Trump Begs No More Oil Strikes, Larijani Dead, Iran Confident | Prof. S.M. Marandi

## A turning point in a widening war The exchange captures a pivotal moment: a regional conflict that was expected to be short and surgical has metastasized into a contest of wills over the future of the Persian Gulf. The most important claim running through the conversation is that Iran’s strategic posture — disciplined, patient, and deliberately calibrated — is beginning to reshape the calculations of its adversaries. What had been an asymmetrical campaign of strikes and counterstrikes now looks less like a rapid escalation than the opening rounds of a new balance-of-power struggle, where economic choke points and public resolve matter as much as precision munitions. The implications reach beyond Tehran and Washington: they threaten to alter the political economy of energy, the operational footprint of U.S. forces in the region, and the diplomatic map that has long privileged certain Gulf monarchies. ## Assassination, martyrdom, and political symbolism The killing of a senior Iranian political figure during these exchanges was described in the conversation as both a crime and a catalyst. Far from producing immediate demoralization, the event was portrayed as reinforcing national resolve. The speaker emphasized the cultural and religious frames that transform individual loss into collective fortitude: martyrdom is not simply a moral category but a mobilizing narrative that unites disparate social constituencies. In those terms, assassination becomes a blunt instrument that risks strengthening the very polity it aims to weaken. The conversation draws a direct line between targeted killings and increased public participation in demonstrations, suggesting the attackers miscalculated the domestic political payoff. This dynamic matters because modern warfare is also a battle for legitimacy — both internationally and within national borders. The conversation highlighted a notable gap between Western media narratives and the street-level reality inside Iran. The absence of widespread coverage of mass gatherings, rituals of mourning, and public calls for retaliation creates a distorted sense of domestic isolation that the reality reportedly belies. If the streets are indeed full and the crowds are committed, the regime’s capacity to sustain a protracted defensive posture grows while the costs of coercive measures for the attackers rise as well. ## From resistance to resilience: public mobilization as a strategic asset A central theme was the transformation of public anger into resilience. The speaker argued that nightly crowds, sustained across cities and neighborhoods, do more than register symbolic dissent: they alter the social contract by embedding resistance within the routines of daily life. Young people, women, and religious communities were depicted not as passive victims but as active participants in a national defense. The speaker’s own anecdotal encounters — attending rallies, observing non-stop mobilization, and noting the emotional composure of protestors under fire — were put forward as evidence that Iran’s social fabric has been hardened by repeated external shocks. This suggestion has two strategic consequences. First, it makes rapid political decapitation or regime-change operations far riskier and costlier, because legitimacy and popular cohesion can blunt the effectiveness of precision attacks. Second, resilience confers time: a government that can count on social endurance can wait out diplomatic pressures, continue to rearm or reconfigure its forces, and shape post-conflict bargaining on more favorable terms. The social dimension thus becomes a force multiplier, limiting the plausible range of coercive options for opponents. ## Measured escalation: Iran’s strategic choices and the restraint rationale A recurrent claim was that Iran’s military responses are deliberately calibrated to avoid permanent damage to global energy infrastructure while still signaling capability and intent. The speaker stressed that Tehran has so far refused to destroy the very assets that push global oil markets — a tacit acknowledgment that Iran has no interest in plunging the world into a long-term energy collapse. Instead, Iran has employed selective interdictions and temporary disruptions that convey credible deterrence without closing avenues for de-escalation. This posture reflects a broader logic: use of asymmetric tools to impose costs and force political recalculation, but stop short of self-defeating mutations of the global economy. The Strait of Hormuz closures and strikes on select facilities are framed as reversible measures designed to impose pressure on the United States and its regional partners. From a strategic standpoint, that line between pain and annihilation is crucial. It preserves Iran’s bargaining leverage — the ability to up- or down-shift pressure — while keeping open the option