How to End US Hegemony in one Summit | Dr. Warwick Powell

## Xi, Trump, and the Thucydides Trap The recent summit between the United States and China functioned less like a decisive turning point and more like a carefully staged mood-setting exercise — an attempt to steer two global powers away from the slide into predictable antagonism. The conversation around the meeting repeatedly returned to the specter of the Thucydides Trap: the historical pattern in which a rising power threatens an established one, creating a high risk of conflict. In the exchanges reviewed, the Chinese argument was overt and deliberate — frame the U.S.-China relationship outside of zero-sum logic and make room for “constructive strategic stability.” That rhetorical maneuver was not mere diplomatic flourish; it was an effort to reshape the terms of engagement, to invite a form of statecraft that privileges managed competition over confrontation. At the same time, the U.S. approach at the summit emphasized personal rapport and pragmatic reset rather than grand strategic reorientation. The contrast was revealing. China showed up with a template of state-to-state architecture; the American side, constrained by wars elsewhere and domestic political turbulence, signaled willingness to defuse immediate tensions but lacked the bureaucratic depth to pivot strategy. The result was a meeting that prioritized mood and optics over negotiated substance — useful as far as it goes, but insufficient to redraft the underlying power dynamics that produced the Thucydides Trap rhetoric in the first place. ## Nvidia, Chips, and the Limits of U.S. Tech Power One striking element of the summit was the composition of the American delegation: a heavyweight business contingent rather than a large cohort of policy specialists. Among them was the CEO of a leading chipmaker, symbolizing a deeper reality — technological interdiction is where American leverage and limits are most clearly visible. Semiconductor controls, export restrictions, and targeted bans have become central instruments of U.S. statecraft. Yet the presence of industry leaders exposed the friction between government security calculus and corporate commercial imperatives. The discussion around advanced chips highlighted how the United States can create friction without guaranteeing control. Chinese manufacturing and market demand remain powerful magnets; companies like Nvidia face frustrated demand even when a product is technically approved for sale. This gap between regulatory permission and commercial flow is a reminder that supply chains, market actors, and geopolitical incentives do not bend instantly to policy edicts. In practice, export restrictions can slow technological diffusion but cannot easily reverse industrial ecosystems that have matured over decades. The summit therefore underlined a dual truth: U.S. tech power matters, but it now operates within a set of constraints created by global interdependence and competing national strategies. ## The End of American Primacy? The summit fed into a broader reckoning: American primacy is no longer the uncontested fact it once was. Conversation participants framed this not as the collapse of American capability — which remains substantial — but as the end of automatic dominance. Several speakers argued that Washington still retains enormous military, economic, and normative tools, yet these tools are less decisive when confronted by resilient rivals and adaptive coalitions. Rather than being the comfortable precondition for global policymaking, primacy increasingly appears like a resource to be managed and rationalized. Instead of admitting decline outright, much of U.S. strategy cycles between attempts to reassert control and efforts to accommodate a changing order. The summit illustrated both impulses: gestures to restore business ties and a simultaneous desire, on the part of some in Washington, to contain or slow China’s rise. Internally, the United States grapples with political actors who treat China as an existential adversary, constraining the president’s room for maneuver. Internationally, other states are moving to hedge or realign, making the maintenance of primacy a costlier, more contested enterprise. ## China’s Invitation to a Multipolar World Central to the Chinese posture at the summit was an explicit invitation to the United States to accept — or at least to engage within — a multipolar world. This was not merely a rhetorical concession; it was a strategic offer. By advancing concepts like constructive strategic stability, China sought to normalize major-power coexistence without demanding that Washington accept a subordinate position. Instead, Beijing offered a template where spheres of influence and competing interests could be managed through rules, dialogue, and mutual restraint. This invitation carries implications beyond rhetoric. If accepted, it would allow the United States to retain status and influence while acknowledging other