Brave EMP Speaks Truth on EU Madness: US-Russia Push Ukraine Surrender | Michael v.d. Schulenburg

## Europe’s Dangerous Leap from Diplomacy to Delirium Europe today is behaving as if it can remake the world by fiat, but without the resources, unity, or strategic clarity to do so. The conversation with Michael v.d. Schulenburg exposes a continent intoxicated by symbolism and slogans, while losing touch with the hard work of negotiation and the sober arithmetic of geopolitics. Rather than seizing the moment to broker peace, key European institutions and legislatures have moved toward an increasingly militarized posture that risks hollowing out economies, heightening insecurity, and surrendering Europe’s long-standing role as a mediator in international crises. This is not a parlor critique. It emerges from a seasoned practitioner’s alarm: a former UN Assistant Secretary-General and long-time conflict negotiator who watches familiar rules of engagement — dialogue, confidence-building, ceasefire arrangements — fade from public and parliamentary discourse. The result is an EU that speaks like a superpower while lacking the credibility and means to shape outcomes, and a polity that treats peace-seeking as political weakness rather than an urgent necessity. ## Putin’s Gains and the Logic of the Battlefield One of the harsher truths raised in the exchange is that Russia has largely achieved its core goals. Territorial increments are less important than strategic outcomes: limiting NATO’s forward posture, securing Black Sea access, and guaranteeing protections for Russian-speaking populations in the east. Viewed through this lens, the current balance offers Vladimir Putin a stronger bargaining position than before the conflict. For Moscow, marginal territorial concessions are small price for a reasserted security buffer and enhanced global stature. That reality complicates the simplistic narrative that more weapons and sanctions will inexorably “break” Russia. Wars are not chess problems to be solved by increasing material inputs alone. Military mobilization, attrition, and logistical endurance matter — and as past conflicts show, the decisive moments often come during protracted, costly late phases when both sides face organizational stress. These dynamics make the case for early and honest negotiation stronger, not weaker. Continuing to double down without a parallel diplomatic track risks prolonging human suffering and leaving the ultimate outcome determined by exhaustion rather than settlement. ## The EU’s Militarization Fever and Fiscal Mirage A striking theme in the conversation is the EU’s rush to remilitarize. Ambitious plans — higher defense spending targets, emergency reconstruction pledges, promises of membership pathways — look politically theatrical but are economically fragile. The proposal of massive expenditure, framed as a leap toward strategic autonomy, runs into a brutal fiscal reality: the money often does not exist, and public tolerance for soaring defense or reconstruction budgets is not guaranteed. Promises of 800 billion or “4% of GDP” defense targets are mostly intentions rather than funded programs. Beyond fiscal illusions, this drive hurts Europe’s core interests. Strategic competition with Russia and China is expensive; attempting to scale military capacity while neglecting economic modernization, energy security, and trade linkages risks long-term decline. Europe’s industries and innovation sectors are already lagging relative to the United States and Asia. Insisting on confrontation that severs ties to eastern markets and energy sources will exacerbate those trends. In short, Europe is betting its future on posture rather than procurement, rhetoric over resilience. ## Diplomacy Abandoned: Breaches of Charter Norms Perhaps the most damning observation is how little serious diplomacy features in current European policymaking. Parliamentary resolutions, as described in this discussion, run to many pages yet omit basic commitments to negotiation, mediation, or confidence-building. That absence is not merely a rhetorical gap; it betrays a breach of the international norms embedded in the UN Charter, under which states agreed to prioritize peaceful dispute resolution. The practical consequences are immediate. Where past conflicts were accompanied by shuttle diplomacy, back-channel talks, and sustained UN-facilitated contact between adversaries, contemporary politics has tolerated — and in some cases encouraged — total communicative breakdown. Conditioning foreign policy on maximalist aims and maximal pressure removes incentives for adversaries to engage, making negotiated settlements politically more costly and militarily longer to achieve. For practitioners who have seen wars end through painstaking bargains, the intellectual contempt for negotiation is both baffling and dangerous. ## A Deepening Transatlantic Rift A recurring point in the exchange is the fissure between Europe and the United States. That rift is