Neocon Protests in Georgia are Failing (again) | Lasha Kasradze

Georgia’s recent unrest — a dramatic but brief attempt to storm the presidential palace in Tbilisi — reads less as the tipping point of a democratic crisis than as the last gasps of a movement that has lost its domestic footing and foreign backers. What emerges from the conversation with Lasha Kasradze is a picture of a government that has consolidated power not merely through electoral wins, but by actively resisting outside influence and reorienting its politics inward. At the same time, the wider South Caucasus is being reshaped by external actors — from European pressure and NGO networks to Washington’s shifting priorities and bold, contested geoeconomic proposals. The result is a region caught between coerced transformations and fragile stabilization; Georgia’s immediate calm may therefore be temporary unless the underlying regional dynamics are addressed. ## Georgia's Local Elections & Protests The municipal elections produced a decisive victory for Georgian Dream, with the party taking more than 70 percent of the vote. What this numerical dominance signifies is less a triumph of one political brand than the collapse of a viable, organized domestic opposition. The scenes of protesters rushing the presidential palace — loudly covered in Western media — were, per the conversation, smaller and less cohesive than portrayed: a few thousand rather than tens of thousands, a fractious movement without the organizational depth or mass base that characterized earlier contests. Arrests followed swiftly; leaders and high-profile figures who lent their fame to political agitation found themselves exposed and, for the moment, neutralized. This moment of calm has not been bought solely with policing. It has been earned through a combination of political strategy and public policy that has allowed Georgian Dream to claim both stability and a mandate to govern. The absence of a credible, organically rooted opposition is a structural weakness for Georgian democracy — one that the government itself acknowledges — but it is simultaneously the very condition that enables the current administration to pursue reformist-sounding agendas without constant political paralysis. Whether this will translate into genuine institutional renewal or simply entrenchment is the central question. ## Resisting Foreign Influence: The Transparency Law One of the most consequential moves has been the adoption of a transparency law designed to expose and regulate foreign funding for NGOs. Modeled, in part, on foreign agent laws elsewhere, the statute requires organizations to declare significant external funding and has forced Western-backed civil society groups into a defensive posture. The law’s passage and application reflect a sober calculus: for Georgia’s leadership, the perceived threat was not only electoral but foundational — the capacity of foreign-funded networks to shape political agendas, foment unrest, and delegitimize domestic institutions. Kasradze stresses that this is not merely a defensive reflex; it is a response to years of pressure from Western governments and NGOs urging Georgia toward policies that many Georgians view as externally imposed. Requests from foreign ambassadors for waivers or carve-outs under the new statute — in effect seeking immunity from the transparency demands — have amplified public resentment and undercut the credibility of those civil society actors that long claimed to speak for Georgian interests. In short, the law has become a litmus test for sovereignty: who gets to influence domestic politics, and under what terms? The consequences are mixed. On one hand, the law has curbed some of the most aggressive external efforts to shape Georgian politics and has recalibrated the relationship between the state and civil society. On the other, it risks chilling legitimate civic activism and pushing independent voices into the margins. How Tbilisi applies the law — transparently, evenly, and tied to clear anti-corruption goals — will determine whether it is a tool for democratic resilience or a mechanism for stifling dissent. ## Trump's Geoeconomic Plan: The Zangezur Corridor Beyond domestic politics, the conversation turns to grander engineering projects with geopolitical consequences. The Zangezur corridor proposal — championed in certain Washington circles as a means to integrate regional economies — epitomizes the duality of geoeconomic initiatives: potentially transformative on economic grounds, but also a vector for new forms of militarization and dependency. Framed as an infrastructure corridor linking Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan, potentially easing regional trade and transit, the plan carries an embedded strategic logic. If implemented without careful safeguards, it could deepen Azerbaijan’s leverage over Armenia while embedding external actors — principally the United States and allied economic interests — into