Ukraine Falling Apart: Military Could Side With Ultra-Right Wing | Dr. Nicolai Petro

## A Fragile Political Order: The Risk of Military Alignment with the Far Right The interview surfaces a stark and unsettling scenario: Ukraine’s political system could unravel not only because of battlefield losses but through a domestic power seizure aided by armed ultranationalists and a compliant military. This is not a hypothetical scholastic exercise but a strategic danger rooted in the interaction of coercive groups and fragile institutions. The central worry expressed in the conversation is that if the civilian leadership ever judged surrender or compromise to be the only path to national survival, a militarized far right—willing to use violence against fellow citizens—might attempt to pre-empt that decision. If the armed forces sided with them, the result could be a coup that turns a war for territory into a civil catastrophe for Ukraine itself. This risk is distinct from the conventional image of foreign invasion. It attends to the internal distributive power of nonstate and semi-state actors who have been armed, legitimized, or tolerated during prolonged conflict. The danger is amplified where political authority has been weakened by years of emergency governance, polarized rhetoric, and the normalization of militias. The interview underscores a crucial point: stability in wartime requires more than battlefield success; it requires the state’s monopoly on coercion. In Ukraine’s case, that monopoly has been eroded by violent political constituencies whose leverage rests more on intimidation than on popular majorities. ## Russia, China, and the New Multipolarity A second major theme is the global realignment that has been catalyzed, not created, by the Ukraine war. The conversation emphasizes the longstanding view among many Russian, Chinese, and Global South strategists that momentum in world affairs is shifting away from a Western-centric order toward a genuinely multipolar system. The war did not reorient Russia’s partnerships so much as validate a trajectory that had already been underway: closer ties with China, India, and other emerging powers that provide economic depth and political cover. Dr. Nicolai Petro frames the Russo-Chinese relationship as synergistic and mutually reinforcing. Russia offers resources and geopolitical continuity; China supplies markets, investment, and technological reach. From this vantage, incentives to “pivot back” to former Western partners are weak. Promises made by Europe and the United States over recent decades—whether about security guarantees, trade integration, or political rapprochement—have often been perceived by Russian elites as intermittent at best and treacherous at worst. Those experiences shape Russia’s strategic calculus: why place faith in partners whose commitments have a history of erosion when others offer tangible, stable benefits? The larger implication is that Western hope for a rapid realignment of Russia away from China is likely misplaced. Economic interdependence, shared strategic interests in reducing Western hegemony, and mutual reinforcement through BRICS and other forums suggest an alliance durable at least across the current century. That does not preclude tactical cooperation with the West on specific issues, but it does caution against expecting a grand geopolitical reversal managed through diplomacy alone. ## Myths of Russian Subservience to China A recurring narrative in parts of the Western commentary imagines Russia as a junior partner—economically dwarfed and strategically subordinated to China. The conversation pushes back against this as a crude and historically lazy explanation. It dismisses appeals to ancient psychological traumas or simplistic size-based hierarchies, arguing instead that relationships among states are transactional and interest-driven. Dr. Petro’s intervention highlights a key empirical point: surveys of Russian public opinion show high favorable views of China, and the strategic logic of resource-for-manufactured-goods trade creates a genuine complementarity. The idea of Russian subservience also ignores the political sophistication and institutional memory embedded in Russia’s senior diplomatic and political cadre. These officials have decades of firsthand experience dealing with European and American leaders, which informs a skeptical posture toward Western inducements that have frequently been reversed or weaponized through sanctions and political pressure. The takeaway is twofold. First, geopolitics should be read through interest and capacity, not metaphors of cultural inferiority. Second, policy that assumes Moscow will naturally gravitate to Western comfort is likely to misread the durable incentives binding Russia to other rising powers. ## The Curated Information Space and Media Dynamics A further and arguably neglected battleground in the conflict is the information space. The discussion draws on media studies to explain why Western publics often receive a heavily curated version of events. In the United States and much of Western Europe, the mainstream press tends to mirror government-sourced narratives because of structural dependencies: official spokespeople are primary sources for reporters, and the rhythms of national policy shape the news agenda. This system produces a feedback loop in which national policy informs public perception, which in turn constrains political debate. It helps explain why certain historical grievances—such as broken diplomatic assurances around NATO expansion—remain marginal in mainstream Western discourse even when they are central to Russian argumentation. The curatorial logic of elite media also means that dissenting narratives struggle to gain traction unless they are picked up by correspondents with deep on-the-ground experience or by alternative platforms that bypass traditional gatekeepers. At the same time, the media ecology is not static. The erosion of a clear line between reporting and commentary, the concentration of outlets under owners with partisan instincts, and the rise of social platforms have complicated the manufacture of a single authoritative narrative. The result is a more contested information environment—one where official conditioning remains potent among elites, but counter-narratives can find dedicated audiences and sometimes influence broader debate. ## Social Media, Public Diplomacy, and the Multiplicity of Voices Linked to the media critique is an observation about how actors—state and nonstate—are exploiting new channels for public diplomacy. The interview points to examples where Russian officials