They Just Quietly DESTROYED The Western Empire | Drs. A. Chenoy & K. Rakhra

## Introduction: The End of the Western Hegemony? What emerges from the conversation is a striking diagnosis: the familiar architecture of Western dominance is fracturing, not as the result of a single cataclysm but through a slow, accumulative unraveling of legitimacy, institutions, and economic levers. The discussion frames this as less a sudden fall and more a reorganization of international management — the West’s monopoly over payment systems, development finance, and diplomatic narrative is being contested by a more assertive Global South that prefers multipolarity and strategic autonomy. Far from being merely rhetorical, these shifts have material consequences: new financial arrangements, alternative forums, and a renewed invocation of older nonalignment norms. The debate in the conversation makes clear that the question is no longer whether the West will decline, but how the systems that sustained its predominance will be reconfigured and who gets to write the rules of the next phase of globalization. ## Trump's Policy and the Alienation of India A recurring theme in the discussion is the disruptive impact of recent U.S. policy choices on longstanding relationships. The exchange highlights how transactional and unilateral tactics — from tariffs to assertive geopolitical moves — have strained ties even with states that had been moving closer to the West. The result is a paradox: countries that once hedged toward the United States are forced to re-evaluate their partnerships when American policy undercuts the very stability and predictability that underpinned those alignments. This alienation is not merely emotional or rhetorical. It has strategic consequences for countries that prize autonomy. The discussion argues that when a major power treats its partners as expendable or instrumental, it pushes them to diversify their options. For India and other Global South states, that has meant a renewed interest in plurilateral platforms, alternative financing mechanisms, and the cultivation of relationships that do not hinge on a single patron. In short, alienation has turned into incentives for institutional independence. ## BRICS Infrastructure and Financial Alternatives A central, practical response to Western dominance discussed in the conversation is the BRICS project: not as a single political bloc but as a platform for building parallel material architecture. The most tangible elements are financial — the New Development Bank, currency swap arrangements, and moves toward digital currency settlement among member states. These initiatives are designed to reduce dependence on Western payment rails and dollar-centric finance, making it easier for trade to proceed even under sanctions or financial pressure. The conversation emphasizes that these are incremental and pragmatic measures rather than revolutionary ones. The aim is not to obliterate existing systems but to create redundancy and flexibility. A BRICS-backed digital currency settlement system, or expanded swap lines, would lower transaction costs, facilitate bilateral commerce, and offer insurance against exclusion from Western-dominated networks. Such infrastructure can be scaled: these are the nuts and bolts of a multipolar economy in practice, and they matter because they alter the leverage that the West has historically enjoyed. ## The Non-Aligned Movement and Internal BRICS Contention Another strand of the discussion revisits the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an intellectual and normative ancestor to contemporary Southern institutionalism. The conversation contends that NAM retains a symbolic and rhetorical role, providing a language of dignity, equality, and resistance to hegemony that newer formations—BRICS, regional organizations, and coalitions—draw upon. Even when NAM appears bureaucratically weak, its normative footprints inform the behavior of a wide set of states. Yet the conversation also stresses an important caveat: the Global South is not monolithic. Internal contestation — bilateral disputes, competing regional priorities, and divergent strategic cultures — complicates cooperation. Intra-BRICS tensions, most notably between the largest members, reflect unresolved territorial and strategic frictions that limit the depth of integration. Comparisons with other regional groupings underscore this: where some organizations have deliberately insulated collective processes from bilateral disputes, others have found that bilateral problems seep into multilateral forums. Thus, the conversation paints BRICS and NAM not as seamless alternatives to Western institutions but as evolving, imperfect coalitions that must continually manage diversity and contention. ## Will Western States Join BRICS? A provocative strand of the discussion centers on whether fracturing within the