Mind Controlled Elites: Washington’s Cognitive War on Europe | Nel Bonilla

## The long arc of transatlantic elite networks A pattern of elite coordination that shapes European foreign policy did not appear overnight; it is the product of a century-long process of institution-building, socialization and strategic investment. The conversation with writer and researcher Nel Bonilla traces this evolution from informal post–World War I connections through the intensive network-building after World War II. The central insight is simple but consequential: what looks like the policy choices of sovereign states often reflects the cultivated preferences of an integrated transatlantic elite whose shared interests and training prefigure political outcomes. This elite was not assembled to be covert puppet-masters but to be insiders who reproduce a particular worldview—pro-American, anti-communist historically, and more recently aligned with certain institutional and corporate priorities—across generations and national borders. These networks emerged in specific historical contexts. Initially fashioned in London and the United States, their early goal was military-strategic coordination among like-minded governments and institutions. Over time, foundations, clubs, think tanks and fellowship programs converted a loose wartime alignment into a durable apparatus for shaping political leadership, financial strategy, media narratives and academic curricula. Far from being a shadowy conspiracy, the apparatus operates openly through named organizations and visible programs; its power lies in its ubiquity and institutional density rather than in secrecy. ## Mechanisms of socialization and power Understanding elite capture requires moving beyond metaphors of “puppetry” to the sociological mechanisms that produce conformity. The structures are diverse: philanthropic foundations (Ford, Rockefeller), party-linked foundations (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung), transatlantic friendship groups (Atlantikbrücke, American Council on Germany), policy-centric think tanks (Atlantic Council, Council on Foreign Relations), and annual fixtures like the Munich Security Conference. Together they form an ecosystem that recruits, trains and amplifies future leaders. These organizations deploy a consistent toolkit. Scholarships and study tours immerse promising individuals in American policy milieus; internships and secondments create professional ties between corporations, government and think tanks; conferences stage public rituals of consensus that normalize particular positions; and media funding elevates voices that legitimize the shared agenda. As Bonilla emphasizes, the result is not merely coordination among elites already aligned—it is active socialization: a process that shapes how people conceive of national interest, acceptable policy options and the proper instruments of statecraft. Two features are worth highlighting. First, the apparatus is multi-layered: some groups focus on financing and philanthropy, others on convening and intellectual machinery, and yet others on placement and career advancement. Second, the objective is ideological as much as strategic: historically anti-communist, the transatlantic project sought to ensure that political elites in allied countries internalized a set of principles—security through alliance, market-friendly economics, and deference to U.S. strategic leadership—rather than pursuing volatile or independent trajectories. ## Germany as a revealing case study Germany occupies an especially instructive role in this story because its reconstruction and integration into the Western bloc required deliberate elite reorientation. Atlantikbrücke, founded in the 1950s, exemplifies how transatlantic friendship organizations worked. Its founders—figures like Erich Warburg and Marion Denhoff—brought existing social capital and networks, enabling the organization to place German elites into American contexts and vice versa. The publicly avowed goal was reconciliation and partnership; the practical effect was to anchor the West German political class within a pro-American security orbit. The archival and biographical details Bonilla highlights are revealing. Atlantikbrücke and its U.S. counterparts sponsored study tours, media programs and scholarships designed to favor candidates and factions that would sustain West Germany’s alignment with NATO and the U.S. Even figures who later pursued more independent policies, like Willy Brandt, intersected with these networks at critical junctures—receiving support during local campaigns even if their later Ostpolitik indicated a distinct strategic orientation. That dynamic illustrates the networks’ dual capacity: they can help propel leaders into power while simultaneously delimiting the policy space those leaders can occupy if they wish to remain part of the elite ecosystem. The country’s recent political roster underscores continuity rather than rupture. Friedrich Merz’s prior leadership positions at BlackRock Germany and Atlantikbrücke show how corporate, financial and transatlantic institutions interlock. Likewise, figures like Sigmar Gabriel, Lars Klingbeil and Jakob Schloth reveal how representatives from across the party spectrum have been integrated into the same transatlantic educational and professional pathways. This cross-party penetration normalizes consensus positions around security spending, NATO commitments and industry-state alignments. ## Institutional depth and generational reproduction What makes the transatlantic model so resilient is its capacity to reproduce itself across generations and sectors. The network does not only absorb established elites; it recruits and grooms young actors long before they hold formal power. Internships, youth organizations (e.g., Junge Transatlantic), masters’ programs and early-career fellowships inject nascent politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs into the same experiential learning environment. These formative encounters are consequential: participants internalize a set of storylines and operational norms—how to think about threats, which alliances matter, how to talk about economic openness and military readiness. The revolving door between private sector roles and public office is another structural mechanism. Corporate boards, asset managers and defense-tech start-ups become nodes that circulate people and resources, aligning business interests with geopolitical aims. Bonilla’s examples—CEOs of tech companies building surveillance and drone capabilities, policy advisors trained in U.S. institutions, and ministers with private-sector tenures—show how states