Iran Ready To Kill Ground Invasion; No Negotiations; Next Oil Shock | Prof. S.M. Marandi

## Introduction and Tehran update The exchange recorded with Professor S.M. Marandi from Tehran paints a stark picture of a conflict that is both intensifying and spiraling into miscalculation. The conversation centers less on isolated skirmishes than on a deeper strategic logic: one side driven by desperation and political imperatives, the other by a resolve that appears to have hardened in the face of sustained assault. The result is a conflict in which routine warfare and theatrical threats coexist, and where normal channels of diplomacy have been rendered ineffective or were never genuine to begin with. From quiet streets in Tehran to the prospect of boots on Persian Gulf islands, the dynamics the discussion illuminates have implications for regional stability and the global economy. Tehran itself, according to the exchange, has assumed an eerie calm that masks deep trauma. Ordinary rhythms—schools, universities, traffic—have been disrupted. The city is quieter because many residents relocated after early, devastating strikes that targeted civilians and educational institutions. That movement of people reshapes how the population experiences the war: cities become pockets of refuge, while other historic urban centers witness crowded streets and vulnerable populations. This domestic picture feeds directly into Tehran’s posture: a society shaken, yet politically and psychologically mobilized against an aggressor it defines in existential terms. ## Bombing toll and public morale The conversation repeatedly returned to human costs and public morale. Government tallies cited by participants place deaths at around two thousand, a grim figure for a few weeks of sustained bombing. Yet alongside mourning there is an unexpected note: morale among ordinary Iranians, at least as described by the interlocutors, remains high. Rather than fracture under pressure, popular sentiment appears galvanized. That paradox—high casualties paired with rising determination—frames much of Tehran’s political calculus. Trauma is everywhere: families, schools, hospitals and apartment blocks have been struck. The attacks have targeted civilians as well as symbolic and institutional spaces, amplifying the perception of deliberate terror. Yet repeated assaults have also produced a kind of social cohesion and resolve. The conversation suggests that Iranians do not see themselves as mere victims but as actors defending sovereignty. This readiness to endure raises the political cost for any adversary contemplating escalation. It also makes the conflict less susceptible to quick diplomatic fixes: concessions that ignore national dignity or security are unlikely to gain traction when public morale is high. ## Ground invasion and Hormuz One of the most consequential claims in the exchange was the prediction of an imminent ground incursion—possibly to seize islands in the Strait of Hormuz. Seen through the lens of the discussion, that move would be an act of desperation rather than strategy. The idea of placing a few thousand troops on exposed islands to “open” the strait ignores the realities of modern warfare: missiles and drones launched from deep inland make shoreline control insufficient. The islands would be sitting targets for long-range precision strikes. Professor Marandi argued that the calculus for such an invasion is less about military logic and more about domestic political narratives—projecting resolve or manufacturing leverage. He emphasized that if boots did go ashore, Iranian forces possess the capability and intent to strike invading troops from multiple vectors, not merely coastal defenses. The implication is grim: a ground invasion would likely lead to mass casualties for the assaulting force, and to a widening of the war in ways that are difficult to contain. More broadly, the Strait of Hormuz itself is a strategic choke point whose control transcends immediate tactical aims; any attempt to neutralize Iran’s ability to interdict shipping would trigger broader regional and economic consequences. ## Fake talks and strike threats A recurring theme was the performative nature of certain diplomatic overtures. The exchange described “negotiations” that were in reality messaging operations—proposals passed through third parties that lacked substance and trust. The narrative presented Iran as receiving a tentative, essentially non-negotiable offer via a neighboring state; Tehran’s rejection of it was predictable because the proposal failed to address the war’s core grievances or the facts on the ground. Threats to strike critical Iranian infrastructure were also discussed as a tool of coercion and market manipulation. The temporary postponement of such strikes, framed publicly as a pause for negotiations, was interpreted as a tactic aimed at calming markets and controlling oil prices rather