🚨 New Strikes Imminent. Iran Prepares Knockout Blow | Prof. S.M. Marandi

## Introduction The conversation with Professor S.M. Marandi cuts to the heart of a dangerous moment: a region already scorched by conflict that now edges toward further escalation, and a global economy feeling the shockwaves. The central contention is stark and simple — Tehran is preparing for a decisive phase of confrontation while Washington and its partners are recalibrating between kinetic strikes and a crippling economic siege. What emerges from the exchange is not a narrative of inevitability but of calculation: each side believes its measures can compel the other to surrender or at least to accept new terms. Behind those calculations lie asymmetric doctrines, fractured regional loyalties, and economic levers that are reshaping both warfighting and diplomacy in the Persian Gulf. ## Iran update and threat of new attacks Voices from Tehran convey a society braced for further violence, yet not surprised. People expect another wave of strikes within days — a judgment driven less by prophecy than by the observable movement of U.S. forces, materiel, and political posturing in the region. Importantly, the expectation of attack has driven parallel preparations: not only military readiness but also civil planning to prevent shortages and maintain social cohesion. The Iranian government’s immediate response strategy seems twofold — harden for direct attack and diversify supply lines to blunt the effects of a blockade. This is not panic; it is defensive adaptation based on the reading that Western escalation has not exhausted its options and that timing (before the heat of summer, some argue) matters to expeditionary forces. ## US war capacity and sanctions pressure The exchange illuminated competing assessments of U.S. capacity to sustain a prolonged kinetic campaign. On one hand, significant expenditures and the visible deployment of assets suggest an intention to act. On the other hand, the costs — operational, climatic, and political — impose real constraints. The summer months in the Gulf raise logistical and human challenges for deployed forces, and rumors that air-defense interceptors and missile stoc ks have been heavily expended complicate the calculus. More consequential, perhaps, is the parallel strategy: a sanctions-driven siege aimed at crippling Iran’s civilian economy. Unlike direct strikes, this “militarized sanctions” approach can be prolonged, reaches further into the global economy, and is designed to force concessions without the immediate political costs of full-scale invasion. The conversation underscores that the United States retains destructive tools, but the shape of the conflict now blends military strikes with sustained economic pressure — a two-front approach that carries risks of blowback and global disruption. ## Strait of Hormuz and shipping tolls The Strait of Hormuz figures prominently as both a strategic chokepoint and a bargaining chip. Iran’s posture in the strait has not been absolute closure but selective interdiction: passage is being allowed for vessels tied to friendly or neutral states while those associated with governments that aided attacks or permitted U.S. basing are being restricted. That selectivity converts maritime access into a reparations mechanism — a lever to both punish adversaries and to generate foreign currency. Practically, this has allowed some tankers to transit, including vessels tied to distant buyers, but Iran has signaled that fees for passage will be assessed. This policy marries coercion to commerce and reframes maritime control as an instrument of asymmetric warfare. It also raises logistical and legal questions for firms and states that must decide between paying a toll, rerouting, or ceasing Gulf imports — decisions that ripple through global energy markets. ## UAE OPEC exit and Gulf state risks The conversation draws a bleak picture of the regional elite and the economic model that made the UAE a global hub for capital, luxury, and illicit flows. The UAE’s announced exit from OPEC is read as a political realignment toward Washington and Tel Aviv rather than a neutral technocratic move. More broadly, the episode is evidence of an unraveling order: the financial corridors that once funneled wealth — both licit and illicit — through Gulf city-states are under strain. If the conflict persists, the strategic calculus for Gulf regimes will be fraught. Their logistical support for U.S. operations and their facilitation of pressure against Iran expose them to retaliatory measures. The long-term prospects for those regimes depend on how durable their security guarantees are and on whether their economic models can adapt to declining flows of petro-dollars, illicit rents, and the regional instability that chases away investment and tourism. ## Resistance doctrine and ideology The exchange highlights a distinctive Iranian blend of military innovation and ideological commitment. Tehran’s “mosaic” approach to defense — dispersal, redundancy, layered capabilities, and resilient logistics — has been designed to complicate superior conventional forces and to make occupation or decisive defeat costly and uncertain. Equally central is the moral calculus of reciprocity: a doctrine that insists retaliation for attacks, including targeted strikes on facilities and supply routes, is necessary to restore deterrence. This is both practical and symbolic. Practically, it raises the costs for opponents who might contemplate strikes; symbolically, it preserves the narrative of resistance that undergirds domestic legitimacy and regional alliances. The conversation argues that this combination — doctrinal adaptation paired with an eye-for-an-eye logic — will be studied by other states and movements that aim to resist hegemonic power in the decades ahead. ## Iran terms for any future deal A defining theme of the discussion is Iran’s stated shift in negotiation strategy. The argument is that Tehran will no longer accept unilateral concessions or one-sided steps. Instead, any future deal must involve mutual concessions, tougher verification measures, and reciprocal rollback of sanctions and hostile military postures. That means Iran now seeks “mutual steps” rather than the phased, often asymmetric arrangements of past nuclear talks. This proposed parity includes explicit reparations for damage, guaranteed lifting of sanctions in a verifiable and immediate way, and