The FATAL Two-Front Mistake—The USA Just Fell For The TRAP | Pietro A. Shakarian

The recent exchange captures a cascading lesson about the limits of unilateral power in an increasingly multipolar world. What emerges from the conversation is not merely a critique of one administration’s policy choices but a broader diagnosis: pushing to fight on multiple strategic fronts has revealed structural weaknesses in Washington’s intelligence, diplomacy, and political calculus. From the Gulf to the Caucasus and from Kyiv’s trenches to U.S. domestic politics, the same pattern repeats—overreach invites creative counters, allies hedge, adversaries exploit openings, and the façade of a rules-based hierarchy cracks. The discussion illuminates how actors from Iran to smaller Gulf monarchies to regional players in the Caucasus are recalibrating to shape outcomes, not simply react to American pressure. ## Qatar, the Gulf, and multipolarity The Gulf’s response to recent confrontations has been a study in pragmatic hedging rather than reflexive alignment. Qatar’s role in mediation—hosting talks and facilitating parts of the memorandum of understanding (MOU)—is emblematic. The conversation underscores that GCC states are increasingly uncomfortable with the costs of hosting a dominant U.S. military presence: such presence can confer security but also attract conflict. As Pietro A. Shakarian notes, Gulf capitals are beginning to privilege strategic autonomy. Saudi participation at a major Iranian funeral and Qatar’s centrality in negotiations are not signs of affection for Tehran; they are signals that regional states are diversifying diplomatic tools to protect national interests amid shifting power dynamics. This regional recalibration is one symptom of a deeper multipolar moment. The Gulf is less willing to accept being a mere extension of Washington’s strategic posture, especially where U.S. policies appear to increase their vulnerability. The transcript points to a striking irony: a policy aimed at exerting pressure on Iran instead amplified multipolarity. Gulf actors—Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE—did not simply bandwagon onto an American script. Instead, they leveraged their position to mediate, defuse, and manage outcomes. That shift matters because the Gulf sits astride global energy flows and maritime chokepoints; its diplomatic choices reverberate far beyond the region. The U.S. discovery that it cannot unilaterally dictate those choices is the central political lesson of this chapter. ## The Iran deal and Hormuz The Strait of Hormuz is the geopolitical fulcrum of the episode, and the MOU negotiated under Qatari and Pakistani mediation plays out as both agreement and instrument of leverage. The conversation frames the MOU not merely as a ceasefire or transaction but as a strategic instrument by which Iran codifies its leverage: keep Hormuz open and trade flows move, but if enforcement or implementation falters, Iran can credibly threaten closure or interference. Pietro’s assessment that Iran “won the war” in effect is rooted in this strategic inversion—Tehran has transformed coercive measures into bargaining power. Two features make this MOU inherently fragile. First, its inclusion of Lebanon as a component creates enforcement dilemmas. Israeli operations in southern Lebanon and Gaza complicate any normative framework that purports to normalize relations or restrain violence without confronting Israeli actions. Second, the choice to frame the agreement as a “deal” rather than a binding treaty reflects the transactional posture of current U.S. politics. An executive-level deal is easier to reverse and therefore less credible; yet in practice it might be more durable because any attempt by Washington to renege risks immediate and painful retaliation in Hormuz. The transcript suggests Iran has designed the arrangement with an engineer’s eye: measurable benchmarks, verifiable actions, and built-in retaliatory clarity. That makes the MOU both a confidence-building device and a measuring stick—one that Tehran can use to call out perceived failures and justify escalatory responses. Underlying these diplomatic mechanics is a striking assessment about U.S. capacity and intelligence. The conversation raises uncomfortable questions about whether American planners misread Iranian resilience and internal complexity. The assumption that decapitating a leadership would precipitate collapse proved false; funerary mobilization instead generated a rally-around-the-flag effect. That miscalculation, and the sidelining of voices urging caution, reveal more than tactical errors: they expose a strategic blind spot about governance structures and popular dynamics in rival states. ## Pashinyan, the corridor, and EU support Turning northward, the Southern Caucasus has re-emerged as a theater where great-power competition and local ambitions intersect. Armenia’s