The West Is Drowning In Its Own War Lies | Anatol Lieven

## Introduction The conversation exposes a striking paradox: the West, committed to a narrative of moral clarity and steadfast resistance, risks being undone by an internal tangle of contradictions, self-deception, and competing agendas. At the heart of this dynamic is the 28‑point peace framework that has surfaced as a potential pivot away from the proxy war in Ukraine. What emerges from the discussion is not a single coherent Western strategy but a fragmented theater in which a U.S. impulse toward de‑escalation collides with European pride, Ukrainian irreconcilables, and deep American domestic splits. The real story is not whether peace is possible, but whether Western political cultures can credibly pivot from endless escalation to a verifiable and durable settlement—without being undermined by their own internal war lies. ## Can the US Bypass Ukraine & Europe? One of the most consequential themes in the exchange is the possibility that the United States could, in effect, bypass both Ukraine and Europe in negotiating an arrangement with Russia. The 28‑point plan, supported in part by elements of the current U.S. administration, appears to be the first time in this conflict that concrete political and territorial questions have been mapped with sufficient specificity to be negotiated. Yet that very concreteness threatens to expose who actually holds decision-making power. NATO membership, foreign troop deployments, and major arms transfers are not things Kyiv decides by itself; they are choices made in capitals in Washington and Brussels. If Washington were to pull the levers—cut off intelligence sharing, suspend arms flows, or cease enforcement of sanctions—the practical defenses of Ukraine would shrink overnight. The transcript repeatedly underlines a basic fact: the Turkish‑orchestrated or bilateral deals among great powers have the potential to determine outcomes on the ground irrespective of Ukrainian consent. That raises an ethical and political dilemma, but it also reveals the leverage already in place. Europe’s current posture, in contrast, is less about effecting the best deal and more about saving face. The European response to the 28‑point draft—demanding inflated military caps, insisting on an open NATO path, and offering maximalist counterproposals—reads as either bargaining theater or deliberate sabotage. Either way, it reflects a continent unwilling to reconcile power and politics pragmatically. ## Verifiable Processes & Arms Control If the central problem is trust, the single practicable remedy is verification. The conversation returns repeatedly to the inability of mere promises or political declarations to reassure Moscow—or to bind future administrations in Washington. This is where arms control-style mechanisms should matter. Historically, U.S.-Russian arms treaties worked because they included monitoring, inspections, and reciprocal transparency. Those elements converted abstract commitments into observable behaviors. The 28‑point plan, as discussed, contains hints of arms negotiations and adjustments to NATO posture, including references to air power in Poland and the U.S. military footprint in Romania. But it lacks the hard procedural guarantees that would make a deal durable: on‑site inspections, phased demobilization with independent monitors, and a transparent timeline for sanctions relief tied to verifiable milestones. Without such mechanisms, a political settlement becomes little more than a pause—an interlude allowing both sides to reload. Russia’s suspicion that a signature might be worth no more than a temporary tactical respite is well grounded in the memory that U.S. policy can be overturned by subsequent administrations. From Moscow’s point of view, then, only processes that can be monitored and enforced over time will bear the weight of strategic change. ## Signals of US Withdrawal & The China Factor The global context changes the calculation. Several voices in the conversation suggest that the Trump administration—at least in part—sees a negotiated detente with Russia as instrumental to a larger pivot toward China. U.S. domestic politics complicate this: factions favoring continued pressure on Russia coexist with those prioritizing the Asia challenge. Signs of an American recalibration already appear: reductions in the U.S. military footprint in Eastern Europe and public signals that Washington might be prepared to accept limitations on NATO’s forward posture. For Moscow, that is precisely the carrot that could make a deal attractive. Yet even a U.S. signal of withdrawal cannot be read in isolation. The fragility of any deal stems from the short political half‑life of American commitments right now. If a bargain is struck in 2025 and reversed in 2029, the strategic benefits evaporate. More practically, the United States faces the risk of escalation if it pushes economic measures beyond current bounds—such