EU Elites Are Freaking-out Over USA Dumping Them | Dr. Glenn Diesen

Europe stands at a geopolitical crossroads. A conversation with Dr. Glenn Diesen captures a moment when the old assumptions that underpinned European security and political identity are being forcefully challenged by a shifting American strategy, Russian resilience, and the rising multipolar reality. What once felt like certainty — that Europe could rely on U.S. primacy, sustain an uncompromising ideological stance toward Moscow, and export democratic norms without consequence — now looks increasingly fragile. The exchange lays bare how the combination of strategic dependency, ideological absolutism, and diplomatic refusal has left European elites exposed to a sudden reordering of power and influence. ## The dynamics of dependence: how Europe “became a poodle” A recurring theme in the discussion is the transformation of European agency into dependence. Dr. Diesen argues that decades of alignment with U.S. policy choices — from security guarantees to economic integration — have hollowed out Europe’s capacity to defend its own interests independently. This process accelerated after the Cold War as successive European governments ceded decision-making on critical matters: energy security, industrial policy, and, crucially, the management of geopolitical crises. The result is a continent structurally reliant on Washington’s priorities and able, increasingly, only to react. That dependence has a paradoxical outcome. Instead of securing Europe as a junior partner within a stable transatlantic order, subordination has exposed it to abrupt shifts in U.S. strategy. When Washington recalibrates, whether by prioritizing a rapprochement with Russia or refocusing on Asia, Europe discovers its bargaining power diminished. The conversation highlights recent signals — a blunt speech at Munich, behind-the-scenes U.S.-Russia contacts, and the suggestion that Americans may negotiate without European co-signatories — as symptomatic of this vulnerability. The metaphor used — “if you make yourself a poodle, don’t be surprised you’re treated as one” — captures the political humiliation that follows strategic weakness. ## The politics of moral absolutism and the costs of narrative lock-in The debate also diagnoses a cognitive and moral trap that has infected European policymaking: an absolutist narrative that equates opponents with pure evil and frames policy as a moral obligation rather than a set of pragmatic choices. Labeling Putin in Hitlerian terms, for example, served to close off diplomatic space, making neutrality or compromise seem morally suspect. Dr. Diesen and the broader exchange make clear that once a political class commits to a Manichean story — good versus evil, democracy versus tyranny — it becomes exceedingly difficult to pivot without losing legitimacy. This narrative rigidity had tactical benefits: it rallied public support, justified sanctions, and sustained military aid. But it also produced strategic brittleness. With diplomacy delegitimized, options were narrowed to escalation or defeat, and the capability to respond to changing realities eroded. The insistence that “we are democracy” and therefore anything done in its name is justified, as one interlocutor put it, creates a closed-loop logic that resists correction. When facts on the ground shifted — Russia’s military capacity proved greater than widely assumed, the human and material costs in Ukraine mounted — the ideological frame prevented a sober reassessment. Instead of adaptability, Europe doubled down on rhetorical purity. ## Diplomacy denied: practical consequences for peace and sovereignty Perhaps the most consequential point in the exchange concerns the practical costs of refusing diplomacy. By walking away from meetings, refusing to engage with Russian interlocutors, and sidelining instruments that might have preserved stability (examples cited include the Istanbul agreements and the Minsk framework), European leaders forfeited leverage when it mattered most. The conversation suggests that many of the most significant missed opportunities for de-escalation came from within the European policy ecosystem itself: NGOs, foreign-policy apparatuses, and allied states pushing a maximalist agenda that precluded compromise. The human cost of this diplomatic closure is stark. Continued fighting in Ukraine has meant more casualties, destroyed infrastructure, and prolonged instability. More strategically, Europe’s insistence on prescribing the terms of settlement after losses had mounted meant it had less influence over any post-conflict arrangement. If a settlement is to be imposed by those who can actually make peace — as the interlocutors worry a U.S.