disputed election and the political crisis around Nikol Pashinyan reveal how geography and historical grievances can be repurposed by external actors. The conversation highlights that the opposition’s weakness—no coherent plan B, insufficient consolidation—left the field open to institutional manipulation and creeping foreign influence. One of the most consequential issues is the so-called “corridor” concept, which has become shorthand for connectivity and leverage across the region. Brussels, Moscow, and Ankara all view transit routes and border access through different strategic lenses: economic integration, security projection, or leverage over minority populations. The EU’s growing involvement—pushing support to Pashinyan while simultaneously advocating for stability—reflects a broader European interest in corralling instability before it spills into NATO’s neighborhood. Yet the transcript makes clear that EU support is neither unconditional nor uniformly effective. The EU can prop up governments, offer carrots, and attempt to anchor states in a Western orbit, but it lacks the coercive depth to impose outcomes in the face of determined regional actors. Armenia’s domestic turmoil thus serves as a case study in how local governance crises become arenas for external contestation. The dispute over ballots is not only about electoral fairness; it is also about whose strategic lines—Russian, Western, Turkish, Iranian—will determine logistics, security guarantees, and economic lifelines. The immediate risk is domestic destabilization; the larger risk is emboldening a pattern where contested states become bargaining chips in a broader game of influence. ## Russia’s strategy in Ukraine Across the post-Soviet space, Russia’s campaign in Ukraine exposes a patient, attritional logic. The conversation critiques Western expectations of a quick unraveling of Russian capacity and instead emphasizes Moscow’s operational pragmatism. Russia’s approach—incremental territorial gains, grinding pressure, and selective escalation—reflects an understanding that strategic depth and domestic mobilization can offset Western material superiority, at least in the near term. What the transcript underscores is the asymmetry between political narratives and military realities. Western publics often seek decisive, symbolic victories to validate policy; Russia prefers the long game, where time erodes external resolve and amplifies the costs of endless support. This is uncomfortable for Western policymakers who operate under electoral deadlines and media cycles. The implication is stark: misjudging tempo and overinvesting in symbolic gestures without appreciating operational endurance invites a protracted conflict with escalation risks. The discussion also raises the prospect of NATO’s own strategic choices creating unintended consequences. Enlarging security guarantees and expanding theater commitments can deter aggression, but they also risk entangling members in conflicts with high escalatory potential. Russia’s strategy, as interpreted in the exchange, is to exploit these tensions, driving wedges among allies and forcing hard choi

The FATAL Two-Front Mistake—The USA Just Fell For The TRAP | Pietro A. Shakarian When things are going really bad in war, then what's the solution? Exactly. Start another on. It worked great for Third-Reich Germany, it worked great for Imperial Japan. So why would it not work for MAGA America? What could go wrong. The signs of hegemonic overreach and imperial desperation are now undeniable. The only question is how long until the ultimate collapse of the 21st century's empire of evil? And will it go quietly, or does it want to drag the world with it? Dr. Pietro Shakarian joins Pascal to discuss Iran’s war fallout, Khamenei’s funeral, Hormuz, and the limits of U.S. power. They also cover Armenia’s disputed election, the Trump corridor, EU policy, Turkey, Israel, Russia’s war strategy in Ukraine, NATO risks, Finland’s loss of neutrality, and why Washington may need deep reform at home. Links: American Committee for US-Russia Accord: https://usrussiaaccord.org The Realist Review: https://therealistreview.substack.com Anastas Mikoyan: An Armenian Reformer in Khrushchev’s Kremlin: https://iupress.org/9780253073556 /anastas-mikoyan/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction and Iran’s position 00:03:40 Qatar, the Gulf, and multipolarity 00:09:03 FIFA, rules, and international law 00:14:30 The Iran deal and Hormuz 00:18:27 Armenia’s disputed election 00:23:56 Pashinyan, the corridor, and EU support 00:29:33 Turkey, Israel, and the Caucasus 00:35:02 Russia’s strategy in Ukraine 00:40:19 Europe, NATO, and escalation risks 00:46: 44 Finland, neutrality, and war lessons 00:52:51 Trump, Russia, and U.S. decline 00:58:17 Putin, Iran, and nuclear danger 01:04:52 Ukraine’s front line and closing remarks #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, tonight