Ex-Ambassador REVEALS The TRUTH on Russia & Ukraine. Europe Always Knew! | Amb. J.A. Zorrilla

## Diplomacy’s Return: An Opportunity Long Denied The recent reopening of high‑level talks over Ukraine has been framed as a belated recovery of diplomacy — but the conversation captured in this exchange shows it is far more than a timing issue. It is the belated admission that decades of strategic choices, narratives, and silences have produced an extremely volatile European order. The discussion draws a throughline from the end of the Cold War to the present fighting in Ukraine: decisions taken in the 1990s, the gradual militarization and political engineering of former Soviet spaces, and a European leadership that repeatedly subordinated long‑term strategy to short‑term politics. If diplomacy is back, it arrives at a moment when rebuilding trust will require Europeans to confront uncomfortable truths about what they knew and what they chose not to act upon. ## The Post‑Cold War Fork: Inclusion Versus Enclosure One of the most consequential choices of the early 1990s was structural rather than rhetorical: whether to pursue a comprehensive, pan‑Eurasian security architecture or to expand NATO into the space left by the Soviet Union. The conversation recalls Germany’s map — a blueprint for inclusive security stretching across Eurasia — and contrasts it with the American turn toward alliance expansion. As Amb. José A. Zorrilla stresses, that choice was not merely technical. It established an enduring logic: either integrate Russia within a reimagined European order, or treat it as an object to be contained and disciplined by a military alliance. The latter route, backed by powerful actors in Washington, set in motion decades of policies that many seasoned diplomats privately regarded as provocative and self‑defeating. This strategic bifurcation matters because it created divergent expectations. An inclusive architecture would have required compromise and mutual restraint; NATO expansion did the opposite. The latter option was justified by actors who, in the exchange’s account, invoked doctrines of global primacy and even a strain of imperial geopolitics. Once the alliance path was chosen, subsequent crises were interpreted through that onward momentum rather than as warning signs that a different course was possible. ## Maidan, Istanbul, and the Politics of Negotiation A particularly sharp point in the discussion concerns Ukraine’s Maidan revolution and the diplomatic exchanges that followed. The claim that Western actors — in particular U.S. officials and their allied NGOs — facilitated a process that culminated in 2014 is presented not as conspiracy but as common knowledge within diplomatic circles. Amb. Zorrilla and interlocutors recount that many career diplomats privately acknowledged that external funding and political engineering were present long before the February events that toppled Viktor Yanukovych. The Istanbul talks of 2022 — an episode repeatedly cited in the conversation — stand as a pivotal missed opportunity in this narrative. According to participants in the exchange, an agreement on basic security assurances and territorial compromise was within reach, only for certain Western actors to rebuff it upon hearing of the deal. The result, as recalled in the discussion, was a decision to prioritize a strategic aim — keeping Ukraine out of NATO — through continued confrontation rather than through the kind of give‑and‑take that diplomacy requires. Whether or not one accepts every factual claim made about the Istanbul negotiations, the larger point is clear: when diplomats and military professionals discover that political leaders reject negotiated compromises, the space for peaceful resolution shrinks dramatically. ## The Hypocrisy of “Not At War”: Strategy Dressed as Denial The exchange foregrounds a recurring theme in public discourse: Western insistence that NATO is not at war with Russia, that material support for Kyiv does not equate to active belligerence. To the speakers in this conversation, that line reads as disingenuous. They argue that the steady flow of arms, intelligence, and political backing constitutes an active campaign to shift the balance of power in Eastern Europe. Labeling such policy “support” rather than intervention became, in their view, a rhetorical shield that obscured responsibility for escalation. Moreover, the debate exposed how strategy and narrative had become decoupled. On the one hand, policymakers justified prolonged confrontation on the grounds of principle — defending sovereignty, punishing aggression, and upholding norms. On the other hand, the practical logic pursued by some actors was explicitly to impose costs on Russia in order to weaken its regional capacity. The result was a policy that combined moral language with strategic aims that many European diplomats privately believed would produce long-term instability. ## Hate, Not Fear: The Emotional Engines of Policy One