American Exceptionalism is Getting a Reality Check | Prof. Michael Brenner

## Connection between USA's internal politics and its foreign policy The United States’ foreign behavior is no longer easily separable from its domestic turbulence. The conversation with Professor Michael Brenner traces a direct line between the breakdowns within American political institutions and Washington’s conduct abroad: when domestic legitimacy frays, foreign policy becomes an extension of personal will and political survival rather than strategic statecraft. Brenner’s central observation is blunt but consequential — the functioning of American government has shifted in ways that alter not only style but substance. Policy choices now reflect internal incentives, personality-driven impulses, and a weakening of the constitutional constraints that once disciplined presidential action. This shift matters because the world still treats the United States as the central power. Other governments must therefore respond to an American state whose core behavior is more volatile, less predictable, and increasingly personalized. Brenner emphasizes that this is not merely temporary noise; the transformations spill into treaty commitments, trade rules, and military posture. When domestic actors devalue legal constraint, foreign partners learn the hard lesson that American commitments can be rescinded on a whim. That learning reshapes alliance calculations, drives hedging strategies, and feeds a global loss of trust in the reliability of the U.S. as a provider of collective goods. Psychology sits at the heart of this linkage. The video repeatedly returns to the idea that certain personality traits — particularly those associated with narcissistic leadership — distort the way state power is wielded. Brenner’s point is institutional as much as individual: when a political system tolerates leaders who treat the state as an extension of themselves, the resulting foreign policy will be capricious, transactional, and often destructive of long-term strategic interests. The domestic erosion of norms thus produces an international environment where allies and rivals alike must navigate an American state that is more impulsive and less bounded by predictable rules. ## Is Trump doing something new, or just repeating a cycle? A central question in the exchange is whether today’s foreign policy under Donald Trump represents a new strategic paradigm or simply a phase in an ongoing American cycle. Brenner’s assessment rejects the idea of a fundamental strategic rupture. What Trump changes is the method, not the objective: preservation of U.S. predominance remains the operating logic. The novelty lies in the disposition toward fixed commitments. Where previous administrations invested in durable alliances and multilateral frameworks (even imperfectly), Trump prefers flexibility, transactionalism, and the avoidance of binding obligations. This distinction is consequential because it reframes “isolationism” as a misleading label. Trump’s approach is not tantamount to withdrawal from global interests; it is instead a deliberate effort to minimize legal and political constraints so that immediate executive discretion is maximized. Reuters-style vacillation, tariff shocks, and abrupt treaty exits are symptomatic of an administrative temperament that prizes freedom of action above institutional predictability. In essence, the administration intensifies a trend already visible over decades — a retreat from multilateralism and longstanding arms-control regimes — but it does so in a manner that is more blatantly personal and less respectful of norms. That said, continuity persists on core aims: maintaining American prerogatives, resisting perceived challenges to hegemony, and preserving status. The difference is the operational calculus. Where prior presidents might have tolerated some costs to sustain alliances, the current posture weighs those costs more narrowly and transiently. For partners, the result is greater fragility: if continuity cannot be counted upon, they must either accommodate or hedge, both of which produce systemic instability. ## Discussing USA's military bases 00: 36:58 Is the current US political system sustainable? The conversation raises an uncomfortable but necessary question: can the United States sustain its global military footstep while its political system strains under revolutionary pressures? Brenner highlights an irony: the presence of bases worldwide is portrayed as both proof of strength and evidence of overextension. Policymakers defend forward deployments as insurance, yet domestic turbulence raises the cost of defending those commitments coherently. If the polity cannot agree on the principles guiding intervention, bases become liabilities rather than assets. The sustainability issue is twofold. First, the financial and human burden of a global basing network is substantial and requires stable, long-term political support that is increasingly absent. Second, the narrative that equates security with constant forward presence is self-reinforcing; attacks on bases are then used to justify further entrenchment, even when such entrenchment fuels the risks the bases were meant to deter. Brenner points to a simpler, often overlooked lesson: absence of presence can reduce vulnerability. Nations that keep forces off distant battlefields expose themselves to fewer direct attacks. The U.S. has institutionalized the opposite logic — global footprint equals security — but the domestic breakdown of deliberative capacities now calls that logic into question. If the system cannot maintain internal legitimacy and constitutional checks, its ability to manage an extensive global posture coherently diminishes. That threatens both the effectiveness of U.S. power and the safety of those it puts forward to execute foreign commitments. ## Israel's effect in the internal politics of USA The discussion turns to another potent domestic-international feedback loop: the influence of Israel on U.S. politics and policy. Brenner underscores how deeply entangled the U.S.