NOW Political Collapse Is Inevitable: NATO Can’t Save Ukraine | Dr. Nicolai Petro

The conversation coalesces around a single, unsettling claim: current Western policy toward Ukraine and the broader international order rests on misreadings of power, diplomacy, and political psychology that make a negotiated settlement increasingly inevitable. The recording surfaces a steady skepticism about doctrines that promise decisive solutions and exposes the domestic distractions and strategic contradictions that hollow out long-term statecraft. It argues that what looks like firmness—military aid, moral certitude, public rhetoric—often masks a lack of political imagination and an unwillingness to engage with rival interests. In the end, the most consequential failure is not a battlefield defeat but a failure of statesmanship: the inability to manage, negotiate, and balance competing interests so that political collapse becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. ## The Mirage of a Doctrine A central theme is the critique of recent political pronouncements presented as coherent doctrines. What is being lauded as a new strategic vision often turns out to be a patchwork of justifications for particular acts. The conversation pointedly questions the substance behind proclamations of "clear American interest," "aggressive diplomacy," and “overwhelming force.” These are offered not as a roadmap for recurring foreign policy challenges but as rationalizations for ad hoc decisions. The danger of labeling ad hoc policies as doctrine is that it confers an unwarranted aura of permanence and consistency: doctrines are supposed to help leaders navigate new crises by clarifying ends and means; what passes for doctrine here merely reassures domestic audiences while leaving the mechanics of long-term strategy unaddressed. Dr. Nicolai Petro’s intervention is illustrative: he contends that a true doctrine would articulate a vision of America’s role and be sensitive to the interests of other actors. By contrast, the contemporary framing frequently treats American interests as if they exist in a vacuum, unconnected to the preferences and survival calculations of other states. When policy is drafted as a solipsistic pursuit of presumed national interest, it becomes blind to the diplomatic work required to weave other nations’ aims into an acceptable balance. The result is a brittle approach that confuses coercion with diplomacy and elides the slower work of persuasion and compromise. ## Diplomacy, Force, and the Limits of Solving Political Problems The dialogue repeatedly returns to a classical realist insight: political problems are managed, not solved. Military victories can rearrange facts on the ground, but they do not make intransigent political questions disappear. The notion that diplomacy can be replaced or shortcut by “aggressive” posturing or by displays of force misunderstands the nature of political orders. Effective diplomacy presupposes patient negotiation, attentiveness to the other side’s perceived interests, and the humility to treat predictions as probabilistic rather than prophetic. This critique extends to the familiar temptation to treat crises as engineering challenges—fix the technical problem, declare success, and go home. Experience shows, and the conversation emphasizes, that successors inherit the consequences of seemingly decisive acts. Short-term gains from coercion or bold displays of force often devolve into protracted difficulties. The moral is not an abstract pacifism but a pragmatic caution: states should invest in the continuous work of balancing interests, not in theatrical attempts at finality. ## American Solipsism and Domestic Constraints One of the sharper observations in the exchange is the way domestic politics circumscribe foreign policy. The recording identifies a distinct American orientation: a combination of national self-absorption and episodic attention to foreign affairs that undermines sustained engagement. Major international crises can be crowded out by immediate domestic compulsions—trials, budget fights, electoral cycles—so foreign gestures are timed for maximum short-term political payoff rather than for strategic sustainability. The practical effect is twofold. First, policymakers often choose actions that generate immediate popular approval, even when those actions create long-term liabilities. Second, the United States—because its public attention is so volatile—cannot be relied upon as a steady anchor for allied security strategies that demand patience. This intermittency breeds strategic instability: allies overcommit in reliance on American staying power, while domestic tides may soon pull Washington in another direction. The conversation stresses that this dynamic partially explains the rush to episodic interventions and the impatience with the painstaking business of negotiated settlements. ## NATO, Ukraine, and the Politics of Loss A core strand of the discussion turns to Ukraine and NATO’s role. The recording suggests that Western hopes for a decisive Russian defeat have given way to the sober recognition that Ukraine cannot achieve a total victory under present conditions. Importantly, acknowledging that Ukraine cannot win does not imply that Russia has secured an unambiguous triumph; there is a wide, dangerous gray zone between those two poles. What matters politically is how Western leaders manage that gap. NATO’s credibility is central. The alliance’s ability to function as both a deterrent and an instrument of cooperative defense depends on the perception that it can pass existential tests. If NATO appears to have been overplayed in Ukraine and fails to shape a plausible, stabilizing outcome, its reputational capital will decline. That loss of credibility carries broader implications: the longer the conflict drags on without a settlement, the harder it becomes to construct political arrangements that preserve as much of Ukraine’s statehood as possible while avoiding further escalation. The argument advanced in the conversation is stark: continued militarized denial of the need to negotiate risks not only Ukrainian collapse but also NATO’s strategic humiliation. ## The Erosion of Rules and the Politics of Credibility The dialogue also turns to the erosion of the so-called rules-based order and the selective enforcement of international norms. Western leaders have insisted on the uniqueness of Russia’s violations while simultaneously excusing or normalizing other actions—such as unilateral uses of force—that would historically have been framed as breaches of international