less about personalities and more about divergent strategic priorities and economic heft. The U.S. can deploy power and then step back across the Atlantic while Europe bears the persistent costs of regional instability. The transatlantic relationship — once anchored by mutual interests and dense institutional ties — now reveals asymmetries that strain solidarity. This is not simply a momentary political spat; it reflects longer-term shifts in economic dynamism, technological leadership, and geopolitical reach. The U.S. remains the central actor in nuclear deterrence and global force projection. Europe, for its part, risks ceding diplomatic initiative by embracing policies that deepen confrontation without offering credible strategic alternatives. The result is a precarious situation in which Europe both depends on American military backing and resents the unequal burden-sharing, while simultaneously losing leverage because it lacks independent tools to shape peace. ## Domestic Politics: The Unlikely Allies of War An especially sobering theme is how domestic partisan alignments have realigned around the conflict. In several European states, including Germany, mainstream left and green parties have shifted toward a consensus favoring rearmament and continued military support, leaving anti-war positions marginalized. That political configuration concentrates skepticism into populist or fringe corners, while broad parliamentary majorities endorse an escalation that once would have seemed unlikely. This realignment carries social justice implications. History teaches that wars are borne unequally: the wealthy and powerful argue over strategy and aims, while the working classes pay the bills, serve in combat, and endure the economic fallout. When the left — traditionally the advocate of working-class protections — embraces hawkish policies, political space for peace-making narrows. Moreover, when political leaders deploy fear-laden narratives (e.g., imminent invasions of neighboring states) without evidence that intelligence assessments support, public debate becomes distorted and democratic accountability erodes. ## Human Cost and the Urgency of Ceasefire Finally, the conversation returns to the moral core: the human toll. Prolonged battles, shifting front lines, and the grinding attrition of late-stage conflict concentrate deaths and suffering into relatively short periods. Experienced negotiators note that the most lethal months of many wars are the final ones, when organizational breakdowns push desperate offensives and armies disintegrate. That pattern underscores why urgent ceasefire efforts matter — not merely for grand strategy but for saving lives now. If the West truly seeks a durable resolution, the conversation suggests a reorientation: pair necessary deterrence with robust diplomacy; fund reconstruction strategically rather than promiscuously; and rebuild channels for negotiation that include regional actors, multilateral institutions, and, where possible, direct contact with adversaries. Peac

The Truth on EU Madness: Ukraine Surrender | Michael v.d. Schulenburg The best ways to support us: Donations on Patreon: patreon.com/NeutralityStudies. A subscription on Substack: pascallottaz.substack.com. Today I’ve got the great honour of talking to Michael von der Schulenburg, a German member of the European Parliament. In his youth, Mr. von der Schulenburg escaped communist rule in East-Germany, then studied in Berlin, London and Paris, after which he started working for the United Nations, including as UN Assistant Secretary-General. He served in many of the world's trouble spots, such as in Haiti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and many more. He also wrote the formidable book “On Building Peace: Rescuing the Nation-State and Saving the United Nations”. Unsurprisingly, he is also an outspoken critic of the belligerent politics the EU and its member states are currently engaged in. #M3 Putin has basically gained what he wanted. I mean, a few kilometers here and there, maybe not. He was not out in the beginning to gain territory. He wanted NATO out. He didn't want to have foreign troops on his border. And he wanted access to the Black Sea. And he wanted to have some safety guarantees for the pro-Russian population, Russian-speaking, whatever you want to call them, in the East. And he has now. He has much more than he had actually gone for in the beginning. So he's coming out of this war as a much stronger country than he went into the war. That's an interesting thing. I mean, really. He wanted to cut Russia to pieces. Now he negotiates with China and the United States on an equal level. You know, it is gone for him. So why should he change it? Why should he go to a few villages in Donbass he didn't have or whatever? I mean, why should he give this up? #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and I've got the great honor today of talking to Michael von der Schulenburg, a German member of the European