than an authentic olive branch. In this view, the existential threat to civilian infrastructure was being dangled to extract concessions—an approach that transforms diplomacy into an economic lever and weaponizes civilian suffering. The conversation warns that reliance on ephemeral promises by an administration whose commitments have previously been revoked makes ceasefires and written guarantees intrinsically unreliable. ## Red lines and Gulf retaliation The interplay between red lines and retaliatory logic has shaped escalation patterns. The interlocutors described how Iran, faced with attacks on energy installations and other critical assets, has signaled it will hit back at equally strategic targets—especially those infrastructure nodes on the Arabian side of the Gulf that enable the intervention. This dynamic rests on a simple strategic logic: if one side will tolerate the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the other will reciprocate in kind. That threatens to turn the Gulf itself into an arena of mutual economic destruction. Attack-and-retaliate cycles complicate the idea of “limited” strikes. Once critical energy facilities become targets, the damage cascades: supply chains are disrupted, insurance costs spike, markets destabilize, and civilian populations in small Gulf states—highly dependent on hydrocarbons—stand to suffer disproportionately. The discussion also highlighted that these Gulf states are not passive bystanders; their role as hosts for foreign military bases makes them complicit in Iran’s view, thereby broadening the circle of legitimate targets in Tehran’s retaliatory logic. The upshot is a fragile and dangerous status quo in which each side’s red lines are porous and contingent on domestic political imperatives. ## Oil shock and global fallout A dominant subtext of the conversation was the centrality of energy markets to international calculations. The mere specter of a strike on Iranian infrastructure, or counterstrikes that hit Gulf oil and gas fields, reverberates through global supply chains. The interlocutors pointed to a likely trajectory: insurance rates for tankers would soar, shipments would be delayed or rerouted, and major markets—especially those dependent on LNG and fertilizer inputs—would feel acute pressure. The conversation made clear that global economic fallout is not abstract. Emerging shortages in LNG, disruptions in fertilizer production, and spikes in crude prices would ripple through food and energy systems worldwide. The economic pain would be felt unequally: affluent Western capitals would absorb price shocks differently than energy-importing and food-importing developing countries. Yet the exchange emphasized another dimension—the political intent to use market effects as leverage. Delaying strikes to calm markets, or threatening infrastructure to spook traders, are tools that turn global economic systems into a battlefield. That weaponization of markets raises the stakes beyond the region, making international actors who are not directly engaged in the conflict nevertheless vulnerable to its consequences. ## Gulf

Iran Ready To Kill Ground Invasion; Next Oil Shock | Marandi Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi of Tehran University, updates us on the war from Teheran: He predicts that the Americans are actually going to do boots on the ground since they are that desperate and it will lead to mass-slaughter of the troops trying. The resolve of Iran seems unbroken and the capability to strike invading troops not just from the shore lines but from any place in Iran is a threat that only an enemy in panic would take. But it seems that's where we are in the war. Links: Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi on X: https://x.com/s_m_marandi Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop. fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and Tehran update 00:02:28 Bombing toll and public morale 00:05:26 Ground invasion and Hormuz 00:14:14 Fake talks and strike threats 00:20:26 Red lines and Gulf retaliation 00:30:00 Oil shock and global fallout 00:35:30 Gulf states and US control 00:44:43 Bounty scandal and media silence #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today we’re joined again by Professor Marandi from Tehran University. Professor, welcome back. #Marandi Thank you very much for inviting me on your show again. It's a great pleasure to be here. #Pascal Thank you for always taking the time to give us updates. I’d like to ask what’s happened in the last week and a half since we last spoke. I mean, how is life in Tehran at the moment, and how are you interpreting the current state of the war now that we’re basically finishing the fourth week? #Marandi Well, Tehran—and I can’t say the same for the rest of the country—but Tehran is still not very crowded. About 30% of the people murdered by this American-Israeli coalition are from Tehran. So from