NATO's New Plans To Destroy Russia | Prof. Jeffrey Sachs

## NATO expansion and US primacy The conversation centers on a simple but consequential claim: NATO’s eastward march was never merely a defensive rearrangement of European security — it was integral to a U.S. strategy of maintaining primacy across Eurasia. That contention reshapes how we read the last three decades of policy choices. Rather than seeing enlargement as an organic post-Cold War stabilization, the exchange presents it as an intentional project to subordinate a revived Russia and cement American military and political reach across the continent. That project, the speaker argues, set in motion the very dynamics that produced the Ukraine conflict. This perspective traces an arc from the collapse of the Soviet Union to explicit strategic blueprints. Promises made around German reunification — that NATO would not expand eastward — are recalled as crucial. Whether those assurances were verbal or assumed as part of a broader settlement, their later reversal marks a turning point. The decision to enlarge NATO, which accelerated in the 1990s, was not merely a reflection of Poland, the Baltic states, or Romania seeking protection; it was the operationalization of an idea: to place the former Soviet space inside a Western security architecture and thereby limit Russia’s geopolitical options. Placed in this frame, Ukraine becomes less an isolated tragedy and more a prized geostrategic objective. The conversation invokes the argument that American strategy-makers viewed the incorporation of Ukraine and Georgia into Western institutions as a way to prevent any future Russian resurgence. Such a program promised the West control over the most consequential Eurasian pivot states. Seen this way, enlargement was not defensive reassurance for worried neighbors so much as an offensive move aimed at shaping the balance of power on the continent. ## From Cold War peace to confrontation The early post-Cold War moment held a fragile opportunity for a different kind of order — one built on partnership rather than domination. The exchange repeatedly emphasizes how leaders in Moscow made clear their preference for integration and security guarantees. Instead of reciprocating, the West pursued a course that many contemporaneous thinkers warned against. Voices that later came to epitomize caution — George Kennan, Jack Matlock, and a number of European leaders — warned that NATO expansion risked provoking the very confrontation it purported to prevent. This shift from a cooperative unwinding of bipolarity to a zero-sum contest did not happen by accident. It unfolded through policy choices and narratives that recast former adversaries as strategic targets. The conversation highlights how such framing fed on a particular political culture: an American elite confident in its unparalleled power and convinced that action taken while an adversary was weak would prevent future nuisance or danger. An influential current of thinking — articulated in the 1990s by figures like Zbigniew Brzezinski and institutionalized in policy circles — argued that early expansion was the prudent course because waiting would allow Russia to reconstitute its influence. Those who resisted enlargement warned of destabilization. The 2008 Bucharest summit, internal European debates, and public diplomatic friction are cited as missed moments when restraint could have been chosen. Instead, the expansion became a structural fact with long-term consequences. For states caught between East and West, neutrality and balance were stove-piped into an existential choice — align with the American-led system or risk being treated as a zone of contestation. The 2014 upheaval in Ukraine and its aftermath — including Crimea’s annexation and the conflict in the east — are presented as direct outcomes of these accumulated pressures. ## The US strategy of global dominance A broader thesis emerges from the discussion: the expansion of NATO is a piece of a wider U.S. blueprint for global dominance. The speaker situates NATO expansion within an expansive posture that treated American power as unconstrained — the “indispensable nation” mindset. That posture, the conversation suggests, permeated official doctrines, influential think tanks, and congressional sentiment, and it animated a range of interventions and pre-emptive strategies around the world. Historical episodes are invoked to illustrate the pattern: plans circulated in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries envisaged a U.S.