Washington Is Destroying the USA to Rule the World | Dr. Arthur Khachikian

## Hegemony’s Hidden Bill The conversation with Dr. Arthur Khachikian cuts to a simple, unsettling point: global dominance is expensive, and those costs are often paid at home by the most vulnerable. The United States, long the unipolar power after the Cold War, has spent generously on military adventures, alliance-building, and forward deployments—while domestic needs such as healthcare, education, and infrastructure have atrophied. The paradox is clear in everyday sights: homelessness beneath bridges the nation can't repair; a vanishing middle class; widening inequality. The exchange reframes these outcomes not as unfortunate accidents of policy, but as structural consequences of an empire-in-practice that redirects resources and political attention outward rather than inward. ## From Post-Cold Hope to New Rivalries The end of the Cold War brought a brief, intoxicating moment of possibility. Voices and images from that era—leaders talking about a “common European house,” troops marching together, and the unexpected warmth between erstwhile adversaries—suggested a path toward inclusion and cooperative security. Dr. Khachikian, who lived through the period as someone bridging Soviet and Western worlds, recalls that hope vividly. Yet the hopes dissolved into a new, more dangerous struggle. Rather than clustering states into a broader, integrative security arrangement, the post-Cold settlement hardened into bloc politics, producing a new rivalry that many observers now see as a self-fulfilling cycle of fear and counter-action. That shift matters because it transformed the political logic of the 1990s. A rare opportunity to institutionalize cooperative security was squandered, and the instruments of economic and political integration became, in several cases, instruments of exclusion. The result was not the balanced, pluralistic architecture some envisioned, but a sequence of policy choices—most notably NATO’s eastward expansion—that produced resentment and strategic counterweights. What might have been a shared security order instead became a ladder for renewed competition. ## The Trap of Grandeur and Institutional Inertia Dr. Khachikian names a timeless dynamic that explains much of why the international community failed to seize a peaceful settlement: the “trap of grandeur.” When a state or its elites suddenly acquire overwhelming advantage—military, economic, ideological—they risk hubris. Power magnifies misperception. Leaders and institutions accustomed to a certain purpose become resistant to reorientation, even when the strategic environment changes. Think tanks, bureaucratic stovepipes, and domestic political coalitions, once mobilized for confrontation, have trouble disbanding; their institutional survival can incentivize prolonging old agendas. This explains why warnings from experienced statesmen and scholars—voices that cautioned against provocative policies—were often sidelined. The conversation repeatedly pointed to historical examples of counsels rendered impotent by momentum: institutions that feed on conflict, diaspora pressures in democratic politics, and electoral calculations that prioritize short-term gains. The result: decisions that should have been tempered by grand strategy and a sense of balance instead reflected domestic politicking, institutional self-interest, and strategic complacency. ## Violating Postwar Rules: Inclusion, Equilibrium, and the Security Dilemma Another leitmotif is the violation of the unwritten rules that traditionally follow major conflicts—do not humiliate a defeated great power; find ways to include potential rivals in a framework of restraint; and avoid unilateral security measures that inherently threaten others. Dr. Khachikian traces how these principles—evident in Westphalia, the Concert of Europe, and post-World War settlements—were overlooked after 1991. Instead of crafting a mechanism that integrated Russia into a cooperative European architecture, the prevailing trajectory leaned toward exclusion and enlargement of military blocs. This political trajectory collided with the most basic insight of international relations: the security dilemma. Defensive measures by one side are perceived as offensive by another, prompting countermeasures and spiraling insecurity. The discussion stressed how easily foreseeable this was. From the construction of fortifications in ancient Greece to modern missile defenses, the dynamic repeats: efforts to make one state safer can make the system less stable. NATO enlargement, the coupling of economic and military integration, and the instrumentalization of institutions intended for peaceful cooperation effectively reactivated patterns of balancing and alignment—pushing Moscow toward other partners and amplifying distrust. ## The Pivot East: Predictable Realignments and Missed Signals A particularly sharp observation in the exchange is how predictable Russia’s alignment