-Russia deal might be — European exclusion from negotiations will translate into real geopolitical losses: security arrangements, territorial settlements, and the capacity to shape the rules governing the continent’s future. ## U.S. recalibration and the rise of multipolarity A central development examined in the conversation is a visible American strategic recalibration. Whether driven by domestic politics, changing threat perceptions, or the economic calculus of prolonged military engagement overseas, U.S. policymakers are signaling a different set of priorities. Prominent U.S. voices have suggested that the United States may be ready to de-escalate in Ukraine, refuse NATO expansion as part of a settlement, and limit its future entanglement in European land wars. Dr. Diesen emphasizes that this shift reflects a broader systemic change: the decline of unipolarity and the emergence of multipolarity. In a unipolar world, security could be conceptualized as something guaranteed by a single hegemon whose power made others’ opposition irrelevant. In a multipolar world, security becomes inherently relative; each power must account for the responses of others when it rearranges forces or alliances. Therefore, Washington’s new posture recognizes that other major actors — Russia, China, emerging coalitions of the Global South — cannot be treated as mere spectators. The practical implication for Europe is uncomfortable: its security assumptions were built on an era that is ending. The continent must now face the prospect that the U.S. will prioritize competition with China, domestic consolidation, or transactional diplomacy that sidelines European preferences. ## Political culture, elite cohesion, and the capacity to adapt If the systemic shift is clear, the harder question explored in the conversation is whether European political systems can adapt. The interlocutors point to mechanisms that inhibit correction: epistemic bubbles, punitive pressure against dissenting politicians, and the institutional capture of public discourse by pro-interventionist networks. Examples discussed include domestic suppression of dissenting electoral outcomes and the ostracism of leaders who seek a more balanced foreign policy posture. Dr. Diesen and the exchange suggest two interlinked obstacles. First, Europe's elites have internalized a moralized foreign policy that conflates dissent with betrayal. Second, institutional structures — from NGOs and media ecosystems to party machines — actively police the bounds of acceptable debate. These factors make genuine course correction politically costly: leaders who propose compromise risk delegitimization and removal. Yet adaptation is not impossible. Historical analogies in the discussion — such as the difficult domestic reckoning that follows military defeat or strategic dislocation — suggest that painful learning moments can provoke institutional change. The key variable will be whether European publics and elites can make the pragmatic leap from moral absolutism to interest-based bargaining before new security architectures are imposed by others. ## Toward a sober European strategy: possibilities and pitfalls The exchange concludes by sketching pathways and warning signs. A sober European strategy would require hones

EU Elites Are Freaking-out Over USA Dumping Them | Dr. Glenn Diesen While the USA is finally working on achieving peace in Ukraine and ending the senseless bloodshed, EU kleptocrats are having a mental breakdown in Munich over the new US Vice President lecturing them on proper democratic values. The EU hasn't even begun to understand what hit them. I'm discussing these tectonic shifts with Professor Glenn Diesen, a professor at the University of Southeast Norway. Find Glenn on othe platforms_ Substack: https://glenndiesen.substack.com YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@UCZFCDIHTe9HGxtIuVDpBz7g Twitter: https://x.com /glenn_diesen?s=21 #M3 And we can do anything. This rigged election in Moldova can annul the election results in Romania. Everything is to protect democracy, and we're slaughtering democracy in the process. This is the core of ideological fundamentalism. It's not about what is democracy. We are democracy, and everything we do is in defense of it. This is, again, a fight of good versus evil, and there's a lot of radicalism that comes out in this. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies. And my guest today is once more my friend and colleague, Dr. Glenn Diesen, who's a professor at the University of Southeast Norway. Glenn, welcome back to the channel. #M3 Thank you. It's good to see you again, Pascal. #M2 Good seeing you too. And before we go into the topic of the second part of this talk, which is going to be the NGOs, we really need to address what's happening right now in Europe because things seem to be happening at light speed. Since we had the announcement that there was a phone call between Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump, now, at the Munich Security Conference, JD Vance gave a big talk and berated the Europeans for being very anti-democratic and shocked everybody there. New announcements are out that Mr. Lavrov and Mr. Rubio actually had a talk at that meeting, and now a meeting is