-led order buttressed by military bases, interventions, and political engineering. The logic ran: if the United States does not secure its interests while it is strongest, its rivals will do so later when the balance narrows. The result was a willingness to engineer regime change, support proxy forces, and accept prolonged low- and high-intensity conflicts as instruments of geostrategic competition. Within Europe, this translated into a reluctance to treat Russia as an equal partner and a readiness to absorb buffer zones into Western institutions. Elsewhere, it manifested in doctrines that contemplated rapid, multi-theater operations and long-term campaigns of influence. The effect on domestic politics and on allied societies has been significant: military spending priorities, industrial alignments, and political rhetoric shifted to sustain a bipartisan consensus about the necessity and acceptability of robust forward deployment and occasional coercion. ## Can the US choose coexistence? If expansion and dominance were choices, can they be unmade? The conversation wrestles with this question candidly: the United States could, as a matter of policy, choose coexistence, but political and institutional obstacles stand in the way. The appeal of coercive primacy — for elites who benefit from arms contracts, strategic influence, or ideological prestige — has proved resilient. Moreover, the bureaucratic and political deep state, in the interlocutor’s account, endures across administrations, shaping continuities even when presidents change. Yet there are countervailing forces. Some influential figures who once supported assertive policies have reconsidered the costs. The speaker references reassessments among policymakers and even hints at the possibility that domestic fatigue and the visible human and material tolls of extended conflicts could create political pressure for a different course. Coexistence would require three fundamental changes: a credible security arrangement for Ukraine that precludes NATO membership; an end to policies that treat Russia as a zone to be dominated; and a shift in U.S. strategic culture from compulsive dominance to managed competition. These steps would be neither simple nor painless. They require political courage, reparative diplomacy, and credible guarantees on all sides. They also demand overcoming narratives that have become ingrained in Western politics — namely, that any accommodation with Russia equates to weakness or moral betrayal. The conversation insists the option of coexistence is not impossible but politically fraught, and the longer the current trajectory continues, the harder it will become to unwind. ## Can the wars be stopped? Stopping the wars in and around Ukraine is presented as urgent and increasingly difficult. The speaker rejects the notion that a Western victory over Russia is feasible without dramatic, and potentially catastrophic, escalation. Conversely, a Russian triumph would devastate Ukraine and produce a ruinous, long-term settlement. The preferred ending described is negotiated neutrality: Ukraine as a demilitarized, non-aligned state with security guarantees from major powers — a settlement that restores sovereignty without converting Ukraine into a forward base for an antagonistic alliance. Achieving that outcome would demand diplomatic imagination and leverage that neither side currently appears to command. The conversation emphasizes three practica

NATO's New Plans To Destroy Russia | Prof. Jeffrey Sachs The West is losing the Ukraine War big time. But that does not mean the NATO lunatics are willing to give up their plans for total global domination. On the contrary, some of them are only getting started. Professor Jeffrey Sachs joins Pascal Lottaz to argue that the Ukraine war is a long-running US proxy conflict with Russia. He discusses NATO expansion, post-Cold War policy, US power and elite interests, Europe’s economic costs, and the risks of escalation. Sachs also outlines what he sees as a path to peace: Ukrainian neutrality, no further NATO expansion, and ending US wars. Links: Jeffrey D. Sachs: https://www.jeffsachs.org Common Dreams: https://www.commondreams.org /author/jeffrey-d-sachs Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Jeffrey Sachs on the Ukraine proxy war 00:00:42 NATO expansion and US primacy 00:12:57 From Cold War peace to confrontation 00:20:43 The US strategy of global dominance 00:23:34 Can the US choose coexistence? 00:29:56 Can the wars be stopped? 00:35:35 Where to follow Jeffrey Sachs #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today with a special episode with the one and only Dr. Jeffrey Sachs. #Jeffrey Sachs Professor Jeffrey Sachs, welcome. Pascal, great to be with you. Thanks so much. #Pascal Thank you very much for saying yes to this. We want to discuss a piece that you wrote a couple of weeks ago and published on your homepage, Common Dreams. You called it "Ukraine, America's Enduring Proxy War on Russia." It's easily forgotten that we are now, you know, four and a half years into this proxy war. And when I speak about proxy war here in Switzerland, where I currently am, people still tell me, "But Pascal, this is a Russian narrative." #Jeffrey Sachs How can you—what