Moscow Bombed—DEVASTATING Retaliation Coming | Vitaly Mironov

Russia’s latest rupture with Europe is not simply a policy disagreement; it is a collision of meanings. The conversation recorded at the Pskov Forum — and articulated most forcefully by Vitaly Mironov — frames the present crisis as one in which ordinary people, history, and memory have been pulled onto the frontlines. What was meant to be a bridge of culture and scholarship has become a site to contest whether the West is confronting a retooled Russian leadership or confronting Russia itself. That distinction matters because it shapes whether policies aim at statesmen, societies, or the very narrative that binds nations together — and whether the resulting pressure will steer the continent toward renewed cooperation or toward catastrophic conflict. ## Why the Pskov Forum was created The Pskov Forum emerged as an intentional act of cultural diplomacy in a moment when channels for communication have been deliberately narrowed. According to the discussion, the organizers sought not merely to stage an academic symposium but to revive a civic habit: to gather historians, musicians, philosophers and analysts in a historic border city to reforge human ties. Pskov’s geography — sitting where Russian and European histories meet — was chosen as a symbolic place to confront the break in understanding that now defines relations. Forum participants wanted to counter what they described as the corrosive effects of contemporary propaganda by creating space for person-to-person exchange: concerts and conversations, scholarship and song, all aimed at keeping the cultural bridge intact. The forum’s rationale goes beyond nostalgia. It reflects a conviction that culture and science are the most resilient technologies of peace. Those running the event have long experience in cultural exchange; they believe that when political channels fail, sustained interpersonal contact can reintroduce nuance into public discourse. The gathering was a deliberate counterweight to polarizing narratives that reduce complex histories to existential binaries. Its success, as recounted by participants, was measured not by headlines but by the quieter metrics of understanding: messages from attendees reporting that their perspectives had shifted and that they gained language to explain the situation to others. ## Is the West dealing with Putin or Russia? A central claim in the exchange is that Western policy has moved from negotiating with a leader to contending with a nation’s perceived intent. The conversation suggests that a decisive inflection point occurred when Western leaders publicly articulated goals that many Russians heard as intent to weaken or dismember their country. That perception, whether or not it was intended, has transformed the bargaining environment: no longer is a single presidency the interlocutor; the polity itself is mobilized. Mironov’s framing — that the West is engaging “not exactly with Putin, but with the Russian people” — highlights how rhetoric can reshape adversarial psychology. If Western statements are heard as existential threats, domestic politics are likely to follow: leadership will orient toward consolidating societal resolve, and public sentiment hardens. The implication is stark: external pressure designed to punish or isolate can produce solidarity rather than fragmentation. The conversation calls for a recalibration of Western assumptions, warning that policies aimed at elites may in practice be read as attacks on the nation, producing effects opposite to those intended. ## Russian public opinion and the war The discussion undermines the simplistic portrayal of Russian public opinion as monolithic, docile, or uniformly coerced. Rather than a populace ready to overthrow its leadership in the face of hardship, what emerges is a people shaped by historical memory and a sense of threatened continuity. The transcript contests the Western narrative that elite capture and repression have hollowed out national will such that a movement from within could easily change course. Instead, participants argued that many Russians see the conflict as a broader contest over national survival and identity, not merely a geopolitical tussle about territory. Crucially, the exchange concedes that Russians desire peace and intimate normality — family ties with Ukrainians, the pleasures of domestic life, and the freedoms of cultural life. Yet these desires coexist with a deep sense of grievance when historical narratives and the cultural space of the Russian language appear to be marginalized abroad. That grievance feeds a “firm will” that the speakers describe as historically recurrent: a readiness to defend what is perceived as the nation’s historic habitat. The upshot is that any policy calculus that ignores this depth of sentiment risks misjudging how populations will respond to external pressure. ## The