Parliament. In his youth, Mr. von der Schulenburg escaped communist rule in East Germany, then studied in Berlin, London, and Paris, after which he started working for the United Nations, including as UN Assistant Secretary- General. He served in many of the world's troubled spots, such as Haiti, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and many more. He also wrote the formidable book on building peace, rescuing the nation-state, and saving the United Nations. Unsurprisingly, he's also an outspoken critic of the belligerent politics of the EU and its member states, as we are seeing right now. That's what we want to discuss today. So, Mr. von der Schulenburg, welcome. -- 1 of 22 -- #M3 Thank you very much. Yeah, to Japan, I guess. #M2 Exactly. #M3 Long distance. #M2 It is. But we found a very good time frame to talk to each other. And I really am eager to hear your assessment of what's currently happening in the European Union, because we are seeing this drive for remilitarization. And, you know, in your book, you have an entire chapter called "Is Peace Escaping Us?" Is it already gone, peace, not just in Eastern Europe, but the mindset of peace? #M3 No, it's not gone. It's not gone. And interestingly enough, by somebody who I thought I would never like, Mr. Trump. You know, what he's doing there, and I know a little bit about negotiations, how he does it. I mean, he does it always with his loud voice and all the theatrics he has, but it's very professionally done, the peace in Ukraine. And the sad thing is, although this is a war on European territory, in one of our neighboring countries, the European Union was not able to bring peace there. The Americans had to come. I mean, unbelievable. You know, I was on Wednesday in the European Parliament. We still approved a resolution about Ukraine, in which we called to continue the war. To continue the war, while there were peace negotiations in Jeddah. Unbelievable. There was somebody standing up and saying, you know, shouldn't we postpone it and wait to see what comes there? It was voted down by a majority from conservatives, liberals, and the Greens, of course. I mean, I sometimes sit back in this parliament, and I think what I observe there can't be true. Now, in the meantime, this resolution also contains hate language towards Trump. I mean, who are we? I mean, little Europe, 5% of the world population. Now, I mean, according to Pricewaterhouse, in 2050, Europe will be... As a European Union, we say, oh, it's Europe. European Parliament. It's not the European Parliament. It's the EU Parliament. And, you know, we will be 4.5% of the population. And we will only have 9% of the global GDP. 9%. #M3 -- 2 of 22 -- I mean, we are small. So what do we do there? We want to become a superpower, and we behave already as if we are one. No, I think the European Union is going to collapse on its Ukraine policy. A collapse, I think. We are very close to collapsing, and the collapse will come from finances. Because what we try to do is this militarization policy. The cost of the war, the rebuilding of Ukraine, maybe Ukraine membership. I mean, crazy. Ukraine membership. I mean, it goes into the trillions. We don't have the money. I mean, this latest decision of 800 billion, not a penny is there. Not a penny is there. It's just an intention. There's no money. And so I think the European Union has completely lost touch with reality. And that's very sad because we are European countries with such a tradition of diplomacy, such a long tradition. We have a tradition of wars, of course, and how we solve wars. It seems to be all forgotten. #M2 You've been there, and you've seen this process happening. How did we get from a place where we had people who did realpolitik, like Willy Brandt and Olof Palme and so on, to this abomination? How did we get there? No idea. #M3 I have no idea. I think this group of politicians felt that the Ukraine war was a chance to make the European Union a state because the population usually doesn't want it. You know, there was a sense of solidarity. We have to go shoulder to shoulder against this enemy from outside, blah, blah, blah. And, you know, this imperialist who wants to occupy and have coffee in Vienna and all sorts of things. Yeah, and I think it's failing. It's just failing. And we have become a real adversary to the United States now. But we don't have the means. We have resolutions that are 13, 18 pages long, and not a single word on diplomacy and negotiations in this whole thing. I mean, these resolutions, in my view, are breaches of the UN Charter because in the UN Charter, all countries in the world, all 193, including all the Europeans, agreed that we should negotiate our conflicts in order to prevent wars or, where wars start, to help to end them very early. And we don't do this. I don't know why. I mean, really, I can't understand it. I'm flabbergasted up there. #M2 I mean, the Europeans have participated in reckless wars before. There were certain