of the most provocative reinterpretations offered in the discussion reframes the often‑invoked label “Russophobia.” The exchange suggests that the operative force driving some European policies is not fear of Russia’s capacity but an ideological hostility that cannot be satisfied by any measurable concession. This distinction matters: fear is instrumental and can be managed through deterrence, guarantees, or accommodation. Hatred, by contrast, resists bargaining because it seeks punitive outcomes rather than security. Speakers point to littoral states and political movements where dislike of Russia plays an outsized political role. When such actors gain outsized influence in European councils, policy tilts away from interest‑based calculation and toward a punitive posture. The consequence is a collective strategy built less on rational assessment and more on a politics of moral absolutism — one that makes diplomatic compromise politically toxic and restricts Europe’s ability to calibrate its response to Russian actions. ## Historical Patterns: Europe’s Long Project to Control the Eurasian Heartland Placing the current crisis within a broader historical sweep, the conversation revisits a long European project: the desire to control the Eurasian center as a means to global influence. From Napoleonic ambitions to British strategic interventions and post‑World War II containment, Western policy toward Russia has been animated by the same strategic logic — that control or neutrality of the enormous Russian landmass is critical to wider geopolitical dominance. Amb. Zorrilla even invokes episodes such as the Crimean War and postwar Western calculations as formative moments. These historical references are not mere historiography; they serve to explain why suspiciousness toward Russia is persistent and why, when Russia regains strength, Western policy often shifts from engagement to containment. The pattern is cyclical and shows how strategic fear — and at times outright hostility — can ossify into policy orthodoxy. ## The Secret Knowledge of Diplomats and the Public Vacuum A striking assertion repeated in the conversation is that professional diplomats and military officers have long known the contours of what transpired in places like Ukraine, yet they seldom speak publicly because they are subordinate to political masters. This “secret” of the diplomatic community — that career officials often disagree with the line taken by governments — reveals a disjunction between expertise and public policy. This dynamic produces two problems. First, it erodes public trust because citizens receive a simplified narrative that omits policy tradeoffs and the messy realities of negotiation. Second, it turns diplomacy into a reactive tool: when professionals are muzzled, strategy is set by political cycles and media spectacle rather than by sober assessment. The debate suggests that restoring meaningful diplomacy requires not only opening channels with adversaries but also creating domestic political space for diplomats and strateg

Ex-Ambassador REVEALS The TRUTH on Russia & Ukraine. Europe Always Knew! The diplomats always knew what the US was up to with Ukraine, Eastern Europe, the coups, and the intrigues. This was and is well-known in diplomatic circles, especially in Europe. They just never told us because national politics would forbid them from letting anyone know. That's the verdict of Ambassador José Antonio Zorrilla, one of Spain's former top-diplomats. How utterly depressing. Ambassador Zorilla joined the Spanish Diplomatic Service in 1973, becoming Consul General to Milano, Shanghai, and Moscow and finally Spain’s Ambassador to Georgia in 2011. Ambassador Zorrilla is also a passionate filmmaker and script writer, as well as a keen analyst of international relations. Hence, today we want to talk about Spain, the future of Europe, and diplomacy in the multipolar world. Ambassador Zorillav, welcome. Ambassador Zorrilla's (Spanish-language) YouTube Channel: https://www.youtube.com/@euroStrategos #M3 I have a secret for you. I have a secret. What you and I are discussing here so openly, and it looks like Russian propaganda, is very much extended in the diplomatic community. Because we are professionals. We are pros. We have nothing to do with politics. We are at the service of politics. We all know very well what happened in Istanbul. We all know that they were preparing a coup. The Americans were preparing a coup for about 10 years. We know who received the money. We know who was behind the coup. We know what Yanukovych wanted to do. We know everything absolutely. And among us, free from constraints, we speak like I speak with you. All is false, Pascal. All is false. