USA Collapsing: Washington‘s Soviet Moment Is Here | Col. Douglas Macgregor

The conversation with Colonel Douglas Macgregor cuts to a stark conclusion: the United States is approaching a geopolitical inflection that looks dangerously similar to the Soviet Union’s terminal phase — not because of a single catastrophic event but through the slow, cumulative erosion of economic, political, and military coherence. What emerges from the exchange is a thesis in three parts: Russia has reached a point of strategic recalibration in Ukraine; Western publics, particularly in the United States, are exhausted and unwilling to sustain new large-scale wars; and Washington’s global posture — its bases, budgets and assumptions of endless forward presence — is increasingly unsustainable. Read together, these observations point to a coming era of retrenchment, painful fiscal adjustment, and a redefinition of what American power can realistically accomplish. ## Russia and Ukraine Turning Point The discussion frames the war in Ukraine as a moment of diminishing ambiguity for Moscow. What began as an intervention framed in defensive terms has evolved, in the interlocutors’ reading, into a deliberate Russian effort to secure strategic depth and deny Ukraine the ability to serve as a persistent threat or logistical conduit for Western military support. This is not portrayed as a rash, emotional campaign but as the culmination of patient Russian planning: time spent rebuilding forces, conserving lives where possible, and waiting for Western political fissures to widen. A central piece of the analysis is the argument that the battlefield calculus has shifted from attrition to exploitation. Strikes alone, the conversation argues, yield temporary paralysis; decisive strategic gains require synchronized ground operations. Hence the prediction of renewed Russian focus on southern approaches, especially Odessa, and coordinated operations from multiple axes. Odessa is described not only as a logistical choke point — a way to choke off maritime lifelines for supplies and mercenaries — but also as a symbolic objective tied to historical narratives that remain potent in Moscow. Taken together, these elements suggest Russia perceives a narrow window to convert battlefield dominance into durable political advantage. Equally consequential is the role ascribed to Western assistance. According to the exchange, intelligence sharing and transfer of targeting data have enabled Ukrainian strikes deep into Russian-controlled territory, escalating risk and prompting a strategic re-evaluation in Moscow. The implication is that battlefield escalation is as much a function of external enablers as of internal Ukrainian will — a dynamic that increases the chance of wider, more consequential Russian operations intended to close the conflict on terms Moscow finds acceptable. ## America Rejects Another War One of the most striking themes in the discussion is the claim that popular appetite for distant wars in the United States has evaporated. The conversation insists that Americans are largely indifferent to geopolitical squabbles abroad and increasingly unwilling to mobilize for conflicts that bear little obvious relation to national survival. This is framed not as ignorance but as rational prioritization: voters worried about inflation, jobs, and rising living costs will not sanction open-ended military commitments overseas. Historical parallels are invoked to underline this shift. Vietnam and the long tails of Iraq and Afghanistan are presented as cautionary examples: wars that drained resources, produced ambiguous outcomes, and eventually prompted public withdrawal. The contemporary manifestation of that pattern is argued to be visible in current polling, electoral politics, and the skepticism expressed toward further entanglement with Russia or Iran. What matters politically is not elite conviction but mass tolerance; without public buy-in, sustained large-scale military operations become politically untenable. For policymakers, this has immediate implications. Sustaining proxy wars through surges in materiel, intelligence, or forward deployments becomes harder when domestic constituencies demand fiscal prudence and question the purpose of continued entanglement. The resulting tension — between an internationalist bureaucratic impulse to maintain global influence and a citizenry focused on domestic pain points — is presented as a structural constraint that will shape U.S. behavior in the near term. ## Soviet Collapse and U S Decline The conversation draws an uncomfortable parallel between the Soviet Union’s unraveling and the potential trajectory of American decline. The analogy is not literal; the United States is not undergoing the same ideological ruptures that felled the USSR. Instead, the comparison centers on systemic overreach: a superpower burdened by global commitments, stunted by economic dysfunction, and