China‘s Silence on Gaza is Strategic | Zhang Sheng

## Introduction & Soviet Legacy in the Middle East The conversation reframes Russia’s posture in the Middle East as a product of layered history rather than a single, coherent strategy. What emerges is a Russia whose choices are shaped by Soviet-era alignments, imperial memories, and the practical demands of survival in a multipolar era. The Soviet Union’s early backing of the Zionist project and its later pivot to Arab republics left Moscow with a legacy of ambivalence: ideological affinity with movements that borrowed Soviet models, but deep disappointment when those movements aligned with Washington. That dual inheritance explains much of today’s Russian posture — a combination of historical sympathy, strategic calculation, and the residue of past conflicts that continue to inform elite and public sentiment. This legacy also explains why modern Russia treats the region as a sphere of enduring interest. Successive Moscow governments have been reluctant to abandon military or political footholds — in Syria above all — because they are entwined with narratives of prestige, historical ties, and tangible assets (bases, networks, influence). From the perspective laid out in the discussion, Russia’s Middle East policy is therefore less about ideological consistency and more about anchoring status and security in a region where it once played a direct role. ## Russia's Pragmatism in Syria: Accepting Al-Julani The discussion highlights a distinctly pragmatic Russian approach to regime change and legitimacy in Syria. Moscow’s decision to engage with the new de facto authorities — personified by al-Julani’s visit to Moscow — illustrates an operational logic: governments change, but the country and its people endure. Russia’s priority is maintaining influence, protecting investments (including military bases), and preserving lines of communication with local actors regardless of their origins. That pragmatism echoes Russia’s broader pattern of normalizing relations with former adversaries once they assume governing power. The comparison to the Taliban is telling: fighters can become rulers, and Moscow’s calculus treats governance as a reality to be managed, not morally judged. This has two implications. First, it keeps Russia at the table in Syria’s future, enabling leverage over reconstruction and regional alignments. Second, it signals to external actors that Moscow values continuity of influence over ideological purity, willing to accept messy compromises to safeguard strategic presence. ## The Russian Roots of Zionism & Early USSR-Israel Ties One of the most striking themes in the conversation is the deep entanglement of Russian and early Zionist histories. Many foundational Zionist thinkers and leaders came from territories of the Russian Empire; their intellectual and social backgrounds were shaped by Russian revolutionary and anti-monarchical currents. The Soviet Union’s initial support for Israel in 1948 reflected both these personal histories and a momentary alignment of interests: the USSR and the U.S. were the two power-brokers able to shepherd Israel into the United Nations. Yet that early relationship was paradoxical. Soviet support was quickly tempered by geopolitics when Israel oriented toward the United States. The USSR then pivoted toward Arab republics, seeking clients in states that would counterbalance Western influence. The conversation underscores how this back-and-forth left Moscow with a complicated memory: a past of ideological sympathy and cultural overlap, overlaid by a Cold War realpolitik that ultimately severed any substantial Soviet-Israeli partnership. ## The Chechen Factor: How Past Wars Shape Views on Israel The scars of Russia’s domestic wars, especially the Chechen conflicts of the 1990s and 2000s, surface as a powerful explanatory thread for Russian attitudes toward Israel and Islamist movements. The trauma of urban warfare, terrorism, and foreign-backed insurgency has left Russian elites and much of the public predisposed to prioritize order and counterterrorism. In that light, Israeli narratives about security and existential threat resonate with segments of Russian opinion that have firsthand experience of violence justified in the name of anti-colonial or religious struggle. This visceral memory influences both policy discourse and public sympathy. It fuels an instinctive alignment with the language of security and often explains why some Russian liberals and commentators, who otherwise critique Putin’s foreign policy, can sympathize with Israel’s stance. That sympathy is not monolithic, but it is rooted in lived history: the experience of insurgency and the existential framing of conflict that Israel has long deployed fit into a Russian cognitive map conditioned by Chechnya. ## Why Russia is Passive on Gaza: The Ukraine War Constraint Arguably the single most consequential constraint on Russian action regarding Gaza is the ongoing war in