In 2014 and 2022, the EU initiated sanctions regimes against Russia. The lists of entities and individuals were originally supposed to target Russia’s econmic and political elites only. But...
Article
## Historical Origins: From the Philippines to J. Edgar Hoover
The tendency to weaponize reputation, law, and state apparatus against perceived internal enemies is neither new nor uniquely European. The conversation with Prof. David N. Gibbs traces a lineage of political repression that begins with American imperial practices at the turn of the twentieth century and threads through the security apparatuses of the mid-century United States. Colonial pacification in the Philippines after 1898, where military suppression and broad definitions of insurgency normalized extraordinary measures, sowed seeds for later domestic techniques of control. Those methods were refined by security and intelligence figures—most famously J. Edgar Hoover—who institutionalized surveillance, files, and bureaucratic pressure as tools of political discipline.
Prof. Gibbs reminds us that the American variant of political repression has a particular form because it evolved against a backdrop of strong constitutional rhetoric. The United States’ reverence for constitutional protections paradoxically enabled subtler repressive methods: rather than open incarceration without process, the system perfected reputational ruin, blacklists, and employment exclusion as ways to neutralize dissent. These non-judicial practices—extra-legal in effect if not always in letter—migrated beyond U.S. borders as democracies adopted the technique of delegitimizing opponents by labeling them dangerous or disloyal. The conversation thus reframes contemporary European practices not as isolated regulatory moves but as part of a broader history of modern states learning to punish politically without proper judicial constraint.
## Mass Psychosis and The "Extra-Legal" Nature of Sanctions
A key theme that runs through the exchange is how mass psychology and administrative power combine to produce a climate where accusation substitutes for evidence. Sanctions, designed initially to target elites or economic levers, have evolved into instruments for policing ideas—catching “disinformation” in their net—and in doing so recreate the logic of witch hunts. The conversation compared this phenomenon to Arthur Miller’s The Crucible: once a narrative of existential threat takes hold, communities begin to operate on collective fear. Allegation becomes sufficient proof; the social and professional costs of being named are irreversible.
Sanctions regimes are legally framed, but their operation often hinges on administrative lists, reputational blacklisting, and restricted access rather than criminal convictions. That creates a hybrid enforcement sphere: not prison sentences but professional ruin, travel curbs, and exclusion from public debate. Prof. Gibbs emphasizes that such measures are “extra-legal” in practice because they bypass ordinary standards of accountability. The target has little way to rebut a label like “agent of disinformation” or “foreign influence” once the state apparatus or influential institutions have signaled consensus. In this sense, sanctions become modern instruments of social control—less visible than trials, more pervasive in social consequence—capable of producing what the conversation aptly calls a mass psychosis of fear and conformity.
## Totalitarian Parallels: Soviet Union & The Fifth Column
It is tempting to recoil from direct comparisons between contemporary democratic states and totalitarian regimes. Yet the conversation makes a careful case for structural parallels, not moral equivalence. One parallel lies in the persistent fear of the “fifth column”—the idea that a hidden internal network works to subvert the polity from within. In Stalinist and earlier Soviet practice, suspicion was institutionalized into regular purges, loyalty tests, and punitive measures against whole cohorts deemed potentially disloyal. The modern securitized state similarly institutionalizes suspicion through lists, statutes, and institutional pressure to conform.
Prof. Gibbs and the discussants argue that labeling dissent as treasonous or as a foreign-directed operation reproduces the mechanics of the fifth-column narrative. Once an entire category of speech or opinion is deemed suspect—whether for alleged ties to Moscow, Beijing, or other external actors—normal democratic responses (debate, evidence, public persuasion) are superseded by prophylactic exclusion. The result is chilling: pluralism narrows, intellectual exchange contracts, and political life becomes a contest of loyalty rather than argument. The conversation draws this as a warning: totalitarian dynamics are not simply the province of one historical system; they can reappear as democracies adopt instruments of secrecy, surveillance, and reputational punishment.