rendered brittle by political class insularity. A key claim is that Washington’s defense posture has been enabled by decades of nonchalance at home. Military engagements abroad were politically tolerable so long as they did not produce immediate domestic shocks. Now, the economic consequences of protracted commitments — manifesting as inflation, rising interest rates, and fiscal fragility — are feeding back into foreign policy, forcing strategic choices that would have been unthinkable a generation ago. If interest rates rise to combat inflation, servicing debt and maintaining force structure will become much more expensive, squeezing both domestic programs and overseas missions. There is also a cultural argument embedded here: institutions in Washington have become detached from popular sentiment. Decisions that once passed through democratic reckoning are now portrayed as the handiwork of a managerial foreign policy class, operating on autopilot. In this telling, the risk is not merely material decline but legitimacy collapse: when populations stop seeing value in their country’s global commitments, the superpower’s capacity to project sustained influence diminishes — sometimes quickly, sometimes painfully. ## Empire Mindset and Iran The exchange extends its critique to the mechanics of empire: forward bases, intrusive presence, and the conviction that technological superiority can indefinitely offset vulnerability. The conversation highlights that forward-deployed forces are increasingly exposed to precision-guided munitions and space-enabled targeting, rendering static outposts far less secure than in the past. This, it is argued, calls into question the wisdom of maintaining large, immovable footprints in contested regions. Iran enters this critique as a case study in the limits of forward presence. If a regional adversary can threaten bases with accurate missiles aided by modern surveillance, then the logic of forward deployment — that it deters adversaries and reassures allies — frays. The corrective suggested is not a hardline isolationism but a reassessment of where and why military forces are forward-stationed. Pragmatism, in this reading, would involve fewer permanent outposts, more mobile and survivable forces, and clearer red lines that reflect national interest rather than abstract notions of global guardianship. The discussion also touches on the propaganda dimension: the globalist narrative that frames adversaries as existential threats to justify continued overseas engagement. The rebuttal here is twofold. First, strategic restraint can be framed as deliberate strength rather than retreat; second, alliances and European politics are shifting in ways that could reduce diplomatic pressure to confront Russia or Iran. If parties skeptical of endless support for Ukraine or of the transatlantic military infrastructure come to power in Europe, American policymakers may find it easier to pivot toward restraint. ## Debt, Cuts, and the End Game The final theme is fiscal: structural debt, rising interest rates, and the imperative of bud

USA Collapsing: Washington‘s Soviet Moment Is Here | Col. Douglas Macgregor Summary Hegemony is over not only on the outside but within the US, too. The decline is irreversible says my guest today, Colonel Douglas Macgregor. We talk about Russia’s next moves in Ukraine, the risk of wider NATO escalation, U.S. support for foreign wars, and why America’s base network and war spending may be unsustainable. Macgregor argues the U.S. is losing control, the economy is the real pressure point, and a major pullback from overseas is coming. Links: McGregor Warrior Substack: https://macgregorwarrior.substack.com The National Conversation: https://thenationalconversation.org Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s /academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com /donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Russia and Ukraine Turning Point 00:13:40 NATO Pressure and Nuclear Risk 00:15:14 America Rejects Another War 00:21:27 Bases, Parties, and Retreat 00:24:50 Soviet Collapse and U S Decline 00:29:21 Cuba Puerto Rico and the Hemisphere 00:32:24 Empire Mindset and Iran 00:37:23 Media Pressure and Public Pushback 00:40:44 Debt, Cuts, and the End Game #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, tonight again with Colonel Douglas MacGregor. Colonel, welcome back. Happy to be here. Thank you so much for making the time, because it is crazy times. And I was wondering how you are currently reading what is going on with Russia and Europe and the U.S.