again for an update with our friend and colleague Pietro Chakarian. Pietro, welcome back. #Pietro A. Shakarian Pascal, great to be here. Pleasure, as always. #Pascal And just to start directly with the topic, I mean, we want to go through Iran and Armenia to Russia a little bit — so from south to north. And you are, of course, from Armenia, from the region, the Southern Caucasus. You've also had a lot of experience in the United States and in Russia as well, as -- 1 of 24 -- an academic. Yes. Let's begin with Iran. Where are we today? We've just had this huge funeral that actually coincided more or less with the Fourth of July celebrations in the United States. Is that a coincidence? And how did you perceive that funeral going? #Pietro A. Shakarian Well, the funeral was, from what I understand, absolutely extraordinary. I mean, many, many international guests attended to mark the passing of Ali Khamenei, his death, his assassination. But really what it underscored to me is, number one, that Iran is not an isolated country by any means. And number two, it also emphasized how the United States is in a bind with the outcome of this Iran war. There was never this belief that Iran could actually, you know, challenge the U.S. in such a way as this. But, you know, as I alluded to, I think in one of our earlier podcasts, you were asking me, what can Iran do? And I said one of the things that they can do would be to kind of close the Strait of Hormuz or kind of take control over it and, you know, control who goes in, who goes out, and all this. And what they did was they completely, brilliantly flipped the whole narrative of international politics. And what it did was, in retrospect, it was a very risky gambit by the United States to think that they could actually challenge Iran in such a way as this. Because Iran completely, you know, flipped the script. I mean, the United States, in the end, it revealed the weaknesses of the United States. And as a superpower on the international stage, that's not something you want to have happen to you. But in the case of Iran, this is what occurred. So, yeah, the funeral of Ali Khamenei. Now, of course, we also had Trump's threats. I mean, this is really obscene to do this in terms of the funeral of a state leader. But, you know, Trump has shown that he has no boundaries and he's willing to do or say anything like this. But at the end of the day, what can the United States do? I mean, they're in a bind. And there is also this other element of this so-called deal that we have on the table that the United States is trying to kind of forge with Iran, with the mediation of the Pakistanis and the Qataris. And so the question becomes now, what happens? Will this deal be fully implemented? And there is a lot of, you know, question about that, because one of the big elements of this deal is this idea of, you know, Lebanon. And Israel, as we know, is not being—rather, it's not being very constructive, to put it very, very, very mildly, in Lebanon. So that's kind of where we are right now, just to give you the general overview of... #Pascal Let me just ask you, because this one puzzled me a little bit when I realized that it's going on, which is like, the negotiations started in Pakistan. They signed or did parts of the MOU in Switzerland. And OK, this is understandable, but now Qatar is involved in that. And because Qatar is one of the states that actually got hammered during this entire affair, how do you interpret that? That part of the negotiations are now done in Qatar, which actually, you know, at the very beginning cried foul very -- 2 of 24 -- badly and said, like, oh, unprovoked attack against us, which, you know, people like us, we immediately dismissed because, of course, the U.S. airbase and everything, and using Qatar’s ground and airspace in order to attack Iran, right? But what’s your interpretation on Qatar? #Pietro A. Shakarian I think that a lot of these GCC states, Pascal, have understood that having the U.S. presence there does not help them. It makes them a target, right? And by the way, the countries in the Baltic region should be getting the memo on that—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, right? In the context of Russia and the U.S., right? But in this case, as we're talking about, you know, the Gulf, increasingly you're seeing kind of a pushback of certain countries there against the U.S. effectively at the end of the day. And, I mean, of course, you have the UAE, which is rather the outlier. But then you're seeing Qatar, you're seeing Saudi. Saudi was at the funeral, okay? That tells you something right there. It tells you something about the changing dynamics. I mean, this whole Hormuz affair is really a vivid illustration of the fact that we're now in a multipolar world. It's an illustration of the multipolarity that we're in, the multipolar moment. And, you know, the great