toward China became as a function of Western policy choices. Rather than viewing this pivot as an act of ideological betrayal, the framing offered by Dr. Khachikian casts it as the straightforward outcome of strategic pressure and perceived encirclement. Had inclusion been pursued—offers crafted to address core security concerns and provide meaningful guarantees—Russia might have remained a partner in constructing a broader Europe. Instead, a sequence of policy decisions and public rhetoric pushed Moscow to seek ballast elsewhere. The consequence of that choice is profound: a multipolar, contested strategic landscape more prone to crises and miscalculation. That outcome undermines the claim that Western dominance could be sustained indefinitely without reciprocal security assurances. It also demonstrates a kind of geopolitical shortsightedness: short-term tactical gains in influence or enlargement can yield long-term strategic headaches when they erode the foundations of a stable continental order. ## Domestic Decay as Strategic Backlash The conversation consistently links grand strategy to domestic well-being. Military overstretch and relentless global engagement carry fiscal and political costs that show up in everyday life: decaying infrastructure, inadequate social safety nets, and a middle class under siege. When national wealth is diverted into security commitments abroad, the social compact at home frays. Dr. Khachikian’s critique is less a moral sermon than an empirical argument: the resources allocated to global dominance are finite, and opportunity costs matter. This domestic dimension operates in two directions. On the one hand, persistent external deployment creates political narratives of exceptionality that justify further military expenditure; on the other, the neglect of domestic investment breeds cynicism and social instability—conditions that can amplify internal polarization and weaken democratic institutions. In that sense, foreign policy is not an external commodity separable from domestic politics; they are mutually constitutive. A nation that cannot meet basic needs at home is less credible and less resilient abroad. ## History’s Lessons and the Case for Neutrality History threaded every part of the exchange as both warning and guide. The old practice of rebuilding European order through inclusive settlements offers a template for a different approach: one that privileges collective security, reciprocal concessions, and institutionalized restraint. Dr. Khachikian invoked epochs—from the Peace of Westphalia to the Concert of Europe—to argue that the durable peace emerges from arrangements that avoid cornering great powers and instead integrate them into shared frameworks. From the standpoint of neutrality and nonalignment studies, the conversation highlights why neutral postures and bridging roles can be stabilizing. States or coalitions that resist bloc logic and promote pathways for dialogue reduce incentives for adversarial balancing. Neutrality is not passi

Washington Is Destroying the USA to Rule the World | Dr. Arthur Khachikian How come that, as Jimmy Dore says, "there are homeless people under every bridge in America, and they don't even fix the bridges"? How is it possible that in the nominally richest economy in the world there is so much poverty, drugs, and despair and why did that problem grow over the unipolar moment when the USA was the unquestioned sole superpower on this planet? Well, turns out, hegemony is not good for the hegemon. Clinging to global dominance comes with heavy costs, born by the most vulnerable of society—a process that already the USSR had to go through and now it's the USA that is learning the same lesson. Today I’m talking to Dr. Arthur Khachikian. Arthur holds a PhD in International Relations from Stanford University, where he wrote a dissertation on Great Power Politics and Intervention in the international system. He currently teaches at an Armenian University in Yerevan, the capital city. Today we want to discuss the very large picture of contemporary world politics. #M3 We became like the Soviet Union. We started wasting our money, $14 trillion—it's a number I've heard—declaring wars all over the world and losing them, not even winning. I mean, this horrendous waste of resources when in the U.S. we have such serious problems as health care and education. Our middle class has disappeared. Fifty percent of Americans are living paycheck to paycheck. I mean, what is this? This incredible inequality in income, so many problems. And America always comes last. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Dr. Arthur Khachikian. Arthur holds a PhD in international relations from Stanford University, where he wrote a dissertation on great power politics and intervention in the international system. He currently teaches at an Armenian university in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, and he is a friend of Professor Jeffrey Sachs, who actually connected the two of us. Today, we want to discuss the very large picture of contemporary world politics. So, Arthur, welcome. #M3 Thank you very much. It's a pleasure. I hope I deserve the title of being a friend of Professor Sachs. Thank you very much for having me. And I know you have hosted many, much more important people. But if there are any thoughts I can share with you, I would be delighted. -- 1 of 20 -- #M2 The important thing is the analysis. And that's where I would like to pick your brain because you grew up and then studied during a very interesting time period, right? You were born a citizen of the Soviet Union, and then that citizenship ended. You became, I mean, were again Armenian, also on passport, and went to the United States. Can you tell us a little bit about the atmosphere at the end of the Cold War and what shaped your outlook on international politics? #M3 Thank you for saying that. In a way, I am the product of the end of the Cold War. I'm a product of Gorbachev's new thinking. And I always joke with my American friends in the '90s. I joked with them at Stanford. They said, you know, we won the Cold War. And I said, no, no, you didn't win the Cold War. I won the Cold War. Look at me. I came here all the way from the Soviet Union with $4 in my pocket. And, you know, I came to this amazing university. And I will be forever grateful to those people who accepted me there. And I did my master's and PhD and worked with some remarkable people. And so I was that living bridge between the United States, Russia, and Armenia, the Soviet Union— what was the Soviet Union—and the United States. It was really an incredible time. I'm in Armenia now. It was here that, when I was a high school student, I listened to the BBC, Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty at night, which was kind of dangerous because if anybody found out, I would get in trouble. So I was kind of a known dissident back in my high school. Once, I criticized Marx, and I got in a lot of trouble with the principal. But afterwards, when Gorbachev came to power, these hopes that we had for a future, this inspiration, it was an incredible time, a very inspirational time. This kind of, you speak some German—I don't speak German a lot—but, you know, it was kind of this ode of joy, "Freude, schöner Götterfunken," that kind of atmosphere. And it was here in Armenia, I had a friend with whom I worked at the Red Cross, Erich Wolstein. And when the Berlin Wall came down, he was driving in the streets of Yerevan with a German flag, celebrating the fact that the wall came down. It was an incredible feeling. We thought that we were now going to put aside the hatred, the war, this propaganda. We're going to be one family, one Europe. And that's what Gorbachev actually wanted to do. We talked about a common European house, if you remember, a common European home, Europe from even like a common security space, I guess, from Vancouver to Vladivostok. There were some really far-reaching statements. I also remember Ronald Reagan. I was quite fond of him. He was a very, very charming person. He came to Moscow, and on Red Square, they asked him, do you still believe that the Soviet Union is an empire of evil? And he said, no, I don't. It was a great time, this feeling of reconciliation, and friendship, and goodwill, and hope. -- 2 of 20 -- And, you know, nobody can believe this now, not to mention Yeltsin's speech in Washington when he said, God bless America. And then American, French, and English troops marching on Red Square. Can you believe this? No one would believe this now. But they marched together to celebrate a common victory. It was a very inspirational time. And look where we are now. It all fell apart like a house of cards. This whole new world order fell to pieces. It's a shambles. All of it is forgotten. We are now witnessing the bloodiest, most devastating conflict in the world and in Europe since 1945. And, you know, we can only hope that the efforts made by President Trump and President Putin will produce some results and this bloodshed will end. But it's just a total collapse, a fiasco of all these hopes and all this inspiration, this atmosphere of hatred, in fact, even worse than the Cold War. It's much more dangerous now than the Cold War. We witness the erosion of nuclear deterrence. The concept of nuclear deterrence is eroding. There are open discussions of nuclear exchanges, which did not really take place during the Cold War, maybe with one or two exceptions. With the advent of hypersonic missiles, nuclear proliferation, and missile defense systems, it's a much more unpredictable and dangerous environment than what we had. And this kind of intensity of propaganda, I don't think... You know, we had that in the '70s or the '80s. It wasn't like this. Not this much hatred, open anti-Russian hatred. I mean, I've never seen anything like this. In those days, you separated the communist regime from Russia and the Russian people. Even Western