and markets are co-constituted within the same elite space. Philanthropic funding compounds that effect: private foundations underwrite think tanks and media projects that produce the intellectual scaffolding justifying particular policy trajectories, while also channeling subsidies and career opportunities to sympathetic actors. This institutional depth produces a feedback loop: organizations socialize individuals, those individuals advance into positions of political or economic influence, and they then sustain and expand the very organizations that socialized them. The outcome is a durable machinery of elite formation that makes alternative visions—especially those that question the strategic primacy of certain alliances or the allocation of public resources to defense—harder to achieve. ## Narrowing the political imagination: consensus manufacturing in practice One of the subtler consequences of dense transnational elite networks is the narrowing of what counts as plausible policy. The conversation surfaces how conferences and panels often function pedagogically: external think tanks and foreign experts “teach” domestic politicians what is expected of them, and public presentations double as informal examinations of adherence. Bonilla recounts episodes in which German politicians are effectively quizzed by Atlantic Council interlocutors about defense spending

Mind Controlled Elites: Washington���s Cognitive War on Europe Today I’m talking to Nel Bonilla, a writer and researcher, running the Substack “Worldliness: The Threads Connecting Geopolitics”. She recently wrote a highly interesting piece on “Elite Capture & European Self-Destruction” about the trans-atlantic networks that are in her assessment one of the main reasons for the brain-dead geopolitics coming from the Europeans at the moment. This is what we want to discuss today. Links: Nel’s Susbtack: https://themindness.substack.com Nel’s Twitter: https://x.com/noirnen Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com #F1 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Nel Bonilla, a writer and researcher running the Substack "Worldliness: The Threads Connecting Geopolitics." She recently wrote a highly interesting piece on elite capture and European self-destruction, about the transatlantic networks that are, in her assessment, one of the main reasons for the—well, I call it brain-dead geopolitics—coming from the Europeans at the moment. This is what we want to discuss today. So, Nel, welcome. #M2 Thank you for having me. I'm really glad you invited me, and thank you for your kind comments. #F1 Well, I read your Substack and it's just brilliant the way you laid it out. You kind of listed different elite networks and also how they were formed historically after the Second World War, and how we can see that they managed to integrate some of the elites currently running the European Union, including Mr. Merz and Ursula von der Leyen, and so on. And I wanted to discuss this with you. What is the most important thing we need to know about these networks, and which ones are we actually talking about? #M2 Okay. Well, I would say the most important thing to know about these networks is, on the one hand, they are not simply networks that just exist right now in the present and that current politicians are connected to, but that these networks actually are formed out of historical processes in specific historical contexts. In particular, in my article, I talked about how the transatlantic networks, in particular, formed out of or after World War II. I mean, they actually started after World War I and -- 1 of 15 -- even a bit before that. They started in London and the United Kingdom, and then in the USA. Their focus was to see how they could manage military strategic issues. In particular, I would say one important thing to know about this development is that it is about how elites, in particular, tried to manage foreign policy. And when I say elites, I mean the people who run, for example, the government and politics, but also corporations and banking. This started at the beginning of the 20th century. It was also about the strategic management of resources and power relations between nation-states. So I would say this is one of the important aspects of these networks. Another important aspect is that these networks are not just networks. They are about trying to find a way so that the different elites in different countries—specifically countries that are targeted to be elite, for example, those that the U.S. puts into its sphere of influence—are socialized into the worldview of the U.S. and its aims, not the aims or interests of their own nation-state or other nation-states, for example, in Europe, such as Germany, France, and so on. So that's a key function of these networks. And these networks have different organizations. Some organizations are about financing—let's say the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation—and other foundations are about creating informal networks. For example, in Germany, there's Atlantic Brücke, or the American-German Council in the US, which is about creating ties between Germany and the US. Others are about creating annual meetings and conferences that are supposed to create a consensus. And not only that, but also to find people who could be well suited to be in this or that corporation, or be channeled into this or that policy role. So they have different functions, different layers. But above all, it's about elite socialization, so that the aims of the US in particular—but I would say, since the elites of other countries are socialized into these networks, these interests become also their interests and goals. So this is the most important, in my opinion, aspect or aspects one needs to know. And I forgot the second question. #F1 I think it's quite important because what you're doing is not trying to establish the nefarious ways in which the puppet masters do their little spiel, but rather how the sociological mechanisms work— how you actually have an agreement between these different elites in the United States and in Europe, and how they jointly build an interest group that then exerts power over politics, business, and finance. And those interests can be quite separate from those of a large part of the population. But because they rise to the top—and especially because they're, I mean, "groomed" is maybe a bit of a strong word, but, you know, you have a lot of them, right? You have a lot, and you only need a few. It's kind of the Klaus Schwab approach, right? Klaus Schwab with his World Economic Forum, who proudly says that, oh, we have "our people" in every cabinet in Europe