irony is Trump put the U.S. in that position, I guess believing somehow that this move would not only be in defense of Israel—you know, as we know, Netanyahu played a very substantial role in convincing Trump to go to war—but also that maybe it was connected with this idea that the U.S. could still kind of show its mettle. We could do regime change on the cheap, from the air, with no ground power, right? We're that good. And hence, it didn't work out that way. And so it's become a vivid illustration, I think, of multipolarity in action. #Pascal The Iranians are actually quite brilliant about this, right? Because the idea of the Americans was to have millions of people in the streets in order to overthrow the regime, right? And now they have millions of people on the streets in order to mark the funeral of Ali Khamenei, the incarnation, basically, of the regime, right? Yeah. They are also really good at using this as a way to message to everybody else. I mean, the biggest surprise to me is that it is the Iranians that actually managed to break through also in the information space of the West. The Lego movies, the memes, the Twitter that they do. Now with this one, this is a huge break, actually, just to hammer a bit of information down the throat of the West, isn’t it? #Pietro A. Shakarian Absolutely, because, you know, again, one of the main theses that they were advancing was that, you know, the regime is so unpopular, the Islamic Republic is so unpopular. And in the end, now we see it's rather, you know, the opposite. In fact, it created a rally-around-the-flag effect. You would even have people, I mean, from, you know, what I've heard on the ground in Tehran, you would actually have people who were former critics of the regime, even, you know, there in attendance at -- 3 of 24 -- the funeral. Right. So, it's quite extraordinary. But you mentioned the Lego movies. They just came out with one today, actually, about the whole, you know, FIFA controversy with the red card, as we know, from the U.S.-Bosnia game. I mean, this was a big deal. And then that was followed by, yesterday, you saw, you know, 4-1 Belgium, you know, clobbered the U.S. team. So, it was like karma came back. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Pietro A. Shakarian But this also follows, Pascal, what happened during this World Cup, right? I mean, it goes beyond just, you know, the whole issue of the red card, you know, Trump calling up Gianni and saying, hey, look, I want you to fix this for me, FIFA, that kind of thing. But also the whole discrimination, really the unfair treatment of the Iranian team. Oh man, it was just disgraceful in this World Cup. That needs to be absolutely highlighted in this. But no matter what Trump did, I mean, no matter what restrictions were placed on the Iranian team, no matter that Trump tried to intervene—which is insane, politically intervene in a football match—even despite all that, you see where the tide is, where things are going. #Pascal Let's discuss this just a little bit, because I think it's a very, very interesting micro thing in the larger macro perspective. I mean, I told you just before we started, right, that to me, this whole affair with FIFA is a perfect example of the rules-based international order, right? The West makes the rules, orders everybody else to follow, but whenever they don't want to follow, they just call up Gianni and tell them that a red card is not a red card anymore, by the way. #Pietro A. Shakarian Absolutely. Absolutely. I mean, the idea is, you know what, we make the rules, you follow the orders, right? That's how this whole thing goes. And it should not be, by the way, conflated with international law. It's the opposite of that. And actually, that's the other thing too—Iran, that whole war was the greatest violation of international law. And so, yeah, that's it. #Pascal But there are more things that are really interesting about this. I mean, you also have this moment where the people who are immediately threatened by Iran—the Gulf states and so on—actually send -- 4 of 24 -- delegations to the funeral of Khamenei, while the United States threatens an attack during that funeral, while the United States actually does everything under the sun in order to kick out the Iranians and be unfair to them, to be unfair to everybody. But you see how the whole rest of the world is already starting to develop a different mode of engagement. I mean, the Saudis obviously are not in love with the Iranians—obviously not—but when it comes to funerals and to this kind of state-to-state interaction, they’ve already moved on from the Western paradigm of, you know, the other one is Hitler, and when Hitler dies, everybody goes “yay” and celebrates in the streets with little flags. They do the opposite of that. #Pietro A. Shakarian Well, and also that really, to me, it tells me, Pascal, to be quite honest, about the shortco