centers of power. If rejected, the alternative is prolonged contestation with increased risk of miscalculation. The discussion emphasized that China is prepared to invest in long-term diplomatic and economic ties that underpin this multipolarity: trade, financial engagement, and regional partnerships. For Beijing, the goal is to insulate its strategic advances within a broader architecture of global governance in which multiple great powers have roles and responsibilities. ## How Japan, Australia, and the Region Will Read the Meeting Regional reactions are where diplomatic gestures meet strategic calculation. For allied and partner states in East Asia, the summit’s significance will be judged by whether bilateral reassurance translates into durable patterns of stability. Japan and Australia, in particular, occupy ambiguous positions: economically intertwined with China but closely aligned with the United States on security. The conversation suggested that these states will watch the follow-through — ministerial visits, defense dialogues, and trade mechanics — more than summitry. Tokyo and Canberra may see a pragmatic opening for de-escalation as welcome, provided it does not come at the expense of alliance credibility. Yet their own policy circles will remain alert to any indications of U.S. retrenchment or a Chinese bid to reconfigure regional security dynamics unilaterally. Smaller regional states will likely continue hedging: deepening economic ties with China while maintaining security arrangements and political signaling with Washington. In short, the summit reduces immediate friction but does not resolve the strategic dilemmas that compel regional hedging. ## U.S. Military Bases and the Crumbling Architecture of Primacy Beyond diplomacy and markets, the conversation turned to the hard infrastructure of American global power — its network of overseas bases and the logistical architecture that underpins rapid force projection. Several participants argued that this architecture is showing strains. Maintaining forward-deployed forces and logistical footprints demands political will, sustained funding, and host-nation cooperation. In an era where fiscal pressures, domestic politics, and shifting threat perceptions complicate those demands, the network that once guaranteed U.S. reach feels more tenuous. This is not to say that bases are irrelevant; rather, their strategic potency now depends on a more contested environment. Potential adversaries have developed asymmetric means to challenge U.S. access and freedom of movement, and regional partners are more cautious about hosting forces that could draw them into a great-power standoff. The conversation underscored the point that primacy relied not only on military assets but on an acceptance by other states of a U.S.-led order. As that acceptance fragments, the physical architecture of primacy becomes a symbol of vulnerability as much as of strength. ## Taiwan, “Losing China,” and America’s Unfinished Cold War Taiwan rema

How to End US Hegemony in one Summit | Dr. Warwick Powell The US-China Summit was one of the largest non-events of the year. That tells us so much about the state of US hegemony after the failed Iran War. Today I discuss with Dr. Warwick Powell, Adjunct Professor at Queensland University about the much anticipated Super Power Meeting. Warwick's YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCwNMn_U9JRjaTrajApH-mKg Warwick's Substack: https://warwickpowell.substack.com Support us on Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack. com Our Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com 00:00:00 Trump’s China Visit and Beijing’s Frustration 00:02:40 The U.S. Business Delegation: Apple, Tesla, Tech, and Finance 00:05: 23 Iran, Hormuz, and What the U.S. Claimed Was Discussed 00:09:41 No Drama, No Fallout: Did the Summit Actually Go Smoothly? 00:11:09 Xi, Trump, and the Thucydides Trap 00:14:56 Nvidia, Chips, and the Limits of U.S. Tech Power 00:19:04 The End of American Primacy? 00:21:33 China’s Invitation to a Multipolar World 00:33:12 How Japan, Australia, and the Region Will Read the Meeting 00:36:26 U.S. Military Bases and the Crumbling Architecture of Primacy 00:45:28 Taiwan, “Losing China,” and America’s Unfinished Cold War 00:53:52 Warwick Powell’s New Book and Closing Thoughts #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today again with my friend and colleague, Dr. Warwick Powell, professor at Queensland University. Warwick, welcome back. Great to be with you, Pascal. We have this visit by Donald Trump in China. This had been planned first for last month, but then Donald Trump didn't win his Iran war, so he postponed it. And then it was announced all of a sudden that it happened this week. And now he was in China for two weeks. What are you making out of this visit, and how do you think it went? #Warwick Powell Firstly, I think it was a very short visit, and there were limited preparations in the lead-up to the visit. Part