Iran Ends US Hegemony In West Asia | Col. Douglas Macgregor

## Introduction The pause in fighting that followed weeks of tit-for-tat strikes across West Asia does not signal a return to the status quo ante. Rather, it marks the public recognition of a shifted balance — one in which the United States no longer holds uncontested strategic initiative in the region. The recent exchange, as laid out in a recorded conversation with retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor and others, makes plain that the ceasefire is a tactical breathing space born of necessity, not a durable reset. The central argument threaded through the discussion is stark: conventional Western assumptions about power projection and military sufficiency have collided with a regional reality shaped by asymmetric preparation, deep geography, and resilient industrial capacity. The result is a new distribution of influence in West Asia whose consequences will persist well after celebratory headlines fade. ## Iran media view and missile power The conversation highlighted how Tehran’s public messaging and military investments have reshaped perceptions of strength. Iranian media, the interlocutors observed, insist the leadership achieved most of its objectives and that Tehran now controls the terms of any negotiation. Whether or not one takes that account at face value, the material reality beneath the rhetoric is hard to ignore: decades of deliberate prioritization of missiles and unmanned systems have produced an arsenal and industrial base that can sustain prolonged conflict. Macgregor’s contribution crystallizes this point. He contrasts Iran’s strategic choices with the United States’ force structure, arguing that Iran built for the wars it might actually fight. Lacking a significant air force and classic blue-water navy, Iran instead focused on mobile missile launchers, cruise missiles, ballistic systems, and swarms of drones — complemented by fortified, subterranean infrastructure. Those investments have payoffs in a geography that favors defense: a continental interior ringed by mountains and deserts that frustrate large-scale invasion and complicate traditional top-down kinetic campaigns. Reported assessments discussed in the exchange — estimates of thousands of missiles and tens of thousands of unmanned systems remaining intact — underline the endurance of Iranian deterrent capacity. Underground production and storage facilities, hardened by years of preparation, mean that attrition from strikes can be absorbed and replenished. Meanwhile, external industrial support from states such as China and Russia, whether material or political, gives Iran access to large-scale manufacturing capacities that Western planners cannot easily match in a short time. The upshot is a mismatch: Western forces can inflict damage, even significant damage, but they lack the capacity to eliminate the adversary or prevent rapid reconstitution. That calculus also changes the meaning of “victory.” Traditional metrics — numbers of targets struck, ships sunk, airframes destroyed — become hollow when the opponent never sought parity on those terms. Iran’s aim, as the conversation stressed, was survival, punishment of adversaries, and the imposition of reciprocal costs. To the extent Tehran achieves those ends, it has little need to claim conventional triumphs; the resilience of its systems and society constitute strategic success. ## US bases hit and Gulf withdrawal A pivotal section of the discussion examined the material consequences for U.S. posture: the damage to regional bases, the withdrawal of personnel, and the political fallout in Gulf monarchies that had come to rely on American security guarantees. The account described more than two dozen bases that suffered serious attack, rendering many “largely unusable.” Facilities that served as forward operating hubs, radar platforms, and logistics nodes were degraded; in several cases, the personnel present were moved to makeshift accommodations, hotels, or evacuated entirely. This is not merely a question of repair bills. The attacks exposed the vulnerability of a forward presence built around Cold War and post–Desert Storm assumptions: centralized airfields, static infrastructure, and long supply lines stretching back to Europe and Diego Garcia. Iran’s missile and drone campaign demonstrated that point defenses and integrated air-defense networks are brittle under concentrated, modern saturation attacks. The practical consequence was immediate: commanders withdrew forces to protect lives and equipment. Politically, the spectacle of American inability to stop these attacks is corrosive to the credibility of security guarantees that underpin Gulf regimes. Macgregor and others in the conversation went further, arguing that much of the U.S. presence in the region served not strictly American strategic interests but those of a