Politics of Collapse Has Begun: Kiev's Is Hiding THIS | Prof. Nicolai Petro

## Introduction The conversation captures a sobering diagnosis: the politics of collapse has already begun to shape Ukraine’s trajectory. What started as a fast-moving, headline-grabbing conflict has settled into a grinding war of attrition that is remaking strategy, institutions, and political identity. As the combatants adapt to each other’s innovations, the battlefield becomes a laboratory for new forms of violence—drones, precision strikes, and asymmetric tactics—that in turn feed back into decisions made in Kyiv, Moscow, and capitals across Europe. The stakes are not only territorial; they are existential for Ukraine’s polity and for the European security order. The exchange demonstrates how military facts on the ground and political incentives off it are increasingly reinforcing a single, brutal logic: prolong the fight until the other side breaks or until outside actors are willing and able to change the calculus. ## Wonder weapons and drone warfare A recurring theme in the discussion is the myth of the “wonder weapon”—the single technological breakthrough that will decisively tip the balance. That myth is perennial: every year produces a new promise of a game-changer that will make victory straightforward and relatively cheap. The conversation pushes back on that narrative. Innovation does matter: Ukraine’s early adaptation of commercial and improvised systems, and its political emphasis on technological solutions, are real contributions to its battlefield performance. Yet innovation begets counter-innovation. Once a capability proves effective, adversaries adapt tactics, defenses, and doctrine. The result is less of a breakthrough than a sequence of episodic advantage and reaction. Drones embody this dynamic. They have democratized aerial reconnaissance and strike capabilities in ways that neither side fully anticipated at the outset. Small systems can surveil and strike with speed and deniability; larger systems extend reach and lethality. But their proliferation creates fragility as well. Rapid detection and shoot-down technologies emerge to blunt drone effectiveness; logistical dependencies and manufacturing bottlenecks limit scaling; and the operational environment—weather, electronic warfare, air defenses—shapes real utility far more than marketing copy. The discussion points out the human factor too: mistakes happen. Public exhibits of drone technology, while politically useful for morale and fundraising, can become liabilities if they signal capabilities or expose concentrated assets to attack. The broader lesson is that technology amplifies, it does not replace, political will and strategic clarity. Sourcing weapons from abroad, or pinning hopes on next-generation systems, does not by itself reconcile mismatched objectives or solve the political problem of how to end a conflict without unacceptable costs. The “search for the magical weapon” is therefore not merely a technical project but a political one—one that shapes expectations, drives resource allocation, and can harden a society’s commitment to prolonged fighting. ## Ukraine’s political radicalization War radicalizes politics, and Ukraine is no exception. The political center that once included voices open to neutrality, accommodation, or negotiated settlement has been hollowed out by years of conflict and by the political dynamics of survival. The conversation highlights a pattern familiar from history: when a polity endures existential threat or large-scale defeat, moderation is discredited and extremes ascend. Officials and parties that earlier might have favored compromise or hedging are pushed aside by leaders and factions who argue that only total resistance will secure survival—or only total settlement will remove the threat. This transformation is reinforced by personnel churn at the top. Dismissals and reappointments within Kyiv’s security and defense apparatus signal not just tactical recalibration but deeper shifts in the political coalition. Leaders who emphasize innovation and Western integration face friction with those who prioritize a different mix of mobilization, central control, or political consolidation. In practice, wartime governance privileges those who promise demonstrable toughness, even at the cost of pluralism and checks on executive power. The consequence is a smaller political space for alternatives such as neutrality or a negotiated buffer state; these options simply lack champions with political traction. Moreover, European and American policies shape incentives inside Ukraine. When outside actors supply military hardware and political backing without enabling a credible political track toward settlement, they can unintentionally harden the domestic consensus for continued fighting. The war becomes not only a Ukrainian struggle with Russia but a proxy arena where external patrons derive strategic benefit—rearmament time for Europe, leverage against Moscow—creating perverse incentives against compromise. ## Could violence continue after a settlement? A settled border on paper would not guarantee an end to violence. The conversation underlines that settlements can produce new forms of contestation rather than closure. If a peace treaty leaves key grievances unresolved—political exclusion, demographic displacement, economic dislocation—then insurgency, sabotage, and localized clashes remain possible. The memory of a protracted, bitter conflict generates networks, capacities, and grievances that are difficult to demobilize swiftly. Three pathways stand out as plausible continuations of violence after an agreement. First, armed elements loyal to maximalist political objectives may reject settlements as insufficient and continue irregular warfare. These actors are often decentralized and hard to reintegrate. Second, state structures and services in contested areas may break down, leaving power vacuums exploited by criminalized or paramilitary groups. Third, the external patronage that sustained the conflict might continue to support spoilers, either to preserve leverage or to punish perceived betrayals. In each scenario, the ostensible end of interstate hostilities can give way to low-intensity, ongoing instability that exacts a heavy toll on civilians and undermines reconstruction. Designing settlements that minimize these risks requires credible guarantees—robust monitoring, economic incentives for demobilization, inclusive political institutions that can absorb rival elites, and third-party guarantees that are themselves politically sustainable. Yet the conversation pessimistically notes that major Western actors have shown little appetite for the kind of sustained, patient diplomacy and deployment of political capital that such comprehensive peacebuilding would demand. Without that investment, even a formally negotiated settlement could breed chronic violence. ## Putin, military planning, and political control Understanding Russian strategy requires moving beyond the caricature of brinkmanship to observe a more cautious, methodical logic. The conversation suggests that Russia