Pure PANIC And Grief in Europe Over US-Russia Negotiations | Ex-Diplomat: Ian Proud

## Panic and Grief in Europe Across Paris, Berlin, Brussels and London a political and media shockwave has been unfolding: the United States has signalled a willingness to engage directly with Moscow, and Europe’s long-held narrative of total confrontation is suddenly destabilized. The conversation with former British diplomat Ian Proud captures the atmosphere: not merely surprise, but what he calls “panic and grief” — the emotional reaction of elites and publics who have invested heavily in a single storyline about Russia. That storyline held that maximum pressure and sustained isolation would either break Moscow or at least keep it contained. Suddenly, the script is changing, and an entire ecosystem of policy, funding, and media certainty is revealed as brittle. This is not just a disagreement over tactics. The shock reveals that much of Europe’s posture toward Russia has been built on a performative consensus rather than a durable strategic calculus. The conversation makes plain a central paradox: the same power — the United States — that helped harden European resolve against Russia has now become the actor capable of recalibrating the entire Western approach, leaving allies scrambling to find meaning and agency. That dislocation forces a question that runs through every paragraph of the discussion: how does a polity retrench its dignity, strategic space and practical policy when its narrative collapses overnight? ## The Collapse of a Propaganda-Based Policy Ian Proud frames one of the most important diagnoses bluntly: for more than a decade, parts of Europe pursued a policy of propaganda-as-policy. Starting in 2014, conversations with Russia were often foreclosed; public diplomacy, op-eds and partisan reporting substituted for back-channel engagement and negotiation. Proud argues that the British state and media conducted a “blizzard of propaganda” that ossified into de facto policy — a sustained attempt to delegitimize and isolate Russia through narrative control rather than through sustained strategic diplomacy. That strategy produced an intellectual monoculture: repeated predictions of Russian collapse, ubiquitous claims about imminent regime change, and a steady diet of tales about military shortages and battlefield failures. When reality failed to conform, cognitive dissonance set in. Media outlets and political parties that spent years insisting on Russia’s imminent defeat now find themselves awkwardly repositioning. The result, as Proud notes, is a state of flux where institutions scramble to reconcile past certainty with present ambiguity. The broader lesson here is institutional: when policy is driven by media narratives rather than by robust diplomacy and contingency planning, the polity becomes unable to respond flexibly to strategic shifts. The current moment — when talks or signals of negotiation emerge from Washington — exposes that fragility. What was presented as principled resolve unravels into the embarrassing sight of states and institutions scrambling to save face. ## America’s Lone Hand and Europe’s Strategic Drift A recurring theme in the conversation is the cyclical relationship between Europe and the United States: Washington drives a policy, Europe follows, the outcome becomes problematic, and the U.S. once again reshapes the agenda. Proud describes this as a political cycle that leaves Europe in a subordinate posture — a dynamic that breeds dependency and strategic drift. The Americans, he argues, have both pushed Europe into confrontation and now seem to be the only actors capable of changing course. This dynamic is less a moral indictment than a structural observation. European governments have relied heavily on the U.S. for security guarantees, material support for Ukraine, and diplomatic leadership. That reliance was always politically convenient inside capitals because it allowed domestic elites to outsource hard, divisive choices. But dependence has a cost: sudden shifts in U.S. posture — whether due to electoral change or strategic recalculation — expose Europe’s lack of independent tools. Proud highlights the irony that Washington is often perceived in Moscow as less reflexively hostile than Europe’s media and political establishments would have it. Whether that perception is accurate is secondary to its effect: the belief that the U.S. might pragmatically engage Russia has shattered assertive European narratives and forced capitals to ask what policies are genuinely European and what are reactions to an American lead. ## The Risk of Spoilers and Domestic Backlash Any pivot toward negotiation or détente carries the risk of spoilers — actors who, for ideological, political or criminal reasons, seek to sabotage the process. Proud and the conversation point to concrete examples: attacks on Russian diplomatic missions and heightened domestic tensions in states already fractured by economic