regional ally. Several bases, they contended, exist primarily to provide early warning and sanctuary for Israeli operations and objectives. If the United States can no longer sustain those outposts without exposing personnel to unacceptable risk, the question becomes stark: will Gulf elites continue to rely on Washington, or will they diversify security arrangements? Already, the talk of withdrawal — whether partial, conditional, or permanent — is reshaping regional calculations and could accelerate recalibration toward regional autonomy or alternative security partnerships. Beyond the physical damage, the strikes undermined the psychological pillar of deterrence. The idea that American presence equaled protection has been weakened, and leaders in the Gulf must now weigh the costs of denying Iranian retaliatory space with the costs of hosting vulnerable foreign bases. That calculus may tilt toward less dependence on U.S. boots and more on diplomacy, hedging, or local military modernization. ## Two week pause and global shock risk The ceasefire, widely described as a two-week pause, is as much a strategic intermission as a political maneuver. Participants in the exchange cautioned against interpreting it as a roadmap to peace. Instead, the temporary halt is an acknowledgment by the United States and its partners that immediate continuation would risk further escalation with no decisive outcome. For Iran, the pause allows time to consolidate gains and preserve coercive capacity; for the U.S., it buys breathing room to reconstitute forces and manage domestic and alliance politics. Yet the conversation highlighted another dimension: the risk of broader economic and geopolitical shock during and after such pauses. Closure or perceived threat to chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz reverberate through global supply chains. Insurance and shipping markets react faster than military planners. Lloyd’s of London’s decisions, for example, can effectively shutter maritime traffic even when formal closures are not declared. The globalized economy’s sensitivity to insecurity means that even localized kinetic exchanges can trigger outsized financial and commodity-market disturbances. Moreover, the pause teases the possibility of episodic escalation. The bargaining behavior described in the conversation — signaling via targeted strikes, reciprocal hits against bases, and public declarations of “ten points” for negotiation — creates a fragile architecture where a single miscalculation or covert operation can collapse the intermission into full-scale hostilities. The presence of external patrons and suppliers on both sides multiplies that danger: stockpiles can be replenished, and external actors may have incentives to push for or restrain escalation for their own strategic reasons. Finally, political dynamics in democratic and allied capitals add another layer. Leaders face domestic pressures and sensational rhetoric; the image of decisive dominance is politically valuable even when strategically hollow. The conversation pointed to bellicose threats that emerged publicly, juxtaposed with urgent diplomatic m

Iran Ends US Hegemony In West Asia | Col. Douglas Macgregor After 40 days of war, a (first) ceasefire is taking effect between the US/Israel and Iran. However, nobody is fooled about the prospects of this pause in the fighting to durably end the conflict. However, the fact that the US was compelled into this break speaks volumes about the new distribution of power in West Asia. The US will never gain back what it just lost. Today, I'm speaking again with retired Colonel Douglas Macgregor about the ceasefire, Trump’s threats, Iran’s missile strength, damaged US bases, Israeli pressure on Washington, the risk of wider economic shock, and Europe’s weak place in NATO. Macgregor argues Iran kept the strategic edge, the US needed the pause, and Israel remains the main block in any wider settlement. Links: Douglas Macgregor Substack: https://macgregorwarrior.substack.com/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz. substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack. com/s/academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:13 Ceasefire claims and strategic balance 00:06:31 Iran media view and missile power 00:13:00 Iran resilience and regime change limits 00:17:25 US bases hit and Gulf withdrawal 00:26:41 Israel under strain and ceasefire anger 00:31:35 Two week pause and global shock risk 00:38:47 Europe NATO and American control 00:49:01 Where to follow Douglas Macgregor #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to *Neutrality Studies*—tonight again with the always fantastic Colonel Douglas Macgregor. Colonel, welcome back. Hey, happy to be here. Thank you for coming online. And, you know, today we’re speaking on April 8th. Donald Trump and the Iranians have actually just declared a ceasefire on