of a negotiated settlement once adversaries accept a new set of constraints in the Gulf. ## Signals from Washington: a Truth Social post and the politics of restraint Perhaps the most striking development discussed was a public message from a former U.S. president that appeared to disavow further attacks on Iranian oil and gas infrastructure. The conversation treated that post as more than a slip of rhetoric: it was an emergent sign that Iran’s measured retaliation had shifted American elite perceptions of risk. The claim was not that any single communiqué alters state policy overnight, but that cumulative pressure — economic, military, and reputational — is producing visible hedging by American and allied political actors. Skepticism toward the reliability of such signals was equally prominent. The speaker cautioned that public pronouncements are ephemeral, and that unilateral promises mean little unless the underlying military and logistical capabilities that enable strikes are altered. In other words, a tweet that stakes out a red line is only credible when it is backed by a tangible change in force posture or basing arrangements. The implication is clear: deterrence must be underwritten by facts on the ground, not just by digital declarations. ## Iran’s bargaining terms: security, compensation, and regional rebalancing The conversation delineated a handful of red lines that would frame any plausible Iranian exit from the current confrontation. First, the U.S. ability to project offensive power from regional bases must be curtailed. That demand goes beyond symbolic gestures; it would likely require a rollback of basing arrangements, refueling privileges, and intelligence cooperation that currently allow rapid U.S.-led strikes. Second, reparations or compensation were presented not as rhetorical demands but as practical claims tied to direct losses — an insistence that the Gulf monarchies which enabled operations will face economic consequences. Third, Tehran insists that future guarantees of non-aggression be embedded with regional stakeholders, including its allies, rather than being unilaterally imposed by Western actors. If taken seriously, these demands would fundamentally alter the architecture of regional security. They imply a diminution of U.S. military primacy in the Gulf, a redefinition of transit customs in the Strait of Hormuz, and an expanded role for regional actors in dispute resolution. For many Gulf regimes, these changes would mean accepting limits on their ability to host external forces and to use territory as a lever against rivals — a realignment with substantial sovereignty costs. ## Who could broker an agreement? The limits of Western institutions and the role of third-party guarantors The conversation dismissed the United Nations and traditional Western guarantors as unreliable mediators, citing prior failures to restrain violations or punish transgressions. Instead, the argument favored neutral or non-Western guarantors — notably Russia and China — on the grounds that these states have both the credibility and th

Trump Begs No More Oil Strikes, Larijani Dead | Prof. Marandi Update March 19 with Professor Seyed M. Marandi from Tehran: As the war drags on and the US /Israelis keep killing Iranian leaders and civilians, Iran's military strategy is not changing and actually producing first results. Donald Trump just put out a tweet that his coalition will not attack Iranian oil fields anymore and that they want Iran to do the same. The symmetrical strikes are driving home the point that the US cannot bomb anymore with impunity. Real hurt will come to the US and its economy if Iran retaliates as it just did toward the Gulf monarchies. This is a big development, although, of course, it could just be another ruse or deception. In any case, the Iranians are adamant about keeping to their strategy, and, according to S. Marandi, they have not even touched their most powerful weapons yet. Support us on substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Shop and Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com The book recommendation by Prof. Marandi: "Going to Tehran: Why America Must Accept the Islamic Republic of Iran" https://www. amazon.com/Going-Tehran-America-Islamic-Republic/dp/1250043530 #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. This is an update for today, March 19th. It’s 4 p.m. in Japan and 10:30 a.m. in Tehran. I’ve got with me Professor Marandi from the University of Tehran. Professor Marandi, welcome back. #Marandi Thank you very much for inviting me. I'm always glad to see you. #Pascal I'm very glad we can still get a connection. I mean, the war with Iran—the U.S. illegal attack on Iran—is now in its third week, soon to be four. We have about two more days to go for that. We've seen quite dramatic pictures coming out of the entire region. And of course, yesterday, Iran confirmed the death of Mr. Ali Larijani. Could