Ukraine. The conversation makes clear that resource limits and geopolitical distraction have curtailed Moscow’s willingness — or capacity — to exert decisive pressure in other theaters. Russia may rhetorically support Palestinian statehood and have open ties with factions across the “axis of resistance,” but its ability to translate sympathy into leverage is weakened by the demands of a large-scale land war in Europe. This constraint produces a cautious Russian posture in multilateral forums. Moscow may condemn violence rhetorically and call for cessation of hostilities, but it can avoid using vetoes or decisive diplomatic muscle when such moves could further complicate its relations with other partners or require resources Moscow no longer has. In short, the Ukraine war imposes a thinning of diplomatic bandwidth: Russia remains engaged in West Asia but is less able to act as a decisive broker or protector when its strategic attention is absorbed elsewhere. ## "Our Gaza": Why Russian Liberals Tend to Support Israel A counterintuitive but recurrent point in the conversation is the tendency among liberal Russian circles to express sympathy for Israel, framed in terms of shared values or security narratives. This sympathy owes partly to the Chechen reference point — an affinity for narratives that privilege state survival and order — and partly to Israel’s effective global public diplomacy machinery. The Israeli model of mobilizing diaspora ties, media narratives, and political lobbies resonates with some Russian intellectuals who admire effective statecraft. Moreover, long-standing personal and cultural ties between Russians and Russian-speaking Israelis soften the edges of abstraction. The presence of a sizeable Russian émigré community in Israel creates human linkages that complicate purely ideological reactions to Gaza. For many in Russia, the conflict is filtered through family, media, and memory, producing reactions that are as much emotional as principled. The result is a domestic debate in Russia that cannot be easily categorized as pro-Palestinian or pro-Israeli; it is textured by history, diaspora, and perceived commonality in confronting violence. ## The Absence of Anti-Zionist Discourse & Literature in Russia Another striking observation is the relative scarcity of deep anti-Zionist intellectual currents or literature in contemporary Russia. Unlike some other Western or Middle Eastern contexts where anti-Zionist scholarship and political movements have developed robustly, Russia’s discourse lacks an extensive tradition of systematic anti-Zionist thought. This gap stems from multiple causes: the Soviet Union’s historical ambivalence, the later realignments with Arab states, and the domestic sociopolitical milieu that has not fostered sustained, large-scale ideological movements on this issue. Practical considerations also play a role. Russia’s foreign policy has tended to prioritize state-to-state relations and transactional alliances over ideological lea

Why Moscow Can't Escape Tel Aviv Last week I did an interview with a young Chinese academic about China’s approach toward West Asia and especially Palestine. Today we want to do the same for Russia to understand the complex relationship Moscow has with the region. Here to help with this task is Dr. Maria Kicha. Dr. Kicha holds a PhD in Law and she is currently serving as an Associate Professor at the Russian State University of Justice in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. Links: Telegram Channel: https://t.me/kief_point Video mentioned in the intro: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbewnsfZCsc Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction & Soviet Legacy in the Middle East 00:08:33 Russia's Pragmatism in Syria: Accepting Al-Julani 00:14:19 The Russian Roots of Zionism & Early USSR-Israel Ties 00:25:13 The Chechen Factor: How Past Wars Shape Views on Israel 00:29:11 Why Russia is Passive on Gaza: The Ukraine War Constraint 00:36:00 "Our Gaza": Why Russian Liberals Tend to Support Israel 00:44:00 The Absence of Anti-Zionist Discourse & Literature in Russia 00:51:56 Relations with Gulf Monarchies: OPEC & "Shady Business" #Pascal Last week, I did an interview with a young Chinese academic about China's approach toward West Asia, and especially Palestine. Today, we want to do the same for Russia, to understand the complex relationship Moscow has with this region. Here to help with this task is Dr. Maria Kicha. Dr. Kicha holds a PhD in law and is currently serving as an associate professor at the Russian State University of Justice in Rostov-on-Don, Russia. Dr. Kicha, welcome. Welcome. #Maria Kicha Hello, Dr. Lottaz. Thank you so much. Hello. #Pascal Thank you very much for agreeing to this interview. You were recommended to me by our colleague, Dr. Jakob Rapkin, because you’ve researched West Asia and Russian policy for a long time. Could you maybe give us an overview now of what Russia’s relationship is—not just with Palestine, but