and North America, right? This kind of thing. But because it is so large, the chances that somebody who was socialized in these networks will swim to the top are quite high. Which ones are you looking at most, or were you looking at most deeply? Because you especially -- 2 of 15 -- looked at the connection between Germany and the United States, like the Marshall Fund, but also the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. You know, some of these things are actually state-affiliated... Because the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is basically the think tank arm of the CDU, of the Christian conservatives, right? And each party has one of these think tank arms. But the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung is also very transatlantic in that way. Can you maybe talk about this one a little bit? #M2 Yes. So the organizations I looked at are, for example, the ones that I would say are most important for the relations between German and US American elites. One of them is, for example, Atlantikbrücke, which was supposed to be a friendship network—in the sense that it was about establishing relations between Americans and Germans after World War II, so that Germans would accept, more or less, US hegemony. On the other hand, that US Americans would understand that Germans had changed and weren't the same as during World War II. So that was, or that is, the idea—the publicized idea. But what else can we say about it? Well, what I find interesting, and also mentioned in the article, is the founders. The founders, for example—one was Erich Warburg, who came from a banking dynasty in Germany. Then he went to the U.S. and made connections with other bankers there. And then there was another woman whose name was Marion Denhoff. She was a countess, and she had links or networks with George F. Kennan and also with Foreign Affairs or the Council on Foreign Relations in the US. What I find interesting, apart from the fact that these are well-connected people, is that they were not only well- connected, but also people who already had a good—how can you say it—role or position in Germany during World War II or before it, and then after it as well. They went to the US, made friendships, networks, and so on. What the US particularly sought, as well as the Germans who established such networks as Atlantikbrücke, was to find people who had not just the idea, but the ideology of anti-communism. One of the goals of the US was to make West Germany anti-communist, but also accepting of US leadership, so to speak. This is one of the interesting parts about, for example, Atlantikbrücke, which was founded in the 1950s. And what else can we say about it? Since it was founded, how did it go about achieving these aims of, for example, making sure that West Germany remained anti-communist? It was the same as how they were founded. What they did was set up meetings, study tours, scholarships in the US—things like that—with politicians, corporate leaders, financiers, etc., and make sure to persuade them about the, let's say, the benefits of US hegemony and ideas like these. This is how they, for example, tried to influence the SPD in Germany. In contrast to the CDU, the SPD was more of a leftist or workers' party. Atlantikbrücke, in tandem with their sister organization in the US, which is called the American Council on Germany, tried to influence the SPD through certain people. They always tried to find people who already had these inclinations. -- 3 of 15 -- For example, there were some early SPD members in the 1950s who went into exile in the US and then came back. It was such persons that, for example, Atlantikbrücke sought out, tried to support, and tried to amplify their voices in the media and similar ways. What I'm trying to say is that it was really about, on the one hand, networks, groups, and people, and on the other hand, it was also about individuals. They were trying to find them. For example, what's interesting—or what I found interesting—is that Willy Brandt was also supported by these transatlantic networks when he wanted to become mayor of Berlin. #F1 Oh, was he really? Okay. #M2 Yes, I was surprised too. And at least in that part of his political career, he was supported by these US-German networks that, how could you say—not propaganda, but who, well, tried to amplify his candidacy on radio stations, for example. They funded such programs. Another thing is when, for example, the funding came from the Ford Foundation or Rockefeller Foundation, which, if we think about it, are private interests or corporate interests—supposed philanthropy, but who are they? Nobody elected them. And still, they pour funds into such organizations that have very clear political aims. So this is interesting. #F1 So these institutions are also connected with each other, of course, and provide funding and opportunities—again, like the club meetings and so on. But Willy Brandt is surprising, because Brandt was, of course, later, when he became chancellor, the Ostpolitik guy. And he was basically pursuing an independent—or at least a less US-controlled—foreign policy. At least that's my impression of him, but maybe that's wrong. But he really tried to create more friendly connections, right? Also during the détente of the Cold War, which is not something I would straightforwardly connect with his immediate transatlantic narrative at the time. How do you assess that? #M2 Well, I would argue that the thing is, at least at the time—for example, during Willy Brandt's candidacy for mayor of Berlin—there was another candidate from the SPD who was, you could say, to the left of Willy Brandt, at least in terms of socioeconomic policy. This was also something that these transatlantic organizations tried to—not erase, but they wanted to avoid having such important parties as the SPD or CDU influenced by Marxist or Socialist ideas. So the other candidate was Wilhelm Ranke. So, at least in that part of his candidacy for Berlin, they tried to support Brandt. -- 4 of 15 -- Now, with Ostpolitik, I would say it is definitely, in my opinion, a clear sign that he had an independent streak in the way that he wanted to have diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe and aimed for sustainable peace in Europe, and so on. Yet at the same time, I do think he could maybe have done more, but he was maybe unable to—or not unable to, but there was this connection. And they tried again, maybe not through Willy Brandt himself, but through other party members, to influence things so that he didn't carry out a truly long-lasting peace project, so to speak. Okay, he started Ostpolitik, but he also needed to s