BRICS Moves to 'Competitive Coexistence', Leaves West Behind | Prof. Anuradha Chenoy

## BRICS and the SCO in a changing world The recent flurry of high‑level meetings in Central and South Asia points to more than routine diplomacy: it signals the consolidation of parallel, non‑Western architectures that are beginning to shape a genuinely multipolar geo‑economy. Conversations around these gatherings emphasize that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS are no longer niche forums; together they create overlapping spaces of political coordination, trade infrastructure and financial experimentation that offer members practical alternatives to Western‑dominated institutions. The SCO’s shift from a primarily security‑focused club into a vehicle for trade corridors, logistics and a proposed development bank demonstrates a deliberate strategy to connect strategic depth with economic muscle. Those present in the discussions, and particularly Professor Anuradha Chenoy, underline that the SCO’s evolution matters because it expands the toolkit available to states feeling the squeeze of Western sanctions and trade restrictions. The organization’s recent agreements on ports, transport corridors and financing mechanisms are not symbolic: they are early stages of building a resilient supply‑chain and payment ecosystem that can sustain cross‑border commerce when traditional channels are restricted. Seen from this angle, the SCO and BRICS function as two strands of the same project—diversifying economic partnerships while preserving strategic autonomy. ## India, Russia and western pressure One of the most delicate dynamics on display across these meetings is India’s relationship with Russia under the gaze of the West. New Delhi is balancing historic partnerships and energy needs against intense diplomatic pressure from Washington and other Western capitals. The exchange highlighted in the conversation reveals how India’s energy imports—particularly Russian oil and fertiliser—have become a fulcrum of geopolitical contestation. Coercive measures short of formal sanctions, such as tariff threats and trade pressures, are being applied to deter partners from deepening ties with Moscow. Yet these pressures collide with on‑the‑ground necessities: for India, Russian hydrocarbons and fertiliser are tangible inputs to economic stability and food security. Professor Chenoy framed India’s posture as one of strategic autonomy under strain. New Delhi’s public appeals for peace and dialogue—framed in moral and diplomatic terms familiar to Indian foreign policy—are not simply moralizing gestures but calculated efforts to retain room for manoeuvre. Russia, for its part, is unlikely to accept a unilateral halt to its military campaign without securing what it perceives as enduring strategic gains. The result is a tense but functional diplomacy: India seeks to avoid explicit alignment while keeping channels open to all major powers, a balancing act increasingly difficult to sustain as geoeconomic penalties proliferate. ## The BRICS declaration and diplomacy The BRICS declaration emerging from Delhi, as discussed in the exchange, is revealing for what it includes and excludes. Instead of naming specific conflicts such as Ukraine or Iran, the text opts for general principles—condemning “unprovoked aggression,” advocating dialogue and diplomacy, and reaffirming support for peaceful co‑existence. That careful wording is not accidental. It reflects an ambition to craft a broad consensus among countries with divergent security narratives and conflicting regional interests. The ability of the BRICS leaders to issue a unified communique—after earlier failures at the level of foreign ministers—speaks to the growing diplomatic maturity of the bloc. This mode of diplomacy prioritizes manageability over moral clarity: by sidestepping direct attribution, BRICS preserves a platform where adversaries can still converse. The hosting power’s role in brokering bilateral talks—India facilitating a meeting between Iran and the UAE, for example—illustrates how the forum allows heated rivals to de‑escalate through mediated, non‑western channels. The practical value of the BRICS declaration, therefore, is less in its rhetorical weight and more in the procedural space it creates for negotiation, trust‑building and, critically, economic cooperation that is less conditioned on alliances. ## Bandung and the legacy of non‑alignment A striking theme in the conversation is BRICS’ deliberate evocation of Bandung and the broader heritage of non‑alignment. For many members, invoking the 1955 Afro‑Asian conference is a political statement: it connects contemporary initiatives to a mid‑century project of decolonisation and political autonomy. The reference is more than symbolic nostalgia. It signifies an aspiration to build a coalition of states that assert collective agency within the UN system and global economic governance, especially as the Bretton Woods institutions and Security Council remain skewed toward older power configurations. Professor Chenoy emphasizes that this lineage is palpable in contemporary diplomatic behavior. The BRICS bloc, while not equivalent to the diverse Non‑Aligned Movement, shares its DNA: an insistence on sovereign equality, resistance to unilateral coercion, and preference for multilateral problem‑solving that does not demand a forced choice between superpowers. This Bandung framing also helps explain why countries as different as China, India and several African and Arab states find common rhetorical ground: they see themselves as participants in an ongoing project of rewriting the rules of global order so that development, rather than geopolitical policing, becomes the organizing principle. ## Sanctions, tariffs and financial reforms One of the clearest outcomes of recent meetings is a renewed push to reduce vulnerability to Western financial coercion. The conversation foregrounded concrete proposals: expanding trade in national currencies, creating alternative payment rails, and building regional or plurilateral development banks to finance infrastructure and trade. These measures are not revolutionary in isolation, but taken together they amount to a systemic effort to erect layers of economic autonomy. The push for alternative finance addresses multiple vulnerabilities. Sanctions often work by cutting banking access, freezing assets or denying access to the dollar system; alternative payment systems and bilateral currency arrangements can blunt those tools. Similarly, regional development banks—while smaller than the IMF or World Bank—offer targeted credit and project finance that can be mobilised more quickly and with fewer political conditions. Professor Chenoy is careful to point out limits: these institutions are nascent and cannot yet rival the scale of Bretton Woods bodies. Still, they signal an important shift in geo‑economic strategy: states are investing in redundancy and resilience so that coercive leverage is less absolute. ## National currencies and alternative payments The technical logistics of shifting away from dollar‑centric trade are daunting, but the conversation suggests practical momentum. BRICS and SCO discussions on settling trade in national currencies, developing clearing mechanisms and pooling foreign‑exchange reserves are part of a piecemeal but cumulative strategy. Small swaps, currency swaps and trade invoicing in local currencies reduce transaction costs and exposure to exchange‑rate shocks imposed by sanctions. Over time, normalisation of these practices could erode the universal convenience of the dollar without needing an immediate, sweeping replacement. Yet this is not a purely economic calculation; it has political valence. Choosing to invoice trade in national currencies is an act of signal‑making: it telegraphs a preference for autonomy and diversified partnerships. As Professor Chenoy notes, the SCO’s proposals for payment alternatives and a development bank are practical complements to this mov