Mass Protests in Taipei, Opposition Imprisoned, MSM Silent, War Preparations | Dr. Joanna Lei

## Mass Protests and Media Silence Something significant stirred in Taipei that went almost unnoticed beyond Taiwan’s borders: a turnout far larger than expectations, a street filled with citizens protesting the ruling party’s tactics, and a public debate about what democracy in Taiwan now looks like. The conversation with Dr. Joanna Lei paints this not as a narrow moment of local grievance but as a symptom of a deeper political shift. The scale of the April protest—estimates ranging up into the hundreds of thousands when measured against the usual protest site—contrasts sharply with Western media silence. That gap in coverage is not merely an oversight; it reveals how narratives about democracy are selectively amplified depending on geopolitical alignment and prevailing strategic interests. The silence is worth interrogating. When governments or movements that fit certain foreign-policy preferences rise up, Western outlets often rush to narrate them as “people power.” When similar civic energy challenges an allied or strategically valuable government, coverage can fall away. This discrepancy compounds the political stakes within Taiwan itself, where domestic contests are increasingly tied to great-power rivalry. Dr. Lei’s account suggests the protest was less an isolated street action than a reaction to a suite of political maneuvers that many citizens interpret as a demolition of institutional checks and balances. ## The Mechanics and Political Use of Recall At the center of public fury is a mechanism that looks democratic on paper but can be weaponized: the recall. Taiwan’s single-district electoral system means winning a seat requires a substantial share of votes; yet the recall mechanism lowers the bar to unseat an incumbent. As Dr. Lei explains, a relatively small pool of motivated opponents can trigger a recall that requires only a fraction of the electorate to topple a legislator. The asymmetry is stark: the party that controls administrative levers can initiate recalls targeting opposition legislators without exposing its own members to reciprocal risk. This design creates incentives for strategic, targeted recalls rather than broad-based appeals to the electorate. The result in this episode was not a localized expression of accountability but a coordinated, large-scale campaign to remove opposition representation in the legislature. Where some democracies would opt for a general dissolution of parliament and a fresh mandate, the recall becomes a scalpel, excising inconvenient representatives while leaving the ruling coalition intact. That procedural vulnerability, combined with intense polarization, makes recalls an explosive tool that can hollow out pluralism without the visible spectacle of a coup. ## Judicialization and the Suppression of Counter-Mobilization The recalls did not operate in political isolation. According to the conversation, prosecutors and judges have been used to criminalize and incarcerate organizers of counter-recalls and opposition leaders. Several actors, including a major opposition party chairman and elderly local officials, were detained—often without formal charges or timely judicial oversight. Dr. Lei stresses that people have been held in pretrial detention for months at a time, on the grounds that they might tamper with evidence, and that bail conditions have been set at levels normally reserved for serious crimes. This pattern illustrates a broader phenomenon: the judicialization of political competition. The law becomes an instrument of political management, not merely a framework for adjudicating disputes. When administrative, judicial, and legislative powers align to remove or disempower political opponents, ordinary mechanisms for accountability—parliamentary oversight, judicial independence, and public debate—become hollow. The effect is chilling: civic initiatives to recall or contest policies risk criminal investigation and imprisonment, which dampens political participation and accelerates a slide toward illiberal governance. ## Geopolitical Realignment: De-linking from China, Linking to the United States Beyond domestic tactics lies the strategic backdrop that helped fuel the unrest. Dr. Lei frames the ruling administration’s strategy as “delinking from China and moving north”—a deliberate pivot toward the United States and away from Beijing. This is more than diplomatic posturing. Legislative and administrative moves include allowing foreign nationals to work inside government departments, an increase in U.S. military advisors, and shifting high-tech assets and capital toward the United States. Those steps implicate Taiwan in a larger U.S.-China confrontation and raise the stakes of every domestic political decision. The conversation stresses that some of these decisions have been justified through a transactional logic: closer military and strategic alignment with the United States could, the administration hopes, blunt the costs of trade friction or tariffs by securing stronger political support. In practice, however, this strategic reorientation is being decided in compressed political space while contentious domestic reforms and budgetary allocations proceed under pressure. That mismatch—big geopolitical shifts being driven by politicized, high-stakes domestic maneuvers—helps explain why citizens poured into the streets: they fear that far-reaching national choices are being made without robust, plural deliberation. ## Economic Vulnerability: Technology, Trade, and the Costs of Realignment Any discussion of Taiwan’s political future must reckon with its economic reality. Taiwan’s economy is deeply integrated with China’s; trade links and supply-chain relationships run deep, particularly in intermediate goods and component manufacturing. Dr. Lei highlights the asymmetric impact of a reorientation that seeks to relocate flagship firms such as TSMC or to reallocate foreign reserves into U.S.