strain. Spoilers can be violent, but they can also be political: nationalist parties, emboldened opposition movements, or coalition partners can disrupt a delicate shift toward engagement. The material capacity of Europe to sustain a long, indefinite conflict is eroding. Economies are strained, energy markets have been reshaped, and domestic political balances are shifting toward more nationalist and skeptical parties across Central and Eastern Europe. Proud notes that continuing to bankroll a war whose strategic contours are being reshaped by an Atlantic actor could fracture unions, empower populists, and set off a cascade of election defeats for incumbents who have bet public credibility on an enduring confrontation. There is also the military-industrial constraint: European defense production cannot easily replace U.S. supply chains and systems. Even if political willingness existed to sustain higher spending, sourcing sophisticated weaponry at scale is limited by industrial capacity. That structural reality constrains the range of credible European responses and makes the decision calculus around continued support for Ukraine both political and technical. ## Toward a European Foreign Policy with Russia The conversation repeatedly returns to one prescriptive insight: Europe needs a genuinely European policy toward Russia — durable, strategic, and insulated from transatlantic electoral swings. Proud insists that a policy should focus on long-term strategic interests, not solely on symbolic punishment. That entails, controversially for many, a willingness to re-engage economically, to think about sanctions relief tied to verifiable steps, and to re-open channels of communication that have been shuttered for years. This is not about appeasement; it is about realism. If economic interdependence and diplomatic engagement have historically mitigated conflict, cutting off those avenues leaves only zero-sum confrontation. A European-centered policy would mean negotiating terms that take account of Moscow’s security concerns while preserving Ukrainian sovereignty and reparative justice where appropriate. Proud suggests that such a policy would be more robust if owned by European institutions — not because Europe can force a settlement alone, but because owning the narrative reduces the humiliation of sudden transatlantic shifts. There are political obstacles: many European elites and much of the public have consumed a decade of binary messaging that frames negotiation as betrayal. But institutionalizing a European line would require honest public conversation about costs, benefits and the limits of military solutions. It would also require a willingness to design conditional re-engagement frameworks that tie relief to tangible, enforceable outcomes. ## Practical Steps for a Quiet Pivot If governments choose to change course without losing face, the conversation suggests several pragmatic steps. First, incrementalism: shifts in posture should be gradual and framed as adjustments rather than reversals. Proud points t

Pure PANIC And Grief in Europe Over US- Russia Negotiations | Ex-Diplomat Ian Proud From Paris, Berlin, Brussels and London, all of Europe is in panic and shock over the US dropping its allies for a better relationship with the former "Enemy Nr.1". What happened and how is European media reporting this? Is there any kind of "foreign policy" that we could talk about? Short answer: no. Ian Proud was a British Diplomat from 1999 until 2023. He worked in Thailand, Afghanistan, and Russia. And recently published a book called “A Mistfit in Moscow: How British Diplomacy in Russia Failed” (https://www.amazon.co.jp/-/en/Ian-T-Proud/dp/1739543106) Today we want to discuss Europe’s deep crisis over the peace talks that are underway between Washington and Moscow—Ian has been publishing several great articles about this over on his Substack and I can’t wait to pick his brain. So Ian, welcome back. Ian's Substack: https://thepeacemonger.substack.com #Ian The countless op-eds and media reports about the imminent collapse of Russia, about Putin's imminent death, and all these things are all wrong. And, you know, now people have got to face up to that. And it hurts. It hurts like mad because those damn Americans have done it again. They've swept in and taken charge of the situation while we're flopping around on our bellies like babies, crying and wailing about how bad it all is. Grow up and actually have a foreign policy towards Russia that makes sense, that works for Europe, that works for Russia, that works for Ukraine. What's so difficult about that? #Pascal Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Ian Proud. Ian was a British diplomat from 1999 until 2023. He worked in Thailand, Afghanistan, and Russia and recently published a book called A Misfit in Moscow – How British Diplomacy in Russia Failed. Today, we want to discuss Europe's deep crisis over the peace talks that are underway between Washington and