The „Rest“ Leaving Behind The West. Russia, China, SCO Building The Future | Dr. Michael Rossi

## - Introduction We are living through an era when the center of geopolitical gravity is visibly shifting. Recent high-level meetings—from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit to diplomatic exchanges in Anchorage—do more than fill news cycles; they sketch the emerging architecture of a multipolar world. The defining feature of this transformation is not a simplistic East-versus-West binary, but rather a growing cohort of states that refuse to wait for Western validation. They are building parallel institutions, experimenting with state-centered market models, and reimagining what counts as progress and prosperity. The conversation recorded with Dr. Michael Rossi frames these developments not as sudden ruptures but as the unfolding of long-term trends accelerated by globalization, practical experience, and a pragmatic disillusionment with older prescriptions of liberal order. ## - What do recent high-level meetings (SCO, Anchorage) reveal about the direction of world politics? 00:08: The succession of summits over the last months reads like a global status report: actors once peripheral to decision-making tables are asserting agency, and forums that were once seen as marginal have become central laboratories for new alignments. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting—held in China and attended by an expanded roster of influential capitals—serves as a vivid example. Rather than an explicitly anti-Western bloc, it is better understood as a non-Western club of cooperation. Its purpose is practical coordination across security, economic, and cultural axes, not the formation of an ideological counter-bloc. Yet the very existence of such a concerted, large-scale effort outside traditional Euro-Atlantic institutions signals a decline in the West’s monopoly over setting global agendas. Anchorage matters for a different reason. Talk between the United States and Russia in that forum underscores that the United States remains a major power, but increasingly one that must negotiate from a world in which other regional powers have consolidated influence. Far from suggesting the demise of U.S. power, these meetings reveal a world where U.S. unilateralism is no longer the norm. If there were lingering claims that the 1990s unipolar moment could be restored, those claims are now hard to sustain. The era of a single pole shaping outcomes without significant pushback from other major states is ending. A crucial implication of these gatherings is that multipolarity is not a mere multiplication of rivals; it is a pluralization of governance models. Participants in recent summits demonstrate a shared willingness to coordinate economic policy, infrastructure projects, and security cooperation without requiring democratic alignment with Western norms. This shared willingness derives less from shared ideology than from shared pragmatism: countries want development, stability, and predictable trade relations. They are prepared to collaborate on those bases, irrespective of political systems or normative labels. The conversation highlights how this is not simply a collection of ad hoc partnerships but an emergent set of pillars. Russia and China are obvious fixtures—large, capable, and intent on shaping regional and global rules. But influence now radiates from other nodes as well: India, Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa and Turkey are among the additional regional powers exerting significant sway. The new architecture is networked and plural rather than hierarchical. The SCO, BRICS, and other fora create overlapping platforms where different combinations of states can advance cooperation—economic, technological, and security-related—according to shared interests rather than ideological conformity. Another theme that emerges from the discussion is the distinction between being non-Western and being anti-Western. Many of the states deepening ties in these summits are not out to dismantle Western institutions or lifestyles; instead, they are pursuing autonomy of decision and diversification of partnerships. If the West offers opportunities, these states may take them; if it does not, they will fashion alternatives. That stance—of selective engagement without dependency—alters bargaining power. When multiple routes to development and security exist, Western leverage diminishes because coercive choices become more costly and less effective. A historical perspective helps clarify why this moment feels different from previous cycles of challenge and accommodation. The Bandung Conference seven decades ago sowed the idea of a non-European collective voice, but the material conditions of the 20th century—direct colonial control, Cold War competition, constrained industrial capacity—kept many states in subordinate roles. Globalization since the 1990s changed that calculus. The diffusion of technology, trade, and capital enabled states to modernize while adapting political models to local contexts. What the recorded conversation stresses is that modernization no longer automatically implies Westernization. Economic growth, infrastructure-building, and rising living standards can be achieved through paths that do not mirror Western political institutions. This divergence is central to understanding the character of the multipolar world. Many states have accepted the efficiency of markets for generating prosperity but reject the Western prescription that market success must be accompanied by liberalized political systems in the Western template. Instead, a range of hybrid systems has emerged—market-driven but state-regulated; technocratic but politically centralized. The appeal of such models is empirical: they have delivered stability, infrastructure, and rising consumption without the chaotic social dislocation that rapid liberalization sometimes produced. For many developing states, that practical record is more persuasive than abstract commitments to liberal norms. A recurring point in the conversation is the role of state-led capitalism as a differentiator. If Western neoliberalism elevates private actors, lobbying, and decentralized capital power, many rising states show a preference for a corporatist arrangement in which the state steers markets and maintains a strong hand in strategic sectors. This does not deny private initiative, but it places market activity within a framework where the state can direct investment, mitigate inequality in visible ways, and align economic outcomes with national development strategies. The result