Trickle-Down Hegemony: How The US Controls The European Mind | Kajsa Ekis Ekman

## The disappearance of a different Europe Europe once contained powerful strains of independent diplomacy that consciously refused to march in step with Washington. The conversation with Kajsa Ekis Ekman — a journalist and public intellectual who has charted Swedish politics and media debates — pieces together how that world unraveled. What emerges is not a story of one sudden betrayal but of a long, layered drift: neutral and non-aligned states slowly reconfigured their identities, public discourse was remade to make that reconfiguration not only plausible but inevitable, and practical arrangements now embed foreign military power on European soil. The outcome is political conformity at the strategic level and a diminished capacity for Europe to imagine policy paths that diverge from U.S. aims. Ekman frames Sweden’s shift from two centuries of formal neutrality into full NATO membership as emblematic. That change was rapid in formal terms, but it rode on decades of diffusion: rhetorical adjustments (from “neutral” to “non‑aligned”), security culture shifts, intermittent episodes of moral panic and high-profile incidents, and a media environment that increasingly reflexively amplified a narrow set of fears. The more remarkable point in her account is not that elites made a decision — elites always make decisions — but that mass publics, journalists, and alternative voices largely echoed those choices as if they were common sense. ## From “neutrality” to a scripted consent The political mechanics Ekis highlights are worth underlining. Sweden’s leadership, she notes, enacted a profound foreign-policy reversal without a referendum and with minimal intra-party deliberation. The decision was presented as a technical necessity — a response to a changed threat environment after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — and accepted by broad swathes of the political class and media as urgent. Long-standing cultural cues that once favored restraint — a social democratic habit of internationalism distinct from militarized interventionism — were sidelined. Crucial to this shift, according to the exchange, was the rapid alignment of Sweden’s public messaging with a U.S.-shaped security narrative. Once Biden and Pentagon talking points set the frame, Ekman argues, they “trickled down” through Scandinavian institutions: prime ministers, major newspapers, and even alternative podcasts began echoing the same scripts. The psychological effect was as important as the formal policy change. Citizens who had once conceptualized their security as a function of diplomatic ties and non-alignment were told, almost overnight, that existential peril loomed unless the country plugged into the transatlantic defense architecture. That narrative was reinforced by simplistic, personality-driven frames — the war reduced to “Putin” as if geopolitical conflict were the product of an individual’s psychosis rather than structural rivalry. Tabloid covers and continuous headlines fixated on the enemy leader, producing a moral and emotional clarity that brooked little nuance: heroize some actors, demonize others, and support the institutional fix proposed by allied capitals. ## Manufactured fear and the media ecology Ekman’s account places the media center stage as both conveyor belt and amplifier. Panic and political decisions — like joining NATO or signing defense cooperation agreements with the United States — did not occur in a vacuum; they emerged from a media ecology that was saturated with alarm and visually relentless about a single adversary. When mainstream outlets placed “Putin” on front pages day after day, they helped convert a distant geopolitical crisis into a domestic psychological emergency. More troubling in Ekman’s telling is the capacity of elite-produced narratives to swallow dissenting spaces. Alternative podcasts and independent outlets that might have offered critical perspectives often adopted the prevailing scripts, a sign of the depth of hegemonic reach. That dynamic has real democratic consequences: when the range of legitimate debate narrows, the substantive choices available to citizens and policymakers shrink as well. The media’s role was not just in circulating alarm but in performing historical amnesia. Hundreds of years of European experience — including the Red Army’s pivotal role in defeating Nazism — were sidelined. Ekman points out how liberating acts in World War II by Soviet forces are often omitted in public commemorations and mainstream narratives, a remarkable erasure given the centrality of that history to modern Europe’s security architecture. This selective memory helps legitimate current alignments by making certain historical actors invisible and thereby reconfiguring the moral map. ## Militarization, bargains, and domestic trade-offs Another theme Ekman stresses is the domestic cost of this geopolitical realignment. Joining