also, let’s say, with the new Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad—and this relationship extending even to Iran? Where is Russia at the moment? #Maria Kicha So actually, Russia has always been involved in the Middle East in general. I mean, Russia has always wanted to take part in Middle Eastern affairs. In some ways, this goes back to the Soviet -- 1 of 13 -- period, because the USSR first supported Israel in the late 1940s and early 1950s. But then the USSR realized that Israel was completely pro-American. And, of course, there was competition and a real struggle—a Cold War—after the Second World War between the USSR on one side and the United States of America on the other. That meant the USSR and the United States each had different states, countries, and social movements as their partners. So the world was actually divided into a pro-American side and a pro-Soviet side. Israel was on the pro-American side, which is why the USSR began to support Arab regimes—but not all of them, only the republican Arab regimes, like Syria and sometimes Iraq. It supported the Palestinian movement and so on. And, of course, the United States supported the monarchies—monarchies like Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and so on—and then some republics, but more pro-Western ones, like Lebanon, for example. And when we talk about the Cold War in the world in general, we have to understand and remember that there was also a Cold War in the Arab world—between the Arab monarchies on one side and the pro-Soviet Arab republics on the other, like Egypt and Syria. Iran is completely different, of course, because it’s not an Arab country. Russia and Iran have a very long history of very difficult and complicated relations. Back in the time of the Russian Empire, our countries were neighbors. We shared a common border in the Northern Caucasus, and countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia were actually on that border and were sometimes even divided between us. For example, the Republic of Azerbaijan, which you see on the map today, was actually part of historical Iran. That’s why they still have some quarrels and misunderstandings even now. Anyway, it’ s historical destiny, and it couldn’t be simpler. There was also a period of wars between Russia and Iran—Persia, as it was called at that time. And during the Second World War, Russia and Great Britain even divided Iran. There was an operation called “Agreement” in the 1940s, and one part of Iran was occupied by Soviet troops, while another part was occupied by British troops. And that’s why here in Tehran there was a famous conference—Tehran, 1943—where the leaders of the three countries, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain—Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt—met in Tehran. You know, there’s one funny thing, for example. Iranians have something called a samovar. It’s a special device for making tea. They love it, they use it every day, and you can find different kinds of samovars in every café and every house. It’s very popular—like a cup, a plate, or a mug for us. And, you know, the funny thing is that they actually took it from Russia during the Russian-Persian wars. #Pascal Okay. #Maria Kicha -- 2 of 13 -- So, that’s it. #Pascal It’s one of those things that was kind of a positive outcome of these interactions. They were very sad, but there was still cultural exchange, even during that war period. #Maria Kicha Yes, some cultural exchange, of course. But they also remember what it is—they remember the roots of this thing. And sometimes it’s not positive for them. Anyway, Iranians, like many Eastern peoples, remember such things very well. They really have a good memory of their history. And then, when the USSR broke down, of course, the position of our new country, the Russian Federation, in the Middle East changed, because the new country wasn’t so big. It didn’t include all the Soviet republics. And actually, the Soviet system of the world—the system of the Warsaw Agreement, or Warsaw Pact—was also broken. It didn't exist anymore. That's why Russia began to build other relationships with Middle Eastern countries and with Western Asia in general. Nowadays, Russia doesn’t want to leave its military bases in Syria, of course, because it has always had good relations not only with Hafez al-Assad but also with his son, Bashar al-Assad. Moscow’s position is that Russia cares for, helps, and supports the Syrian people and Syria in general. It doesn’t matter who leads it, who the ruler of Syria is, because there are strong connections between the Russian nation and the Syrian nation, and Moscow doesn’t want to lose them. #Pascal So is this the reason why Russia also decided to welcome Mr. al-Jolani in Moscow just one or two weeks ago? It really surprised me, because Mr. al-Jolani came in and pushed out Bashar al-Assad, and Mr. Assad has long been supported by Moscow. But now Russia seems to be making up with that