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Ambassador José A. Zorrilla. Ambassador Zorrilla joined the Spanish Diplomatic Service in 1973, becoming Consul General to Milan, Shanghai, and Moscow, and finally Spain's Ambassador to Georgia in 2011. Ambassador Zorrilla is also a passionate filmmaker and scriptwriter, as well as a keen analyst of international relations. Hence, today we want to talk about Spain, the future of Europe, and diplomacy in a multipolar world. Ambassador Zorrilla, welcome. #M3 Hello, Pascal. Good morning. Thank you very much for inviting me to your program. #M2 -- 1 of 14 -- Well, thank you very much for saying yes to me writing you an email. I would like to know more about Spain. But first, I really wonder what you think of the current situation where we are finally, after three years, seeing the return of diplomacy to a really horrible situation. I mean, especially Ukraine, the war in Eastern Europe. For the longest time, there has been an absolute refusal from the West, and especially from the US, from the Biden administration, to even pick up the phone and have a call with their Russian counterparts. And now all of this is happening. Are we seeing the return of diplomacy to world politics? #M3 Well, to world politics, I don't know, but definitely to the Ukraine scenario, no doubt. And it is a welcome initiative. It's a very good idea, and it should have never been abandoned. It's difficult to believe. Remember, in the days of yore, when the Soviet Union existed, and it was an existential threat to the West—it was indeed an existential threat—the ambassador Chernomyrdin, who represented his country for a very long time in Washington, had a place reserved for parking at the State Department. Today, not even a bank account. You know, the embassy of Russia in Spain, for instance, does not have a bank account due to sanctions. This is unheard of. And I'm delighted to see that finally the two warring factions have decided to meet in Saudi Arabia. But anyway, you are going to discuss, talk, which is very good instead of, you know, just killing each other on the battlefield by proxy or non-proxy. Yeah. #M2 It's very good. You know, much of the discussion that came out of Washington and Brussels for the past three years has been that, oh no, NATO is not at war with Russia. We are just supporting the victim of aggression. And therefore, then saying that they have no say, they cannot push any kind of negotiations. Do you agree that that was the height of dishonesty? #M3 Pascal, this is a blatant lie. This is a lie. In 1990 or 1991, as you want, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States had a choice. One was the choice offered by Germany. Germany presented itself with a map. You can find the map drawn in the book by Mary Sarotte, Not One Inch. It's there, drawn. And the security of Eurasia went from Brittany in France to Kyrgyzstan in the Far East. So it was comprehensive, inclusive. And the alternative was the American one with NATO. The Americans rejected flatly the German notion because they thought that it was, in inverted commas, toothless. So it had to be, yes, toothless. There has to be a witch. There had to be a witch. And the witch was NATO. There had to be a witch. And all this came from the old doctrine of English imperialism, Mackinder. -- 2 of 14 -- Never the union between Germany and Russia. That's it. Second, following the advice of the Rand Corporation and Wolfowitz, instead of creating a collective security, they tried to enter the whole country that the Soviet Union left and thus finally conquer the world, to which they were destined by manifest destiny, which is the basis of their policy since the beginning of the 19th century. Well, the result is for everybody to see, you know, unending wars, crimes, blood, capital, and three trillion. Three trillion is a year of deficit. In short, an unsustainable policy. And the end, of course, has come with Donald Trump. Now, the idea that we have a war but we don't have a war is hypocritical. For years, from 1990 to 2014, the coup of Maidan, the United States funded and financed all possible NGOs and institutions. We saw the preparation for the coup that finally came in 2014 with the Maidan. It's false. It's utterly false that Yanukovych was a Russian bogeyman. He was not. Surely, you have seen more than once a piano concert. There is a left hand and there is a right hand. What was the purpose, the strategic purpose of Yanukovych? He knew that the East was pro-Russian and the West was not pro-Russian. The idea was to make the two of them sound harmonious. Now, that was a no-no for the United States. They wanted a united Ukraine under the sway of Kiev. Of course, definitely welded the United States of America. Now, for anybody knowing even superficially the history of Ukraine, it was impossible that the eastern part of the country would obey the orders from an elite that considers their forefathers and the founders of the homeland the Nazis, Stepan Bandera, Roman Shukhevych, Konovalets, etc., and Stetsko. Impossible. Even, even... Kissinger said it. You have the article. If you are interested in this, you are a professional. Henry Kissinger, in the Washington Post, 5 March 