America First VS. Neocons: Showdown in Trump Cabinet? | J. Carden & L. Kasradze

## A presidency of contradictions: transactionalism, chaos, and strategic continuity What emerges from this discussion is a portrait of a U.S. foreign policy that is at once disruptive and deeply familiar. The administration projects a mix of transactional bargaining, impulsive personalization of statecraft, and institutional incoherence — yet it also reinscribes long-standing instincts of global power projection. The conversation frames Trump-era diplomacy not as a clean break from the post–Cold War orthodoxy, nor as a straightforward pivot to isolation, but as a hybrid phenomenon: part transactional deal-making, part neo-colonial ambition, and part continuation of America’s global commitments, retooled to fit an “America First” logic. Understanding this cluttered logic is essential because it shapes outcomes across theaters — from Ukraine and the Middle East to China and the South Caucasus. ## Factionalism and the inner circle: why personalities and patrons matter A recurring theme in the exchange is the outsized influence of the president’s inner circle on the direction of policy. The conversation underscores that, in this administration, formal titles sometimes matter less than proximity and patronage. Advisors and confidants who control access, messaging, and operational levers can tilt policy toward either restraint and direct communication or toward hawkish interventionism. That factional competition generates policy whiplash: moments of outreach and diplomacy can coexist with escalatory military decisions, not because of coherent grand strategy, but because of competing power centers inside the palace. The implications are twofold. First, policy becomes volatile and contingent; allies and adversaries alike must continually reassess what Washington will do next. Second, the institutional checks that normally stabilize American foreign policy — career diplomats, enduring defense architectures, and treaty commitments — are being tested unevenly. The conversation offers a cautious optimism that institutions still function and can temper excesses, but it also warns that institutional resilience will be stressed whenever internal rivalries intensify. ## Russia, Ukraine, and the limited virtues of diplomacy One of the clearest shifts noted is the administration’s opening to direct conversations with Moscow. The exchange treats these contacts as significant, not because they promise an immediate peace, but because they reestablish communications that have been absent or frayed. In a conflict as entrenched as the war in Ukraine, the mere existence of interlocution — lines of communication, face-to-face diplomacy, envoys working to test ceasefires or confidence-building measures — is a notable departure from policies that rely exclusively on sanctions and arms transfers. Yet realism tempers optimism. The conversation suggests that diplomacy does not equate to an imposed settlement: the war will likely continue until battlefield realities change. There is skepticism that a Washington administration can dictate terms to Moscow and Kyiv. Instead, the most valuable function of renewed dialogue is to manage escalation, reduce miscalculation, and create pathways for incremental de-escalation. Those pathways are fragile; they depend on predictable U.S. commitments, credible guarantees, and, crucially, a domestic political environment that does not undermine negotiated outcomes for partisan gain. ## Middle East complexities: outreach and complicity The Middle East is presented as the administration’s central contradiction. On paper, this presidency has at times pursued outreach — conversations with Tehran and attempts at de‑escalation — while simultaneously greenlighting aggressive military steps, including resumption of strikes and support for partners whose actions contribute to humanitarian catastrophe. The result is a moral and strategic muddle: messages of peace are undercut by operations that deepen regional instability. The conversation highlights how domestic political ties — to powerful lobbying networks and donor constituencies — constrain executive choice. Domestic politics can thus tether U.S. policy to the imperatives of allies, even when broader strategic calculations might favor restraint. At the same time, outreach to adversaries like Iran is described as a pragmatic corrective. Contact and negotiation are seen as preferable to perpetual confrontation, but their efficacy is limited by inconsistent follow-through and by the gap between rhetoric and action. ## China, tariffs, and a neo-colonial turn A striking argument in the discussion reframes the administration’s posture toward economic competition not as isolationist but as a form of neo-colonial transactionalism. Tariffs, threats over strategic assets, and aggressive bargaining with allies are interpreted as attempts to reassert control over global economic space through coercive leverage