a halt to proxy attacks and covert operations emanating from opposing states. The change reflects lessons learned: previous deals left Iran vulnerable to renewed coercion and to strategic surprise. Whether external parties accept this posture will determine whether diplomacy can re-enter the field or whether bargaining will be conducted from positions of escalating force. ## Closing and where to follow Marandi The conversation closes with the practical reminder that these debates are living and rapidly evolving. Professor Marandi’s analysis provides a vantage point from Tehran that emphasizes resilience, strategic patience, and a willingness to turn economic measures into instruments of deterrence. For analysts, diplomats, and publics watching the Gulf, the core takeaway is that the conflict is as much about control of economic channels and political narratives as it is about missiles and ships. Following voices on the ground — scholars, journalists, and participants — remains essential for understanding the next moves. The debate is not over whether confrontation will resume, but over the shape and limits of coercion in a world where economic interdependence and military reach are both finite and fragile. (End of article)

New Strikes Imminent. Iran Prepares Knockout Blow | Prof. S.M. Marandi As the US prepares for more war, Iran prepares for victory. Teheran's strategy is effective because it is based on accurate analysis about the enemy. Today I speak again with Professor Seyed M. Marandi of the University of Tehran about conditions in Iran, the risk of a new US and Israeli attack, sanctions and shipping pressure in the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf state exposure, OPEC, ideology and resistance, and the lessons of past nuclear talks. Marandi argues Iran now wants mutual steps, tougher terms, and no more one sided deals. Links: Prof. Seyed M. Marandi on X:https://x.com /s_m_marandi Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:26 Iran update and threat of new attacks 00:05:31 US war capacity and sanctions pressure 00:12:20 Strait of Hormuz and shipping tolls 00:20:55 UAE OPEC exit and Gulf state risks 00:31:35 Resistance doctrine and ideology 00:39:58 Iran terms for any future deal 00:47:18 Closing and where to follow Marandi #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. My name is Pascal Lottaz, and I'm joined today again by Professor Saeed Marandi from the University of Tehran. Saeed, welcome back. #Marandi Thank you very much for inviting me. It's always a great pleasure to be on your show. #Pascal I'm very happy to have you back because you can give us, of course, the updates from Iran, from Tehran. We are speaking today on Wednesday, April the 29th. We are in the third week of the ceasefire, or even already the fourth, after seven weeks of war. And we are still inside the warfare. The counter-blockade is going on. The Americans are still very belligerent. Can you give us a bit of an update on what things are like in Iran at the moment? #Marandi Things in Iran are... normal, or at least as normal as they can be under the circumstances. In general, the people who I speak with seem to believe that the United States and the Israeli regime will soon carry out a second assault, a second wave of attacks in continuation of the war. It will -- 1 of 14 -- probably take place within the next three or four days. It's not, of course, for certain. This is just based on what people... it's just the likely outcome of events, and as a result of U.S. regional posturing, the military activities of the United States, and of course the political realities that we're dealing with. So it's not for certain that the United States will attack, but it is believed that within the next few days it's quite likely. And I'm guessing if that's the case, maybe they'll do it when the markets are closed, because that's something that they like doing—killing people, but not having their markets closed. Apparently, the Americans have brought in lots of equipment for land operations and both operations that may take place on Iranian territory near the Persian Gulf, but also operations that may take place deep inside Iran. And of course, the air power and the missiles are in place too. The Iranians, on the other hand, are preparing themselves militarily, and also the government is trying to prepare society to make sure there are no major shortages in the days ahead. After all, the siege that the Americans have imposed is basically directed at ordinary Iranians. It's not so much directed at the military. In fact, it's not directed at the military. #Marandi It's intended to prevent medicine and food. #Marandi Other supplies for Iranians to reach the markets, the marketplace in Iran. And it's intended to prevent Iranian oil from being sold in order to purchase many of those products—foods and products and medical supplies that Iranians use on a daily basis. So the government is busy speaking with neighboring countries, doing deals with them so that they can import and export more than before through the border with Pakistan, even Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, and Central Asia. Through Turkmenistan, of course, Iran is linked to China, and through the Caspian Sea to Russia and Kazakhstan, and then the northern borders with the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and then Turkey and Iraq. So Iran is preparing itself to lessen the pain that the Americans want to inflict. Meanwhile, because of U.S. policy, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the global economic crisis grows by the day. And it's quite stunning that Trump is sacrificing the world economy for the sake of Netanyahu, an Israeli regime, and a genocidal regime gets to determine the fate of billions of people, even those people whose governments have been supporting the genocide, like the Europeans, the Canadians, the Australians, the New Zealanders—they're all suffering as a result of this global crisis. And they all supported the extermination of the Palestinian people in Gaza. #Pascal -- 2 of 14 -- It's interesting what you're saying, that Iran is getting prepared for the next phase and for our next kinetic attack. A lot of people have been online saying, like, oh no, we need to warn Iran that this is just a ploy, but I don't think Iran needs to be warned by anyone about anything. I mean, obviously, the current ceasefire is also in the interest of