2014, published an article and said this will lead to territorial splits and civil war. Now, the United States wanted the war to go on because this will bleed Russia, which I don't know by what reason they consider to be a danger, you know. Other than, you know, it's a very big country. It has 12 different time zones. Apart from that, it's not a danger to anybody, you know. Not that I know. Then there was, you know, this is not mentioned at all, but it is true. And the sources of all I'm going to say right now are Victoria Nuland, Oleksii Arestovych, who was Zelensky's right hand, and David Arakhamia, another of the big shots of Ukraine, of the new Ukraine. And they said and repeated that a peace deal was signed with initials between Russia and Ukraine in Istanbul. And what happened? Well, it happened that they went to Washington and Washington said, how come you signed a peace? What's this? And the others, they're very innocent. The poor Ukrainians were very innocent. And they said, well, Putin doesn't want any territory, you know. He has no territorial ambitions. The only thing he wants is that we don't join NATO. And then Biden said, no, no, but this is the object of everything. This is the goal. No NATO, no peace. There's war, and we will give you all the necessary support, and you will end up winning. Not only did they do that, they went to Georgia, and they tried to convince them to open a second front. Georgia wisely said no. Now, to say that they were attacked without a cause by the Russians is, quite frankly, incomprehensible. -- 3 of 14 -- But the most incomprehensible of all is that everybody in the West has joined in, you know, in this kind of lie. So everybody agrees that Ukraine was a normal country, didn't do anything bad, nothing happened, and then a vampire of the steppes, a cynic, Dracula, invaded Ukraine. That's not true. A journalist asked the director of security, "Sorry, would we accept the militarization of our frontiers?" And Salima said, "Of course not. We would intervene decisively." So what we do not accept, Russia has to accept. Why? Obviously, as I said before, because we are different. We have been chosen by God to extend republicanism and democracy the world over. So we are different. Furthermore, the Solomon Islands lie 9,300 kilometers away from the coast of the United States. The Solomon Islands said, we would like to open a Chinese base. And the Department of State, two days afterward, said, never. Considering all these arguments, to say that Putin invaded for no reason is simply unbelievable. The extraordinary thing is that finally Trump, the new administration, is beginning to say exactly, Pascal, what I'm telling you. So you are listening to Trump. #M2 No, we really, I mean, we had a battle of narratives, right? And people like us who were saying this is the height of irresponsibility, stop this provocation and stop the incredible escalation of this conflict, we were decried as Putin puppets and we were decried as pro-Russian and pro-Kremlin when all we wanted was to stop the fighting and come to some sort of agreement. What I don't understand, I mean, I do understand why the Biden administration did that. I do understand why people like Victoria Nuland and Antony Blinken, in their mindset, have a neoconservative mindset of "we have to control the world, and nothing less than total domination is enough." I understand how this makes sense for them. What I do not comprehend is the Europeans. How could they go along? And you were an active diplomat in the years before. I mean, what was the consensus or what was the view of the diplomatic corps of the Europeans? Because I know they meet, right? You meet among each other. What was the view on Ukraine and on Russia? Was this a slow progression toward this stupid narrative? Or was it all of a sudden, and everybody was silent? #M3 You ask a very difficult question. And if you were older, I would reply in Latin, because there is a very good beginning in Latin on all this. I don't know. The very same Germany that offered the map of Eurasia a comprehensive security, the very same Germany that said, no, Ukraine and Georgia should not be part of NATO in 2008, created this incredible, I don't know how to call it, hoax, that is Minsk, to fool Russia, which is incredible. I mean, they created Minsk with the idea of giving time to Ukraine to arm. Now, the philosophy of the European Union is peace. They were giving time to Ukraine to arm and go to war. Now, you ask me a question that I simply can't answer. I don't know why. Why this sudden reversal of fortune? -- 4 of 14 -- Why this sudden turnabout? I don't understand. I don't know. But I have to say that my peers in Europe, and above all, the guys at the top, haven't the slightest idea of strategy. They know nothing. They are a bunch of ignoramuses. I insist, total ignorance. And now they have put the fate of the United Europe, so to speak, in inverted commas, in the hands of people who hate Russia, l