being prepared between Trump and Putin in Saudi Arabia, and that the Americans are intending to do something that people on this channel have been saying for two years, which is -- 1 of 11 -- that the Americans and the Russians can make a peace and impose it on the rest. And this seems to be the way that things are going, and the Europeans are furious. Glenn, what do you make of the situation? #M3 Well, as I said, a lot of this was predictable. If you see what the Europeans have done over the past few years, and especially the past three years, they have made themselves more and more dependent on the United States. When you make yourself this dependent, you also see that they've been failing to actually defend their very basic interests. And when you fail to defend your interests, you become even more dependent on the United States. Also, there will be opposition emerging at the periphery because any country that doesn't really pursue its national interest will leave a big vacuum. Now, what has happened is the Europeans are obviously realizing that they are no longer needed. The Americans don't really need to listen to the Europeans anymore. I know everyone wants to make this sound like it's only Trump, but keep in mind there was Biden who blew up the Nord Stream pipeline, and he's the one who pushed this Inflation Reduction Act, which got a lot of the German industries to move across to the United States, and nothing was ever said in Europe. So indeed, the first instinct is always to make excuses for it. So I think this has been quite—it's been coming for a long time. So now, of course, instead of being rewarded for subservience, we see that the Americans effectively can dictate terms, and then of course they also come to Europe and express some contempt for how political opposition here is dealt with. And I know there's a lot of opposition to what Vance said, but if you read the newspapers, it's quite interesting to learn what the journalists want you to think. But do listen to what he actually says, because what exactly are they disagreeing with? I heard a lot of angry talks afterward where they mentioned MAGA, Putinist, Christian fundamentalist, populist. But what exactly was it that he said that was so incorrect? So I think, yeah, a huge change is coming. And as always, I think the Europeans get very upset when reality strikes. I remember I had an interview with a Russian representative at the United Nations two weeks ago, and he was also saying, no, probably the Americans, now the Europeans won't have any role in the negotiations. Like, we don't want them there, they have no point, and the Americans as well, probably not. So this is predictable, but we live in our own little bubble. And we have to be honest, why would the Europeans be included? They have made these outlandish demands, which are not serious in any way. Furthermore, for three years, they rejected even basic diplomacy. Forget about negotiations. They didn't even want to sit around the table with the Russians. Every now and then, you might have an OSCE meeting, but when the Russians speak, the Europeans stand up and leave the room in some kind of display of their wonderful virtue. So they didn't believe in this. Furthermore, now they even indicate that they don't like these negotiations. They have this mantra that Ukraine will determine everything, but that doesn't reflect reality at all. And they don't have any alternatives. They just oppose this. -- 2 of 11 -- So what would you do if you sit in Washington and you see that the Europeans will resist and fight any negotiation? And you don't really need to have them there because they're not really that relevant anymore. They kind of surrendered a lot of their sovereignty. So the common sense is they're being cut out, and that's what you're seeing. You kind of have to adjust to reality if you want to be part of reality. And as long as the Europeans live in this bubble where they get to essentially continue to dictate terms even after they've lost the war, it doesn't make any sense. It's like having Hitler in the bunker at the end, trying to tell Stalin what to do and what the post-war peace will look like. It doesn't make any sense at all, but this is where we are. #M2 It is fascinating to me because it shows that the people in power, the people now at the Munich Security Conference and talking there, actually believe in this fiction. I was wondering about this for the last three years. Do they believe the narratives they create, or are they knowingly saying untruths, which they just use because they are convenient? But it seems either they actually believe them, or they are now so tightly locked into what they said that they created a core set for themselves that they cannot get out of. But it's just basic logic, isn't it? You go the easiest way or the way with the least resistance in order to achieve what you want. And if what the United States wants to achieve is getting out of the Ukraine war, then you don't go