West could lead some Western states to engage with BRICS in a more formal way. The conversation notes two different kinds of dynamics at play. One is a pragmatic, transactional logic: states under economic pressure or seeking market access might be tempted to participate in plurilateral platforms where practical benefits — financing, trade networks, and developmental projects — are available. The other dynamic is political and normative: for some Western states, joining a forum that explicitly seeks multipolarity may be inconceivable as long as geopolitical rivalries remain high. Importantly, the conversation suggests that engagement is likely to take non-binary forms. Rather than wholesale accession, Western states may seek issue-based cooperation with BRICS constituencies, or they may develop parallel partnerships with individual members. The prospect of formal Western entry into BRICS is limited by politics and trust, but the erosion of exclusive Western control over global systems makes hybrid, cross-cutting linkages increasingly likely. In practice, this means a world of overlapping clubs and networks rather than neatly separated camps. ## The Future of Globalization and Trade Norms One of the most consequential insights from the exchange is the idea that globalization itself is being redefined. Where once globalization implied the spread of a particular set of institutions and norms under Western leadership, the conversation predicts a future in which trade, investment, and technological standards are contested and negotiated across multiple centers. That process will generate fragmentation — not necessarily a collapse — of global norms. The dialogue underscores a shift from a single, integrated global economy to a patchwork of interlocking systems. Supply chains may reroute; standards for digital trade, data governance, and finance may diverge; and new mechanisms for dispute resolution could emerge outside traditional Western-dominated fora. This does not mean the end of economic interdependence, but it does mean that the rules governing that interdependence will be more plural, contingent, and politically negotiated. The real question becomes who can craft durable, widely accepted standards in a more contested international space. ## India's 2026 BRICS Chairmanship & Relations with China The conversation gives special attention to India’s upcoming BRICS chairmanship as a test case for how a large Global South democracy navigates rising multipolarity. India’s role is depicted as cautious and strategic: committed to a principle of strategic autonomy, willing to work on pragmatic agenda items (like digital currency settlement), yet mindful of domestic and international pressures. India’s chairmanship offers a platform to broaden the BRICS agenda to include wider Global South representation, and to push for agendas that emphasize development, finance, and dignity. India’s relations with China are portrayed as the most consequential bilateral dynamic within BRICS. The conversation stresses that India seeks to preserve space for cooperation without compromising core strategic interests. This ba

They Just Quietly DESTROYED The Western Empire | Drs. A. Chenoy & K. Rakhra With Western elites in Davos finally abandoning the charade of a "rules-based order" and Trump’s trade wars alienating even New Delhi, we face a stark reality: Is globalization dead, or just changing management? And if the West is bowing out, is India ready to lead the Global South? To map out this volatile landscape, I sat down with two Indian colleagues who see these shifts not as threats, but as inevitable evolutions. Professor Anuradha Chenoy, the former Dean of the School of International Studies at JNU, brings the historical weight of the non-aligned perspective, while Kanika Raka from the Kautilya School of Public Policy offers a sharp look at the tactical realities of India's 2026 BRICS chairmanship. We aren't just speculating on the end of Western hegemony; we're discussing the nuts and bolts of what actually comes next. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop. fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction: The End of the Western Hegemony? 00:05:40 Trump's Policy and the Alienation of India 00:08:43 BRICS Infrastructure and Financial Alternatives 00:14:13 The Non-Aligned Movement and Internal BRICS Contention 00:22:20 Will Western States Join BRICS? 