-denominated assets. Moving high-end semiconductor production or capital to the United States may safeguard certain strategic interests, but it undermines the dense industrial ecology that sustains Taiwan’s middle-tier suppliers. Even absent outright conflict, tariffs or trade restrictions imposed by either great power could inflict severe damage. If Beijing were to reciprocate the kinds of tariff measures the United States has recently used internationally, Taiwan would be vulnerable—both because its exports to China constitute a large share of its trade and because relocations of key assets would hollow out employment, growth, and tax bases at home. The political calculus of re-linking to the U.S. therefore carries an economic trade-off: security assurances at the cost of economic disruption and industrial dislocation. ## The May 20 Moment and the Path Forward Taiwan faces a calendar as consequential as its institutional crisis. A high-profile anniversary speech and an approaching cycle of local elections create a compressed decision window. Dr. Lei predicts the administration will use symbolic and substantive rhetoric to cement its alignment with the United States and to justify assertive posture toward Beijing. That rhetoric will be accompanied by efforts to consolidate domestic political control—curbing opposition growth before a municipal and local election season that functions as a barometer of public sentiment. Local elections are not secondary in Taiwan; they are a practical measure of street-level politics and often presage national trends. The current crackdown on potential opposition leaders, including the incarceration of figures whose political bases could win crucial municipal posts, appears designed to blunt that bellwether effect. If opposition parties lose local ground, the national narrative shifts: the ruling coalition can claim a domestic mandate to press forward with its geopolitical orientation. If, instead, citizens continue to turn out in large numbers and the opposi

Mass Protests in Taipei, Opposition Imprisoned, War Preparations | Dr. Joanna Lei Last week there were rather large protests in the capital Taipei against the ruling TPP party and President William Lai. This news got suprpisingly little coverage in western media, which usually is so keen on showing all kinds of “people’s power” movements when they occur against governments the west doesn’t like. But this time, rather a wave of silence. To discuss this and more, today I’m talking again to Dr. Joanna Lei, a Taiwanese business woman, media executive and former law maker for the Kuomintang Party in the Republic of China (Taiwan). Links: Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #F1 Well, the protest was not even reported, right? Pascal, this is the same playbook. If you look at what the DPP has done, we have passed a law so that foreign nationals can now serve in our government. American advisors can work in our government departments. The United States has sent more military advisors to Taiwan, which has not happened since 1979, when they severed the relationship with us. In 1979, they severed diplomatic relations, withdrew all U.S. military forces, and also ended the Joint Defense Treaty. There were three conditions in 1979. But now, American advisors are coming back, advising our military. They are also potentially coming back into the government. And those things are happening right now. #M2 Hello everybody, this is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking again to Dr. Joanna Lei, a Taiwanese businesswoman, media executive, and former lawmaker for the Kuomintang Party in the Republic of China—that is, Taiwan, of course. Last week, there were rather large protests in the capital, Taipei, against the ruling DPP party and President William Lai. This news got surprisingly little coverage in Western media, which is usually so keen on showing all kinds of people power movements when they occur against governments the West doesn't like. But this time, there was rather a wave of silence. That's what we want to talk about today. So, Joanna, welcome back to the channel. #F1 Thank you, Pascal. I'm so glad that you picked this news up, because there was almost no Western media coverage at all. -- 1 of 13 -- #M2 So, A, why is that? B, was it just a few dozen people on the street with flags? Can you describe what these protests looked like? #F1 Well, I've been on the street in the same location many times. From the beginning of the stage to a major door at the back, usually people will claim to have 100,000 to 200,000. If you go further on the side to the other street, then people would claim to have 300,000 people or more. So this is like the traditional place for protests in Taiwan. This is an extremely large crowd. Initially, they expected about 50,000 people to turn up, but the final turnout was five to ten times the initial expectation. Okay, now, why was it never covered? In this particular instance, the Kuomintang and People's Party claimed that there was an illegal mass recall of all the existing lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan. Because the DPP doesn't have a majority—they have a minority in the Legislative Yuan—even though they have control of the executive branch, the judicial branch, and our two other branches. So they waged a massive recall to oust all the KMT and People's Party legislators. #M2 What is a recall? What do you mean by that? #F1 Okay, let me say a few words about recall. In our system, we have a single-district system, so you need to win pretty much a majority in order to win a seat. But you can have 1% of the constituents and 10% of the final number proposing to recall your seat and re-elect a different person. And this recall only requires a quarter of the people voting against you. So if you fight and win a seat in a constituency, you will need to win about 50%. But if people opposed to you—probably they will have 40%—if they use that 40% to recall you, then you will lose your seat. So that's a very strange system by design. Because the DPP didn't win a majority in the Congress, they waged a massive all- out recall to remove all KMT legislators. So think about this. In any other country, if you want to do something like this, you dismiss your Congress, right? You dismiss your Congress like Singapore recently did. The new prime minister said, "I need a new mandate from the people. So let's dismiss the Congress and have a general reelection." That's the normal way of doing it. So whether you are from A party, B party, or C party, you all go back to the people and ask for another mandate. But a recall allows A party—in Taiwan's case, the DPP—to target B party's legislator without risking A party's seat at all. So this is a very asymmetrical system. Of course, if it were just a fair system, it wouldn't raise so much public protest and wouldn't call so many people to the street. -- 2 of 13 -- However, this time, we have two things happening simultaneously. One is the DPP using this as a political tool against the opposition party to recall just the opposition legislators. Second, they are using judicial tools to suppress the counter-recall, because the KMT also said, "Okay, you recall my people, I will recall your people." But the people who led the