do you make out of this proxy war four and a half years into it? First, I think we can legitimately say this is a proxy war that's been going on at least 12 years, since the coup which overthrew the Ukrainian president in February 2014. Arguably, it is a proxy war that has been going -- 1 of 10 -- on in one form or another for 35 years, since 1991, since the end of the Soviet Union, because when the Soviet Union fell, America's next target was that Russia should fall. And you could say that this is a proxy war that's been going on for maybe 81 years, since 1945, because at the end of World War II, American and British strategists felt that the next battle was to bring down the Soviet Union. So, in a way, I believe there is a long continuity in American policy. Of course, as you say, this approach runs completely against the mainstream narrative that we are fighting a defensive action against Russian aggression. But this is rather ridiculous, because Russia was weak after the 1990s. Russia wanted partnership with Europe and the United States. Russia actually wanted into NATO, if we recall that in the early 2000s. This is not a war of aggression by Russia. This is the tragic result of a mindset of the United States and Britain primarily, and then also now continental Europe, which was a late joiner in some sense to this mindset that the U.S. should run the world. And to do so, it should take whatever territory it wants in the world into the American camp. And Ukraine was a big prize for the American strategists in their attempts at victory, control, or primacy or hegemony, whatever term one wants to use. And they were explicit about all of this back in the 1990s. A debate came as soon as the Soviet Union fell in December 1991. What should America's policy be? Should it be a friendship with Russia and the successor states? Should it be to create an environment of inclusive security, as President Gorbachev and President Yeltsin ardently called for? Or should it be an expansion of the American military system? And we know that by 1992, the decision effectively was taken: NATO will enlarge. It was a fateful decision. It was a decision completely contrary to what was promised to President Gorbachev and Yeltsin back in 1990 and 1991, when the terms for German reunification changed. #Jeffrey Sachs were being negotiated, and the President of the United States and his Secretary of State and the German Chancellor and his Foreign Minister, all in unequivocal terms, said to President Gorbachev, “NATO will not enlarge.” But as soon as the Soviet Union fell, both the Americans and the Germans said, “We have a free hand. Our commitments don't mean anything.” Even though Russia was the continuation state of the Soviet Union, the treaties mattered. The promises that had been made, as you have so beautifully pointed out, whether they were verbal promises or whether they were written promises, they were restated constantly. They were the basis of actions taken by Germany. They were the reliance for unification that made German reunification possible. The Soviet Union relied, and Russia relied, on these promises. They were abandoned. And the idea became that America and its European allies should expand their political reach and their military reach as they see fit. And we know already by the mid-1990s, the decision was that NATO should expand at least to Ukraine and to Georgia, because these were committed already and explained in a very clear article by Zbigniew Brzezinski in 1997, that the future of NATO would be to take Ukraine in between 2005 and 2010. And he spelled all of this out in -- 2 of 10 -- his book, The Grand Chessboard, in 1997. And the subtitle of that book is “American Primacy in Eurasia,” or I'm paraphrasing, but it's substantially that subtitle: how the United States will be the power, primacy, the hegemon in Eurasia in the decades ahead. And the answer was the United States needs essentially to make Russia a weak player in the system, subservient to American and European interests, and that expanding NATO and the European Union political organization would be the way to do it. Russia would resist, but Brzezinski analyzed the situation and said Russia can't really resist if the West pushes. It has no place to go. It will never ally with China, he wrote. It won't ally with Iran, he wrote. It will have no option but to accede to American demands. And so this game, because it was a game, the Great Game of the 19th century, replayed as the Great Game of the end of the 20th century and the early 21st century, was American primacy pinned down by military bases in all parts of the world, and in the European theater by the expansion of NATO. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Jeffrey Sachs Of course, sane American thinkers knew how dangerous this was. George Kennan said it was the biggest mistake of American foreign policy. William Burns, who was the CIA director in 2009, said it was the reddest of red lines for Russia, that this idea of Ukraine being in NATO was neuralgic not only to Putin or to a particular group in Russia, but to the entire Russian political class. And Angela Merkel knew that this march of NATO eastward was tantamount to a declaration of war with Russia. Well, this all came to a head, as we know, in February 2014. The simple fact is the Ukrainian public didn't want to join NATO. And their president, Viktor Yanukovych, was a president who had won his election at the end of 2009 and 2010 on the basis of neutrality, non-NATO membership, and keeping a balance between Russia and Europe, or Russia and the United States. And the U.S. cannot tolerate that kind of neutrality. The mindset is, you're either with us or you're against us. And Yanukovych clearly was against us. He had to go. And so the United States helped to stoke the overthrow, which came on February 22nd, 2014. And we've been at war since then, because as soon as that happened, eastern Ukraine broke away, said, "This is not our government in Kiev. This is a government of coup." Russia took actions, variously described, to ensure that Crimea would not fall into NATO hands. And the war began. And my view is the U.S. foreign policy hasn't changed. It is to continue to, quote, win this war, which is impossible. It won't be won. It could end in a complete nuclear war, but it can't end in a Western victory over Russia, because Russia will not accept such an outcome. It will escalate if needed. In practice, it -- 3 of 10 -- probably won't need that escalation, because it looks like Russia will defeat Ukraine just on conventional means alone. But God forbid, if it ever came to a truly existential question, Russia is going to go down in defeat or escalate to nuclear weapons. You have to think, because we've been told a thousand times now, that escalation to nuclear war is probably the likely outcome, certainly a very possible outcome. So this whole war is a proxy war. It's a proxy war for American primacy. It's being lost. It's destroying Ukraine. It's been going on for a dozen years. The campaign has been going on for more than 30 years. And this is the deep state in operation. And it's very, very unfortunate. And Europe, European leaders have completely lost their senses, because everything I just said would have been taken as normal 20 years ago, not controversial. Ask the German government at the time. Ask the French government at the time. Ask the Norwegian government at the time. What I'm saying absolutely would have been mainstream. Yeah, don't push Russia. Why would you push Russia? Why do we need to expand NATO? That is tantamount to war. Now the European politicians, for many reasons that are debated, are saying things absolutely devoid of the truth in their utterances. And what we don't know is what they think, really, whether they're just ignorant of this history, or whether they're so deeply locked into it that they see no way out, or whether they're delusional that they think they're going to defeat Russia. I don't know what it is, but we're in such a confused state of discussion, even though what I've recounted, which now is called Putin apology and pro-Russian propaganda, was mainstream in Europe 20 years ago. #Pascal Maybe this is one of the things that is so difficult to comprehend for many of us on this side of the discussion. First, how is it possible that we went from the de-escalatory 1980s, when, yes, there was a Cold War brewing, but actually the one thing that Gorbachev and also Reagan understood was this needs to be somehow managed. There needs to be— and we've had people like Jack Matlock, who's still around and keeps telling us how they worked toward that. And he's the guy, he's the man who says, like, no, no, no, the Cold War was ended because it was beneficial for both of us. We wound it down, and the Soviet Union collapsed two years later. And this was that cooperative spirit. And he actually is on record in the 1990s saying, like, do not expand NATO. It would be a huge mistake, right? Just like Mr. Kennan. And then we went into this unipolar moment. And now we are at the epitome of that unipolar moment, still, at least in the thinking of people in Switzerland. Next month, we're going to vote on the neutrality initiative, which, if we did it, would actually strengthen Swiss neutrality. But we are probably going to lose this because the counter side, the other side, says it would be pro-Putin. We couldn't put sanctions anymore on Russia; it would be pro-Putin. Literally, the only thing they throw around is Putin, Putin, Putin. So we are in the height of a mania in Europe, you know. And it reminds me so much of the fifties, of the Red Scare, right? And -- 4 of 10 -- how the idea was, we need to defeat communism. And it took twenty years to get to the idea of mutual c