Moscow. Ian has been publishing several great articles about this over the last couple of days and weeks on his Substack, and I can't wait to pick his brain. So, Ian, welcome back. #Ian Nice to see you again, Pascal. It's nice to be back. #Pascal -- 1 of 17 -- Well, nice to have you back on because you've been really writing a lot. And I would like to know, in one of your pieces, you wrote about the media meltdown in the UK and how the BBC is going nuts over this situation. Can you maybe expand on that a little bit and tell us what it's like to read British media at the moment when it comes to peace talks or the prospect of such? #Ian Well, it's in a state of complete flux, Pascal, because for the past three years, indeed, actually the past 10 years since the Ukraine crisis started—actually, it's 11 years now, oh my God, that long—the only thing that BBC media has been allowed to print is negative stories about how this is all Russia's fault. We should apply maximum pressure on Russia, not give them a blank check, hold them to account, and all these kinds of slogans. And all of a sudden, in one 90-minute phone call, President Trump has completely flipped the narrative and said, well, no, we should talk to Russia. Engagement is the only way through the deadlock of this dreadful war, which has killed or injured over a million people over the past three years. Engagement is the only thing we have to do. And so now the British media are desperately trying to reposition themselves, not quite knowing where to land on this, having been saying the complete opposite for the past 11 years. So it's a total state of flux right now in the British press and political establishment. #Pascal You also wrote that the first reaction was equating this with a disaster, right? That now basically the bad side is winning or seems to be winning because there's no more intent of defeating it. Is that narrative also, as we speak on February 25th, still up and running? #Ian Yes, even the Liberal Democrat party is talking about the kind of, you know, the sellout of Zelensky that's happened. People are speaking about this as being a defeat, that our approach has lost, that somehow we've sold Ukraine down the river, we've thrown them under the bus. All of these, you know, terms that British media is even repeating things that Zelensky said, you know, that actually Trump is just spouting Russian propaganda. And how could this possibly be happening? It's a completely bizarre situation that we find ourselves in. But ultimately, you know, that repositioning is going to have to kind of work its way through because times, they are changing. And little Britain, there's very little we can do to stem that tide, because as I predicted before, several times last year, in fact, the Europeans will move before we do. That will leave us yet again stranded at the back of the pack with the Americans leading, the Germans and -- 2 of 17 -- French coming in behind, you know, now that the elections are out of the way. And us, you know, the mad people at the back of the bus still crying and wanting things to be the same and never change. #Pascal Where do you think this entire disaster is coming from? Is it a failure of policy that we're seeing now in Britain and continental Europe as well? Or is it really the logical endpoint of this insane media propaganda that we've been going through, which, to this extent, we haven't seen—at least not in my lifetime. I've never seen such an extensive form of propaganda that is so divorced from any form of verifiable reality the way that this war was reported about for the last three years. A lot of it was factual. Pure fantasy land, including the North Korean troops, including the Russians running out of people, including the Russians running out of war materials, and the Russians about to collapse, and the Ukrainians going to win and sprint to the Black Sea, right? All of this was pure fantasy. And it was never accepted or never worked up that it was fantasy. Are we seeing the failure of policy or the failure of propaganda? #Ian Well, we're seeing both on the basis that propaganda has been our policy. That's an important point to make. Right back in 2014, as I actually pointed out in my book, we decided at that point in the second half of 2014 that we would no longer talk directly to Russia, that we would have our conversations via the media. We would push the things that we wanted to talk about regarding Russia and start a conversation with the collective West, with the Global South—that didn't really work out—but with anybody that would listen to say that Russia was wrong and we were right, no more talking directly to Russia. That was pointless. So the whole drive of propaganda came from the state itself. Even before the Ukraine crisis started, the British media probably had an anti-Russian bias. Actually, what we've seen now, this blizzard of propaganda over the past 11 years, has been an article of state policy, and it's important