Iran, but that doesn't apparently mean that there's any kind of complacency on Iran's part, right? And the question, though, to me, is whether the United States still has the ability to continue the war. In, let's say, U.S. mainstream media, we even read that the United States used 40 to 50 percent of its missile capabilities, its striking capabilities. And more colleagues of mine who I've interviewed before, like Stephen Starr, he speaks about 70 to 80 percent of Patriot and THAAD missiles that are gone. They're just gone. They're not here anymore. So what is your assessment actually of the U.S. capability to continue the kinetic phase of the war? Because in my interpretation, we've gone to a non-kinetic phase of the war where the strangulation tactics are being put into place and the blockade in this sense being a... #Pascal You know, being a version of the—what's the word? It was in place before, right? The United Nations, the sanctions—sorry, sanctions on steroids, right? Super sanctions, militarily enhanced sanctions. How do you view that? #Marandi Well, again, a military assault on the Iranian people is not for certain. It's not inevitable. We don't know what the United States will do. But the fact is that they brought a lot of equipment and troops into the region, and it's very costly. And the weather is getting warmer. You know, the region—the Persian Gulf region, the Arabian Peninsula—becomes very hot and very humid very fast. And the summer season is intolerable, really, for ordinary people if there's no electricity or they are working outside during the day. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this can happen anytime again. So please consider subscribing not only here, but to my mailing list on Substack. That's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. #Marandi Right now, May is the transition month, where by the end of the month it becomes very hot. And then June, July, August, September—these months are very difficult. So it will be very problematic -- 3 of 14 -- for the Americans to keep their troops here, to keep all that equipment here. It's very expensive. So the assumption is that before it gets hot, it's the final opportunity for the United States to be able to launch an assault before it gets intolerable for soldiers. Of course, that doesn't mean that they won't do it in a month when it's very hot. It doesn't mean that they will thus carry out this attack in the next few days. But it is highly likely, especially after all the expenses that they've incurred—the many, many billions of dollars that they spent just getting these troops here. But, of course, the sanctions or the siege that they've imposed on the Iranian country are intended to bring Iranians to their knees. But the miscalculation, I think, works at two levels at least. One is that they fought the United States assault and the Israeli regime with the help of the regimes in the Persian Gulf like Kuwait, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Qatar. They assaulted the Iranian nation for almost 40 days—39 days— during the Ramadan war. And they failed. And the reason is that the Iranian people are extraordinarily resilient, and they've shown themselves to be extraordinarily resistant too. And of course, the Iranian military has been structured in a way which they failed to undermine their defensive and offensive capabilities. It's a unique structure, something new in warfare, and something that will be studied in the years ahead by countries across the world, especially countries that want to resist against empire. What Iran has done will be a model, I think, that can be, that will be repeated elsewhere. So... yes, and what I was saying is that the siege is going to have the same result because they failed in waging open warfare against the Iranian people. There's no reason to think that the same resilience and resistance will not assist the Iranian people in overcoming this phase as well. Whether there's a military attack or a second wave of assaults accompanying the starvation siege or not, I think the outcome will still be the same. Whereas the United States has also imposed a siege on the rest of the world, which began much earlier. In other words, we are two months into this global economic crisis that is the making of Trump and Netanyahu and, of course, the Zionist lobby. So I think, ultimately, the suffering across the world and across the region and Iran will continue. But I think it's clear that the United States will still fail. #Pascal Do you interpret what Iran is doing in the Strait of Hormuz actually, like most in the mainstream, as a blockade? Because to me it doesn't look like one, since the ships can still pass, right? It's a very selective affair where friends can go through, and those who ally with the enemy cannot. It's relatively simple. Plus, then there's the issue of charging for that. What do you think going forward? Countries like where I am in Japan right now are going to get very desperate about actually having oil coming through. And Japan hasn't had bad blood with Iran, at least not in the past. Is there a chance that if countries like Japan approach Iran and say, hey, can we make an agreement among us that our things go through, Iran will try to make these kinds of selective agreements with third parties to open the strait from their side? -- 4 of 14 -- #Marandi Well, if I'm not mistaken, a Japanese ship actually passed through the Strait of Hormuz yesterday. I think it was a supertanker, if I'm not mistaken. So that is true. You're right. The Strait of Hormuz was never shut down by the Iranians. Iran only shut down trade that was linked to countries that were involved in the war against Iran. The countries that I named earlier allowed the Americans to use their land, their sea, and their airspace to wage war against Iran. Iran has been preventing their ships or ships linked to them from passing through the Strait of Hormuz. But Chinese ships, Russian ships, Iraqi ships—these ships and ships that are linked to countries friendly with Iran have been able to pass through. Even some of those ships from countries whose goods are being taken are from these countries that helped in the assault on Iran. So, for example, if I'm not mistaken, the Japanese supertanker—its oil came from one of these five countries. It may be Saudi Arabia or the Emirates; I'm not quite sure which one. But it did pass through. Of course, the Iranians,