through the Europeans. So instead of dealing with, like, 25 or 30 states, you deal with the main other. #M2 I usually say, if you make yourself into a poodle, don't be surprised that people treat you as a poodle. And that's the role of the Europeans, all of them at the moment, including the UK. This inability right now of Europe to understand its own position and see itself from the outside, because the Chinese see it too, the Indians see it too. The Global South is seeing it, and they've been saying something about this even, but the Europeans wouldn't listen. They continue to lecture everybody about what's going on, not understanding that they're the ones captured in a really, really weird ideology that removes them far away from reality. This war now brings back the hard reality that Russia was systematically underestimated. Russia is capable of far more than what even our media and our leadership told us. Now, what does this do to the future of Europe within what's going to remain a system, right? I mean, Europe itself is not going to disappear from the globe, right? But it finds itself with another radically new paradigm, doesn't it? #M3 Yeah, very much so, because this is the unraveling of this political West, which we've seen not just through the Cold War, but also after the Cold War as well. But I think you're very correct, and this is the whole narrative they built for themselves: that the Russians are backwards, they're fighting with -- 3 of 11 -- shovels, they're stealing washing machines to take the computer chips. We kind of have to buy into this because if not, then you can be accused of trying to talk up the Russian army. You know, you have two sets of narratives: the Russian one and ours, and you have to pick the right one if you want to have your legitimacy and be allowed to speak. This is the way it works. But we had these strange narratives from the beginning. We said, no, we can't have diplomacy. As the EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, says, I don't talk to war criminals, and Putin's a war criminal, so I don't talk to them. Okay, well, you know, this is the top diplomat. So what the EU said for three years is... We're not going to talk to the Russians. In other words, this will have to be resolved on the battlefield. Either Russia can capitulate or nothing. This is it because we're not talking to them. This is the only option. So win or capitulate. Now, if we had the honesty to recognize that Russia considers this to be an existential threat, one doesn't have to agree with it. But if we recognize that this is obviously very genuine, they see this as a threat to their survival, and you now put them in a position where we won't talk to them, and we say we will fight this till the end—either capitulate or win. Now, of course, they're going to fight. But we can't even recognize that they know how to fight because they're so backwards, we say. That's one week. The next week, of course, they are all-powerful. But we have this crazy narrative that everyone has to follow. And even when we talk about peace, we kind of get used to the same ideas over and over again that, well, we have to send more weapons to Ukraine. This way, they will have an advantage at the negotiation table. But we said this for three years. They don't have any more manpower. We don't have any more weapons. So what exactly are we doing? We make this sound like we also sell this as a betrayal. We can't betray them. But what really is the betrayal here? The betrayal isn't to find peace when you know that every day the Ukrainians will only lose more men. They will lose more of their infrastructure. They will lose more of their territory. And still, we refuse to even speak with the Russians. How is this not a sellout? The majority of Ukrainians want negotiations. They're willing to cede the territory and everything. So why is this a betrayal? For me, the massive betrayals were when we toppled the government. It was when we didn't implement Minsk. It was in 2019 when 73% of Ukrainians voted for the peace platform of Zelensky. And through NGOs, we pushed everything we could to reverse this election. And of course, in 2022, canceling or sabotaging the Istanbul peace agreements. This, for me, was a huge betrayal. And as Zelensky's former advisor Arestovych says, the people who refused to let us negotiate a peace three years ago still don't want to allow us to negotiate a peace today. And this is, yeah, now walking away from this, we're calling this a betrayal. To me, it's just very crazy. Often we need outsiders to understand what bubbles we've come into because I remember the French confused the Chinese a lot. They went over there to talk to the Chinese, asking, "Can you help us get Putin to the negotiation table and finally end this war?" And it's like, yes, we want this -- 4 of 11 -- war over as well. Okay, well... But Putin, he's willing to talk. He never shut down diplomacy with anyone. But we don't want to talk to Russia at all. So