have directly engaged influential social media figures and alternative commentators rather than traditional news outlets. This reflects an adaptive strategy: if mainstream Western media are closed or hostile, direct outreach to opinion leaders and niche communities can seed sympathetic frames and bypass editorial filters. The United States’ strong legal protections for speech complicate any effort to suppress such outreach domestically; Europe’s regulatory and political responses have been comparatively heavier-handed. Yet bans and platform restrictions are blunt tools. They can suppress some transmission but often drive audiences into echo chambers where narratives harden. The global information environment is therefore simultaneously more plural and more fragmented, elevating the stakes of narrative competition while dimming the prospects of a single authoritative interpretation. For the policy community, the lesson is practical: public diplomacy must be nimble and calibrated to multiple fora. Traditional elite-focused messaging remains important for shaping policymaker views, but targeted engagement with digital communities, influencers, and nontraditional interlocutors is now part of the contest for hearts and minds. ## The Internal Challenge: Armed Nationalists and the Future of Ukrainian Politics Finally, the conversation returns to domestic politics

Ukraine Falling Apart: Military Could Side With Ultra-Right Wing | Dr. Nicolai Petro [Part 2 of 2] There is a serious risk that even if the political establishment of Ukraine (Parliament and Government) came to the conclusion that only a surrender could save the country from complete annihilation, the ultra-right wing with its willingness to kill their own people, might be able to seize power if the army sides with them. That is a real fear that Professor Nicolai Petro expresses in this interview. Beyond this, we discuss the future of both Russia and Ukraine as the war is drawing to a close. I’m talking again to Dr. Nicolai Petro, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the magnificent book „The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy can teach us about conflict resolution“. #M3 Will the Ukrainian military stand with the elected government and validate its authority, or will it stand with the far right if groups on the far right make an effort to overturn the government in the interests of this kind of nationalistic vision of the country? I think this threat is not to be discarded. #M2 And this is a wonderful segue into the second part of this interview. And everybody, I'm still talking to Nicolai Petro, our analyst on everything Russia and Ukraine. You were just talking about how Russia is charting its own course in this multipolar world and how some of the analysis suggests that the current US approach might be trying to do basically a reverse of the China strategy of 1973, when Nixon was normalizing relations with China in order to drive a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. This might currently be the opposite of that, trying to normalize relations with Russia in order to drive a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. And you're saying this is unlikely to happen. Could you expand on that a little bit? Why do you think that the current trajectory of the multipolar setup that we are in is unlikely to incentivize Russia to go that route? #M3 Well, because Russian, Chinese, and other analysts from the Global South have been saying for more than a decade already that the momentum is with these other countries, the BRICS Plus countries. There are all sorts of economic and geopolitical examples and evidence of that. The Russia-Ukraine war has reinforced this assessment. It didn't change that calculation on Russia's part, but what it did was reinforce the correctness of that assessment, and it has confirmed Russia's ability to rely on China, India, Vietnam, and other countries as partners in any confrontation that Russia might have, large or small, with Europe and the United States. -- 1 of 10 -- So, in essence, why would you turn your back on reliable partners and return to your former partners who have betrayed you time and again? There's no incentive. Plus, these newer partners are only becoming more and more influential; they're becoming stronger in their own right. And Russia, again, I think of Russia and China in particular as having a beautiful economic and political synergy. China has a growing population and economy; it needs resources. Russia has those resources to provide and, in return, has allowed China to become a major player in its domestic markets. Again, this is sort of the way that international commerce, based largely on mutual profit, is supposed to work. And so I think there's an inescapable synergy to this relationship that nothing the United States could offer would encourage them to break. Now, if the United States wants to offer something in its own right that is attractive economically or politically, I'm sure Russia would consider it, but not at the expense of China. I think Russia and China are indeed a partnership and an alliance that is destined to last for quite a long time, at least in this century. #M2 Some people within the Western commentariat, who don't let any opportunity go to basically speak badly about both Russia and China, have made the case that with this development, Russia has become a junior partner to China. Being like one-tenth the population of China, with Russia at about 140 million and China at 1.3 or 1.4 billion, they argue that Russia is now inevitably going to be a satellite of China. This, to me, seems absolutely ridiculous, but what do you make of such arguments? #M3 Well, I would say two things. It's a play on some sort of collective psychosis, I think. There's an assumption that for deep historical reasons going back nearly a thousand years, the Russians fear the Mongols, and so we can derive current policies from that sort of deep psychological trauma. I think that's weak and implausible. As a matter of fact, if you look at surveys of countries that are viewed favorably by Russians today, China is at the top of the list. So, it's not at all clear what these analysts are talking about in those terms. In terms of being a junior partner, of course, that's exactly what the project of the EU was supposed to be in the 1990s with respect to Russia. Russia was a small country, a small economy that was going to be dominated by the much larger and wealthier EU economies, and they indeed explicitly were going to try to manipulate Russian political outcomes through this kind of economic investment and control. And