## The Vietnam Analogy: Losing Wars and Credibility Gaps
A recurring observation in the discussion is how military failure or strategic stagnation intensifies domestic repression. The Vietnam era offers a salient analogy: as a conflict dragged on and legitimacy eroded, political elites sought to shore up domestic consensus by policing dissent and framing critics as traitors or enemy sympathizers. The conversation suggests contemporary Western elites face a similar dilemma in the context of the Ukraine conflict. When a war becomes costly, ambiguous, and politically unpopular, democratic leaders feel pressure to manufacture solidarity, often by suppressing opposing narratives and by construing critique as disloyalty.
That dynamic explains why sanctions and information controls harden precisely when strategic clarity diminishes. If the public begins to question the efficacy or wisdom of an intervention, authorities will be tempted to shrink the acceptable spectrum of debate to preserve mobilization. As Prof. Gibbs notes, widespread unpopularity among European leaders—remarkable approval dips that would have been almost unimaginable in past eras—creates desperation. When leaders have invested political capital, economic resources, and reputational prestige into a policy, the temptation is to double down on coercive means of social management rather than to reopen genuine political contestation. The Vietnam analogy thus serves as a cautionary tale: strategic failure breeds domestic illiberalism.
## Political Instability and Anti-System Parties
One of the most consequential political effects the conversation explores is the unintended empowerment of anti-system parties. Heavy-handed suppression of dissent, coupled with widespread economic dislocations produced by sanctions and war economies, creates fertile ground for parties that reject the established consensus. When center-left and center-right elites unite to delegitimate critics and to police boundaries of acceptable speech, they hollow out political opposition in conventional channels. That vacuum tends to be filled by movements promising to break the rules—some offering genuinely democratic alternatives, others leaning toward authoritarianism.
The discussion underscores that purges within mainstream parties—such as those that removed insurgent figures—will produce short-term cohesion but long-term fragility. Electoral systems can absorb periodic realignments, but social cohesion degrades when vast segments of the population feel excluded from debate or punished for nonconformity. The European case is instructive: parties that once prided themselves on pluralism increasingly adopt uniform positions on foreign policy and treat internal dissent as a security threat. The consequence is a polarizing feedback loop: repression breeds alienation, alienation breeds anti-system mobilization, and anti-system success reinforces leaders’ temptation to clamp down.
## Why is Japan Militarizing?
The conversation ends with a regional pivot that connects European and American trends to broader geostrategic shifts: why is Japan—long a pacifist, postwar democracy—moving toward remilitarization? Part of the answer is external: shifting great
Transcript
EU Totalitarianism: Sanctions Are Only The
Beginning
In 2014 and 2022, the EU initiated sanctions regimes against Russia. The lists of entities and
individuals were originally supposed to target Russia’s econmic and political elites only. But since
2024, the list has been expanded to include “disinformation” and is being used to target journalists
and academics even in EU and Schengen-state areas, like the German nationals Alina Lipp and
Hüseyin Dogru, or my countrymen, Jacques Baud, and Nathalie Yamb It’s a dystopian reality but
certainly not the first time something like this happens. To discuss the historical precedents I’m
joined today agin by Professor David Gibbs, a professor of history at Arizona State University. Links:
For an interview with Professor Gibbs, see Sadiq S. Baht, "Trump-Zelenskyy spat — 'Under Trump
2.0, foreign policy will never be business as usual,'" TRT World, February 28, 2025, https://www.
trtworld.com/article/7d92bf6c71b3 Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com
(Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s
/academic) Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Intro:
EU Sanctions & The Return of McCarthyism 00:08:31 The Crucible: Witch Hunts and Ideological
Shifts 00:17:53 Historical Origins: From the Philippines to J. Edgar Hoover 00:30:55 Mass Psychosis
and The "Extra-Legal" Nature of Sanctions 00:43:00 Totalitarian Parallels: Soviet Union & The Fifth
Column 00:47:38 The Vietnam Analogy: Losing Wars and Credibility Gaps 00:54:20 Political
Instability and Anti-System Parties 01:00:04 Why is Japan Militarizing?
#Pascal
In 2014 and 2022, the EU initiated sanctions regimes against Russia. The lists of entities and
individuals were originally supposed to target Russia's economic and political elites only. But since
2024, the list has been expanded to include “disinformation” and is being used to target journalists
and academics even in EU and Schengen area states, like the German nationals Alina Lipp and
Hussein Dogru, or my countrymen Jacques Baud and Nathalie Jamb. It's a dystopian reality, but
certainly not the first time something like this has happened. To discuss the historical precedents,
I'm joined today again by Prof. David N. Gibbs, a professor of history at Arizona State University.