as seizing Russian cargo at sea. Such steps would amount to maritime blockade and could trigger kinetic retaliation. That is a red line not only for Russia but for U.S. military planners. So, while the U.S. may have the capacity to bypass partners tactically, strategic prudence and the China competition impose real constraints on how far Washington can press without inviting wider confrontation. ## Russia's Negotiation Strategy & The Long Game If we shift the focus eastward, the conversation reveals that Russia is playing a cautious, long‑term game rather than a rash maximalism. The initial Russian responses to the 28‑point draft were more flexible than many analysts expected: willingness to delegate some minority‑rights questions to European frameworks, openness to staged sanctions relief, and even a pragmatic view on using Russian assets to help reconstruction—if framed as voluntary rather than reparative. Those concessions suggest Moscow sees advantage in freezing or winding down the conflict if its principal security aims are secured. Russia’s calculus is shaped by several factors discussed in the exchange. On the ground, the Donbas question remains the most intractable politically, but demographically and militarily it is becoming less tenable to hold indefinitely against attrition. Politically, Moscow knows the EU cannot realistically offer Ukraine either NATO membership or rapid integration into the EU acquis; promises in Brussels are conditional and administratively onerous. Hence, a deal that freezes borders and secures Russian influence in contested territories could, over time, be preferable to a protracted low‑grade war that risks deeper economic and military bleed for all sides. Yet Russia’s acceptance of any settlement is contingent on two linked truths: first, that guarantees must be verifiable and operational, and second, that the agreement must leave Russia with durable strategic gains. Moscow fears the “Ukrainization” of Europe—where EU accession becomes a vector for exporting Ukrainian nationalist politics into European institutions—but also recognizes that a failed promise of inclusion would destabilize Kyiv and play into Russian hands. In sum, Russia is treating negotiation as an exercise in incremental advantage: accept what is on offer if it secures long-term buffer zones and a reduction of Western coercive leverage; refuse and risk further attrition and uncertainty. Conclusion: The West’s credibility problem is not rhetorical. It is institutional. The biggest obstacle to a genuine settlement is less Russian maximalism than Western inability to translate political aims into credible, verifiable arrangements that can survive domestic politics and electoral cycles. If the United States genuinely seeks to pivot away from conflict—whether to focus on China or simply to spare Ukraine further devastation—it must bind any agreement with enforceable processes that make promises observable and reversible only at a strategic cost. Otherwise, Europe’s insistence on face‑saving demand

The West Is Drowning In Its Own War Lies If war is the continuation of politics by other means—as Clausewitz once said—then, logically, politics is also the continuation of war by other means. Is the US currently trying to switch back from one to the other in its Proxy War in Ukraine through the 28 point peace plan? Here to discuss this with me is Anatol Lieven, the director of the Eurasia Program and the Andrew Bacevich chair in American Diplomatic History at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Links: Responsible Statecraft: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/ Anatol's UnHerd articles: https://unherd.com/author /anatol-lieven/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:02:52 European Sabotage & The Donbass Problem 00:08:39 Can the US Bypass Ukraine & Europe? 00:14:15 Is Peace Just a Pause to Reload? 00:19:09 Verifiable Processes & Arms Control 00:22:49 EU Membership & The "Ukrainization" of Europe 00:35:43 Signals of US Withdrawal & The China Factor 00:43:30 Internal US Politics: MAGA Splits & Populism 00:48:06 Russia's Negotiation Strategy & The Long Game #Pascal If war is the continuation of politics by other means, as Mr. Clausewitz once told us, then, logically, politics is also the continuation of war by other means. Is the United States currently trying to switch back from one to the other in its proxy war in Ukraine through the 28-point peace plan? Here to discuss this with me is Anatol Lieven, the director of the Eurasia Program and the Andrew Bacevich Chair in American Diplomatic History at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Anatol, welcome back. Hello. Nice to be back. Thanks for coming online. I’d really like to pick your brain on where you think this is going— especially if the United States and the Trump team are serious about the 28 points. The Russians have signaled so far that they’re willing to entertain the idea. It might