the security architecture of the South Caucasus. Kasradze describes the corridor as a “poison pill” in that it promises economic benefit but may impose geopolitical realignments that accelerate Armenia’s marginalization or militarize commercial spaces. Two dynamics worry regional observers. First, corridors of transit can become corridors of influence: economic chokepoints translated into leverage for political concessions. Second, the corridor proposal has been advanced in an environment where Armenia’s political autonomy is already under strain. If an economic project is tied implicitly or explicitly to security guarantees favoring one side, the economic calculus becomes subordinate to strategic competition. The result would be a highly instrumentalized geoeconomic policy that could, perversely, increase instability under the guise of development. ## Armenia's Sovereignty and Risk of Militarization Armenia sits at the crux of these competitive pressures. The country’s post-war politics — traumatized by territorial losses and dependent on uneasy external guarantees — make it uniquely vulnerable to designs that fold economic access into security bargains. Kasradze warns that proposals like the Zangezur corridor, combined with the diplomatic choreography of powerful actors, risk transforming Armenia from a sovereign actor into a dependent actor whose choices are constrained by transit deals and security arrangements negotiated externally. The danger is twofold. On the one hand, economic integration schemes that do not equally balance political agency risk normalizing a subordinate role for Armenia. On the other, the militarization of transit routes — whether through direct security deployments or the implicit threat of force — would turn what might have been zones of cooperation into flashpoints. Where corridors demand secure passage, the logic of control can prompt the very securitization that proponents claim to avoid. Moreover, domestic political currents in Armenia — fluctuating between pro-Western, pro-Russian, and nationalist impulses — make policy continuity difficult. Any externally driven infrastructure project must navigate not only geopolitics but the fault lines of Armenian domestic politics. A failure to secure broad domestic buy-in will produce projects that are unstable, potentially militarized, and likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate regional tensions. ## Outlook for the South Caucasus in 2025 Looking ahead to 2025, the South Caucasus will likely remain a stage where the decline of one set of external interventions coincides with the rise of others. In Georgia, the immediate prospect is stability under an emboldened Georgian Dream — conditional stability that depends on the government delivering tangible improvements in governance and economic performance while avoiding authoritarian drift. If the government uses its newly consolidated position to pursue transparent anti-corruption reforms and open civic space responsibly, it can institutionalize its gains. If, instead, it monopolizes political l

Neocon Protests in Georgia are Failing (again) Protesters are trying to storm the Presidential Palace in Tbilisi, but why now? With the ruling party winning another decisive victory in local elections, what is truly fueling this unrest? To make sense of it all, today I’m talking again to my colleague and friend Lasha Kasradze, a geopolitical analyst and Liaison officer for Sokhumi State University in the United States. We dive into how Georgia’s government weathered intense foreign pressure, using its new transparency law to push back against outside influence. From there, we zoom out to the shifting fault lines in the region—Moldova’ s turn towards the West and the strategic dismemberment of Armenia. We dissect Trump's ambitious Zangezur corridor plan, questioning if it’s a shrewd economic project or a militarized "poison pill" in disguise. Finally, we ask if sidelining Western meddling could, ironically, be the key to the South Caucasus's future stability. Links: The Realist Review Substack: https://therealistreview. substack.com/ ACURA: https://usrussiaaccord.org/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz. substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:39 Georgia's Local Elections & Protests 00:06:12 How the Georgian Dream Government Secured Power 00:15:47 Resisting Foreign Influence: The Transparency Law 00:21:04 Shifting Fronts: A Look at Moldova & Armenia 00:29:10 Trump's Geoeconomic Plan: The Zangezur Corridor 00:33:55 Will Azerbaijan Become the Next Geopolitical Hotspot? 