David, welcome back.
#David N. Gibbs
Thank you, thank you.
#Pascal
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Thank you for having me. Well, thank you for taking the time to do this, because you’ve actually
looked at McCarthyism, and you have something to tell us about that and the parallels you’re seeing
between what happened in the United States in the ’50s and ’60s with the Red Scare, and where the
European Union is today. Could you elaborate on that?
#David N. Gibbs
Yes, I think what you have in McCarthyism is a kind of distinctively American variant of repression—
of political repression. In America, we have very strong constitutional protections of civil liberties.
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Fifth
Amendment guarantees due process of law. And the Constitution has a particularly high status
because it’s a kind of revered document in American political culture, seen almost as mythical or
even religious. Evangelical Christians look at it almost like the Bible. So it really has enormous
influence. There have been some restrictions on the ability to throw people in prison just because
others don’t like their political views—that happens too in America—but it’s relatively the exception.
I think McCarthyism, I would define broadly as a distinctive form of repression that involves
intimidation and threats to your career or reputation, combined with mass surveillance. And this is its
origin. I know you're in the Philippines now, so the origins of this are actually in the Philippines, in
the American empire after the conquest in 1898. Well, before I discuss the deeper history, I just
want to note that we’re definitely seeing a resurgence of McCarthyism now, with a constant
obsession with Russia—basically, Russian disinformation—and constantly accusing people of being
Russian dupes or Russian agents, or agents of disinformation, damaging their reputation in a way
that’s almost impossible to refute. How do you prove that you’re not a Russian agent? You can’t do
that.
So the enormous damage done to your reputation and credibility by merely accusing you of this—
however falsely—is very effective, and it’s being used widely both in Europe and in the United
States. And again, one of America’s distinctive contributions to world history is this new technique of
McCarthyism: the use of intimidation and essentially forms of defamation as the main method
through which disturbing or threatening viewpoints are dealt with. Again, one way of dealing with
viewpoints you don’t like is to refute them—show they’re wrong, give evidence they’re wrong—and
you can argue back and forth. There’s accountability there. But the whole idea of McCarthyism is to
evade accountability and do it through subtle means that are essentially irrefutable and not
susceptible to logic or evidence.
#Pascal
So basic repression that then leads straight into, basically, the criminalization—although we need to
be careful here, because the legal aspects of something being criminal and what’s actually going on
in the EU, and what McCarthyism is, are separate concepts. But just to make it clear, you’re saying
-- 2 of 23 --
that in the United States at the moment there’s also a climate of repression, although probably—
massive. Massive.
#David N. Gibbs
Yeah. Well, I mean, I think there are two things. First of all, it must be said that Trump is using,
shall we say, old-fashioned pre-McCarthyite techniques of repression—rounding people up and
throwing them out of the country because you don’t like their political views, or just don’t like them
generally. That’s being done. That’s completely unconstitutional. I’m amazed he’s been getting away
with it. You know, when the Fifth Amendment, by the way, says nobody shall be deprived of due
process of law, it doesn’t restrict that to citizens.
#Pascal
Yeah, I mean, he establishes that in the way he interprets the Constitution. He says the Constitution
only applies to U.S. citizens, period. So everybody else, he claims, is outside its protection. The
Constitution doesn’t say that. Do we already have a verdict on this from the Supreme Court?
Because actually, these cases should be taken to the Supreme Court, right?
#David N. Gibbs
It should be, yes. It tends to take a long time to wind its way through the court system. They should
really expedite something like this, but they haven’t—at least not fully. So at some point, I’m sure it’ll
be declared unconstitutional, but that could take some time. And that’s one aspect. But another
aspect, which I think is much more pure McCarthyism, is the way the Democrats are acting—
accusing anybody, really. I mean, this is both parties, but mostly the Democrats—basically accusing
anyone who dissents on any aspect of the Russia issue, you know, the “Russian threat” as they see
it. Anybody who dissents on any aspect of U.S. aid to Ukraine is a Russian agent. And the Democrats
have also used that, I think, against Donald Trump, ironically, and have constantly accused him of
being a Russian agent.