of the feedback that I received from people on the Chinese side was a sense of frustration, actually, that the US side was not focused on the issues that a summit like this could conceivably seek to address, in part because the United States is deeply embroiled in wars elsewhere, which has drawn a lot of energy and attention. So there was, I think, some frustration that many of the issues were not going to get the kind of preparations that you would normally expect. And as a consequence of that, the summit became quite a narrowly defined event where I think the aim was to firstly just re-establish a sense of rapport that would establish a mood, if you will, that would hopefully carry through to more substantive discussions that will need to take place on a -- 1 of 15 -- whole range of matters, and also provide a means by which the American administration and some of the key players within that could actually meet some of their counterparts on the China side for the first time. So in a funny kind of way, it was a get-to-know-you-again summit rather than one focused on addressing some of the substantial issues. And so the second thing which was quite interesting about the event was, of course, the very large business delegation that accompanied President Trump, as opposed to a large contingent of public servants and people involved in all of the various issues. Interestingly, if you go through the list of the business people who attended the couple of days, they basically fell into, I would say, three broad categories or three and a half categories. The first category was a couple of businesses that are already deeply enmeshed in the Chinese ecosystem and are incredibly dependent, actually, on the Chinese industrial supply chains. And I'm speaking, of course, of Apple and Tesla. We then had a number of enterprises in the technology and information space, whether it was in the hardware environment or otherwise, who at a certain level would desperately love to be deeply enmeshed in the Chinese marketplace but have been, for different reasons, restricted in their ability to access such a large market. We then had quite a number of folk from the American financial services industry, which I thought was interesting because one of the major unfolding issues, you know, some of the big, deep background issues that are sort of percolating away, really goes to the heart of the American business model, its global business model, and the United States dollar in that regard, and the willingness of other countries and central banks to recycle. US dollars in particular ways. And I'm sure that these financial services firms were keen to make sure that they could have a shot at the opportunities of a maturing and expanding Chinese financial services sector. There's no doubt that it is one of the growth areas in China, and these firms would dearly love a slice of that business. And that little last half bit was actually some folk from the food industry who no doubt were looking for market access as well. So all in all, the fact that there were no snafus from anybody, you would say that that was a positive outcome insofar as the big issues were, whether it's bilateral issues or global architecture issues or AI or the war in Iran, et cetera, et cetera, I don't think much progress was made. #Pascal Now, do you know whether they discussed that at all? Because on the one hand, we had last week Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi also going to Beijing, actually, and meeting, I think, with Wang Yi, his counterpart. We also had the Iranians, of course, going to the Russians. We have the Russians soon going, Vladimir Putin soon having a meeting with Xi also in Beijing—everybody going to China these days. Why? Do we know anything about whether the Chinese and the Americans at all spoke about Iran? #Warwick Powell -- 2 of 15 -- Well, according to President Trump's or the White House's social media post/readout, the question of Iran did come up, particularly in relation to two things—well, three, I guess, in a sense. One is that there was an agreement from both the Americans and the Chinese that this war needs to stop. The second point is that the Strait of Hormuz should be open to traffic. And the third thing is that Iran should not become a nuclear weapons power anymore. When you read the Chinese materials, I don't think—I haven't seen any mention of those three things. #Pascal So, uh, and that's not—I've not seen any mention of it. #Warwick Powell No. Okay. #Pascal So it's only from the American side claiming that they discussed this and that these three points are in agreement with their counterparts. #Warwick Powell And, you know, maybe they were raised, maybe they weren't. But they certainly don't seem to have featured particularly prominently in the Chinese focus on the issues that they did cover. The other thing, I think, is that in terms of the question of West Asia and Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, whilst