the beginning of the war, a lot of people left the city. After the first day, when the Americans murdered those 168 elementary schoolgirls along with a couple dozen school staff and teachers, they closed the schools and universities. People were encouraged by the government, if they didn’t have anything important to do here, to leave. And then, of course, it was Ramadan. -- 1 of 15 -- People were fasting, so Tehran was quiet. But it continues to be quiet now because we're in the Iranian New Year. Yeah, and the Iranian New Year is sort of like Christmas and New Year in the West. Schools are closed for a couple of weeks, offices for a week, but the second week is pretty quiet. People usually take their vacations during that time, so Tehran remains quiet. It’ll stay that way for about ten more days, then businesses will have to open. So yes, it’s quiet. When I drove across the city yesterday, the traffic was light. They still bomb, of course, but over the last two or three days, the bombing has decreased. It’s believed there are two reasons—one of two, or a combination of both. One is that they have a shortage of ammunition. The Americans and Israelis bomb cities and people so much that they run short of these weapons. The SEC and also the fighter jets get worn down, and of course, we all know jets need to be overhauled. So that could be one reason—probably is. The second reason is that they plan to attack Iran’s territory and invade, so they may be trying to prepare themselves for that attack. I would imagine it’s a combination of both. May I just ask— #Pascal Sorry, may I just ask, how many people are now— I mean, the Iranian numbers—how many people have been killed by this onslaught so far? #Marandi The government releases numbers regularly. I don’t remember exactly, but I’d imagine the total is around 2,000 by now, or close to that—around 2,000, yeah. But just one final point: this isn’t necessarily the case for other cities, because during the New Year, people leave Tehran and go to smaller towns or other big cities. So other places may actually be quite crowded. When the Americans, for example, bomb Esfahan—a very historical city with a long civilizational history—it’s very crowded there right now. And people, you know, little children especially, are traumatized, of course, if they’re not killed or wounded. But these are the terrorists of our era—the pilots of the U.S. and Israeli Air Forces. They're the ones who bomb country after country from everywhere: Venezuela more recently, but also Libya, Syria, Iraq, Gaza, of course, and Yemen. So these are the terrorists of our era, and now it's Iran's turn. But the difference is that Iran is determined to beat them off, and it has the power to do so. I see among Iranians that their morale is very high and they're very confident. I was always expecting Iran to defeat this Western coalition in this war, but I never imagined—the morale among ordinary Iranians is even higher than I thought. #Pascal So do you think the Americans could actually be crazy enough to seriously plan a ground invasion, even if it’s just an island or two? I mean, those would be sitting ducks, wouldn’t they? The way Iran -- 2 of 15 -- is still striking back at Israel and the United States—the bases and so on—do you think they’re serious about this? #Marandi Yes, I think it’s actually going to happen in the next few days. It’s not far off. It’s crazy, but Trump is desperate—he’s lost the war and made a catastrophic mistake. He can’t open the Strait of Hormuz, and he can’t stop Iranian missile and drone strikes against the Israeli regime or against U.S. assets in the Persian Gulf region. So instead of walking away, declaring some fake victory, and accepting Iran’s very legitimate demands, he’s going to double down. And remember, when we look at Joe Kent’s resignation letter, the reason we’re in a war is not because of Iran’s nuclear program, because Kent said American intelligence was clear that there was no plan by Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. And, of course, Joe Kent is a Trump appointee. He also said very clearly that Iran was not a threat to the United States. But this war goes on—or rather, it started and continues—because of Zionism, the Zionist lobby in the United States, and the Israeli regime. So the whole war, from the very beginning, I think many of us—I've been saying it for years—knew this is how it would play out, and that the United States would fail. And it’s happening as expected. That was madness from day one, so continued madness shouldn’t be that surprising. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. I mean, what could be the goal of the Americans if they actually try to bring troops into harm’s way? Because there’s no question that Iran will hit them, right? There’s no question that those missiles and drones will fly straight into the troops and kill them, right? Or is there any other kind of logic you can see? #Marandi Well, you know, before the war there were discussions in Iran about what the greatest vulnerability of the United States might be. Some were saying it was the deaths of their troops. But I’ve always believed—and I’ve said this in different gatherings—that the Americans don’t care about their troops. The Epstein class, the Zionist oligarchy, for them these troops are just tools to be used. Even the language used by Trump and Lindsey Graham, among others, clearly shows that the lives of these troops are not important. You know this better than I do, but American troops are usually from the poor. And the poor classes and communities in the United States have no influence. When their kids are killed, they just die and they’re buried. -- 3 of 15 -- During Vietnam, for example, the United States had a conscript army. Except for those with very good connections who could avoid going, almost everyone had to serve. Their kids had to go. So when the body bags began to pile up and people started learning more about the reality of Vietnam—seeing through the propaganda about Ho Chi Minh and the resistance there—people began to protest. Those protesters were from the middle class, sometimes the upper middle class, and their voices could be heard more easily. These people, they were really just cannon fodder, as they say. And so, what can really stop the United States is a combination of things. One is for Iran to fight back and strike at these troops who are themselves, I would imagine, mostly victims of the empire. But the second would be to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed, because the oil, gas, and petrochemicals coming from there belong to countries invested in this war. Kuwait, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar—they all have American bases. They all facilitate the war. They’ve allowed the Americans from day one to use their airspace, their territory, to fire missiles. They are part of this war, and they’re funding the Americans. At least Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates are funding the war. So by stopping their oil and gas—for the most part, Iran allows some to go through—but by stopping this, what they’re doing is putting real pressure on the United States. And what the United States wants, by taking these islands, is to open the Strait of Hormuz. But the problem is that Iran doesn’t keep the strait closed by putting troops on the shoreline. That’s 19th‑century stuff, 20th‑century stuff. They fire missiles and drones from hundreds of kilometers away. So if the Americans want to stop those missiles and drones, they’d have to go deep inside Iran—and that’s impossible with five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty thousand troops. It seems completely foolish, but everything Trump has done so far is foolish. #Pascal But that’s why it makes no sense to put these troops there, as if they could somehow be defended or actually open the strait. Because again, you said it correctly, right? Iran lets some ships through. Iran didn’t categorically close it. Actually, the biggest problem is that the insurance companies don’t give coverage to the ships anymore. So even if Iran said, “You can go,” a lot of them would probably stay anchored. That’s not the problem. So talking about the Strait of Hormuz, to me, seems—at the moment, when it comes from the Americans—like they’re saying, “They must open, they must open.” It seems like a straw man. It’s a bit like the nuclear discussion, telling Iran, “You’re not allowed to build a bomb.” And Iran says, “We don’t want to build a bomb.” Then they’re told, “You have to sign that you won’t do it.” “Yes, yes, let’s sign, let’s have that.” And then you do that, and it keeps coming. So I wonder what their strategy is when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz, because it seems to me like just another excuse to keep the onslaught, the warfare, going. But then, how do you see Iran -- 4 of 15 -- responding to this, and what about this negotiation—the exchange of fire? At the end of the day, these missiles flying are actually a form of negotiation, unfortunately. Where is that going, and what are we learning from the way these bombing negotiations are being done? #Marandi Well, right now we don’t have negotiations. Trump came out and made this claim on Monday morning, right before the markets were going to open, saying that negotiations are taking place and we’re going to have peace. And he delayed his threat to bomb Iran’s critical infrastructure. He said he’s going to obliterate Iran’s electrical power plant, which is, of course, a crime against humanity. #Pascal And as we speak, on this March 26th—your morning, March 26th—they haven’t been bombed, right? That actually didn’t happen. The fields are fine at the moment, right? #Marandi Yes, at the moment, yes. Of course they do bomb. They bombed markets—they bombed