rather than cooperative governance. This manifests in pressure tactics — aggressively applying economic pain to extract concessions — and in renewed interest in strategic assets once framed as benign or neutral. This approach is both tactical and symbolic. On the tactical side, trade and economic coercion are instruments to rebalance supply chains and domestic industry. Symbolically, the rhetoric evokes a revival of an earlier American posture — a muscular assertion of geopolitical entitlement — reframed for the 21st century. The conversation argues that such methods may secure short-term concessions but risk eroding long-term trust. Allies and partners may question the reliability of bargains with the United States if agreements can be reversed with the change of an administration or the whims of a powerful inner circle. ## Multipolarity as a check on unbounded ambition A recurring, almost structural, point in the discussion is the weight of a more multipolar world. The United States no longer operates in a global environment where unilateral action goes unchallenged. China’s economic reach, Russia’s assertive regional posture, and the rise of nimble regional powers all impose costs on expansive American strategies. In practice, these shifts compel Washington to recalibrate: to pick theaters more carefully, avoid overreach, and accept negotiated compromises when brute force is too costly or ineffective. This emerging multipolarity works in two ways: it limits the range of feasible policies, and it opens opportunities for diplomacy that does not require complete surrender of strategic objectives. The conversation frames multipolarity as a latent ally of restraint — not because the United States is pacified by virtue of global checks, but because the real costs of maximalist strategies have risen. Consequently, the administration’s decisions are increasingly shaped by an external topology of power that maps rival capabilities and regional interdependencies. ## Regional implications and small-state maneuvering: the South Caucasus as a case study The conversation closes by considering how these global dynamics filter down to more localized theaters, particularly the South Caucasus. Small states in proximity to larger rivals face a twofold challenge: the direct pressures of the great powers and the consequences of Washington’s unpredictable swings. For countries that straddle competing influences — Turkey, Iran, Russia, and emergent regional blocs — the potential for strategic dislocation is high. An escalatory U.S. posture toward Iran, for instance, could realign regional balances, deepen fault lines, and disrupt emerging economic corridors. Yet small states are not merely passive victims. The discussion points to nimble hedging and regional alignments as adaptive responses. These states can exploit competition among major powers to secure concessions and investment, while also seeking to insulate themselves from the broader strategic turbulence. That said, the conversation warns that deep

America First VS. Neocons: Showdown in Trump Cabinet? NEW (!) Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Today I’m talking to two colleagues in the US, James Carden and Lasha Kasradze. James is the editor of the Realist Review on Substack. And Lasha is the Liaoson officer for Sokumi state University in the US. We discuss the complexities of Trump's foreign policy as his administration nears its 100th day, and how the changing multipolar world and internal factors might check US power. We also discuss the influence of neoconservatism in Trump's approach. #M3 Something that Lasha just said reminded me of this story. During the Second World War, Anthony Eden was meeting with Stalin in the early 1940s. And Stalin said to Eden, "Do you know what Hitler's problem is? It's that he doesn't know when to stop." And Eden said, "Well, who does?" And Stalin said, "I do." That's the problem with the neocons. They don't know when to stop, and they won't be stopped. Trump has four years left, and then there's going to be a Republican primary. It doesn't seem like Trump is going to, in any sense, crown his successor. And the neocons are going to be a force, again, to be reckoned with. The problem, though, that we face is that they're a force now to be reckoned with in both political parties. So it's an absolute nightmare because not only do they have a substantial base within the Republican Party, a lot of them have migrated since 2016 to the Democratic Party. And in some respects, the Democratic Party is even more neoconservative than the Republican Party. So they are going to remain a force to be reckoned with. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to two colleagues who've been on this channel before. I've got with me James Carden and Lasha Kasradze. James is the editor of the Realist Review on Substack, and Lasha is the liaison officer for Sukhumi State University, a Georgian university in the United States. Both of them are talking to us from the East Coast. And today, as we are nearing the 100th day of the Trump administration, we want to discuss his foreign policy, although I'm not entirely sure if "policy" is still the right expression for it and more the foreign policy train or steamer because so many things have changed. Maybe James, let's start with you. What's your general assessment of this Trump presidency? #M3 -- 1 of 15 -- Well, as with anything with Mr. Trump, there are positives and negatives. Right now, the country and the world seem to be focused on Trump's tariff policy, which is reasonable enough. I think a story that's going underreported, however, is the divide within the Trump administration's national security team. Really, the team looks like it is about to unravel. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, who really no one thought was qualified for the job, has proven everyone correct. He is not, and it looks like his days are probably numbered. National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, likewise, is rumored to be close to finished. So that's good news for people like us who care about peace and care about diplomacy and dialogue, things that have been, you know, out of vogue in Washington for so many years. But the Trump team still has this divide between the neoconservative traditionalists who have brought so much damage to the world over the past 20, 30 years, and the kind of America First people like J.D. Vance and Tulsi Gabbard. I think the most interesting thing, and we can get into this later, is the emergence of presidential advisor Steve Witkoff, who has really become the Secretary of State in everything but name. There's a lot of chaos here. On the one hand, you have people like Vance, Gabbard, and Witkoff who are doing well and doing good things, like talking to our adversaries, something that we haven't done in years. On the other hand, you have the neocon traditionalists who seem to be unraveling. It's a mixed bag, as with anything with Mr. Trump. #M2 I see it like that, too, especially as it shows the importance of the inner circle of decision-making in the White House. But Lasha, how do you look at this factionalism inside the administration? And what do you think is the most important impact it has on what you're looking at? #M1 Sure. I don't know if I can add much more to what James has just said, except to sort of go back slightly to the first few days, perhaps even shortly before Trump actually entered the White House. We all talked and sort of collectively analyzed what Trump's presidency, in terms of foreign policy, would look like. There was this sort of regional division in how they viewed it. For example, Russia and Ukraine would, relatively speaking, reject the neocon influence and have more flexibility to do that. Meanwhile, Trump's policy towards the Middle East would come more under the sway of the neocon tradition. I think basically that's what we are looking at, but I also think that even with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, Mr. Trump is coming under the pressure of the neocon influence. Just to quickly mention what James said in terms of competency and internal chaos, on the one hand, we are kind of accustomed to internal chaos with Trump. Whoever voted for Trump probably doesn't look at these details. His personality is such that it's the overall vision with which he challenged the establishment, which is fine, right? Shake things up. We all remember this sort of populist terminology. -- 2 of 15 -- But then at the same time, we have to ask, this is America, and it has to be governed, and there are institutions. And I still want to believe there are independent checks and balances, right? Call me naive, but that's, you know, look, just like Mearsheimer says, I love the fact that, you know, this is still a liberal democracy, and what are we doing about it? But, you know, this whole cell phone brouhaha with allegedly some very important information being leaked to family members. And I mean, okay, so how can I, what shall I say? I mean, this is just, I don't know if this is extremely serious, not serious, but politically this looks like a disaster. This is not some third-world country where these things are supposed to happen. If any other administration, just to be fair, had done anything like this, they would have been accused of being traitors or whatever. But without going into the nitty-gritty, it's just not looking good. But I also remember Mr. Hexer declaring in Brussels, I think it was a few months back, at a security conference, saying that the era of power matters has arrived. If you remember that phrase, I'm paraphrasing, obviously, but he said that the balance of power or something along the lines of power matters, not some ideals and utopian worldview. And some of us who actually adhere to a pragmatic, sort of realist-oriented foreign policy, we said, you know, I know I did that. You know, it looked great. You know, there is somebody who