—the escalation that we are seeing, the drones that are going into Russia and even killed 21 school kids in Lugansk. And on the other hand, the Russians now said that Kiev must be evacuated, or that the diplomats should go because it's going to be dangerous. What do you think is going to happen? #Douglas Macgregor I don't like to be trite, but I think we have reached a strategic inflection point in the war in Ukraine. And I think we have to understand things from the Russian perspective at this stage. This war has dragged on and on and on. People are always asking why. In the West, the answer is, oh, well, the Russians are weak. They don't know what they're doing. Putin lacks will, and on and on and on. All of that's nonsense. President Putin launched this special military operation for the reasons that we've discussed many, many times. It was essentially a defensive move to protect Russia from what he did not understand at the beginning but eventually discovered was a very serious attempt to turn Ukraine into a battering ram that could be employed against Russia. -- 1 of 15 -- It took him time, but he finally discovered that it was not simply a question of reaching a settlement between Moscow and Kiev. It was a concerted effort in the West, led by the globalists, to destroy Russia, to carve it up, exploit it, and make it irrelevant on the world stage. When it became clear this was what was happening, President Putin fell back and said, look, it's time for us to build up. We have to create a new military establishment. The one we have is not adequate. And this is going to take time. And it has taken time. And he has moved deliberately, methodically, and cautiously because he wanted to spare as many lives as possible. He did not want to waste Russian lives unnecessarily. He is probably, in the history of Russia, the single most humane person to lead Russia in a war that's ever existed. Because in other wars, the Tsars and then their successors were always willing to spend lives in the pursuit of their military objectives. Putin, to his credit, has tried to avoid that. Secondly, Putin has tried to keep in mind that the people his forces are fighting and killing are ultimately, for the most part, Orthodox Slavs. And he's trying to spare them as well. Now, I think he's been very successful on the Russian side. Anyone who spends time in Russia and talks to the population discovers very quickly that he has enormous support. The latest polling data suggests 82 to 84 percent support for him, which is pretty darn good this far into a war of any kind. So he has maintained that. He's maintained the standard of living. He's negotiated all these sanctions very effectively to the point now where Lavrov simply says they don't matter anymore because we've found ways around them. But he still has a war on his hands. He still has a problem in Kiev. And that problem is no longer existential as it once was. In other words, the Ukrainian forces are decimated. They've lost over a million dead. It depends upon which source you want to check—certainly 1.5 to 1.8 million. Now I'm hearing people say it's more than that, plus another million casualties. Most of those will never return to duty; they're so severely injured. The bottom line is, from a purely military standpoint, he's been extraordinarily successful. The Russians have been extraordinarily successful, and they have built a very effective force. The question is, now what? Because you're still stuck with this regime in Kiev. And while it can no longer threaten your very existence, it has the ability to do damage and remind everyone that they are alive and well. And sadly, we and the Europeans continue to support and assist them. Now, you mentioned what had happened to these schoolgirls, which was horrendous and despicable. That's not the first time the Ukrainians have done something like that. And if you listen carefully to whatever the Ukrainians claimed over the last four years that the Russians had done, in virtually every case, I would say 90% of the time, what they claimed the Russians had done, they had in fact done. And we can go all the way back to Bucha, which came very early. And that was an atrocity committed by Ukrainians against Ukrainians. It was not an atrocity committed by the Russians. So we've been down this road before. What's different now, though, is that we, in addition to providing components for these long-range drones that are dangerous because they can fly great distances, we've also plotted the flight paths. We've given them the intelligence. We've flown aircraft, -- 2 of 15 -- surveillance aircraft, and come back and handed to the Ukrainians the exact locations of virtually every radar, every air and missile defense battery, every military installation, every supporting manufacturing site, every refinery, every oil storage site. These things have been provided by us, and I'm including the United States, which is very, very disappointing. Because I don't think President Trump has ever gotten control of the Central Intelligence Agency or anything else in the government that seems to be on an autopilot of hostility to Russia. And I think that's why President Putin has said repeatedly, I've met with all of these presidents, and they all said they were going to do