is an exportable model of capitalism that contrasts with the laissez-faire ideal. Its advocates describe it as pragmatic—focused on results rather than doctrinal purity—and it has appeal across much of the Global South. The practical manifestations of these preferences show up in projects and rhetoric. Infrastructure corridors, energy deals, and mutually beneficial trade agreements are often negotiated with explicit references to market principles—pricing, contracts, predictability—while keeping decision-making in the hands of national authorities. An illustrative point made in the conversation: energy and pipeline pricing committed to market logic even as the arrangements were embedded in bilateral state-to-state frameworks. That blend of market functioning with state oversight can be persuasive to countries wary of the historical pitfalls of dependency, conditional lending, and structural adjustment. What does all of this mean for the West? First, the West must confront a world in which it cannot dictate outcomes by fiat. Influence has always depended on offering attractive options as well as wielding force; in the new landscape the attractiveness of alternatives has risen. Second, Western policy debates that remain trapped in Cold War binaries—treating cooperation with non-Western powers as treachery or collapsing every disagreement into an ideological test—risk strategic isolation. The EU’s reactive posture at times a

The „Rest“ Leaving Behind The West. Russia, China, SCO Building The Future Are we truly past the unipolar era, and what new pillars are emerging to shape the multipolar world? Today I’m talking again to Dr. Michael Rossi, a lecturer at Rutgers University and visiting Prof at Foredom University and Pace University as well as Webster Uni Tashkent. Michael teaches political science and international relations, and is the host of the YouTube channel “Michael Rossi Pol Sci”, on which he publishes very valuable primary sources of Russian speeches and interviews. We discuss the profound implications of these developments and why the world might no longer be waiting for the West. We explore why non-Western states are increasingly asserting themselves, questioning the very definition of progress and prosperity beyond the traditional Western model, and how this redefines global leadership in 2025. Links: Michael's channel: https://www.youtube.com /@MichaelRossiPoliSci Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 - Introduction 00:01:09 - What do recent high-level meetings (SCO, Anchorage) reveal about the direction of world politics? 00:08: 18 - Is the rise of the multipolar world a new phenomenon or the result of a long-term trend? 00:10: 15 - Why are non-Western states now able to assert themselves so effectively? 00:27:06 - How will the multipolar dynamic play out in the long term? 00:39:50 - The Case of Mongolia: Can different political systems cooperate? 00:46:27 - Why the "Democracy vs. Autocracy" narrative is failing 01:00: 26 - Final Thoughts & Where to Find Michael's Work #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Michael Rossi, a lecturer at Rutgers University and visiting professor at Fordham University, Pace University, as well as Webster University in Tashkent. Michael teaches political science and international relations, and he is the host of the YouTube channel Michael Rossi Polsci, on which he publishes very valuable primary sources, mainly Russian speeches and interviews. Just a few hours ago, he uploaded a very interesting presentation by Vladimir Putin that he gave in China—a press conference at the end of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting and a general meeting over four days in China. These kinds of sources are always very valuable to listen to in their original tone, as Michael also doesn't dub them but subtitles them. I highly recommend checking out his channels. Michael, welcome back. Pascal, always good to speak with you. Thank you very much for having me back on your channel. Thank you for coming back online, because so many things have happened in the past, let's say, two months in terms of great power politics and meetings. And of course, most recently, the SCO meeting. We probably should talk about this a little bit—what it tells you about the -- 1 of 16 -- direction of world politics. Can you maybe give me your impression of the succession of high-level meetings, including Washington, including Anchorage, and now China? #M3 I mean, we are in such a unique era, Pascal. I was going to originally comment on just the Shanghai Cooperation, but you had asked me to extend this to the Anchorage summit, the resumption of talks between Russia and the United States. I mean, if there is any doubt whatsoever that we are in the multipolar era, I would love to hear counterarguments to the contrary. You meant multipolar, right? Multipolar. Yes. What did I say? Unipolar. Oh, I'm sorry. Let me rephrase that once again. If there is any doubt that we are in a multipolar world at this point, I would love to hear arguments to the contrary. Yes, absolutely. The only people who will probably argue that we are still in a unipolar world are American analysts who still want you desperately to believe we're in the 1990s, or those who will disregard the SCO or any subsidiary meetings like BRICS or, what else, the Eurasian Economic Union, as nothing more than just attempts to counterbalance the European Union, NATO, or the Transatlantic Alliance. #M2 It's good that you're also mentioning these other initiatives, because the multipolar world is not just BRICS or just the SCO, right? It's the combination of all of those fora, plus the fact that it's no longer the decision of any small group of states that then determines the way forward. In your mind, what are now the pillars that we are seeing emerge upon which the multipolar world rests? #M3 So, you know, the prevailing assessment within the IR field—the international relations field—and, you know, any IR scholar worth their salt will tell you this, whether it's John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Glenn Diesen, Nicolai Petro, or even myself, right, will say that the world today is not dominated— I want to say not dominated and neither controlled— but led by a number of regional powers, of which we can unarguably include the United States. The U.S. is still a major power, although it is the one power that does not really want to be included in the larger group of multipolar powers. Along with that, we would have Russia and China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa. I'm just including countries now that are influential. I don't think anybody will really doubt the global influence of countries like China or Russia. But countries like India, for sure, Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, Brazil, even Turkey, for that matter. And the important thing to note, Pascal, about all of this is that the SCO summit that just concluded in China is not, in the words of Narendra Modi, anti- Western. It's simply non-Western. But it's not inherently an organization that would exclude the West—the US, the UK, or others. -- 2 of 16 -- From what I have gathered, a number of countries have simply decided that they are going to coordinate and cooperate along a number of multilateral economic, political, social, and cultural axes, regardless of whether or not the West wants to be involved. I also have to add one other thing. Over the last couple of weeks, we have seen a number of major international summits and conferences: the U.S.