NATO and signing a Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the United States are not merely symbolic. The DCA she describes allows near-unfettered U.S. access to Swedish military bases, with troops subject to different regulations and tax exemptions. Ekman compares the arrangement to a post‑defeat occupation treaty because of its asymmetry: it grants operational freedom and legal insulation to foreign forces without commensurate guarantees that they will act to defend the host in a manner consistent with national sovereignty. Those institutional imbalances have budgetary consequences. A chorus in Swedish politics that long advocated higher defense spending succeeded in reallocating resources away from welfare, education, and public services. Ekman laments the erosion of the social safety net that once set Sweden apart — a welfare compact that narrowed inequality and cemented broad social solidarity. Money moved toward armaments and readiness at the same time as health and education systems were starved, contributing to the kind of social deterioration that corrodes civic trust and democratic capacity. The normalizing of foreign basing and increased defense spending also alters the optics of sovereignty: when vast tranches of strategic infrastructure are effectively available to an external power, the practical ability of the state to control its territory is diminished in ways that are rarely visible in headline counts of tanks or troop numbers. ## The poisoned well: Russophobia, memory, and the Eurasian alternative Ekman foregrounds another deep effect: the cultivation of a generalized hostility toward Russia that blends Cold War anti-communism with contemporary strategic demonization. The emotional register of this hostility matters. Ekman recounts anecdotes that show how quickly and socially contagious the stigmatization became: ordinary citizens adopting blanket distrust, tabloids turning a complex geopolitical actor into a cartoonish villain, and public commemorations that omit the Soviet role in defeating Nazism. These are not mere cultural quirks — they are political tools that make certain alliances palatable and some neighborhoods of the geopolitical imagination unreachable. The conversation raises a broader geopolitical question: why would Europe persist in a perpetual rivalry with its nearest continental neighbor when a cooperative Eurasian order could, in theory, produce mutual gains? Thinkers like Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined how an integrated Eurasia could undercut transatlantic primacy; from this vantage, the cultivation of rivalry is not merely accidental but strategic. Ekman wonders whether Europeans have internalized a U.S.-driven logic in which sustained division is a feature rather than a bug. The result is an ideological blockage against imagining strategic pluralism: non-alignment, neutrality, or nuanced engagement with both east and west become marginalized as “naïve” or “dangerous.” This mix of historic erasure and manufactured fear also serves to consolidate U.S. soft and har

Trickle-Down Hegemony: How The US Controls The European Mind | Kajsa Ekis Ekman Washington has an unprecedented grip over Europe. When Washington says "jump" the European's will reply "how high?" But that was not always the case. There once was a Europe of independent states, not US satellites. There was the Europe of Olaf Palme, Willy Brandt, or Bruno Kreisky that had a decidedly different foreign policy from the USA. Where did that place go? today I’m talking to Kajsa Ekis Ekman, a Swedish Journalist, Activist and the author of 4 books on human trafficking, prostitution and the economy. She is currently the editor in Chief of Parabol Press. Previously, Ms. Ekman worked for various Swedish outlets but was let go in 2022, after critically covering the unfolding Russo-Ukrainian War. More from Kajsa Ekis Ekman: https://www.parabol.press #F1 We're so aligned with geopolitical hegemony that it's ridiculous, on every level of society. Whatever the Pentagon says will just trickle down into even alternative podcasts here in Sweden. Since the White House didn't say anything about the genocide because they were complicit, our prime minister has not a single time during this whole period condemned Israel. And then Joe Biden all of a sudden said, you know, the settlers in the West Bank, that is not cool, like Israel should kind of put some halt on this. All of a sudden, you heard our prime minister say, well, yeah, actually, the settlers in the West Bank, that's really bad. Then you heard our newspapers saying, well, the settlers in the West Bank, I can agree that's bad. All of a sudden, these alternatives... #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Kajsa Ekis Ekman, a Swedish journalist, activist, and the author of four books on human trafficking, prostitution, and the economy. She is currently the editor-in-chief of Parabol Press. Previously, Ms. Ekman worked for various Swedish outlets