legality. The result is not only moral hypocrisy but also strategic self-harm: double standards undermine the normative authority of Western states and make their appeals to international law less persuasive in other disputes. The conversation further highlights how intelligence and prognostication are often presented with unwarranted certainty. When policymakers lean on opaque assessments to legitimize coercive policies, they invite skepticism upon those judgments’ inevitable failures. A political culture that uses uncertain assessments as pretexts for dramatic action damages its long-term credibility. In international affairs, where reputation and predictability matter, such slippage is costly; it makes potential partners and adversaries alike less inclined to trust verbal commitments or to believe in the staying power of alliances. ## What Comes Next: Negotiation, Balance, and the Tragedy of State Survival Taken together, the conversation urges a return to politics as management: to negotiation, incremental adjustments, and an acceptance of contingency. The recording repeatedly stresses that remaining faithful to an aggressive fantasy of decisive resolution will only deepen catastrophe. For Ukraine, the stark implication is that elite belief in some dramatic turn that will compel direct American military intervention is a dangerous myth. A more realistic strategy would be to prepare for a political settlement that prese

NOW Political Collapse Is Inevitable: NATO Can���t Save Ukraine Today I’m talking again to Dr. Nicolai Petro, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the wonderful book “The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution”. Today we want to do an update on the Russo- Ukrainian War and the US involvement in it. Links: https://www.npetro.net](https://www.npetro.net “The Trump Doctrine,” The Realist Review: https://therealistreview.substack.com/p/the-trump- doctrine Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #M3 At some point, it will dawn on even the most ardent nationalists in Ukraine that the survival of the state requires a negotiated settlement. That's missing right now. The mythology among the Ukrainian elite who want to continue fighting is that they can create a circumstance so disastrous for either Russia or for themselves that it will force the United States to become directly involved and attack Russia. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Nicolai Petro, a professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the wonderful book, The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict Resolution. Today, we want to do an update on the Russo-Ukrainian War and the U.S. involvement in it. So, Nicolai, welcome back. #M3 Nice to be with you again. #M2 Well, thanks for taking the time, because you've, of course, continued looking at what's happening between Russia and Ukraine—I mean, how the war is developing—but you are also trying to assess the U.S. posture. And you recently wrote an article about the Trump Doctrine as pronounced by J.D. Vance. Maybe let's start there. What's your take on this pronouncement? #M3 -- 1 of 14 -- Well, I didn't think very much of it because it struck me that it wasn't really a doctrine. It was rather a justification for the decisions that were made, without really anything doctrinal about it. A doctrine would be something that explains the purposes of the action in a broader context and offers us a vision that could be applied to other situations, explaining the similarities and differences that would lead to the application of certain types of action. More importantly, I think a doctrine has an ideal vision of the world and, in this case, America's role in it. And none of this was part of what the vice president spoke about. Instead, what he did was simply congratulate his boss, the president, on a job well done. And he did so by arguing that America had done the right thing in Iran in three ways. First, he said what America had done was to articulate a clear American interest. Then, it had tried to use—and would continue to try to use—what he called "aggressive diplomacy" in the pursuit of these interests. And lastly, he said not if, but when that fails—the aggressive diplomacy—America would be happy to use overwhelming military force to solve the problem. And I see major problems with each of these positions. So, on the first one, articulating a clear American interest, that's always been the complaint about American foreign policy: there are too many conflicting interests. But beyond that, what is most obviously lacking in this formulation is that we are articulating our interests without any regard for the interests of other nations—in other words, as if we were alone in the world. And that's a foolish position to take, and one that will always lead to disaster. If we're only looking at our own interests, rather than seeking to build bridges between our interests and the interests of other nations, we will always wind up fighting with everyone, including our allies. The example now is the deterioration of America's relations not only with the Europeans, but also even with Canada and Mexico, our immediate neighbors—and the Japanese too. Yeah, yeah. Well, everyone, really, not surprisingly. So, secondly, aggressive diplomacy. Well, I don't think he meant aggression—diplomatic aggression. I think he meant being very assiduous in America's diplomatic relations. But unfortunately, that's not how diplomacy is conducted. Successful diplomacy is always the result of patient negotiation and deliberation. And the negotiation has to, again, be attuned to listening to the interests of others and being willing to consider them—having a dialogue. And again, the notion of being able to accomplish a political or diplomatic outcome through force, or through fiat, or through yelling, or through some sort of aggressive behavior—well, it's just the antithesis of actual diplomacy. And then lastly, U.S. military power to solve the problem. Well, first of all, classical realists understand well that political problems, and especially in foreign policy, are not solved—they are managed. They are managed for the time being, because political actors change, circumstances change, political alliances shift back and forth. And as a result, you have to get away from the mentality that you can solve a problem and then leave it behind you. Instead, what you want to do is be constantly engaged with all your interlocutors to maintain a balance of interests. -- 2 of 14 -- This is something that I think Hans Morgenthau, the father of