Yemen Destroys US Middle-East Strategy. US-Saudi Alliance FAILING | Laith Marouf

## Saudi Strategy and Yemen’s History What looks like a sudden collapse on the battlefield is better understood as the unravelling of a decades-long Saudi grand strategy: to keep Yemen weak, fragmented and dependent. The conversation makes plain that Riyadh’s interventions are not merely tactical responses to insurgency; they are the product of a historical project that stretches back to the 1930s. Control of the Arabian Peninsula, and especially of Yemen’s population centers and strategic straits, was a formative objective of the emerging Saudi state. Over time, this became institutionalized into foreign policy: either buy pliant clients inside Yemen or keep the country in a permanent state of low-intensity conflict. That long view helps explain why Saudi campaigns often appear disproportionate or oddly persistent. The goal has rarely been simply to topple one government and replace it with another; it has been to prevent the consolidation of a Yemeni polity that could reclaim its historical centrality on the peninsula. As Laith Marouf emphasizes, attempts to project power into Yemen—whether by outside empires or by Riyadh itself—have repeatedly failed when they relied on the familiar, blunt instrument of invading from the low desert into mountainous population centers. The geography and social cohesion of Yemen have historically resisted external domination, and modern Saudi policy has repeatedly underestimated those constraints. The consequence of this strategy is that Yemen’s condition—economically stunted, politically fragmented, and under continuous foreign meddling—has been durable. Saudi policy has therefore succeeded only in perpetuating instability, feeding the very resentments and capacities that have allowed groups like Ansar Allah to grow into effective national actors. ## Territory, Population and Ansar Allah Maps are misleading for understanding power in Yemen. The conversation repeatedly stresses that while a large share of Yemeni territory is sparsely inhabited desert, the real strategic prize is population: the mountainous west where nine out of ten Yemenis live. Controlling population centers, not empty acreage, determines political legitimacy and state capacity. Here Ansar Allah has the upper hand. According to the account, upwards of 85–87% of Yemen’s population currently live under the authority of Sana’a’s national government led by Ansar Allah; the major exception is Aden and a few coastal or desert pockets. That demographic reality converts into political leverage. When a polity controls the services, institutions, and economic lifelines that matter to most citizens, it gains de facto legitimacy, even if international recognition remains divided. Moreover, Ansar Allah’s posture has been to broaden its governing coalition inside Yemen rather than to rule as a narrow faction. After seizing Sana’a, its reported invitation to other parties to join a national salvation government contrasted with the formation of a Riyadh-based rival government, one sustained chiefly by external patronage. This internal inclusivity strengthens Ansar Allah’s claim to be the national authority and complicates any external project to replace it through force. ## The Strategy Around Ma’rib and Aden The current operational logic being described in the conversation is methodical rather than maximalist. Rather than an immediate, frontal assault on Aden’s dense urban fabric, Ansar Allah’s forces appear focused on cutting the supply arteries that sustain pro-Saudi militias—specifically gains in Ma’rib and Al-Jawf, which sit along routes that link Saudi Arabia to southern Yemeni strongholds. Controlling Ma’rib and Al-Jawf would interdict the principal land corridors for cross-border reinforcement and logistics. That is a classic application of siege logic without the moral and military costs of urban annihilation. By making overland supply untenable, the Sana’a-aligned forces can convert a battle of attrition into a negotiation platform: deny external sustainment to proxy forces and then press for political settlements in places like Aden rather than raze them. This strategy also accounts for the recent operational creativity on the Yemeni side. Diversionary strikes on the Red Sea coast, the use of drones and ballistic missiles to target forward airfields, and coordinated pincer movements have been employed to exploit Saudi overreach—pushing into one theater while striking where the enemy is dispersed and vulnerable. It’s a clear application of asymmetric warfare that leverages local geography, industrial ingenuity, and tactical surprise. ## Aden’ s Geostrategic Importance Aden matters for more than domestic symbolism. Control of Aden would give Sana’a a presence on the Arabian Sea, complementing its already ominous reach into the Red Sea via Bab al-Mandeb. That geographic span would allow