says, you know, it's ugly. It doesn't sound good. It's a departure from these liberal internationalist views. But yeah, power apparently does matter. And now we have this multipolar world where, you know, the United States is being checked specifically by, you know, the projection of power by China, of course, and then this third, Russia. And then from that point, we've somehow arrived at where we are now, sort of feeling incompetent and chaotic and in disarray, right? So that's just my view of this. Is this a collapse of some sort, or is this—no, I think the Trump administration will sort of come out of this. But just like James said, I think there will be changes made. #M2 This is a very good observation about power. We also had the statement, of course, from Secretary Rubio at the beginning of his term that we are now living in a multipolar world and this is normal, and we just need to find our place. And we should also remember, actually, that Donald Trump started his campaign, his administration, with his inaugural speech saying, like, we will be remembered for the wars that we didn't get into. He's the peace candidate. He was also introducing himself still during the inauguration as the peace candidate. However, by now, Donald Trump is bombing Yemen and has basically greenlit the resumption of what I still think will be remembered as the Gaza genocide. James, how do you square this? On the one hand, we have all of these peace efforts with Ukraine, which I also applaud very much. And Vitkov is doing a fantastic job at trying to get the Trump administration into a place where either you get to a ceasefire or you get to audit. It seems that now the next thing will be that the U.S. will just leave it and walk away, which is probably not a bad -- 3 of 15 -- thing. But the Middle East—how do you square these two things and also the rhetoric towards China? I mean, they are connected, I believe. #M3 Well, I think with regard to Russia and Ukraine, you're probably right. I don't think that the idea that Trump and Vitkov were going to come in and dictate terms of peace to Russia and Ukraine was ever realistic. I think it's a good thing that they're talking in and of itself. That is a positive thing. As Steve Vitkov said in an interview with Tucker Carlson, you know, Biden and Putin didn't talk for three and a half years, so the very fact that they're sitting down and that there are lines of communication that are open is a very good thing. I think that the war in Ukraine is nowhere near finished. I think that the Russians are going to fight it out, and they're going to have to take by force the entirety of the oblasts that they have annexed formally. With regard to the Middle East, it's a total mess. You're exactly right. It's very hard to square Trump's peace rhetoric with his greenlighting of the genocide in Gaza. And as you mentioned, the bombing of the Houthis. On the other hand, Steve Vitkov, again, is talking directly to the Iranians, which is a very positive thing. The thing that we, in the background of all this, and you're not supposed to say this in Washington, is the Israel lobby and the ties that Trump has to Netanyahu. And he's in a very difficult position because his donor base, his ties to the lobby, prevent him from doing, I think, certain things. But it hasn't prevented them so far in talking with the Iranians. So again, the theme of Donald Trump and foreign policy is always a mixed bag. So, you know, what they're doing in Gaza, what they're doing in Yemen is deplorable. Outreach to Iran is very positive. With regard to China, I think that remains to be seen. I think that right now, thanks to his tariff policies, relations between the United States and China are headed south. #M2 Right. There are basically two schools of thought. One says Trump is genuinely overhauling and changing U.S. foreign and domestic policy. To do so, he has to dismantle some internal mechanisms, including USAID, and this represents a genuine change. Then there's the other school of thought that says, no, this is a continuation of policy, a continuation of agenda. It's just regroup, reload, and then shoot in a different theater. Instead of targeting Russia, you target Iran, and finally, you're going to target China. The Trump administration actually just wants to refocus U.S. hard power onto China and Russia. Which one do you think, or what third option might help explain what's happening? #M1 Well, I think it's going to be more of the same in terms of tension. I think, look, for the region, for the South Caucasus, we are in proximity, right? Turkey, Iran. If there is a bombing campaign, and if, say, Trump succumbs to whatever forces there are in Washington nowadays, it's tough to pinpoint or call them, you know, all these names, new and neoconservative forces. From my perspective, as a -- 4 of 15 -- Georgian looking at the region, Russia, yes, we know the relationship with Russia and Iran. It's not a sort of classic military alliance. I have no d