-Israel relationship has become in domestic political calculations, with significant consequences for American foreign priorities. Support for Israeli policy, even when it conflicts with broader American interests or international norms, is sustained not just by strategic considerations but by partisan political alignments, organized lobbying, and the moral frames that shape voter coalitions. This entanglement has produced policy continuity across administrations, particularly regarding actions in Gaza and the West Bank, where Washington’s backing has at times insulated Israeli actions from the usual diplomatic pressures. Brenner warns that such one-sided commitments can be destabilizing: they reduce the U.S. capacity to serve as an honest broker in the Middle East and narrow policy options by binding the United States to a partner whose domestic politics and military choices may provoke regional escalation. The larger point is that foreign policy driven by domestic coalition politics risks becoming suboptimal for both U.S. interests and regional stability. ## The lobbying system of USA and its problems Connected to the Israel example is a broader critique of American lobbying: an ecosystem that channels private interests into public policy with remarkable effectiveness. Brenner views the lobbying system as a structural problem that amplifies inequality in political influence, skews policy priorities, and corrodes democratic accountability. When concentrated interests can buy access and shape policy, the result is often a foreign policy that reflects those narrower interests rather than a deliberative national strategy. The problem is compounded in a damaged political system where transparency, media scrutiny, and institutional checks are blunted. Lobbying then becomes not merely persuasion but a mechanism of capture. Brenner’s analysis implies that reforms — from stricter disclosure rules to l

American Exceptionalism is Getting a Reality Check | Prof. Michael Brenner Today I'm talking again to Michael Brenner. Michael is Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Jogn Hopkins. Links: Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Preview 00: 00:51 Intro 00:01:13 Connection between USA's internal politics and its foreign policy 00:09:28 Is Trump doing something new, or just repeating a cycle? 00:22:19 Discussing USA's military bases 00: 36:58 Is the current US political system sustainable? 00:47:01 Israel's effect in the internal politics of USA 00:51:07 The lobbying system of USA and its problems 01:02:46 Will the USA understand that it doesn't have to be exceptional? 01:08:20 "Kakistocracy" - The rule of the least capable 01:12:00 Outro #M1 Americans are frightened of China not because of anything China does, or even its more efficient SUVs or its infrastructure. The United States is frightened of China because it exists. It's the purest example of existential anxiety—the word for which is dread. In other words, it's China, by its very success and existence, which challenges this sort of foundational assumption of American collective identity: that we're superior, exceptional. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Prof. Michael Brenner. Michael is Professor Emeritus of International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh and a Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at Johns Hopkins. Michael, welcome back to the channel. #M1 Well, it's good to be back with you, Pascal. I'm looking forward to this discussion. #M2 Likewise, you always have very good observations, and you recently told me in an email exchange that you had some new thinking on the connection between the internal politics of the United States and its foreign relations. Why don't you tell us what you're observing? #M1 -- 1 of 17 -- Well, let's jump into things, first of all, by depicting what's going on here in the United States. The United States is experiencing, in effect, a political turbulence which sort of borders on the revolutionary, and it's shaking the Republic to its foundations. Now, understandably, this phenomenon baffles many people, especially those who are responsible for the leadership of other governments. It's disorienting, it's confusing, it has introduced elements of great, great uncertainty. So let's try and put ourselves in the position of such leaders and assume that they are reasonable people—rational, not disengaged from reality, and not weighed down with their own dogmas and stereotypical views of America and the rest of the world. I'm not sure, frankly, whether there are leaders in the collective West who deserve this characterization of being reasonable, rational, down- to-earth, and level-headed, but let's be charitable. And if that strains credulity, let's think in terms of other leaders who most certainly are, like Mr. Putin in Moscow and Mr. Xi in Beijing. I think the first thing to say is that the United States today, and particularly the government of the United States and the whole political system of the United States, is not what it historically has been. It is undergoing a transformation, and it's a transformation that touches on some of its fundamental characteristics. I think it's fair to say that, as of now, the United States is no longer a constitutional republic in the manner that it's been since its founding—not in every respect, but in major respects. In effect, in functional terms, the United States today operates and makes policy in an autocratic manner. And the principal autocrat, of course, is Mr. Donald Trump. And he surrounded himself with an odd collection of cronies. Some of them are, quite frankly, oddities, oddballs, and misfits who have no qualification for really holding high office. In any case, he is not just the ultimate decision-maker, but it's his impulses—his own sort of personal drives and needs—which determine how the United States government behaves, both domestically and abroad. So I think there are a couple of things we should keep in mind in asking ourselves the question: How does another country, another government, cope with this situation? Because the United States' presence in the world is still predominant. It's huge, if you like. And the United States certainly is not reverting to isolationism. It does continue to see its interests and have its concerns in really every corner of the globe. And it sees itself as having prerogatives to act, to intervene, and to influence what's happening in every region of the world. So I think the first lesson is: do not assume the United States is reverting to some form of isolationism, some neo-isolationism. It is not. The other error to avoid is to try to normalize the individual actions of the United States, whether it refers to economic matters like the draconian imposition of these extraordinary tariffs, whether it takes the form of hostility towards China manifesting itself in across-the-board antagonism, or whether it manifests itself in its behavior in the Middle East, where it is confronting Iran—we can come back to that later—and has bound itself, as have previous American administrations, to