successor government and seems to be accepting the situation. So does that go back to the connection with the Syrian people rather than the Syrian government? #Maria Kicha Yeah, you know, it’s a situation like with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Now they’re not terrorists anymore—they’re the government. They are the government. Because Moscow’s position is that governments change, but the country stays, and the nation stays. That’s it. And, you know, the visit of al-Jolani wasn’t so unexpected for experts in Russia, because we knew something like this would happen. We saw that—it was clear it would happen one day. And actually, you know, for example, Bashar al-Assad always came to Moscow in secret. -- 3 of 13 -- So there were no claims that he was going to visit Moscow. We just turned on the TV and saw Bashar al-Assad meeting with our president, Vladimir Putin. But this time it was announced— announced loudly—that the new leader of Syria, al-Jolani, was coming. He’s on TV, in the press, on social media, and so on. Also, our ministers—for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs—met with Sheybani, the Iranian minister. And now it’s clear, it’s open, there’s no secret about it. That’s it. #Pascal But, you know, it's surprising, because when something like this happens in reverse—if a government takes over that the West doesn’t like, that the United States doesn’t like in a country— then they’ll do anything in their power to crack down on that government. An example would be Georgia. The U.S. is really unhappy with the Georgian Dream Party governing Georgia, and there’s massive pressure on them. For Russia, which for the longest time stood behind Bashar al-Assad and also has a military base there, everybody’s expectation was that Russia would do the opposite—that Russia would have to leave, that its military base would be lost. But that’s not the case. Russia is now making up with the new Syria, even under Mr. al-Jolani. #Maria Kicha Russia is staying. Yeah, that’s it. Because a lot of money, a lot of resources were invested—yes, they were invested in the military bases, in the connections with the Syrian people, and so on. Actually, I think that al-Jolani is also a kind of dark horse. I think he’s a much more complicated person and politician than just an ex-terrorist. Yeah. How can we call him? #Pascal You know, some people compared him to Mr. Zelensky in Ukraine because it looked a bit like they were both installed. I mean, they even look a little bit the same, right? Especially after he cut the beard. And it’s like, okay, he’s now going to be the puppet of the West in Syria. But it seems that’s also not going to be the case, because Mr. al‑Jolani now seems able to foster relationships with various parties—including, to some extent, well, the Israelis, the Iranians… I don’t know, probably not, but at least the Russians. #Maria Kicha You know, I'm not sure that al-Jolani, or any Arab country in general—even Saudi Arabia—will establish relations with Israel, because I don't think the situation is right for it now. That’s why the Abraham Accords are expanding to places like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. These countries aren’t Arab, and they have no problems with Israel. Actually, for them, normalization with Israel isn’t really an issue. That’s it. #Pascal -- 4 of 13 -- Let's talk about that. Let's switch to Israel now, and Russia's relationship with it—which must be very complicated because of geopolitical interests, but also because of the Russian diaspora in Israel— and then Russia's relationship with Palestine. Can you talk about that a little bit? #Maria Kicha Oh, yeah, of course. You call it the Russian diaspora in Israel, yes? And do we call them Russian Jews in Israel, or maybe the Israeli diaspora in Russia, or something like that? Because in Russia there are a lot of nationalities, and one of them is the Jewish nationality. In the 1940s, the USSR, as I said, supported Israel very strongly, because many Zionists came from Russia—from the Russian Empire, from territories that included not only what is now Russia, but also Poland, parts of Moldova, and so on. Actually, the majority of the first Zionists, the first Zionist pioneers, had Russian roots. For example, David Ben‑Gurion—his real name was David Gruen—and Golda Meir, whose original name was Golda Mabovitch. Then she married and became Golda Meir, and so on. Leo Piskner and many, many others—theoreticians and active members of the Zionist movement— were from Russia. They immigrated from the Russian Empire, from Tsarist Russia. Later, when the Soviet Union appeared, they thought it would be a great idea to talk about getting help from the new Russia, from Soviet Russia, because they had a lot in common with the new Soviet government. Many of the Zionists who left the Russian Empire still remembered the anti-monarchist movement. Hmm, yes, yes. And also, there was something called Labor Zionism. #Pascal A left‑