00:41:04 Armenia's Sovereignty and Risk of Militarization 00:46:43 China, India, and the Eurasian Balance 00:49:57 Outlook for the South Caucasus in 2025 #Pascal Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to my colleague and friend, Lasha Kasradze, a geopolitical analyst and liaison officer for Sukhumi State University in the United States. Lasha, welcome back. #Lasha Kasradze Thank you so much, Pascal. It's great to be back. #Pascal Thanks for taking the time, because we’re seeing news coming out of Georgia again—though this time they’re not as big as they used to be. Your home country just had elections, not parliamentary ones but local ones, and there are protests again in Tbilisi, in the streets. We read on BBC News: “Georgia protesters try to storm Tbilisi presidential palace.” Can you tell us what happened with the elections and these protests? -- 1 of 16 -- #Lasha Kasradze Sure, I’ll be happy to. So, on the fourth of this month—just yesterday—local elections took place: municipal-level elections, mayoral elections, and the Georgian Dream election. Again, Georgian Dream won resoundingly, with over 70 percent of the votes. After counting 100 percent of the ballots, 70-plus percent went to the Georgian Dream government. But this time it was slightly different and, relatively speaking, easier for the Georgian Dream government to, you know, digest the win, if you will. The opposition has virtually lost all its legitimacy. You can’t even call them an opposition anymore. Unfortunately, I wish things were different. I wish there were a healthy sort of opposition in Georgia, where two parties could challenge each other on legitimate issues. But in this case, there is no real opposition in Georgia. It’s just a radicalized, deracinated—well, you know—really a sect or sects that are willing to engage in absolutist activity, where it’s either them or no one else. They’re basically ready to use violence and try to overthrow the government, which they were openly calling for. So, just for the sake of this conversation, let’s call them “the opposition.” The opposition rushed—they wanted to rush—and they did, to the presidential palace in Tbilisi, openly calling again for the overthrow of the government. And this time, the Georgian Dream Party once again managed to react decisively and firmly, arresting those who were calling for the arrest of Georgian Dream officials, including the honorary chairman of the party, Bidzina Ivanishvili, as well as other top members of Georgian Dream, including the Speaker of the House and the Prime Minister. One of the people calling for this was a famous Georgian opera singer—quite well known in Europe, a tenor. And one of the biggest ironies is that they just try to cling to anyone who wants to criticize Georgian Dream, because this man has no place in politics. The whole country knows him, and he’s just—he’s no politician. So… the question is, how do these people get so radicalized? They're just being bought and sold, perhaps. But it's so odd to look at some of the figures in Georgian politics, some of the personalities, and think that they can be politicians. It's just ridiculous. But be that as it may, yes, they rushed the presidential palace, and nothing came of it. They're all in jail currently. I'm not sure to what extent the law will be applied to them. They might be let go because of their status and fame. No, because they—it depends on... I don't know the details in terms of whether they individually committed crimes or what exactly they were calling for. But the allegations are that they were calling for the overthrow of the government, which, in my opinion, is a pretty serious charge if that sticks. #Pascal -- 2 of 16 -- Yeah, and just let me throw this in here, because the BBC report—I'm quoting from the BBC—says that the government stated 21 police officers and six protesters were taken to the hospital. So there was violence, and the BBC actually claims that tens of thousands of protesters marched in central Tbilisi. Can you confirm that, even though you're in the United States? #Lasha Kasradze I may not be able to corroborate that, but I highly doubt it. Everyone I've spoken to in Georgia said there were not tens of thousands of people out in the streets—maybe a few thousand. But again, this was probably the least powerful act of resistance compared to all the previous protests during parliamentary elections in the past. This was probably the weakest effort the opposition put forth, and it was over relatively quickly. You know, this is, what, almost 48 hours now that have passed. The Georgian Dream has decisively won these elections, and I haven’t heard any continuation of the protests or resistance, so to speak. #Pascal And again, this was just the local elections. I mean, they wouldn't change the configuration in Parliament anyway, but they were used by these opposition forces to stage these attacks and make themselves heard—probably in Europe more than in Tbilisi. And the BBC still frames the entire situation by saying the Caucasus country has been in crisis since the ruling Georgian Dream Party claimed victory in last year's election, which the pro–European Union opposition says was stolen. Okay, the framing is very clear, right? Georgia is under an illegitimate... illegitimate... #Lasha Kasradze Illegitimate government. #Pascal Illegitimate