both sides—both of them declaring victory. Yesterday, just 24 hours ago, Donald Trump was still threatening basically the annihilation of the Iranian nation, something that a lot of people took as a direct threat to use nuclear weapons. And a lot of people on Twitter have invoked the 25th Amendment, saying that Donald Trump should be removed from office. And now this—the ceasefire, both sides. What do you make of it? #Douglas Macgregor It very much depends on whether you think the United States holds the strategic initiative or whether you believe Iran does. In my estimation, Iran’s principal goal throughout this entire conflict has been to survive—to defeat the attacks against it, to punish American allies and supporters in the region, and to survive. So, based on that assessment, I see Iran as holding the strategic initiative, not us. And I think that creates an almost insoluble problem for us. We have a World War II–era -- 1 of 16 -- force structure, designed to refight some version of World War II. The last time that approach worked was Desert Storm in 1991. We should have undergone profound reorganization, reform, and change in the military after that, but we did not. Everybody has worshipped at the altar of Desert Storm ever since, and everyone still talks in terms of World War II. Iran is very different. Iran had to make some decisions 20, 25, 30 years ago about what they would and wouldn’t do. We know they have effectively no air force. We keep talking about having destroyed the air force—well, they have none. Then we talk about destroying the navy. They had seven old frigates, but they also have a lot of smaller boats and unmanned systems at sea. That was their answer to the navy. They appear to have lost the seven frigates, and no one seems to have lost much sleep over that. They were quite old and antiquated. But again, we go back to old metrics—you know, “we sank this, we destroyed that,” and then we claim to have destroyed, say, 7,000 targets. Well, that presumes the targets are meaningful, and that when you run out of quote-unquote “meaningful” military targets, you’ve won. Well, there’s no evidence for that. Iran, on the other hand, invested heavily in missiles and unmanned systems—drones—and that has paid off handsomely because Iran is a natural fortress. It’ s a continental power with 93 million people, surrounded by mountains and bordered to the south by deserts. How do you invade Iran? It hasn’t worked out very well for anybody, certainly not since Alexander the Great. I don’t know of anyone who’s tried to invade it since the Mongols. And, of course, the Mongols were willing to do things that no one else in history would do, including mass murder—at least until we get to the Second World War, and then more recently to Gaza. So, I think the Iranians hold the strategic initiative. They’re capable of holding out much longer. They’ve been much more successful than we thought they would be, and our efforts have been largely futile. In the meantime, we blame Iran for closing the Strait of Hormuz. No, that’s wrong— Lloyd’s of London did that. No one is going to underwrite any shipping until the war is over or there’s a complete cessation of violence. We keep saying, “Well, Iran stopped this,” and “Iran caused that.” No, it’s not true. People in the United States seem to forget that Israel began this conflict, and then we joined Israel and got into it. Iran didn’t attack us, and Iran didn’t attack Israel. So the bottom line is, this is a very strange set of circumstances—and now the ceasefire comes along. And it came at a very odd time, after all these bellicose threats. And the more I look at this, the more persuaded I am—and others are—that if we look at the evidence we can find out there, it seems the CIA contacted the ISI in Pakistan and said, “Here’s a proposal we’d like your leadership to make.” So they took this proposal—apparently almost word for word what we had written—and sent it to the Iranians, and then sent it back to us, creating the illusion that somehow we were approached to do this by Islamabad on behalf of Iran. The Iranians never asked for a ceasefire. There’s no evidence for that at all—none. In fact, on Monday they reiterated their ten points, and Witkoff said, “This is a catastrophe. We can’t possibly accept any of -- 2 of 16 -- this.” Now, all of a sudden, as part of the ceasefire, we’ve said we will negotiate, and we’ll do so on the basis of the ten points that Iran has submitted. That’s a catastrophe if you’re an Israeli or an agent of Israel. So I don’t know how that’s going to turn out. And then we discover that Witkoff and Kushner are going back to Islamabad to theoretically represent the United States, when everybody has concluded they’re Israeli agents who represent exclusively the interests of Israel. Nobody wants them anymore for that very reason. Now, this isn’t new. When Tony Blinken was Secretary of State, the Egyptians and others in the region all concluded he was an agent for Israel. They didn’t see him as representing us either. So I don’t know what to make of any of it, but I have very low expectations. I don’t think this is going to fundamentally change much. As far as I can tell, the military buildup on our side continues. #Pascal Right. Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. I studied today what the Iranians put out in their media—their version of what’s happening, translated—and they’re saying they achieved almost all of their goals, and that by now there’s a proposal the Americans have been begging for, for a month— 30 days, they’re saying—for negotiations. And now they've been putting forward a proposal—the Iranian ten points. They’re willing to consider it, but they’ll do so under complete distrust, literally, as they said, “with our finger on the trigger.” So if the other side does something foolish, then, well, they’ll just continue. Because I think their assessment is the same as yours: they have the strategic advantage at the moment. What they need to do is hold out—and they do. They’re trying to establish reciprocity: for everything that hurts them, they have a designated target and a designated strategy to hurt the other side as well. And they’re willing to do that. But they're also willing to, you know, invert Clausewitz—war as the continuation of politics by other means, or politics as the continuation of war by other means. Right. So they’re trying again in Islamabad through negotiations. Do you think that if this ceasefire doesn’t hold, the United States will be hurt overall? Because we can see that some of the things Iran was able to do over the last week or ten days—especially the shooting down of U.S. Air Force planes and helicopters, Black Hawks—what do you make of that? That the Iranians still have that capacity, despite all the pronouncements by Pete Hegseth and Donald Trump that it’s basically open skies in Iran? #Douglas Macgregor -- 3 of 16 -- Well, I've seen some reports from people recently in Iran. These came through intermediaries, through journalists. The people reporting are not American nationals, but they’re also not from the region. They seem to be Europeans who, for whatever reason, were able to enter Iran. There are also some reports from Asians, and they tend to say the same thing. They estimate that Iran has at least 15,000 missiles remaining in its arsenal—maybe more—and at least 45,000 unmanned systems, drones. Their manufacturing capacity for drones is untouched, and the missile arsenal is, for all intents and purposes, untouched. And they have more than enough launchers—mobile launchers. They seem to have lost, we think, maybe 50% of their mobile launchers, but those appear to be replaceable, and they still have half of them left. So, from the standpoint of their offensive striking power, that seems to be intact. That’s the first thing. It’s important for us to know that, because that’ s a lot of missiles. And of course, all of this is underground. When you look at these underground facilities—there are lots of pictures online—they’re enormous. This reflects a 20-year effort by the Iranians to build them. So we have to juxtapose that with ourselves. We’re operating 6,000 miles away from the United States, at least that far, using Germany and other European states as intermediate stations. But the bottom line is that we don't have access to ports right in the region, which means we have to go all the way south to Diego Garcia. And in the Mediterranean, we can go up—at least so far we've done it—to Greece and other places. So we're at the end of a very long line. Our manufacturing capacity is not the same. We could produce perhaps seven, eight, nine missiles every couple of days. Some people say maybe ten a week—I'm not sure. But we’ve never built a, quote- unquote, “surge capacity.” And when you look at what the Russians have done, when they rapidly ramped up, they created a surge capacity so that if the battlefield demands it, they can point to a particular piece of equipment and say, “We need more of it immediately.” And it can go from, instead of ten, up to a thousand. The Chinese are supporting them. We know the Chinese can manufacture roughly ten thousand rocket motors—that is, rockets or missiles— about a thousand rocket motors or missiles a day. We'd be lucky to produce a hundred in a week. When you look at these kinds of things and realize the Chinese and the Russians are strongly supporting the Iranians—because they have no interest in seeing the Iranian state destroyed by us under any circumstances—you see that if anybody needed this ceasefire, we did. I'm not saying it was irrelevant to the Iranians; I'm sure they're grateful for it. But we needed it. But it's temporary. And everybody who's looked at this—sober-minded Americans, Europeans, Iranians—