realism, spoke to very well. He said you do not, or you should not, if you are wise—a wise leader—you do not pursue dominance in the world. You pursue balance. And it's always a guessing game. You aim for balance and then you correct. As you come closer to it, you understand more properly the interests of the other side and how you need to balance their interests against your interests. And it's a constant process of refining. As a result, the entire mentality here is the wrong one for achieving international peace and international stability, it seems to me. So I was not impressed. #M2 You put it very diplomatically. I mean, it's much more a notion of dominance than it is a notion of diplomacy. And in this sense, you know, it strikes me because Donald Trump and his entire team, including J.D. Vance, advertised themselves to U.S. voters as people who want to explicitly stay away from this neocon vision of forever wars, coercive actions wherever you go, and regime change operations. But this Trump doctrine, and also what we have seen now—the way that, of course, the interactions and the bombing of Iran went—suggests that nothing has fundamentally changed, not even in the mindset of the administration, but it is meeting new limits. Iran shows new limits. What are your views on this before we go to Russia? #M3 It's too early to say. In other words, as I see the situation right now, there are many things that the Trump administration can claim to have achieved, but it will not actually be clear what the achievement is until many months or years from now. That's what I mean when I say we should disabuse ourselves of the notion that political problems are resolvable. Because if we come to the table or initiate an action thinking that, once we take these steps, the problem will be taken care of and we can withdraw from the problem, you are fooling yourself. That simply will not happen. The problem will persist, the problem will fester, and you might get away—as an administration or a president, you might get away with fooling the people into thinking that you have solved the problem, but it will be your successors who will have to deal with the fallout. How many times in the past have we seen this? It's so axiomatic in all politics, including, but not limited to, international politics, that you'd think we would have learned this lesson by now. But it is an unfortunate characteristic of American political culture that, A, Americans are profoundly isolationist. And by isolationist, I mean they have a deep-seated disinterest in the rest of the world. They simply don't care about what the rest of the world thinks, or what the rest of the world thinks America should do. Therefore, all of their attention, and the way they see and interact with other nations, is through the prism of the current American political discourse and whatever the issue of the day is. The issue that is absorbing America today is the trial of Sean "Diddy" Combs, a rapper. That's all. That has taken over the entire news arena. And secondarily, there is Trump's struggle to -- 3 of 14 -- pass the budget and what compromises will have to be made in that budget—from the Senate version that has passed, to now having to be reconciled in the House. I think you are on to an important point when you say there are limits that have been revealed by this. But I'd like to stress this point in one sense: it's not a new limit. It's one that we have been reminded of recently. I was thinking, for example, that Trump had a time deadline on whether or not he could act militarily or in any other way in the Middle East. And that time deadline was that he had to initiate his action before the agenda switched to the domestic arena and back to the passage of the budget, because that has now become so all-consuming that if he had a foreign policy matter to deal with now, it would be irreconcilable. It would be too much of a distraction for the American public, and for him personally, to have to do both of these things simultaneously. The American political system, to paraphrase a famous American saying, is one where people cannot walk and chew gum at the same time. They have to do one or the other. And the priority in making these choices always will be the domestic agenda. Therefore, Trump understood one thing, or he was advised to do one thing: if you're going to do something, be sure to do it quickly. Be sure it makes a big splash. Get out so that you can get the accolades of having done something—whatever it is—accomplished, taken a decisive action, and then move on directly from that upswing in popular perception into your next domestic fight, now over the budget, which is so decisive for you and from which you cannot be distracted. The consequences, however, of what you've done, we don't have to deal with. We can ignore those completely for the foreseeable future, perhaps even months. By the way, I think the war in Ukraine is pretty much in the same category right now, as is every other current and potential international crisis. #M2 I mean, the way everything is going at the moment has all of the indications that now that the Ukraine war is more or less lost for—at least the NATO side—at least it is utterly clear that the outcome is nothing, nothing even remotely close to what the NATO side envisioned it to be, and the United States is losing interest, that Iran was kind of the next thing, the next war to involve the US in. But the way you're putting it could even be an indication that the US actually wants to focus more on its own domestic issues. But how do you see it? Then let's talk about Ukraine and where you think that stands, and how it ties in with Iran and the solipsism of the United States. #M3 Yeah, self-absorption. I think the West had a... hope that Russia would be defeated. The initial strategy was for the defeat—the strategic defeat, as the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin put it—of Russia. That was the objective. Since then, however, the U.S. administration—so, the Biden administration—and most of his senior advisors, or at least the ones that have the president's ear -- 4 of 14 -- currently, have come to the essential conclusion that Ukraine cannot win. Saying that Ukraine cannot win is not the same thing, however, as saying that Russia has won. There is a gap between that. And somewhere in that gap, the U.S. administration currently has an interest in seeing that the final outcome, whatever that may be, comes closer to Ukraine plausibly not having lost too much, versus Russia has clearly won. So they need to play that out, or they would