government since last year. And, you know, everything is going downhill, and Georgia is moving in this authoritarian direction. Fourth time... this is the fifth time. This is the fifth time. #Lasha Kasradze Sorry to interrupt, but this is the fifth time. They had one, yeah. #Pascal And now the local elections are being used again to stir up trouble, right? Correct. But overall, the mood you're describing—and what we're seeing with the 70% to 80% approval rating of Georgian Dream—is actually quite clear inside the country, I suppose. -- 3 of 16 -- #Lasha Kasradze Yeah, let me just make a few comments on that. What's happening under the Georgian Dream government is quite unprecedented. We had the ultra‑nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who tragically died—still sort of the beloved son of Georgia; everybody loves him. Then we had Shevardnadze. And then we had Saakashvili, the United National Movement, directly supported by, you know, the neocons and neoliberals in Washington and Brussels, who basically turned into an autocrat. Right. And his henchmen, and that regime that ran the country for nine years, did some awful, horrible things—all under the banner of democracy and, you know, the Rose Revolution and all that. And now we have the Georgian Dream. Now, what is the difference? The difference is that the Georgian Dream government has managed two things. It has managed to withstand the dying pressure—which was still enormous—coming from Washington to open up a second front, to basically go to war against Russia and defend Ukraine. It managed to withstand that pressure. It also managed to withstand pressure from NGOs. So the entire concert, the whole system of the neocon propaganda machine, it stood up against that. And the second thing it did was manage to preside over economic growth in Georgia—um, and stability. It created social and economic stability, in relative terms. Um, and in parallel, just like I mentioned, it persevered through enormous pressure. I would say that the last of it came before Trump came to power, and they survived it. So now what they're doing is, in my view, a genuine effort to fight corruption. And now they're looking inward, to take care of serious issues that will advance their political message—not necessarily continuing to use the past as the reason to keep them in power, but now that they've actually strengthened their legitimacy. So the political vertical is being strengthened. They’ve managed to do this. Now they’re looking, in my opinion, inward—to basically satisfy the electorate, to deliver as much as they can on the promise of anti-corruption. So there is a genuine... I believe, observing their politics right now with the current prime minister, there is a genuine effort to look into some of the problems that GD has always been sort of tainted by. Corruption, in my view, has been a problem. Now, every government—we can discuss that—there are no angels in any government. But what I’m saying is, there is a genuine effort taking place, and this is their way to show that, look, we have to shift gears now from blaming everyone else—or legitimately so, if you ask me—the United National Movement and their neocon supporters, and how the European Union was always, you know, on their case. So now that they have, with these local elections, the perception is that they’ve finally managed to secure their power, and they’re going to use it to look into some of the problems internally. If that happens, and if they successfully prevail, and if they at least create, you know, fact-based -- 4 of 16 -- investigations and show the rest of the population that GD cares and works toward the betterment of society and good governance, I think that will go a long way toward further legitimization. The problem they’re facing, though, is that there is no healthy opposition in the country. That's a problem. Even they admit they wish there were a healthy, organically grown domestic opposition that could challenge them on things people don’t like. Society has, you know, whatever problems have accumulated politically—whoever can take up those issues and challenge them democratically, in a healthy, rational, democratic manner. So hopefully now society is turning into this—turning the corner, if you will—to the possible next stage of GD’s governance, because they’re the only legitimate party in the country. Because again, there are other parties, but they stand no chance. They can’t even get their 5% threshold. They can’t even pass that. You have a 5% threshold for parliament—okay, correct. But, you know, they did let a few other marginal parties into city councils in this election, if I’m not mistaken, right? There’s no serious, domestically grown political party that can offer a real democratic challenge. That’s a problem for GD, and they openly admit it. They’re saying they need a legitimate opposition—but not the kind of opposition that Brussels and Washington support. #Pascal Not thi