leaders did that. Reagan did that. Margaret Thatcher, another hero of mine, did that too. There was a very careful distinction. And my final point—I'm sorry, my answer is very long—but there is a huge change in the quality of leadership. I mean, we had people, we had visionaries. We had people like Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, Helmut Kohl, and François Mitterrand. And with all his faults, Mikhail Gorbachev. Of course, it's very controversial to say this now. In Russia, they don't like it when you say this. But they were people who thought philosophically. They had this systemic, holistic vision of the world. They had amazing foresight and wisdom, which is more than I can say about some of our leaders today, sadly. #M2 How was it? This is on my mind the whole time, and I ask this a lot, and I still can't wrap my head around it. How did we lose that peace? How did we Europeans, and I include all of us, you know, from the Caucasus and Russia and all the way to West Asia and Europe, how did we lose that? I mean, it's such a dumb thing to do. It was such a hopeful time. And you look back at it and yes, okay, sure. You can say, like the Scorpions and a certain part, there also was some sort of CIA involvement and, you know, the propaganda. The propaganda was there, and Radio Free Europe always was a propaganda thing. But there was genuine aspiration, especially from the side of the Soviet Union, to make this better. And, you know, one of the things that Jack Matlock, the last U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, keeps saying time and again is that the Cold War ended two years before the collapse of the Soviet -- 3 of 20 -- Union because it was in the strategic interest of Washington and Moscow to end it. And only two years later, the Soviet Union collapsed, which actually George Bush Sr. didn't even want. He famously had a speech in Ukraine, in Kyiv, in a parliamentary building, saying, like, you should not secede. Everybody was afraid of what would happen. And then we went into the 1990s. And then what happened? How did we lose the peace? #M3 Well, of course, you have people who can speak with more authority, but I'll just offer my thoughts. I think there were several reasons. The main one, I think, was what I call the trap of grandeur. When a person gets a lot of money suddenly, they usually lose their head. They don't know what to do with it, and they make silly decisions. When a power and when leaders of a certain power just become too strong and they feel that they can do whatever they want, it plays a trick on them. There was a famous British politician, Lord Acton, in the 19th century who said, "All power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely." It's very dangerous for any particular country to be all-powerful and to be always right. It plays a trick on your mind. Now, I must say that there were a lot of people, and we'll talk about it if you like, many people in the United States who warned about this. So there were a lot of very wise people who had foresight, amazing foresight. And some of them have been mentioned on your program before. There were people who said we shouldn't lose this chance to build one world where we could cooperate with Russia. Russia is a vital partner. And I will go into this with your permission. There was a letter by 50 senators and diplomats written in 1997 saying that there is no threat emanating from Russia and that the expansion of NATO would be, they said, a mistake, an error of historic proportions. They said that. There is this famous statement by George Kennan, the architect of containment, which has been mentioned before, saying that this is a tragic mistake. It will bring on another Cold War. An esteemed colleague, William Perry, former Secretary of Defense, almost resigned over it, and he said again it's a needless provocation. You have the very famous telegram, again referencing William Burns, who sent a telegram in 2008 saying that the inclusion of Ukraine is the brightest of all red lines. You know, person after person was warning against it. I'm in no way comparing myself to all those people, but there was a conference at Stanford in 1995 or '97, I believe, and there was a debate on this issue. And certainly it was a bit of a show because the issue had been decided by then. But I wrote a small article and said that the expansion of NATO to the east, if it didn't take into consideration Russia's interests, would lead to a war in eastern Ukraine and the Caucasus, and would build a new Berlin Wall and a new Iron Curtain, hundreds of kilometers to the east. I wrote it back then, and many of my colleagues were in agreement. But I think what happened is, number one, there was organizational and institutional inertia. There were organizations, research institutions, and think tanks that were created for the business of the Cold War, and they made a lot of money on it. -- 4 of 20 -- And for them to suddenly stop functioning and find ano