to understand that. So as that policy is being found to have no clothes on, the propaganda is figuring out what it's going to do in the future because it has nowhere left to run. #Pascal Yeah, reality just hits back again. I just wonder, on the one hand, how we got ourselves into this utter mess in Europe and Britain. And on the other hand, what it means that it is, again, the Americans who are lifting us out of it. I mean, on the one hand, they got us into it and they're taking us out of it. We've been pushed into it by America, and now we're being left behind again by the same ones. I keep repeating 2008, when the Germans and the French didn't want to go along with promising NATO membership. In 2014 and so on, the Minsk process was supposed to be underwritten by continental Europe, right? And then again, sold out again, and Nord Stream as well, -- 3 of 17 -- and so on. And now it is America again that's running ahead of the pack and is leaving Europe behind. What do you make of that? #Ian Well, I mean, that's the political cycle, right? And that actually shows that Europe doesn't have its own clear policy towards Russia that's durable in a strategic sense in terms of what they want to do with Russia, and that's durable in terms of how they manage constantly shifting US positions. Ultimately, Europe needs to have a policy with Russia that is uniquely European, that is immune from the regular kind of shifts, you know, when the Democrats are in power, who basically hate the Russians, to the Republicans, who have a more nuanced kind of position on Russia. You know, we need to kind of isolate ourselves from that and get back to having a European foreign policy with Russia that focuses on both sides' respective strategic interests. Only then can we move on from this vicious cycle of the Americans coming in, us doing exactly what they want us to do, and then falling foul of it later, only to be rescued by them again. I mean, it's a bizarre form of Stockholm syndrome in a way. #Pascal Very bizarre. The thing, though, is we are now seeing the nuances, right, in what used to be this grand alliance. And just before, also today, I talked to Andrei Kortunov, and he was making the argument in one of his essays that the collective West, also the way that Russia perceived it or thought about it, is not as collective as it might be, not as monolithic as it might be. We are seeing all of these cracks now, obviously. And one of the important differences is a lot of Russians seem to be saying that the Americans are much less Russophobic than the Europeans. Is that something that you would also see this way? Or do you have another perception on that? #Ian I think there's a risk of massive generalization. I think the vast majority of people in Europe, who have probably never met a Russian person, are probably ambivalent either way. If given the chance to actually engage with Russia, they would probably be quite open-minded. When I speak to normal people about Russia, they're fascinated that I have a different take on it from what they'll read in The Sun or the Daily Mail in the UK. I think actually the political establishment, the media establishment, is very clearly Russophobic. And you could say the same across large parts, but not all, of Europe. I think the position is more nuanced in Central Europe. I don't think it's correct. I just don't think it's objectively correct to say that the US is less Russophobic than Europe. The Democratic Party, under Biden with Blinken, Nuland, and Sullivan, and all of these dreadful human beings, were rabidly Russophobic, arguably more so than Europeans. We just find it strange now that there's a new brand of realist Republicans. People have finally been listening to people like John Mearsheimer and Jeffrey Sachs, who actually say, well, -- 4 of 17 -- whether we like Russia or we don't like Russia, we have to engage with Russia. And it's pragmatism and realism more than necessarily affinity that we're seeing right now. #Pascal Right. And there, I mean, there needs to be a way forward. I mean, that's the one thing that is clear now. Or do you think that in the UK, there's still a debate on whether the UK and Europeans, the rest of NATO, are able to continue the war? I mean, there is a threat when it comes to these negotiations about the normalization of US-Russia ties, and especially, you know, bringing an end to the warfare in Ukraine. There is a threat that spoilers emerge, and spoilers can be minor players, right? Is it possible that the Europeans will be active spoilers if the process develops in a certain way? #Ian Well, we saw this kind of bomb attack in Marseille against the Russian consulate overnight. So the scope for spoilers, you know, is huge. But taking you back to your question, I don't really think there is any debate in the UK about Russia policy. Maybe that will change on the back of Keir Starmer's visit to Washington, D.C. on Thursday of this week. I think, you know, relucta