things. None of them were able to do very much. Obviously, they aren't really in charge. So the real question is, who's in charge in Washington? Is President Trump really in charge? Is he a hands-on leader? I would argue no. And while he may say things and he may mean them at one point or another in time, he doesn't follow up to ensure that anything happens. And so I think now the Russians have decided this can't go on anymore, and there's only one way to end it. And that is, it's not enough to simply launch strikes. Whatever you launch in the air has a temporary impact on the ground. In other words, there's a period of time when you have knocked your enemy off his position. In other words, you have inflicted a certain temporary paralysis. But in order for that to have any real strategic impact, you have to follow up on the ground. You have to go in and exploit the success of your strikes. The Russians understand that, and I think we're on the verge now of watching that happen. I think we're going to see strikes in Odessa that are designed to facilitate the seizure of Odessa. I think we're going to watch Russian forces cross on the southern end of the Dnieper River and take Odessa. Why Odessa? Well, obviously, it's an outlet to the sea. If you can cut Ukraine off from that outlet, well, you're going to reduce the number of mercenaries that can be brought into the country, arms and equipment, food, you name it. You can't export anything, or very little. You have to move everything through Poland and Polish ports in order to reach anything in Ukraine. That's a bottleneck that's difficult. And the point is, I think the Russians understand that has to stop. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this can happen anytime again. So please consider subscribing not only here, but to my mailing list on Substack. That's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. #Douglas Macgregor Secondly, as we know, Odessa is historically a Russian city. It's not just Russian-speaking. It was founded by Catherine the Great and the generals that drove out the Ottoman Turks and the Tatars from Crimea. So it's one of those places that must return to Russia in the minds of Russians. Well, now you have several other concentrations that deserve some attention on the Russian side. There -- 3 of 15 -- is a large concentration of force up in Byelorussia, north of Kyiv. Very large. It also includes an estimated 20,000 to 30,000 North Koreans. In addition to that, you have another very large concentration that is roughly 100 to 200 miles east of Kyiv, facing the river. Now, these are forces that have been working slowly across the northern portion of eastern Ukraine to eliminate the so-called neo-Nazis and Azov units and other things. They've generally had great success, and now they are able to turn their attention en masse to something more. So I think you have the potential now for three major avenues of approach for large Russian forces: one in the south that will cross the river, probably near Dnipro, I suspect, move south and take Odessa; another that cuts across the center in the direction of Kyiv; and perhaps a third pincer movement coming down out of Byelorussia towards Kyiv. The reason I mention this is, yes, we're going to see more Oreshniks employed in places like Kyiv. And the Oreshnik is a devastating weapons system. We don't know how many of these they've got. They probably have somewhere between 50 and 100 Oreshniks ready to go. That's certainly enough for what they want to do. But the point is, they're also seeing something else happen. Putin has exercised a lot of patience because he always knew that the globalist regimes in Western Europe were not popular, and that the more they argued for war, the more unpopular they would become. This is especially true in Germany, which has been deindustrialized stupidly, throwing people out of work. And Germany is caught up in internal problems with all these Muslims and others that are non- Europeans, that were not really invited into the country to begin with. This is Merkel's great gift to Germany, which is very destructive. So he's known about these things. And his assumption was, well, at some point, the Germans are sober-minded people. They'll wake up and they'll throw out the globalists. Now that seems to be coming. That's very important because in Europe, Germany is arguably the keystone in the edifice of everything — the EU, NATO, you name it. And it's very clear from what Alice Weidel has to say that if the AfD comes into power, there are certain things that are going to happen immediately. Number one, they want to end this war. They want to stop supporting and supplying Ukraine. Secondly, they want to go to Moscow and make arrangements to buy energy again. That makes sense for them. They don't want to pay exorbitant prices for American liquefied natural gas or anything else. And I think the third thing that the Alt