the clincher on that was indeed the constant threat of application of sanctions, which has been going on. Again, I'll remind you, our listeners, there's never been a generation since the Korean War that has not imposed some sort of sanctions on Russia, either the United States or its junior partners in Europe. So that's the relationship. And again, the Chinese have stepped up and proven themselves to be -- 2 of 10 -- good friends, whereas the Europeans have historically not stepped up and never proven themselves to be reliable partners. And at some point, I think, or at least this generation of Russian leaders, therefore, doesn't look to Europe and its advice as reliable advice. #M2 I think that makes a lot of sense. I mean, especially if you think about the fact that the people in power at the moment are the ones who have been there for the last 20, 25 years. I mean, we've not had a lot of change in that. #M3 We cannot overlook the treasure house that Russia has in its senior political and diplomatic personnel. They have seen it all. They have dealt with every European leader over the last generation and every American leader, as well as with China. So, in a very real sense, they have the true measure of what the word of a European leader, an American leader, and a Chinese leader actually means with respect to Russia. They don't have to guess. They have personal experience with this, and I'm sure they will be guided by that first and foremost. #M2 Why do you think it is that analysts like you and I, and others on the Internet, are able to put this history together and actually pinpoint the moments when promises were clearly broken on all sides, when agreements were thrown out time and again, but this ability seems to lack or is intentionally kept away from a large part of the European and North American population? Why is it that these things, which are public knowledge and that Russia keeps pointing at and repeating, are not just ignored but talked down? Like when people like Jack Matlock remind others that, yes, there was a NATO promise, a promise that this situation wouldn't be weaponized against Russia, and that this was immediately and repeatedly broken. How is it that this realization hasn't set in among the general public, at least in Europe and North America? #M3 There's a discipline in the social sciences called media studies, or media and communications at some colleges. One of the interesting aspects of the study of the media is who generates our information space, who manipulates it, and what the outcomes are. I've looked at this research. It's not very controversial. It's very consistent, especially with respect to the Western democracies, which are the ones that are mostly studied by media analysts. They all agree, at least in the United States, from the time of the Vietnam War, when the first attempt was made to understand how the American public's attitudes were changed, given the information they were provided over the course of the Vietnam War. -- 3 of 10 -- And the leading scholars, W. Lance Bennett at the University of Washington comes to mind, several scholars at the University of Missouri, they all agree that our information, the public's information, is curated. It's curated by the media elite. And this media elite doesn't invent its own narratives; it has its narratives handed to it by the government. So what happens, inevitably, is that a reporter and an editorial staff have to get their information as much as possible from the key sources of information, and that has to be the government. The government tells them what that information is. A minuscule number of media outlets today actually have foreign correspondents, people who live and work in a country for a long period of time and have a good association with a variety of people on the other side. All of that is partial and has a minimal influence compared to the overwhelming bullhorn that is the press spokesman of, in the case of the United States, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House. I mean, those are on the news every day, simply feeding the press the information that they want the press to cover. Historically, and Professor Bennett has pointed this out in the case of the Vietnam War, there is no criticism of the government's assertions. Because, again historically, the press has not seen itself as having the proper role to interpret what the government is conveying, because the government news is, in fact, the national policy, and the national policy has to be conveyed fully to the populace. This is why we have this distinction in the American press between reporting and commenting. And those are supposed to be very separate and completely distinct endeavors conducted by even different individuals in the same organization, with a firewall between them. But we live in a different media culture, a different media age now. For one thing, there is no more commentary versus reporting distinction. Secondly, editorial boards are no longer, by and large, striving to be detached from events. And one of the examples of this is that Jeff Bezos, the owner of the Washington Post, criticized. He said, my newspaper, the Washington Post, has always reliably endorsed the Democratic candidate, no matter what. And it is no longer, therefore, credibly impartial. Therefore, we will simply no longer conduct this kind of endorsement because it discredits us as a news organization. He has since come out with further pronouncements that many people in the Washington Post feel is an abdication of their journalistic rights. Their rights as journalists, I would say, are to tell people what to think, to educate, to illuminate the ignorant masses, and to reveal to them what is the proper role that they should be playing in the policies of the United States, which the media, the elite media, should be determining. All of this is crumbling now because of the impact of social media and the fact that Sergei Lavrov, certainly one of the preeminent diplomats of modern times for a major power, has gone out of his way to give an interview recently to three prominent bloggers rather than to a news outlet. This tells us about the shifting importance of the role of the media, which, in its own mind, is still trying to shape the narrative and to inform the way the public thinks about things, but is less and less successful in doing so. -- 4 of 10 -- #M2 Thank you very much for this assessment. The three bloggers are highly interesting because these bloggers are, of course, one of them is Judge Napolitano, who is a huge figure actually on YouTube. The other one is Larry Johnson. And the third