be good in some respects, not in others, but they’re willing to go along. The Europeans, meanwhile, are now trying to sabotage it. But first of all, do you think this is a new approach by the U.S. administration toward the European theater? #Anatol Lieven Well, I think it is, at least on the part of the Trump administration. You know, Witkoff certainly seems to have thrown his weight behind this, as has J.D. Vance. But it's not nearly as clear that Rubio, the Secretary of State, is behind it. And of course, there's this tremendous ambiguity, doubt, and confusion about what he actually said to the senators when he met them about it. And we know -- 1 of 15 -- that Kellogg is against it. In fact, Kellogg is basically, I think, resigning over this. So it would appear that there are deep divisions within the Trump administration. But I don't think there's any doubt that Trump, in principle, wants to get this war finished. And, I mean, what’s new about this is that only last month I was told by both Russian and American officials that the negotiating teams still hadn’t engaged in detail with many of these concrete issues. Well, now they have. I mean, they haven’t nailed down completely some of the issues, but actually, you know, all the key points are addressed in this 28‑point plan. The European response seems to me very strange, frankly, and it does raise questions. The thing is, as far as I can see, there’s only one aspect of this 28‑point plan that is really, really difficult for the Ukrainians—and I’ve always said it’s very difficult, and I can understand their objections—and that’s the call for withdrawal from the whole of the Donbas. Because, I mean, it seems that if you read the BBC, quite a few Ukrainian soldiers are now prepared to give it up, because, well, they don’t want to die for somewhere they think they’re bound to lose anyway. But, you know, on the other hand, people who’ve fought and suffered for so long to keep this slice of land—you understand why they don’t want to abandon it. Although, of course, in the 28‑point plan, this territory is going to be demilitarized. So it’s not a question of the Russian army moving forward to take it over. From a security point of view, Ukraine will have protection, but it will come under Russian administration. Now, this is only 1% of Ukraine—of the whole of Ukraine—and it’s largely depopulated anyway. If the war goes on and Russia closes in on Kramatorsk, then the whole place will be depopulated. So, you know, in a rational world, this shouldn’t be so difficult—but it is difficult. But there are other things in the European and Ukrainian response—their 19‑point plan, or whatever it is; I’m getting my plans confused by now—which seem very strange. I mean, one of them is this demand that the Ukrainian army be capped at 800,000 men rather than 600,000, you know, in the initial draft. Because, firstly, you know, in Istanbul at the start of the war, the Ukrainians were ready to agree to 250,000 as the cap. But also, even 600,000 is as much as the British, French, and German armies—the current ones—put together. And there’s no way that Ukraine can sustain an army of even 600,000 men in peacetime. I mean, you have, of course, reserves, conscripts, who you then recall to service. But, you know, they’ll never have the money to sustain that size of peacetime army. And similarly, I mean, keeping NATO membership open—they must know by now they're never going to get into NATO. I mean, it's obviously a matter of pride and a face‑saving thing for both sides. But it does... I mean, the European reassurance force—even the British have admitted now they're not going to send ground troops because they don't have any ground troops. So, I mean, there are two ways of reading this. One, the optimistic version would be that they don’t take these things seriously and are putting them down as bargaining counters, so that they can then say, you know, all right, we’ll no longer insist on this, we’ll no longer insist on that, but the Russians have to give up the demand for the whole of the Donbass. -- 2 of 15 -- Now, that would be the optimistic version. The pessimistic version is that this is a deliberate attempt at sabotage—at wrecking the peace process. I'm not sure, frankly. I mean, if it is a deliberate attempt to break the peace process, then this is truly malevolent, because there is, frankly, no chance whatsoever—none—that the deal Ukraine will get a year down the line will be any better. I mean, possibly it will be able to hang on to a bit of the Donbass, but everything else the Russians are not going to compromise on. Much worse, exactly. And the Ukrainians and Europeans will be risking a complete Ukrainian collapse if this war goes on. #Pascal Yeah, and the Russians have already said, look, it's thinkable to go to Odessa, right, and connect what they have all the way up to Transnistria. So, I mean, I think that's actually on the cards as one of the potential