you maybe say a few words about that? My condolences on his death, and please give me your interpretation of what happened. #Marandi Yes, it's yet another crime committed by the Israeli regime and the Trump regime—attacking Iranian civilians, attacking Iranian leaders, attacking Iranian infrastructure. And of course, the West doesn’t, Western media don’t put it that way. They don’t remind viewers that this was a war of aggression -- 1 of 13 -- that was unprovoked. We just saw a high-ranking U.S. intelligence official step down and resign— Trump-appointed—because he was basically saying what we were saying: that this is unprovoked, that the Iranians were not a threat, and that this was done because the Israeli regime and the Zionists wanted it to happen. But having said that, Dr. Larijani is actually someone I knew. I cooperated with him for a while. During the Rouhani administration, he invited me to his office once for lunch and a discussion—me and another academic. At the end, I told him about my concerns regarding Iran–China relations, because the Rouhani administration wasn’t, I think, performing adequately in strengthening them. He asked me to accompany the delegation, which is something I usually don’t do. I’m not involved in government; I never have been. During the nuclear talks, I was only a media advisor for Dr. Zarif and Dr. Bagheri. But because I liked him and thought he was a wise man, I accompanied him. After we returned, he had met the Chinese president. It was a very good meeting. And after that, he asked me to take care of the Iran–China file because he had become the person in charge of it as Speaker of Parliament. So I met with him regularly—every week or every couple of weeks—for half an hour, an hour. He was very wise, very smart, very well educated, very moderate in the proper sense. Everyone pretends they're moderate in this madhouse of a world we live in, but he truly was. He wouldn’t let emotions get involved when he was thinking about making a decision. He had all sorts of positive qualities. It was an honor working with him, and it was a great loss. But his martyrdom—and the martyrdom of all those children, and of course the martyrdom of Ayatollah Khamenei, and all those innocent people who were either just sitting at home and were bombed, or defending the country and were murdered by this so‑called Epstein coalition—only strengthen Iran. And this is something that the United States, the regime in Washington, the Israeli regime, and their regional proxies encouraged, because we’re increasingly discovering that the Saudis, from the very beginning, were pushing for this war. But they don't comprehend that what this is doing is only making people more determined to see the war through. Every night—not every other night, every night—we have millions of people on the streets across the country, in Tehran, demanding revenge. The clips are online, but the Western media doesn't show them. Sometimes I post bits and pieces, but if anyone goes to Fars News Agency, their Telegram channel, they can see the gatherings every night in all the different cities and neighborhoods of Tehran. People gather in solidarity with the armed forces, with the leader, and to condemn the United States. And basically, it’s the people who are preserving the Islamic Republic of Iran, because it’s being attacked by this huge coalition. The Europeans, though they don’t want to send troops to the region, have been cooperating with the United States in every other way possible. And of course, there are the regional proxies—Erdogan, who continues to transport oil to his business partner Netanyahu, -- 2 of 13 -- and who allows NATO AWACS jets to gather information from Iran, and allows U.S. bases to collect information through their radar installations, shared with the Emirates, the Saudis, Jordan, Syria, and all those tiny Arab family dictatorships in the Persian Gulf. They're all working together against Iran. The reason they failed—and for almost three weeks now Iran has been hitting back with enormous success—is because the people are on the streets. These martyrdoms, these unjust murders, have only made Iranians more determined. But this doesn’t fit with the narrative we see in the West. They fail to acknowledge it; they fail to even show the crowds. You know, on Friday I went to a gathering. It was International Quds Day, the last Friday of the month of Ramadan, when people go out to support the Palestinians. #Pascal And I participated. #Marandi People were fasting, as most do during Ramadan. They went there—huge crowds in Tehran and across the country. They fired missiles at the crowd, and one woman was killed. Nothing in the Western media. So this evil coalition fires missiles at demonstrators, but people didn’t budge. I posted some of this footage. The bombs would strike—and it wasn’t just Tehran. They did the same in Hamadan. There are many instances of people gathering and