the -- 2 of 17 -- Israeli government and fully backs the most extraordinary and draconian measures it is taking, including the genocide in Gaza and now spreading through ethnic cleansing in the West Bank, as well as military action in Syria, Lebanon, etc. In this sense, that's the one example, of course, in which there has been continuity in American policy. But it would be a mistake to assume that there is anything normal about what the United States is doing in these other spheres. And I think the beginning of wisdom is to recognize that the world is dealing with a Washington, if you like, which it has never known before. And it is dealing with an American sort of president who in no sense is normal. That is, his personality and character don't fit within the normal range of personalities that one would associate with a national leader, much less the president of the United States. You don't need to go too deeply into that, but in fact, Mr. Trump was called by psychiatrists a clinical narcissist—a particular form of narcissist called a malignant narcissist. This expresses itself in his characteristic manner of intimidation, bullying, total self-regard and self-absorption, and a total inability to empathize or even understand the motivations, thinking, or interests of other parties. So that's the reality of it. Now, we can talk in a moment about what this means specifically in terms of both individual American foreign policy initiatives and more generally in terms of this administration's—or this president's—conception of the world and how it intends to act, and is acting, in the world. #M2 We should do that. But I would like to ask you how you see the continuum of U.S. foreign policy. Because there are two schools of thought out there. One says that Donald Trump is the inversion of the Biden administration, is completely different, and actually has a completely new approach— especially when it comes to Russia—and a genuine wish to reconfigure U.S. foreign policy toward something that can coexist with the Russians. Donald Trump’s speech during his inauguration stated that the United States, or his administration, would be remembered for the wars they ended and the wars they didn’t get into, and so on. Then there's the other school of thought, and this argument was made by another commentator on YouTube, Brian Berletic, that what we are seeing is just a different version of the continuity of agenda, or continuation of agenda, with a different withdrawal because the United States hit a brick wall when it came to Russia. The original idea of breaking up Russia didn't work. So you withdraw, you reload, and then you go again. And what we're seeing is just the cycle—we are in a different part of the cycle. And this is what the US system produces. Do you think that one of the two sees it correctly, or how should we frame the long-term foreign policy under these very, very different administrations? #M1 -- 3 of 17 -- The depiction of today's American attitude toward its external relations is by far the more accurate one. What we see are changes in style and manner. What we don't see is a reversion from an American approach to the world that represents a new strategic conception—much less a new model of how the world is ordered, how it functions, and what American interests are. Mr. Trump and his associates are as dedicated to keeping the United States "number one"—which, of course, is shorthand in Washington for maintaining American predominance, whatever you want to call it. The methods for doing so are somewhat different, or let me put it another way: it is an approach that wants to minimize any American fixed commitments. Fixed commitments and the obligations that flow from them are anathema to someone like Mr. Trump, both because he is Donald Trump and because a clinical narcissist resists any formal commitment—whether it be legal, whether it be formed internationally in terms of a treaty, whether it entails pledges and obligations—because it is constraining. And the imperative for a narcissist is to have complete freedom of action in order to filter out anything that challenges or threatens this exalted sense of self and anything that limits their ability to do whatever they feel impelled to do in the world, to gratify this enormous, outsized ego—for grandstanding, for status enhancement, whatever. And so when people refer to neo-isolationism, it's not really isolationism. It's not even calculated, because this is driven by strong forces within Mr. Trump's own subconscious, if you like, to avoid engagement—any sort of permanent engagement—and to maintain a complete freedom of action. That's why he disparages NATO. That's why he feels no compunction about breaking any norms or agreements when it comes to the conduct of international commercial or financial relations. And this is, by the way, similar to what he's doing in the United States. Most of his very prominent executive orders, which are always in the headlines, are illegal and /or unconstitutional. That does not faze him. They're being challenged in the courts, but the courts themselves, in many cases, lack either the will or the force to thwart him, to thwart his will entirely. Because for the federal judiciary to directly confront the President of the United States inevitably leads to a constitutional crisis, and they wish to avoid that. That's not the administration, the White House; it's the judicial authority. And of course, the Supreme Court itself has been overly sympathetic to Trump, to the MAGA movement, etc. And so, therefore, federal district courts and appeals courts don't have the leeway that the Supreme Court can provide in encouraging them to face up to and to challenge actions by the executive which violate the law or seemingly violate the law or the Constitution. So, but this pattern then expresses itself overseas. Of course, this is, in a way, an exacerbation, an accentuation of a trend in American foreign policy generally. Think: over the last 25 years, how many international treaties the United States has withdrawn from, abrogated, or violated. Just about every arms control agreement with the then-Soviet Union, and reaffirmed with Russia, has been broken, beginning with George Bush's ending of American participation in and observance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Now, of course, when it comes to commercial dealings, the Trump administration totally ignores the undertakings incorporated into the articles that constitute -- 4 of 17 -- the World Trade Organization, which, for all intents and purposes, is dead. It's been to