00:31:30 The Future of Globalization and Trade Norms 00:39:20 India's 2026 BRICS Chairmanship & Relations with China 00:47:47 Closing Remarks: EU-India Relations #Pascal Welcome back to Neutrality Studies. Today we are joined by two wonderful Indian colleagues. I've got with me Professor Anuradha Chenoy, the former Dean of the School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Kanika Rakha, an Assistant Professor at the Kautilya School of Public Policy. Anu, Kanika, welcome. #Chenoy Hi, hi, Pascal. Glad to be here—thank you for having me. #Pascal Glad to have you both online. And Anu, sorry for always butchering the name of the university—it's just so difficult to pronounce. But let's go straight into the topic, which is India in 2026. What we’re seeing right now—we’re recording on Thursday, January 22nd—is that there’s a lot going on in Davos, in Switzerland, in my home country. And it seems that Western elites are giving up on this entire charade of “oh, it’s a rules-based international order and everybody is equal.” We’ve seen the Canadian prime minister saying out loud, “let’s give up the charade; we all know this was a -- 1 of 16 -- hegemony of the United States,” and it seems the Europeans are willing to end it. However, India and the BRICS states have been working—and have been saying for years—that this system cannot continue. Anu, what are your thoughts on this? #Chenoy Two things, Pascal. Firstly, I think the outburst at Davos—from Carney and others—is primarily on account of Greenland and Trump’s policies, not just toward the Western Hemisphere but the Northwestern Hemisphere. They’re not reacting to Venezuela; they’re reacting to Greenland and Davos. Canada and, specifically, for example, Macron even said in his tweet to Trump directly that, “We are with you on Iran and Venezuela, but why Greenland? Leave that alone.” So the colonial, neocolonial continuity seems quite clear to me as far as Davos is concerned. And the press around Trump also said he was going there to gather some more billions. The BRICS countries, on these issues, have been saying this for years—and that’s why they were formed, because they don’t have a voice and they want to link both with the West. They're not against the West, but they want to bring the Global South along with them—especially at a time when this kind of imperial politics has become so explicit under Trump. Earlier, it had a different cover: democracy, and so on. At the same time, the BRICS are being threatened because Trump has tried, very systematically, to attack all of them. You can see the kind of confrontation happening individually with BRICS countries—not collectively, of course, because it’s not that kind of collective. It’s more about trade, economics, and finance. But Russia, China, and Iran are the three leading BRICS countries. Brazil is already under attack, and Trump has said he would put 10% tariffs on any country that has anything to do with BRICS. Yet at the same time, BRICS is continuing with its own agenda, gradually expanding. I think they use the Chinese kind of slogan that says, “Increase your capabilities and bide your time.” So, just a day or two ago—this has been a process—the Indian government and the Central Bank, which we call the Reserve Bank of India, actually proposed to the prime minister and the foreign minister that digital currency exchange between BRICS should be on the agenda of this year’ s BRICS meeting, for which India is the chair. Now, that’s a very big step because it won’t be like SWIFT, but it will facilitate currency and trade swap deals between the BRICS countries and make things easier. This was proposed just in Rio last year, and no one thought the Indian Central Bank would work it out so quickly. And if they say they want it on the agenda, it means India has agreed to it. Whereas on other things, India was going a bit slow, and there’s a lot of pressure from the United States on India to go slow on BRICS. That’s why, you know, the tariff issue hasn’t been resolved—in fact, it’s been increased. So you can see that BRICS is going to continue to respond to the U.S. They’re not going to accept the kind of pressure that says you can’t have these kinds of plurilateral or minilateral— whatever you want to call them—alliances. They’re not even an alliance; they’re just a forum that’s focusing on the material basis of multipolarity. -- 2 of 16 -- #Pascal I see. Kanika, we’ve seen a lot of attacks on BRICS recently, right? Donald Trump has said outright that he doesn’t want states to cooperate in that format. And, you know, especially with Brazil—he seems to think the southern hemisphere belongs to the United States. He’s actually made a lot of enemies, including in India. It’s quite amazing how he managed to wreck that relationship. What’s your assessment of this? #Rakhra So maybe I’ll also respond to what Professor Chinoy was saying earlier. When you look at the way Donald Trump has sort of butchered the relationship with India, it’s honestly very surprising. One of the things that stands out is when Jeffrey Sachs made a recent comment at the UN about how Trump is behaving and what he’s doing wrong—it found so much resonance in the Indian media and the Indian strategic community that everyone wanted to know more about where this view is coming from and how Americans are thinking about it. Because if you look at