Yemen to threaten seaborne traffic across two critical maritime chokepoints and would complicate naval operations by extra-regional powers throughout the western Indian Ocean. The strategic implications extend further: reunification of Yemen under Sana’a would unlock petroleum and gas resources in the east, previously siphoned off by foreign-backed businesses and proxies. That revenue would underwrite state reconstruction, broaden the fiscal foundations of governance, and reduce the leverage outsiders currently have through economic manipulation. Control of both coasts also enables power projection toward Djibouti, Eritrea and Somalia, potentially undermining external bases and partnerships that Western and Gulf actors have cultivated. For the United States and allied partners, a Yemeni polity with effective control over Aden and Bab al-Mandeb would complicate maritime logistics, naval deployment patterns, and force posture in ways that are hard to mitigate with distant presence alone. Simply put, Yemen regaining coherent territorial control reverses the strategic marginalization that external actors have long relied upon. ## Oman’s Role in Yemen Oman’s place in the conversation emerges as both facilitator and outlier. Historically and culturally linked to parts of southern Arabia, Oman has cultivated a diplomatic niche: engagement without entanglement, mediation without overtly taking sides. Its geopolitical posture has often involved opening channels when others close them—an approach that has been respected, if not fully trusted, by various parties. But the account also urges caution about romanticizing Muscat’s independence. Oman’s ability to act as a broker has depended in part on its relatively modest hydrocarbon wealth and the permissive posture of larger external powers that find value in an interlocutor that keeps communications alive. While Oman can and does enable initiatives—flight corridors, shuttle diplomacy, or discreet logistical accommodations—its room for radical facilitation is constrained by bigger strategic calculations and external pressures. That said, Omani diplomacy can still be consequential. By providing a forum and modest connective tissue between Tehran, Sana’a, Riyadh, and others, it helps translate battlefield realities into bargaining positions. In a war driven by local force dynamics, such mediation can determine whether territorial gains crystallize into sustainable political arrangements or remain ephemeral tactical victories. ## US Support for Saudi Arabia 00: 30:17 Saudi Arabia’s Internal Crisis The conversation casts US backing for Riyadh as a central but increasingly fragile pillar of the regional order. Washington’s provision of weapons, intelligence, and diplomatic cover has long underpinned Saudi military efforts in Yemen. But the current dynamic exposes limits to what external assistance can achieve when domestic political costs and battlefield reverses multiply inside the patron state. Saudi setbacks on the battlefield produce acute internal stress. Military losses, public anger over casualties, and the ec

US-Saudi Alliance Is SCREWED | Laith Marouf And suddenly, the underdog flips the table: Yemen is destroying US Middle-East Strategy and there is nothing the US can do about it. Laith Marouf, a Canadian-Syrian journalist based in Lebanon, discusses Yemen’s advancing front lines, Saudi Arabia’s strategy, Ansar Allah’s goals, Oman’s mediating role, US involvement, Saudi internal pressures, the wider regional war, nuclear risks, and Egypt’s decision to remain outside the conflict. Links: https://freepalestine.video Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Yemen’s Front Lines Are Moving 00:02: 57 The Trigger Behind the New Offensive 00:06:11 Saudi Strategy and Yemen’s History 00:09:03 Territory, Population and Ansar Allah 00:12:08 The Strategy Around Ma’rib and Aden 00:15:20 Aden’ s Geostrategic Importance 00:21:20 Oman’s Role in Yemen 00:26:53 US Support for Saudi Arabia 00: 30:17 Saudi Arabia’s Internal Crisis 00:38:42 Regional War and Nuclear Risks 00:47:30 Egypt’s Position and the Regional Shift #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, for an update on the situation in Yemen and West Asia more generally, with Leith Marouf, a Canadian Syrian journalist currently in Lebanon. Leith, welcome back. #Laith Marouf Great to be with you, Pascal. #Pascal Thank you so much for doing this. And you've kept a very close eye on the situation in Yemen, which actually has been moving now. I mean, the front line has been moving after having basically been frozen for a while. Can you bring us up to speed where the conflict was and what then happened over the last one week to 14 days? #Laith Marouf Well, you know, most of the viewers must have forgotten, of course, seeing that rapid advance on the coast of the Red Sea, where Ansarullah and the government of Sana'a captured Bab al-Mandab Strait. And since