Great Patriotic War and Russian memory The shadow of the Great Patriotic War — World War II in Russian parlance — is woven through the conversation as both a source of trauma and a foundation for social identity. Participants described family histories of loss, sacrifice, and a moral ledger that influences contemporary political imagination. The war’s lessons are invoked as proof that Russians can be extraordinary allies when treated with respect and formidable adversaries when threatened. That binary is not merely rhetorical; it is embedded in stories passed down through generations and used to justify a heightened sensitivity to perceived threats. This memory also operates as a moral claim. The war’s moral significance allows political actors to frame present conflicts in existential terms. When historical suffering is portrayed as continuous with present challenges, policy debates exit the realm of interest-based bargaining and enter moral terrain. The forum conversation highlights how this reframing complicates attempts at external pressure: appeals to universal norms or strategic deterrence may be interpreted through a historical lens that views such appeals as dismissive of Russia’s sacrifices and rights. ## The meaning of the Russia-Estonia border Borders in this conversation are not merely lines on a map but are charged with cultural meaning. The Russia-Estonia border — referenced as an emblematic frontier — is described as both a literal and symbolic threshold between differing historical narratives. Where one side sees sovereign territories and post-Soviet realignments, the other reads cultural and linguistic continuities whose rupture feels like an erasure of history. This symbolic reading matters for diplomacy because it undercuts the presumption that borders are neutral facts. When populations are told — by policy, media, or intellectual currents — that their cultural world has no legitimate claim beyond the state line, resentment follows. The Pskov discussion argues for sensitivity to the symbolic freight that border politics carry and calls for dialogues that attend as much to memory and identity as to legal sovereignty. Engaging border regions with cultural humility, the speakers suggest, would be more productive than heavy-handed realpolitik. ## Can Russia and the West still avoid war? Perhaps the most urgent question posed in the exchange is whether escalation to a wider war can still be averted. The mood struck in the conversation is ambivalent but not without hope. There is a clear recognition of the dynamics that increase the risk: inflammatory rhetoric, public declarations of maximalist goals, and strategic moves that confirm existential fears. Yet the forum’s existence itself is offered as evidence that peacework remains possible. Cultural gatherings, people-to-people contact, and intellectual exchanges are presented as underappreciated but potent tools to de-escalate tensions. Avoiding war, the conversation implies, requires a complex mix of restraint, narrative repair, and mutual recognition. Restraint means both sides avoid rheto

West's BIGGEST Mistake: New Russia Rising | Vitaly Mironov Vitaly Mironov, one of Russia's greatest humanists, discusses the profound shock he and his colleagues who always wanted better relations with the West are going through. We talk about the Pskov Forum, Russian-Western relations, Russophobia, the immanent danger of war, and why many Russians see the conflict as larger than Ukraine. He shares views on Russian history, memory of WWII, ties with Ukraine, and the need for people-to-people dialogue, culture, and peace forums to rebuild understanding. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction to Vitaly Mironov 00:00:52 Why the Pskov Forum was created 00:03:18 Russia’s view of Europe in 2026 00:05:35 Is the West dealing with Putin or Russia? 00:14:37 Putin, the West, and a changed Russia 00:21:14 Russian public opinion and the war 00:26:20 Why the West misunderstands Russia 00:32:00 The Great Patriotic War and Russian memory 00:36:06 Feeling Russian history, not just knowing it 00:40:35 The meaning of the Russia-Estonia border 00:44:18 Rebuilding ties with Ukrainians and the West 00:53:11 Can Russia and the West still avoid war? 00: 55:07 Optimism, peace work, and future forums #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, I'm joined by Vitaly Mironov, the director of the International Pascal Lottaz Forum to support peace and friendship among nations. Vitaly, welcome. Welcome. #Vitaly Mironov Thank you, my friend. Nice to meet you. #Pascal Nice meeting you too, again. And we met, of course, just recently in Russia, first in Moscow and then in Pskov, where you took us to the forum. And I really wanted to do an interview with you in order to ask you about your motivations to organize what we did in Pskov, which was an academic conference, on the one hand, where we