Indian foreign policy before, it’ s never been a very comfortable idea that an alliance with the United States could even be a possibility. The fact that the Indian strategic community moved beyond and went into a strategic partnership— there was a lot of change that had to happen within the Indian strategic community, within how India works with the United States, because of the distrust that came from how the relationship was during the Cold War. So crossing that barrier was a big step for India. And for the U.S. to then butcher the relationship after India crossed that barrier is something that doesn’t sit very comfortably within India either. I’m not sure how it sits with the United States right now, but definitely not with India. And just to respond to something Professor Chinoy mentioned about BRICS and how the Global South is looking at the Canadian Prime Minister’s comments. I do feel that there’s a sense of unity starting to come in, because when we look at the Global South as a whole—the whole conversation around it, how the narrative started building—a lot of the strategic community felt that the Global South didn’t necessarily have a unified agenda. And that’s one of its weaknesses when you look at how the G7 behaves and engages with the world. But slowly and surely, you can see a sense of unity coming through in terms of what they want from the world. And that changes a lot in terms of engagement too, right? Because earlier, Global South countries were all on the receiving end of aid, on the receiving end of a lot of institutional structures. But now, if they start defining those institutional structures, then the change starts happening gradually, and they start coming on board as one as well. #Pascal -- 3 of 16 -- Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s in the description below. And now, back to the video. I mean, one of the main issues is that a lot of the global infrastructure is still Western. That’s why it’s so easy for the U.S. and the Europeans to dominate these systems, including, of course, international investment infrastructure. On the one hand, the BRICS have said they want to build alternatives to this. On the other hand, they’ve signaled that they don’t want to fight against the existing ones—it’s not about destroying them. It seems, though, that the United States has the idea of a wrecking ball. Anu, what are you seeing that India is now trying to do to contribute to this new infrastructure, maybe over and beyond the payment system? #Chenoy Well, look, one is, of course, that the Global South is not coordinated. They don't have a command center. It’s never been hegemonic—no one in the Global South has ever been hegemonic. Regional powers, yes, but within a hierarchy of Western hegemony. So, at most, what they have is the Non- Aligned Movement, where they meet once a year or every two years. And if there’s a summit, it’s very declaratory, but it gives indications of how these countries move. And out of this, BRICS has emerged. As far as institutions are concerned, yes, they have the New Development Bank, or the BRICS Infrastructure Bank, as it’s called. And since they meet once every year, each country that holds the presidency organizes almost a hundred meetings, which are very dispersed—BRICS Global, BRICS Youth, BRICS Women, BRICS Businessmen. These aren’t regular institutions, but they’ve formed into networks that meet, coordinate, and develop strategies. That’s how, last year, when India held the G20 presidency, they proposed that the African Union be part of the G20 and at least attend the BRICS meetings. So they’ re conscious that they have to carry along the Global South. As far as other things are concerned, BRICS has no intention of excluding the West. It's non-West, not anti-West. They respect and want to—well, all of them do—even when there’s confrontation with China. And I think it’s come out in many of your conversations in neutrality studies: the Chinese point of view is that they’d like to engage with the U.S. and the West on equal terms. What they want is dignity, equality, and inclusion, and, very importantly, multipolarity—a non- hegemonic world. That’s it. All in line with, you know, the UN Charter. So the institution they rely on is the UN Charter and its bodies, from which Trump himself, just a few days ago, removed the U.S. from over sixty of them. But for the BRICS, for the Global South, the UN is the main organization. They still rely on it because, for the weak, it’s still the best institution. So why create alternate institutions? This “Board of Peace” of Trump, for example—which I think you did a very good analysis of—is really a Ponzi scheme. It’s not an alternative to the United Nations, and I agree with that. But it’s something -- 4 of 16 -- Trump wants to, you know, kind of lord over and dictate. And it’s not just about the Gaza peace board or plan; it’s about any