but was let go in 2022 after critically covering the unfolding Russo-Ukrainian war. Hence, today we want to talk about her work and the media situation in Sweden. Ms. Ekman, welcome. #F1 Well, thank you so much. It's an honor to be here. Great to speak to you. And especially, I like your name, Neutrality Studies, because, you know, up until a year ago, we could have been part of that. Sweden and Switzerland were neutral countries, but that's now history. -- 1 of 22 -- #M2 I used to study you as a case, and now it's a historical case only. Let's start with that. What do you think about Sweden's transition from neutrality to NATO? #F1 Oh, it's awful. I mean, it's awful in so many ways. It's awful because, you know, I think historically it's a very bad decision. I mean, we were neutral for 200 years. We did fine. We weren't in any wars. You know, we're a peace-loving country. We do export weapons, though, and we have had close collaboration with NATO. I mean, we weren't 100% neutral still, I would say. But, you know, it saved us from a lot of wars. And it also left its mark on our culture that if you see a fight, the typical Swedish person is not like the typical American who will jump in on one side, but would rather try to separate the two people fighting. And also, it's awful because we weren't asked. We didn't have a referendum on this. It was just a top-down decision taken overnight. #M2 Why do you think that was? From my own research, I know that there was a progression as well, right? Because Sweden used to call itself neutral until about the 2000s and then started calling itself non-aligned. Then it started dropping references to that, and then came the war, and the switch happened. Does the media environment have something to do with it? #F1 Well, I mean, I think if it weren't for the Ukraine war, of course, we would still be neutral. We wouldn't be in NATO. But I mean, I think that was, I don't know if it was the reason as much as the excuse, because this had already been happening, as you're saying, slowly. Yeah. But what surprises me about this is the fact that everybody just bought into it like, oh, if we don't join NATO, Putin is going to invade us. I mean, nobody talked about that as a possibility outside of Sweden. I mean, there was no international discussion about saying like, oh, Sweden is next. You know, it never has been. I mean, we lived through two world wars up close. We've had, you know, I mean, all these invasions. I mean, the Soviet Union sometimes invaded other countries close by. Nobody ever said that was the reason for joining NATO. I mean, that was the reason for keeping out. #M2 Don't make yourself a target. That was the strategy, right? #F1 -- 2 of 22 -- Yeah, exactly. And our diplomacy was about trying to make friends in other countries and understand other people. In that way, you can create peace. And now it's just send arms, send soldiers. I mean, I think it's terrible. #M2 I also wonder about how Sweden is currently portraying its security situation, because I saw something very, very scary, and I'm going to make a separate program about this. It's a brochure that apparently was sent to Swedish households in English called "In Case of Crisis or War," a little yellow brochure that tells Swedes how to behave when the war comes. #F1 Have you seen that brochure? Yeah, they sent it here, but because there was such a brouhaha internationally about it, I gave it away to some Spanish relatives that came to visit because they were like, we want this. We want to show it back home. So, you know, I mean, I don't think that's such a big deal because they've sent these out for decades. So this is not a new thing. They do send these brochures out just in case. It's not just a war. It's in case there is a, you know, a climate crisis or, you know, what to do, how to get, you know, to stock up on cans or things like that, where you can find drinking water. So, I mean, essentially, I think that's a good thing. But, of course, now it comes in the context of, you know, Swedish people being, at least in 2022, I mean, there was real panic. People were writing in local Facebook groups, like, where are we going to hide when Putin comes? #M2 You mean 2023, right? #F1 Yeah. #M2 What did I say? In 2022. But you mean after the... Yeah, yeah. No, but... Yeah, yeah, yeah. In 2020, things were still fine, right? After Ukraine, that's when people got scared. #F1 Yeah. I mean, it was a fear that was instilled in us by our politicians and our media. And then it was kept alive by people themselves. People were thinking of moving, like, where should I move in the country to be safe? Yeah. I mean, and it's bizarre because we were told overnight that, you know, -- 3 of 22 -- Ukrainians are like our brother people and what happens to them is happening to us. I mean, nobody in Sweden basically knew where Ukraine was before this. Nobody ever talked about that country. #M2 Sweden sees a lot of its security in the context of the