Well, there’s a lot of speculation in Kyiv about that. The most popular theories are that the Americans—who are known to be the funders and supporters, both institutionally and financially, of the Ukrainian anti-corruption organizations—are now pulling the strings. They’re saying, “We know what you have on Zelensky’s entourage.” And so, to put him in a position where he can no longer deny their requests—lest he lose political legitimacy at home—they can begin to leak these tapes and start the process of possibly calling into question the legitimacy of his entourage. And if necessary, it could go even further, implicating Zelensky himself. What we know so far from those tapes is that, ostensibly—this is, of course, the accusation, not something proven in court yet—the claim is that several ministers in the government are implicated on recordings as having taken bribes through a close associate of Zelensky’s, known as Timur Mindich, referred to in the Ukrainian media as “Zelensky’s wallet.” On these tapes, we hear him and several individuals who sound like Ukrainian government ministers arranging kickbacks in the energy sector—kickbacks for securing government contracts. And, as is well known, many of those energy resources aren’t even functioning right now because of Russian attacks. So the question is, why? Why are they not being defended? Why are they still taking money for services they’re not providing? All of that raises serious concerns. What these anti-corruption organizations have also publicly stated is that they are not releasing the tapes that directly affect military procurement, because they fear the results would undermine morale—morale at the front lines. So they’re holding on to those. But many people, including the former state prosecutor of Ukraine, Ihor Lutsenko, under Poroshenko, expect—as many analysts do— that this is where the largest amount of corruption lies. It’s not just a couple of hundred million, but actually an amount nearing billions of dollars—specifically, the billions that the EU and previously the United States have given or granted to Ukraine, either in the form of loans or funding. The implication, according to these anti-corruption organizations, is that the people closest to Zelensky are involved. How close? To date, it’s been leaked to the Ukrainian media that the chief of staff, Andriy Yermak— the person who will be leading the Ukrainian delegation to the peace talks in Switzerland this week— is the head of that delegation. Zelensky relies on him very much. Even though he’s identified on all the tapes with the code name—well, I apologize, it’s kind of funny, but not really—his code name is “Ali Baba,” as in “Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves.” So Yermak’s code name is Ali Baba. All of this has yet to be proven in court, but it looks very bad. And according to leaked reports of surveys done by the presidential administration, Zelensky’s popularity rating has fallen by 40% since this scandal erupted. So that’s what’s putting pressure on him—on the current regime, on the current administration—to negotiate a peace deal. A peace deal? -- 2 of 15 -- Which one? Well, there’s only one, because the Europeans have not offered a single proposal. They haven’t, in the last four years, come up with a single peace plan of their own. They’ve simply said, “We support Ukraine, and they have to make the decision.” But if it were up to us, we would continue fighting. This week in South Africa—I just saw him on German television—he said it’s up to Ukraine to make the decision, and up to the Europeans as well, to decide whether or not to end this war. That’s a little confusing, because I thought the idea was for the Ukrainians to make peace and for the Europeans to support them in whatever decision they made. But that’s not actually what Merz said. He said he wants the Europeans to be the ones deciding as well whether any peace formula is acceptable. And by adding more actors, the Ukrainian leadership and the Europeans have, in the past, effectively stymied any negotiations by simply insisting that there should not be peace. There should instead be a ceasefire. Well, a ceasefire and a peace treaty are antithetical to one another, because peace is actually designed to end a conflict once and for all—to come to a conclusive agreement about all the matters of disagreement. A ceasefire is merely a cessation of hostilities, with the possibility always open that hostilities could be renewed. Why would they be renewed? Because it would give the party that’s at a disadvantage when entering negotiations a chance to redress that disadvantage and then resume the fight to its advantage. That has always been an openly stated secret among Ukrainian military leaders and nationalists. Under previous administrations, it was even stated as the Ukrainian position during the Minsk negotiations, which is why those talks never reached any conclusion—because they were never intended to. They were meant merely to preserve the status quo while Ukraine built up its army, which it did very effectively, as we now see. So, to get around that, Russia has insisted on a clear end goal—on having a peace treaty—and for close to four years now, it has stipulated what its objectives in that treaty are. This seems to be the first effort—namely, Trump’s 28-point peace plan—to actually come up with a proposal based on what Russia has said are its demands for peace, and then adjust those with the advice and input of Ukrainians, and, secondarily, if necessary, the Europeans as well. I think there’s now, as far as we can tell, a clearer understanding that a workable plan will be one proposed by Russia but flexible enough to take Ukrainian and European security concerns into account. And within that framework, if the United States supports it, we might actually get a peace deal. #Pascal Well, thank you very much. That’s a very, very good overview. The thing is, on the one hand, the Europeans are now, again, very angry at this prospect of a peace deal—which it is not. And I must say, you know, their proposal for the last four, three and a half years was Russia withdrawing from everything, including Crimea, paying hundreds of billions of dollars in reparations, and Vladimir Putin in The Hague. That was their proposal. They’ve been repeating that that’s the end they want to see, -- 3 of 15 -- which is basically the complete and utter defeat of Russia, right? On the other hand, we also see that on the battlefield now, Russia has, over the last couple of months, been moving forward, and one Ukrainian city after another has fallen. We also had the saga with Mr. Putin meeting Mr. Trump in Alaska. And then there were talks about this meeting in Hungary, which never happened. It seemed as if the fronts were hardening again. But now we’ve found out that there were always back-channel negotiations. What’s now on the table—and what has leaked—is basically what people, especially Alexander Mercouris and others on The Duran, call “Istanbul Plus.” The four regions go to Russia, more or less, and Crimea, of course. Then you have a framework for reparations payments and renewed relations with the United States and, as you said, Europe. Because for Russia, it was never just about the front line or territory—it’s about a comprehensive security arrangement. Can you maybe talk us through that? #Nicolai Petro So, if we look at the text of the 28 points, I’ll highlight the ones that seem to me worth mentioning— reiterating—because they provide something concrete. In other words, point one: Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed. #Pascal It’s never an issue. Before we do that, can you tell me your assessment of how credible this 28-point peace plan is—the version that was leaked to the New York Times? Do you believe this is probably what they’re actually working with in Washington and Moscow? #Nicolai Petro There are a few differences among the versions that are out. This was true, by the way, of the Istanbul accords as well. I think that when Trump and others say this is a work in progress, that’s exactly what it is. So the differences between the versions are not that important, because what matters in the context of a document that’s still evolving is the principle—what perspective is being taken. And the perspective being taken emphasizes several things: one is security, one is reparations, and one is human rights, put it that way. So those are the baskets. The security stipulation meets Russia’s essential demand, which is that there should be a security framework concluded between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. All the parties need to appreciate each other’s security interests. Concretely, Russia says that this requires stopping the expansion of NATO and not allowing Ukraine to become a member. However, in exchange, Ukraine should be able to guarantee its own security. That’s a formula Zelensky has used before, because several months ago President Zelensky said, “We understand that NATO is being taken off the table. So what we want, in effect, to replace that is -- 4 of 15 -- a view of NATO in Ukraine”—as if Ukraine were part of NATO and had the ability to build up its forces to that level of capacity. And again, what that means is subject to debate. So, I wouldn’t call this Russia’s proposal or America’s proposal; it’s more a framework that takes into account Russia’s concerns and those of others who have commented on it. And we