then airstrikes taking place. People don’t budge; they don’t run away. Sixteen-year-old girls, eighteen-year-old women, twenty-two-year- old women, twenty-five-year-old boys, eighteen-year-old boys—they stand their ground. I've never seen anything like it in my life, or footage of anything like it. But that's what they've done to this country. And that's the spirit of the people—deeply influenced by their cultural and religious beliefs, by the grandson of the Prophet who was martyred in Karbala well over a thousand years ago, and by his sister’s role in that episode. This religious and cultural background, alongside the huge injustice against the Iranian people and the murders, and of course everything happening across the region, has made Iranians much stronger than I’ve ever seen in my lifetime. Even during the first years of the revolution—which I thought was the high point of it—what I see now is more… more determination than I saw even back then. The front lines are now the cities where people are standing by. I think that murdering and killing—whether it’s these little girls at their elementary school and then trying to hide it or blame Iran and blame the victim for their crimes, or murdering a highly respected person like Dr. Larijani—don’t serve the interests of the United States or the Israeli regime. #Pascal -- 3 of 13 -- Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link will be in the description below. And now, back to the video. So, you’re saying that currently the resistance of Iran and Iranians is becoming not just resistance but resilience, right? I mean, you’re interpreting this as the will to fight back actually getting stronger. And what we’re seeing now is that Iran has been able to strike back the entire time. And actually, we see—and you just pointed this out to me before we started talking— an encouraging development out of Washington, because Donald Trump, of all people, posted on Truth Social about wanting to restrain Iran. Now, whether this is true or not—sorry, wanting to restrain Israel. Israel, that’s the point. Whether that’s true or not, we of course don’t know. It could be another one of those just blatant lies. But let me read part of this post on Truth Social, and then maybe I can get your reaction. He says that Israel, out of anger for what has taken place in the Middle East, has violently lashed out at a major facility known as the South Pars Gas Field in Iran. A relatively small section of the whole has been hit. The United States knew nothing about this particular attack, and the country of Qatar was in no way, shape, or form involved with it, nor did it have any idea that it was going to happen. Unfortunately, Iran did not notice—or any of the pertinent facts—regarding the South Pars attack, and unjustifiably and unfairly attacked a portion of Qatar’s LNG gas facility. “No more attacks will be made by Israel.” In all caps, he wrote that, referring to this extremely important and valuable South Pars field, unless Iran unwisely decides to attack a very innocent— in this case, Qatar— and then he goes on a bit more, starting to threaten Iran again. But, I mean, this is the first time that Donald Trump signals something like a will to de-escalate, and actually kind of—not really apologizes, but almost gets to apologize to Iran for striking something very, very critical. Of course, knowing that Iran will always, always symmetrically fire back. So he apparently doesn’t want the gas war and oil war to continue. But what is your interpretation of this? #Marandi Yes, I think this is a very significant post, even though, as you correctly pointed out, we don't know what's really going to happen—because it's Trump. He may say one thing today and something else tomorrow. But obviously, the significance of Iran's retaliation worries him, and so he said that Iran didn’t know what happened. In a sense, he’s sort of justifying Iran’s attack on Qatar, even though Qatar is more than complicit. I mean, they host U.S. bases—Qatar, in fact, hosts CENTCOM. So if there’s one country that’s more complicit than others, if that’s possible in the Persian Gulf region, that would be Qatar, of course. The Saudis host the U.S. jets and refuelers—planes that refuel those jets—and they allow the Americans to fly over their airspace to bomb Iran. They're all complicit. But the point is, he says Iran didn’t know, and he’s also lying that the U.S. had no knowledge of the attack. That’s not possible. Their airstrikes are all coordinated—the two are -- 4 of 13 -- working together. You can’t wage a war against a country without coordination among those countries working together against a third party. The fact that he says it will not happen again—I think that’s huge. It shows that Iran’s retaliation had a massive effect and has put fear into the heart of Trump and the U.S. political establishment. Because, you know, right now, as things stand, Iran has shut the Strait