talked about Russophobia and had a couple of wonderful days, actually, with very interesting conversations. And then you also added music. You had musicians from all over the world, including from Scotland and India, who did wonderful performances. Vitaly, can you give us a little bit of the background of this forum and yourself? #Vitaly Mironov -- 1 of 18 -- You know, Pascal, the decision to make such a forum like in Pskov recently was to try to build a bridge between Russian people and people abroad, especially in this difficult and dangerous time for everybody. You know, because in my opinion, normal people, I would say ordinary people, should try to be together, try to create understanding between them, because propaganda, you know, mainly, I would say, Western propaganda, is now doing its best to destroy this bridge that we’ve had for centuries, you know. And I think it's time to create an event like Pskov in Pskov to bring, as you said, analysts or intelligent people, artistic people, historians, philosophers from different countries together in one place, in such a historical and cultural place like Pskov, because it's situated exactly on the border between, let's say, the Russian world and the Western world. And it's exactly the proper place to meet each other and speak with each other, to try to make new narratives and understanding among people. That's why we did it. And actually, I’ve been doing these activities for many years already — let's say since 1999, when we created the Moscow Russia Scottish cultural organization, the Caledonian Club. By my education, I'm a historian. Not a historian like you. I mean, I was a teacher of history in school many, many, many years ago. And not an academic historian, I mean myself. But I'm still a historian. And my interest is history and policy, world policy. And, of course, as a normal Russian person, I wish all the best to my country and all the best to people around the world. And I say culture is a real bridge. Music and science are bridges between people. And we should keep this bridge between us. Don't give the possibility to bring this world to catastrophe. Now it's a very dangerous time. #Pascal It is. And that's what I would like to ask you about. I mean, you've been working in this space for many decades now, bringing culture from Russia to Europe, from Europe to Russia, and organizing friendship events all along. Right now, in 2026, what is the mood in Russia? How do you perceive culture? How does Russia look at Europe, or how do you—and how does Russia—understand Europe at the moment? #Vitaly Mironov Oh, that's a global question, actually. Well, I would say that it's a mental question now — a question of the mentality of Russian people and a question of the mentality of people in the world, Western people. The situation... well, actually, the situation changed totally. Because now, in my opinion, the key question, the key to resolving the question of understanding, is that the Western world doesn’t really want to understand Russia. And I would say that the Western world, let's say the West, is too snobby. And the problem is the West doesn’t want to understand Russian interests, Russian national interests, or the interests and issues of Russian people. What happened? It’s a good question. We -- 2 of 18 -- call this Russophobia right now. Yes, and the situation changed totally because now it has become very dangerous. It can bring the whole world to a nuclear disaster. #Pascal How can we resolve this? Hey, just a very quick note: the best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. Yeah, I mean, that's the question we are working on, right? How to prevent our nations from going to a large war with each other. I mean, you in Moscow, you feel that, right? You feel that we are getting closer and closer to a moment. #Vitaly Mironov There is a phenomenon now. I would say a phenomenon that has been created during the history of Russia. For example, let's say it like this: our common friend Alexander Mercouris mentioned in his broadcast that we have now another Putin. We have this, yes? #Pascal We have another Putin because he changed his mind on... yeah, yes, yes. #Vitaly Mironov This is a key question: why do we have now another Putin? Because we know that many years before, he tried to manage this bridge, as I mentioned, between Russia and the West. He tried to solve this question by diplomacy. Okay, now not. Now we have another point. Why did he become another? In my opinion, now it's a moment when the West maybe doesn’t notice yet the situation, or maybe doesn’t want to notice the situation, but now we have a situation when the West is dealing not with Putin exactly, or better to say, not exactly with Putin, but with the Russian people. This is a very interesting question. With Russian people — and by people, I mean in his message — when Russian people, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, came to the world stage, I would say. Maybe I say it not correctly in English, but I hope you understand what I mean. For the first time since the end of the Second World War. Why did it happen? It was not a question of Russian propaganda. Actually, the Western leaders explained to the Russian people what they want to do with Russia — to disintegrate Russia. It’s been openly proclaimed recently, you know, by leaders of the West. And the Russian people just opened their eyes. You know, what’s happening? We have a deal. We’re dealing now not just with Ukraine, but with the West. And this West is quite aggressive -- 3 of 18 -- toward us. Well, speaking frankly, my friend, we were not ready for this. Well, I can say, Russian people maybe were not ready for the war with Ukraine, but we’d be ready to resolve this question, this Ukrainian question, because it’s a historical question, actually. This question has a long history, and we thought it's just between us, between Russians and Ukrainians. We thought it's just between Russia and Ukraine, but obviously we recognized suddenly, quite suddenly, we recognized it's... it's not. It's a different situation. We have now in front of us a very aggressive united West, which is very, very aggressive toward us. That's exactly what we were not ready for. And quite suddenly, not just step by step, we opened our eyes. What's happening? It was a shock. First, it was a shock to us. I can say for myself, it was really a shock. Why? We did nothing wrong to the West. We did nothing wrong to Great Britain, France, or Germany. It's been at least the last 80 years, speaking frankly. But what's happening? Why? Why do they so strongly support the Nazis in the Ukrainian regime? Yeah. #Pascal In western Ukraine. #Vitaly Mironov And after that, I would say that the Russian people discovered a very special, specific characteristic of theirs. I mean, I would say this phenomenon — the firm will of the Russian people, firm will. I hope you can understand what I mean. In Russian language, it's твердая воля. Твердая воля — it's strong will, or better to say, firm will. #Pascal The firm will. #Vitaly Mironov This firm will, we can say this firm will, occasionally during Russian history, as many as once a century, you know, it happened quite often. Quite often in our history, I would say. The 13th century Mongol invasion, you know, we spent 200 years to resolve this problem. Another example, let's say the 18th century, the struggle for the entrance to the Baltic Sea by Peter the Great. But we started even earlier, in the time of Tsar Ivan the Terrible, and we spent 150 years on that, you know. Another example, obviously, the Ukrainian question, obviously, the war with Poland. A good example, by the way. Do you know, my friend, how many years Russia was at war with Poland in the 17th century, just to take back the left Ukraine, the left bank of the Dnepr River, Ukrainian territory, over the left bank? Twenty-nine years of wars, twenty-nine years just in the 17th century, and just for the left side of the Dnepr riverbank of Ukraine. This is exactly what we call firm will. So, and now... -- 4 of 18 -- #Pascal Can I just ask, so you're saying that Russia is now going into another one of these periods, and that you thought we were in a different situation, but now it seems clear that, oh my God, we are going toward a period of firm will? #Vitaly Mironov I think so, I think so. It doesn't mean that we will, in a long time, be at war with the West, and I hope we will not be at all in war with the West. I hope, fingers crossed. I wish it from the depth of my heart, you know. But I think, what I'm sure of exactly, is that the West is now dealing not just with Putin. That's what I wish to explain. Not exactly with Putin. The West had a deal with Putin since maybe 2007, the time of his famous Munich speech, right? Until 2023, when it was the peak of military struggle in Ukraine. But during 2024, when Western leaders were... #Vitaly Mironov Very honest, I would say. Not just stupid, but very honest to say the real goal, what they wish to have in this war with Russia — I mean, to put Russia into disintegration and to make a strategic defeat of Russia. Pascal, you can’t say anything better for Russians to understand than just to say, “We want to disintegrate your country.” We think more. After this, our Russian propaganda can stop, do nothing at all. #Pascal Yeah, I mean, Western propaganda couldn't help Russian propaganda more than by saying that kind of thing, because... even not Western propaganda, Western leaders. #Vitaly Mironov Yeah, yeah, yeah. #Pascal It's an interesting situation. It's quite insane, but it's very good that you're explaining that, because if I understand you correctly, the whole point was that Vladimir Putin, of course, was a great friend of ties with the West, a bridge maker, the first perso