then, there's been two fronts that are very, very active. One is around Taiz in the south. This is the last inhabited area before Aden, or Aden in English, the major city on the Arabian -- 1 of 14 -- Sea. And in the northeast, on the border with the Saudi kingdom, in the province of Al-Jawf. So those are two areas where Ansarullah, the national army, is pushing. And simultaneously, much of the Saudi-backed militias have suffered huge losses, specifically in those two axes. And at the same time, we see the Saudi Air Force trying to give some air cover for these militias. Since yesterday, for instance, it's almost over 50 air raids by the Saudi Air Force. And that is forcing the Yemeni army to target the airports where these jets are coming to attack them from. So mainly the airports in the south of the Saudi kingdom, in Khamis Mushait, in Jeddah, in Abha. These are the closest military airports, basically, that the Saudis need to use to do multiple raids at a time to provide cover for moving troops. The attacks on these airports are forcing the Saudi Air Force to retreat more north in the kingdom, and that's making their runs longer, making it harder for them to provide air cover for their militias on the ground. #Pascal And these movements that now happened, why did this start now? I mean, it was the Saudis that kind of restarted the fighting, if I remember correctly, when they actually attacked an airport in Yemen, I think in Sana'a, actually, when an airplane was on its way back from the funeral of Ali Khamenei, carrying Yemeni dignitaries. And I think there was a humanitarian aspect to that component as well. Was that the start of what's currently going on, or is there something else that happened that I missed? #Laith Marouf You know, that was what you referred to. That trip was a few months ago, of course, when the funeral happened. But there was kind of a ceasefire after between the two sides. But suddenly we saw the Saudi military, you know, export all these weapons and push thousands upon thousands of people and their militias across the border in the Taiz region in the northeast. And, you know, they were hoping, I think, the Saudis, to do a big push up the mountain towards Sana'a, which is a lunatic plan because never in history, in recorded human history, did any army succeed going up the mountain to capture Sana'a. Not one foreign army ever occupied Sana'a. Not the Romans, not the British, not the Ottomans, not the Saudis themselves, who tried it multiple times in the last 60 years. So this was the trigger of the beginnings of these confrontations. The Yemeni armed forces took advantage of the Saudi concentration of attack in the northeast to do a surprise attack on the Red Sea coast, and I think that surprised everybody, not only the Saudis. And the advancing Saudi-backed militias in the northeast fell into a pincer maneuver, and we watched those videos of their troops getting pounded by FPVs and ballistic missiles. So that was the trigger. Since then, we have been hearing that the Saudis have been begging for at least a temporary ceasefire. They asked the Omanis to have meetings with Ansar Allah, and Ansar Allah is -- 2 of 14 -- refusing any ceasefire that is temporary and is requesting that the Saudis lift the blockade over the country and withdraw all their backed militias and stop backing militias in the country with weapons and money. #Pascal And just for my own understanding, and pardon my ignorance, but what exactly is the beef that the Saudis have with Ansar Allah? And that goes back 12 years. Why are the Saudis so dead set on conquering Yemen? I mean, we've got nearby Oman, which has a passable relationship with Saudi Arabia. Can you explain that triangle to me, like the bigger picture? #Laith Marouf Well, for people that don't understand the history of the geography, the Arabian Peninsula has had really just three population centers: the Hejaz, where Mecca and Medina are, Yemen, which is all the mountains south of Mecca and Medina, and Oman. This is historically where the population centers are. Of course, with the coming of colonialism and the discovery of oil, the British and the Americans after them had the primary goal of kind of bringing down the civilization centers and birthing new ones in the middle of the desert, as we saw. So the Saud regime was given weapons in the 1930s to invade Syria. Hejaz, where Mecca and Medina is, and that happened, and they expelled the Hashemites that were ruling the Hejaz to Jordan, and at the same time invaded what is now the south of Saudi, which was provinces of Yemen, Asir, and kind of ethnically cleansed those regions in 1934. And since then, the Saudis have the interest of maintaining Yemen in an impoverished state because it is the biggest population center in the Arabian Peninsula. It has the geography that gives it control of the strait. It has the resources and so forth. So if actually Yemen rises as a state, it will return to its rightful place, which means it would be dominating the Arabian Peninsula. So since the 1930s, the Saudi regime has been either buying off governments inside Yemen to make sure that the country doesn't develop and/or maintaining a status of war, as we see since the Arab Autumn, or what people call the Arab Spring. In 2012, the war hasn't stopped since then. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note: the best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. Okay, so this is a long-term Saudi grand strategy to make sure that Yemen never becomes a regional rival. And the Ansar Allah is obviously the force that is not okay with that, because there is a collaborationist government inside Yemen, and that's the one that the Saudis and the United States are backing up. How much of the Yemeni territory is still under that collaborationist control? -- 3 of 14 -- #Laith Marouf Well, if we look at territory, just a map, it's deceiving. Why? Because 90-some-odd percent of the population of Yemen lives in the mountainous region in the west. And currently, 85–87% of the population of Yemen is under the rule of Sana'a and the national government led by Ansarullah. The only major city that is out of control of the government of Sana'a is Aden on the Arabian Sea, and that constitutes another maybe 10% of the population. The rest of the population is spread out in the desert regions in the east of Yemen, which are the largest part of the territory of Yemen. But this whole region is known as Hadramawt, which means death is present. That's the name of the region of Yemen. That tells you how inhospitable it is. And currently, the military forces of Sana'a are just a few 10 kilometers, 20, 30 kilometers away from Aden. And so if they decide to capture Aden, which I think is not going to happen—they're not going to try to invade into Aden yet—but if they do, there will be only 5% of the population out of their control. So it's not the issue of territory. It's the issue of how much of the population is with which side. Another thing that is important to note is that Ansarullah, after they captured Sana'a and overthrew the government of Ali Saleh, formed a national coalition, a salvation government with all the parties, invited everybody in, and just a few parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood, refused and formed a government in Riyadh, in the capital of Saudi Arabia. They're sitting in the hotels. That's where the government that the Saudis support actually resides. So definitely, the government of Sana'a led by Ansarullah is more representative, whether we're talking about population and/or in terms of how many parties and political movements are in the coalition with them. #Pascal So what do you think then is—if the goal is not to capture Aden—what do you think is the current strategy? Because the Yemenis, I mean, Ansar Allah, also is very famous now for being one of the only foreign governments that actually supports Palestine and actually also refuses to cave to Israel and, together with Iran, of course, is an integral part of the axis of resistance, although the geographic distance to Israel is significant. What do you think are the aims and goals of Ansar Allah, at least at the moment? #Laith Marouf I think they are going to be concentrating on capturing Ma'rib and Al-Jawf. These are the provinces in the northeast that border with the Saudi kingdom. It is a hard battle because it's an open space. So whoever has a bigger air force in this situation—the Saudis—will have the ability to pick at his enemy. This is why, at this moment, we see the military of Yemen staying in the hills and the mountains overlooking Al-Jawf and Ma'rib and just pounding at the positions of those gathered mercenaries. So I think they'll concentrate there because they would like to cut the supply route for the militias coming from the border of the Saudi kingdom. And there is only one main border -- 4 of 14 -- crossing that has a road actually in that area. And once you have control of that and close it, all of these militias that are backed by the Saudis in the south of Yemen will have zero land supply routes. They will have to be supplied by air and/or sea, which is not a viable thing to do continuously. It could be a one-off attempt by the Saudis, let's say, to supply their militias by air or by sea. And why would they do that? It's because it's easier, if you cut these supply routes, to negotiate with the militias remaining specifically in Aden. The national government of Sana'a doesn't have the interest of destroying its own city. You know, Aden is—the Yemeni people love their own city, and they're not going to destroy it. But if there's no supplies coming into Aden, then the city could fall through negotiations without actually having to fire any weapons inside the city. I think that's the main goal of their movements right