President Trump was in Beijing, reports came out that about 30 ships came out of the Strait of Hormuz heading towards China carrying oil. And so, in a sense, even if President Trump's own recollection of the discussions is correct and that this issue of the straits being open for traffic was a general consensus view, I think the Chinese perspective is, well, you know, from our perspective, it's open to traffic. And, you know, that's how it is. Now, the other point that the Americans did make was not only that it was open to traffic, but that there'd be no tolls on it. Now, I'm sure that China would take the position that, well, we'd rather there be no tolls as well. But that would only be the case in ideal circumstances. And right now, the circumstances aren't ideal, but the tankers are moving, and the Chinese are coordinating with the Iranians, and, you know, payments are being made if need be, and perhaps some aren't. So I think from China's point of view, they've got a much more pragmatic view about all of this, not because they somehow want to see, you know, a toll booth placed on the Strait of Hormuz, but because they simply understand that the Americans brought on this test of strength. They failed in it, and Iran currently, until it can be negotiated otherwise, can exercise the Hormuz weapon. #Pascal -- 3 of 15 -- Yeah, and, you know, there is no good reason to believe why Iran would have to impose the same rules on everybody. I mean, the tollbooth can let the Chinese ones through for free, right, and can charge for others. And if you're on the good side of Iran, which China is, then you probably have more chances that—well, cheaper or free. The point is a bit that the United States tries to formulate this in this kind of “we are defending the principles of international law” kind of thing, right? This is not okay. Nobody's above the law, except for the hegemon, of course, right? But the whole affair struck me a little bit as much... well, there was no drama. I really had the impression there was no fallout, there was no drama. And actually, actually, America, the U.S. delegation seems to have behaved, right, and also went along with everything that the Chinese side had prepared. Or did you hear of anything that went completely wrong? #Warwick Powell Well, no, and this is what I mean. I think in terms of, you know, the formalities and, you know, the behaviors and the conduct and things, it all went very smoothly. It just means that there were no, well, no publicly recorded blow-ups of any sort. There doesn't appear to have been any ill temper, raised voices, or anything like that. And perhaps in part, I think that's because the nitty-gritty issues really weren't put on the table. The issues were sort of laid out at a very high level. And I think you saw that in the footage of the official opening remarks by both presidents, where President Xi Jinping articulated a particular set of concerns and perspectives on those concerns insofar as bilateral relationships were concerned, but also how those bilateral relationships mattered globally. And he framed that by reference to the Thucydides trap issue, and laid out, in a sense, some rhetorical questions, which is, are we able to overcome this so-called Thucydides trap? And are we therefore able to forge a new model of state-to-state interactions? And he went on, in effect, to answer that question by ultimately proposing the idea of constructive strategic stability. And it was an idea that President Trump had agreed to as well. And I guess the core proposition here is that what President Xi Jinping sought to do was reframe the nature of the bilateral relationship in non- Thucydides trap terms. He tried to transcend the dualism that's usually implied, the zero-sum implications of this idea of the Thucydides trap, and create room for what is, in effect, statecraft. That's what he tried to do. And on the other side, President Trump focused a lot more on the interpersonal rapport. You know, we've known each other a long time. It's an honor to be here in China. It's an honor to be your friend, and those sorts of things. And so I think we had perhaps slightly different, not at odds per se, but approaches to this summit that weren't necessarily on the same page. And, you know, obviously people bring their styles to the table, but I think this reflected the lack of preparation on the one side, but also the fact that China does take this question of statecraft, and as a major country, very, very seriously. #Pascal -- 4 of 15 -- Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this can happen anytime again. So please consider subscribing not only here, but to my mailing list on Substack. That's pascallottaz.substack.com. The link's going to be in the description below. And now back to the video. Right. You know, if I'm not mistaken, the last summit between a US president and Xi Jinping was actually in San Francisco, wasn't it, like with Joe Biden in his last year in offic