Nordics, right? Of Finland and Norway, but not of Central and Eastern Europe. #F1 No, no, we've always thought that those countries, you know, they're East, you know, we're the West. So that doesn't have anything to do with us. And, you know, you can call that an egotistical attitude, but it's been our attitude for many, many years now. Let people solve their problems themselves. We don't have anything to do with that. But I think crucial to Sweden's decision of joining NATO was also the fact that Finland switched from one day to another. And then we felt like we didn't want to be the border of NATO. So I think that's when our Social Democratic Party switched overnight without having an internal democratic decision about it. There was no extra Congress. Basically, there was an information meeting online, and that was it. And I mean, our historic leader, Olof Palme, he's turning in his grave. How much did he not fight for neutrality and for Sweden to be with the Third World? And now we're with imperialists. #M2 Olof Palme was a very fascinating and very engaged politician who would, exactly like others, like Bruno Kreisky in Austria, rotate in his grave. And Olof Palme, we still... He was murdered, right? Yeah, that we know. Who did it, we don't know. It's still unknown today who murdered Olof Palme. #F1 Yeah, nobody knows. #M2 Well, do you think that this change in how Sweden views its foreign policy, and that apparently a large group of politicians decided that really NATO is the only way to go, is something that grew during this time after the Cold War? Do you think that feeling was there already before? Because I talked to another countryman of yours, Ola Tunander, and he was talking about the submarine affair and how the submarine case instilled a lot of fear in people's hearts, and how today we understand that those were psyops, that these submarines never came from the Soviets, except for the one that actually crashed and was visible for a long time. Do you see any other mechanisms through which Sweden was scared into NATO? -- 4 of 22 -- #F1 I mean, there is a group of men in Sweden that are perpetually worried about being invaded. I would say women in general in Sweden, we never think about this at all. We're not worried about that. But there are a group of men who are kind of obsessed with this and, you know, who spend their time just, like, worrying about the status of our army and our weapons and our borders and things like that. So every time something like that happens, whether it was the submarine scandal in the '80s or whether it was now the sabotage of cables that turned out to be an accident, you know, I guess you heard about this. That was, whoa, for a couple of weeks, and now they're coming. And a lot of these men have high positions. So every time something like this happens, they get to speak out in the media. And they always say the same thing, like we need to spend more money on defense and less money on other things such as healthcare and education and things like that. So this has always been the battle, you know, about where we should put our money. And now they're so happy because we're putting billions into NATO. Whereas our social system, which made us famous back in the day—the Swedish welfare system—we didn't have rich or poor. We didn't have beggars in the street. You could be the child of an unemployed single mom and still have the same material standard as the child of a CEO. That's just going away now. #M2 That's very sad. Yeah. And this, does it have to do with the militarization of the Nordics, do you think? #F1 Well, it doesn't help exactly when your education system is underfunded and the health system is underfunded, over-privatized, and added to that, we're going to take from our tax money and put it into NATO. And there's also another thing that we did that actually has nothing to do with NATO, which I don't understand why we did, which was the DCA agreement where we now signed a separate agreement to allow the U.S. total access to 17 military bases in Sweden. It looks like the agreement that Iraq signed after having been invaded, except Iraq got this exception in the treaty that the U.S. was not allowed to put nuclear weapons. We didn't even ask for that. This treaty looks like we were at war with the U.S. and lost. #M2 You are not the first one to tell me that. I had Tuomas Malinen from Finland on the channel recently, and he said the same. This is basically an occupation agreement because these people, these are not NATO troops. These are U.S. troops. And they don't even have to pay taxes in your country, not even value-added tax. They don't even have to obey Swedish law. -- 5 of 22 -- #F1 They don't even have to obey our laws. We don't even have the right to check them when they go in and out. What are they bringing? Who are they? What passports do they have? They can just come and go. And I think what the Swedish people don't know is that they're not here to defend us. There's not