European EU states involved in the Iraq war. Not all of them. It was the coalition of the willing. Germany didn't go along. But now with this particular one, it seems it has galvanized the Europeans into, or like the EU war, almost entirely, with the exception of Hungary and Slovakia, has galvanized them into a war frenzy against an old enemy. It's almost a drunkenness. -- 3 of 22 -- #M3 I have a frenzy. It's a drunkenness. You know, you have lost control over it. The words used in the parliament are worse than what I've heard in the Iran-Iraq war. You know, in the Iran-Iraq war, the negotiation took place actually in my house for the ceasefire. We almost lost our lives over that. But, you know, one could talk to all the sides, and they would talk at least to us rationally. But here, it's not there anymore. You know, for instance, in all the wars I've experienced, and I've seen a lot of wars, you know, that was my job always, both sides always tried to keep contact, very often through the UN. I mean, the Iran-Iraq war, which was the biggest, with one million people dead, eight years of a long war. You know, it was the UN, and that's why I was on the one side. I know we went forward and backward, but we went forward and backward because both sides agreed on it. Now, we don't have any communications whatsoever. I mean, who do we think we are? I mean, we lose all these things. So I think Europe is going to be the big loser. I mean, the big loser is, of course, Ukraine. What I say is it's a very big loser. But the other loser is Europe. And I think we will be impacted for many, many years, for many years by what we are doing. Now, we want to have more money in the military, extremely more money. I mean, we speak now in the resolution of 4% of the GDP. That's huge amounts. That means our military, in that case, would be something like five, six times as large as Russia's, which creates, of course, in Russia also a reaction. You know, you can't only increase your conventional forces. Russia will, of course, rely then on nuclear bombs because they couldn't otherwise match it. So there is no talk about negotiations, about confidence-building measures, about reducing armament in Europe. Not at all. It's all gone. It's all gone and for nothing. And then we have, of course, here yesterday, in this interview, we had some very high-level Austrians. They were convinced that Russia is going to want to occupy Austria. I mean, yeah, that's what they say. I don't know if I should laugh or not. I don't know what to say. I mean, Russia can fight this war. I mean, they need three years to get a few kilometers. They haven't even got the whole Donbass. Of course, they win in the end, but it's with huge efforts. And you say they want to attack NATO countries? Even when the Secret Service in the United States says there is no chance that Russia will attack any NATO country, we say this. #M2 I don't know why. But this is what we need to try to answer in one way or another: how is it possible that within the "Russia is evil" narrative and "Russia is an evil aggressor," we have at the same time one strain of the narrative saying, if we just pump more weapons into Ukraine, we will break Russia? On the other hand, we have the argument that Russia will attack Austria tomorrow. How are these two beliefs possible at the same time, up to the highest level of politicians who feed this? And if I listen to you, I think you're saying the people in the European Parliament don't only say that in order to make others believe it. They believe it themselves, right? They really believe it. Yes, they believe it. -- 4 of 22 -- #M3 Yesterday, we had someone who was the highest judge in Austria. I mean, she was adamant, adamant, and she had no clue about wars and peace. I must say that, you know, I know a little bit about this. She was adamant that Russia was about to attack us. I said, but how? You know, I read to her the report of the Secret Services of the United States. They do one annual report about the threat to the United States, where they clearly say there is no threat from Russia to attack a NATO country. And we say that nonetheless. And I read it to her, and she continued arguing it. I don't know. I don't know what to say even. And people like me who know a little bit about war, I mean, I'm treated like a traitor. Although I try to say, I mean, you know, all wars are like this one. You know, in all wars we have propaganda, and we behave like a war country ourselves by saying the story that the other one is guilty. It's the same in all wars. We want to justify to our population why we go to war, why we spend money on it, and why we shoot at somebody else. So we must be the good ones, and they must be the bad ones. It's typical for all wars. And anybody in the country who speaks against it is, of course, a traitor because he undermines the war defense, the war mentality of the people, or whatever. But I said to them, now that we are very close to a ceasefire, you have to