futures. #Anatol Lieven Well, if the Ukrainian army collapses completely—and it would have to collapse completely, because remember, the Russians have to get across the Dnieper River, which is not easy—one could certainly imagine them capturing Zaporizhia and a whole swathe of Kharkiv, and then trying to exchange it. I mean, we can’t say that for sure. Obviously, the Russian advance over the past year has been extremely slow—grindingly slow. But then, you know, there’s so much evidence now of enormous Ukrainian difficulties. Also, so much will depend on who Trump blames for the collapse of this peace process, if it does collapse. Because, you know, if he blames the Russians, then pressure continues, sanctions continue, U.S. arms sales continue, intelligence provision continues. But if he blames the Ukrainians and Europeans, then, of course, he could cut off the arms sales and the intelligence. And then the Ukrainians would be in a really desperate situation. #Pascal That's the real question to me. Would you do that? Because if the United States really pulls out— including the intelligence sharing, the satellites, and so on—the Ukrainians would be basically blind, and there's nothing Europe can do to change that, right? So, in a sense—and I’ve discussed this earlier in another talk with Michael Rossi—if it’s Russia and the United States coming to an agreement, would they even need Ukraine to sign off on that? Or would they need Europe? I mean, if they agree and actually make a framework and stick to that framework, how could the Ukrainians wreck it, other than, you know, a little shooting at a couple of soldiers here and there, where in the end the defense will be? #Anatol Lieven -- 3 of 15 -- Well, I mean, the thing is, this is where, you know, in so many ways, most Western reporting and analysis has been so shamefully bad. Because, of course, there’s a whole range of things that are portrayed as being, you know, “Ukraine must have the final say, this is Ukraine’s decision,” which they aren’t. NATO membership is not a matter for Ukraine. European or Western forces in Ukraine are not a matter for Ukraine. Arms provision, arms sales—those are not matters for Ukraine. These are matters for Western governments, and above all, the United States. But, of course, the Ukrainian army would have to withdraw from the rest of the Donbass—that is for Ukraine to decide. #Anatol Lieven Well, it's very interesting. The Russians have gone further in this initial draft than I expected on some things. I mean, one of them is that I didn’t think they would be willing to leave the question of Russian rights in Ukraine up to the European Union accession process. Because after what happened to the Russian minorities in the Baltic states, all the Russians I talked to said, “We can’t trust the European Union on that.” But, you know, in the initial draft, that’s what it was. I mean, there were also going to be certain commitments from Ukraine, but very vague ones. #Pascal Although we don't know, in the initial draft, what was actually cleared with the Russians and what wasn’t. I mean, that might just be... I mean, it's one of those things—they ping-pong it back and forth and so on. And, you know, we don't know what was inserted at which point and what was agreed on. That's true. Yeah, yeah. #Anatol Lieven But still... I mean, you know, the Russians have backed that draft in principle, not the latest European one. They haven’t committed themselves absolutely to it, but Putin said that, in essence, it’ s acceptable. And—wait—there was something else as well, which was quite interesting. Oh, yes, that sanctions will only be lifted in stages, and there’s no timetable. I had always assumed the Russians were going to insist on the suspension of sanctions as part of the peace deal. And then, of course, when it comes to the initial deal on Russia's assets being used for the reconstruction of Ukraine, I was told in Moscow that Russia would actually accept that, as long as it’s not phrased in any way as reparations—that it’s Russia’s decision, basically, to give this money for the reconstruction of Ukraine, and that it would be shared between the areas under the Ukrainian government and those under Russian occupation. And then people differed. Some said it would have to be 50–50. Others said, no, we could accept 20–80, since we know it’s very... Otherwise, you know, we risk losing this money altogether. But the European and Ukrainian counter-proposal is totally unacceptable to the Russians. So... -- 4 of 15 -- #Pascal Yeah, I mean, I didn’t actually expect anything else to come out of Europe, to be honest, because it seems to me they really prefer to let Ukraine keep bleeding if it means not losing face right now— rather than later, maybe when some of these governments aren’t even in power anymore, right? Then they can say, “I did all I could, and the next guy, he screwed it up.” The bigger question... You’ re right. #Anatol Lieven I mean