counter-recall were being investigated and incarcerated by the judicial system. So both the legislative arm and the executive branch moved against any political opposition in Taiwan. And that's a really, really big issue. It's causing our so- called democratic system to deteriorate to a state that you cannot believe, because you have a standing people's right for free elections and free expression. B, you have changed the basic judicial system in terms of its proportionality, due process, and burden of proof, because they have incarcerated opposition party chairman Ko Wen-je. They incarcerated people in the Taipei KMT headquarters—the general director of the Taipei KMT office. She's a 75-year-old woman. They incarcerated her. They also incarcerated young people who led the counter-recall from the KMT camp. So these are all done by using prosecutors and the judicial system. So the deterioration of democracy in Taiwan is beyond belief. And it called out so many people on April 26, the event you picked up and no Western media reported. #M2 So just let me get this straight. In the US context, if we take the US as an example, this would mean that, let's say, the Republican Party attacks the Democrats because they don't have enough seats in Congress. They get enough—a quarter of the districts or the seats in the House of Representatives— to file this motion for a recall, and then all the Democrats lose their seats while the Republicans keep theirs. And this is just expected to go on, and if the other party does the same, then those people are being investigated and judicial methods are used against them. And that is currently the party that is hailed as the shining beacon of democracy and is also supported, naturally, by the United States. And if I'm not wrong, then Mr. Lai is also one of the people, of course, who supports a closer relationship with the United States, weapons imports from them, and the stationing of U.S. troops on Taiwanese soil, isn't it? #F1 You're exactly right. There are just two small modifications. One is, in your example, the Republican Party can target the Democratic Party and start a recall process to have another election in a specific district. The second part is that they not only investigated the counter-recall leaders, they incarcerated them. They put them in jail without communication, before they had any proof of wrongdoing. They weren't being charged; they were being incarcerated before being charged. And this is our unique system. #M2 -- 3 of 13 -- How many days can they be incarcerated without being brought before a judge? Because this shouldn't be more than a day or two. #F1 No, no, no. It's two months at a time, renewable for another two months—so, four months. #M2 Without seeing a judge, without even being charged with anything. #F1 They were incarcerated by the judge because the prosecutor asked the judge to put them in jail for fear of tampering with witnesses or whatever. But let me say one thing—I'll answer your question first. It's two months at a time, so twice is four months. Once it's put to the court, then it can be renewed continuously. Therefore, Ke Wenzhe, the leader of the People’s Party, is now in jail for more than three terms—more than six months. Now, the reason this is a tampering with our entire judicial system is that if you lead a counter-recall, right? You ask people to sign the petition—you need 1% of the vote for the first time, and you need 10% of the signatures at the second stage. All of this will then be vetted by our central election committee. They will check whether these are real people, whether they really supported your motion. This is a very small administrative process. Now, the government said that because you are recalling legislators, it involves national security. Therefore, they turn a very minor crime, a very small procedural issue, into a massive crime punishable by a five-year term. Because you need to have a severe crime to incarcerate people. So now you can see how terrible the use of the judicial system is, and how it may interrogate people and intimidate any opposition. Now, even the youngest leaders—there are some young people who decided to recall their legislator, waging the so-called counter-recall—were asked to post bail at a level that in Taiwan is usually reserved for major crimes. So you can see the overall cooperation from the judicial system, especially the prosecutor's side, with the current ruling DPP. #M2 What is this for? I mean, the last large elections in Taiwan were just a year ago, right? The general election. So the current parliament still has three years left in its term. And now the DPP is eradicating the Kuomintang and other opposition forces because it cannot ram through its legislative changes. What are the changes that they want, that they can't get through, that they want to implement? -- 4 of 13 -- #F1 Well, there are two things. One is they claim that the fiscal budget was not approved, and therefore the government cannot run. So this is a little bit like Donald Trump's view on the opposition. However, if you look at it dollar for dollar, this year the Congress passed more of the fiscal budget than in previous years. But there were major problems. For example, a new project on building a submarine had a budget freeze, saying that you need to provide proof of concept before additional budget is allocated. However, that submarine is now reported as a major failure. There were tons of mistakes, and therefore the Congress was actually doing the right thing, saying that you cannot, just because of your political agenda, fast-track everything. You have to prove that you have proof of concept, you have proof of safety, then you move forward. So the Congress actually froze some of the budget proposals, saying that you need to come back to report to Congress and/or propose a revised budget. The legislature made such a reasonable request, but the administration decided not to put forth their revised budget until the general recall started building momentum. So after the general recall began gaining momentum, they finally submitted their revised budget to Congress. So you can see this is a bit of a dance—it's a tangle, it's back and forth. Secondly, I think what's more pertinent today is that after the tariff war, you know that Taiwan is on the short end. We were asked to move TSMC to the United States. We were asked to buy additional U.S. arms. We were asked to invest more in the United States and perhaps change our foreign exchange—which is a large amount, $5, $7, $6 billion—into longer-term bonds. So none of this was discussed by the current Lai Jingde government in Congress