That was true all along. I mean, in 2016, when Hillary Clinton debated Donald Trump, she said, “You’
re a puppet of Putin.” That’s pure McCarthyism—100% McCarthyism. It’s also obviously false,
because most of what Trump has done has been very harmful to Russia. So the idea that he’s a
puppet of Putin is manifestly false, but the Democrats still cling to it. There’s a very popular
television show host—I think she’s not really that well known in Europe or Asia, but she’s widely
viewed here—her name is Rachel Maddow. And she constantly talks, it seems almost 24 hours a day,
about the Russian threat and whether Donald Trump is an agent of Russia. Again, that’s
McCarthyism. So you have McCarthyism going—it’s everywhere now.
And evidently it’s in Europe as well. And I’d like to say, I mean, at first I— In law, there’s the idea of
equipoise, that basically both sides—neither side—comes off looking very good here. Let’s put it that
-- 3 of 23 --
way. Both are committed to the use of repression, essentially non-democratic means to get their
way. And that includes opponents of Trump who are using this McCarthyite cudgel as a way of
structuring debate and blocking any real, serious, adult discussion of what’s going on in Ukraine right
now. Oh, you know, also, by the way—very important—that’s happening widely with regard to the
Middle East. Anybody who criticizes Israel faces major threats of being kicked out of school or losing
their job. I mean, that’s being done on a wide scale.
#Pascal
But if you accuse Donald Trump of being a puppet of Netanyahu, then you’re out of polite discourse,
and you’ll be called an anti-Semite—an anti-Semitism charge. It’s quite amazing, you know, that
when actual foreign leaders have influence—not control, but there clearly is influence, there clearly is
a lobby—that one is exempt from McCarthyite accusations, right? The real McCarthyism is always
about a boogeyman, about something that’s clearly not going on.
#David N. Gibbs
A boogeyman, that’s right. The whole idea of McCarthyism is basically wild exaggerations or
fabrications about a boogeyman. So clearly, Putin has been reduced to a boogeyman. And anti-
Semitism is being used in the most frivolous and preposterous ways. Being Jewish in no way
guarantees that you won’t be accused of that. That’s not a shield at all. A lot of the demonstrators
on campus against Israel’s policies in Gaza have been Jewish, and that hasn’t protected them from
retaliation.
#Pascal
What fascinates me—in the negative sense, I really hate that this is happening—is that all of this is
so well understood. I remember 20 years ago in my English classes in high school, we read this
wonderful book called *The Crucible*. I think it’s by a guy named Miller, right? It’s a very famous
book written during McCarthyism, the first McCarthyism in the 1950s, about the witch hunts in Salem
in the 1690s or thereabouts. This is so well documented and understood, and the processes are the
same, and now it’s repeating again. It’s like 400 or 500 years of the same mechanisms—designating
some groups of people as boogeymen and then as agents of Satan. The witches were agents of
Satan, right? In the ’50s, they were agents of the Soviets, and now they’re agents of Putin. It works
in the same psychological way, and even though we teach this stuff at universities and schools and
so on, we’re not getting out of it.
#David N. Gibbs
What you’re seeing is also an ideological switcheroo—or, as George Galloway put it, a kind of
political cross-dressing—in which McCarthyism had been confined pretty much to the political right,
mostly the Republican Party. And now it seems to be more common in the Democratic Party. Even
-- 4 of 23 --
much of the activist left is falling into line here. I have friends who are basically lefty friends, and
they condemn McCarthyism and talk about how horrible it is. And then they’ll say, “Yeah, but Donald
Trump clearly is working for Russia.” They don’t realize how—there was a group called the John
Birch Society, which, after McCarthy fell from favor, was an extreme right-wing group funded, I
think, by industrialist oil men in Texas. There was a lot of business support, but in the extreme ultra-
right, it was considered fringe.
It was very conspiracy-minded and accused everybody of being a communist and an agent of
Russia. So much of what the Democratic Party is saying today is almost exactly what the John Birch
Society was saying in an earlier period during the Cold War. And they don’t even realize how
discrediting that is to them, and how strong the parallel is. Now