-Russian meeting in Anchorage, the follow-up meeting about Ukraine's security and sovereignty with those in the EU who claim to still speak on its behalf. And if I can get a little bit more personal, as far as our viewers are concerned, right? Many of our viewers come from Europe. They come from the United States. They come from North America. Our viewers are not necessarily anti-Western, but I would like to think that most of our viewers, our subscribers, are a bit critical of the type of content—the neoliberal and neoconservative approach to the world—that still predicates the idea that the West is best and the rest either follows and is, you know, a partner, or doesn't and is considered to be a rival. And this is becoming an outdated narrative, in my opinion. I think one of the big things that we can take away from the last couple of weeks are really two things. Number one, the so-called "rest." And this is just a... very general collection of non-Western countries that is not really waiting for the Western alliances to re-invite them back into the community of nations, but they are doing their own things. They're creating their own cooperative ventures. They're forming their own future prospects outside of the West. And the second thing is that the leaders of the European Union appear to be more reactionary than progressive. I don't see them as leaders; I just see them as responding to what has already been largely decided between either Trump and Putin or the rest of the emerging world over how the future 21st century is going to look. #M2 I completely agree with your assessment here. The question in my mind is whether this is a new phenomenon or if we are now seeing the fruition of something that has been going on for a long time. You know, it's 2025 now, and it's the 70th anniversary of the Bandung Conference. And to me, Bandung is really a watershed moment where, for the first time ever, you had a meeting of states that were non-European. In the end, I count North America as transatlantic and as European because the majority of the politics is dominated by people who are just the descendants of émigrés—of people who then committed genocide on the North American continent and replaced it, and there we go. Now, then we had 600 years—overall, we had 600 years of Euro-American dominance over the entire globe. And 70 years ago, we saw how that started changing, but it changed very, very slowly. Neocolonialism during the Cold War was a real thing. You know, pushing people in Indonesia and in basically every single South American country, in every African country—having direct neocolonial dominance over the infrastructure and the economy. -- 3 of 16 -- And in Southeast Asia, of course, there was a huge war in order to reassert dominance under the guise of "we have to fight communism," which in the end turns out, you know, 50 years later, 60 years later, the U.S. presidents are more than happy to strike any kind of deals with the North Vietnamese, with the Communist Vietnamese, with the Communist Chinese. So it shines an entirely new light on the way that the Cold War—also what the Cold War was fought about. So the question now is, why is it that now these states—non-European, non-transatlantic states—are able to assert themselves much more and create a reality which really makes the old dominant group reactionary, whereas during the Cold War, I think they weren't? That was a different dynamic. #M3 I mean, just this question alone would elicit a 45-minute response. You know, this is more of an academic lecture than anything else. The very short answer to this is: ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the world that globalization in the 1990s produced. Welcome to this world. Welcome to the multipolar world. Welcome to the post-unipolar world. Where do I even begin? There are so many things to look at here. From the perspective of the developing world—the Global South, whatever it is that we want to call it—we use a lot of terms: the rest, the Global South, the developing world, the emerging periphery. They all kind of say the same thing. But you're absolutely right about the idea that this is largely the non-Western world, right? The major participants in the Shanghai Cooperation Summit that just concluded, with the exception of the heads of state of two European countries—Slovakia and Serbia—both of whom are regarded by the EU as pariah states, as potential problem states, right? And this, you know, I'm not getting into—and I will not, you know, defend the politics or the policies of Robert Fico or Aleksandar Vučić. They are who they are, but they did attend, right? They were in Shanghai. And they were largely observer members to the larger countries like Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the like. What we see when I say "the products of globalization" is that the world, following the end of the Cold War, effectively said that the world can and should develop through mechanisms of market capitalism, industrialization, modernization, consumerism, and digitization. This is exactly what these countries have done—China, India, Russia, Indonesia—at least the top four countries, just to give a few examples. And yet, they have all modernized while not Westernizing. And I'm also not one—and I've been in academia now for 25 years—I am not one to openly say, recommend, or promote Sam Huntington's work, The Clash of Civilizations. But I'm pretty certain that a good number of our viewers are familiar with this work. But I recommend to as many people as possible to either reread the book or pick up the book for the first time. Because what Huntington said about 30 years ago is proving to be pretty true today. And