is pursuing a calibrated war of attrition aligned with narrowly defined objectives. Russian planning appears centered on enshrining gains that secure the western approaches to its borders: control of key regions in Donbas and the recognition of Crimea. That does not mean that broader ambitions are absent, but public rhetoric and institutional behavior indicate a preference for incremental consolidation rather than sudden, wide-ranging escalation. This strategy is informed by political constraints at home. Mobilization carries acute social and political risks; economic reorientation to a full-war footing is costly and politically fraught. Consequently, the Kremlin primes its policies to balance military effectiveness with domestic stability. When costs rise, the political calculus can shift toward greater repression or a harder line, but the default is to avoi

Politics of Collapse Has Begun: Kiev's Is Hiding THIS | Prof. Nicolai Petro While the Titanic is sinking, its captain is rearranging the chairs on the deck. No number of burning warehouses in Russia can hide anymore that something very crucial broke in Kiev. Nicolai Petro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode Island and author of The Tragedy of Ukraine, joins Pascal to discuss Russia’s war strategy, strikes on Odesa, drones, and the search for game-changing weapons. They examine Europe’s role, Ukraine’s political future, postwar radicalization, outside influence, possible insurgency, and Zelensky’s leadership changes. Links: Nicolai Petro’s Website: https://npetro.net Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack. com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:16 The war situation and Odesa strikes 00:08:06 Wonder weapons and drone warfare 00:16:22 Russia’s war aims and strategy 00:28:22 Ukraine’s political radicalization 00:36:36 Western influence after the war 00:41:38 Could violence continue after a settlement? 00:49:14 Zelensky’s leadership changes 00:59:17 Putin, military planning, and political control #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today again with the always brilliant Dr. Nicolai Petro, professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island and the author of the wonderful book, The Tragedy of Ukraine: What Classical Greek Tragedy Can Teach Us About Conflict. Nicolai, welcome back. Thank you, Pascal. Nice to see you again. Nice seeing you too. You're one of the people who has a very deep understanding of the internal workings of Ukraine, since you wrote many books and articles about political processes there. And we will talk about the changing personnel situation in the latter part. But I wanted to begin actually with what's happening around Odessa, these Russian strikes on Odessa and the increased warfare that is now happening also through direct bombings and the near consolidation of the Donbas region under Russia. What is your reading of where the war is between Ukraine and Russia, the direct fighting of these two armies, four and a half years after the beginning of the SMO? #Nicolai Petro Well, the war of attrition is continuing. Russia's strategy, it believes, is working and allowing it to move forward at a consistent pace. But the reason for the slowness is, of course, Ukrainian resistance, but also the fact that Russia is simultaneously consolidating behind itself, something that Ukraine spent eight years doing between 2014 and 2022, building up these four fortress cities that Russia is now apparently systematically dismantling. And that, according to several analysts, formed -- 1 of 14 -- the last significant line of defense in Donbas, and really for the rest of the path to the Dnieper River. So the idea was to build around Konstantinovka and northward to make these bridges impregnable fortresses. But these fortresses in the past, like Bakhmut and others, have fallen. And so now that process is underway in the Donetsk region. And once that is done, once those are consolidated under Russian control. And that's the thing. It's a movement forward, then a consolidation at the same time. So those two things, I think, understandably take longer than just a direct frontal assault, which I think no one advises at this point, given the new nature of warfare with drones that can see and attack in a few minutes, as we now know, once the target is identified. So that strategy is continuing. You ask about Odessa. I would say I'm not sure there is any novelty in the strategy toward Odessa. I think Russian strategy intends to underscore that there is no safe haven in Ukraine—not in Lviv, not in Kiev even, not in Uzhgorod, not in the West, not in the South, not in the North. And as a result. #Nicolai Petro Russia wants not a ceasefire along the line of demarcation, but it wants a peace treaty. Because without a peace treaty, the fighting will continue, and replenishment and refurbishment of equipment, etc., all of this will occur in other regions that are then safe from attack. The whole point of the war is to ensure that Ukraine understands there is nowhere from which it can safely attack Russia. But we have had attacks, and this is now one of the novelties that we keep encountering in this war: new strategies, new weaponry, new responses to the weaponry. And this is, I hate to say it, a vicious cycle. Vicious in the sense that there is no good reason for warfare and for killing people, I think, at least. But there is a learning process that is underway. And I like to point out to my Western colleagues, especially those who are eager to point out Ukraine's successes in the war, particularly in the areas of technology, which is something that was one of the calling cards of the recently dismissed Minister of Defense, Fedorov. He was sort of an innovation guru. #Pascal But innovation only lasts so long. #Nicolai Petro There's innovation, then there's the reaction of the opponent, which then needs to be countered in turn with different strategies, different innovations. So there is no one magical weapon that will give a decisive advantage to any side of the conflict. I think Russia understands that. At least I don't see anyone on the Russian side, in analysis or in the government or in the military, saying, "Ah, we now have a weapon that makes us invincible." On the other hand, the West and Ukraine are still looking for this mythical solution to their problems. And I think that will fail and is one of the reasons why -- 2 of 14 -- the entire strategy, to the extent that it is built on the hope of finding a magical weapon, ultimately is not realistic in its expectations. #Pascal That's a very good point. There have been talks about these wonder weapons for, like, every year. They keep popping up again and again. It's a game changer. The idea of a game changer is recurring. It's quite interesting how this war is basically a narrative, also a narrative invention of the West in a lot of ways. But I would rather ask you: Vladimir Brovkin, on my channel, made the point that, to him, the strategy of the Russians rather is one of hide your strength and bide your time, also trying to learn from the ways of attacks that are coming, often how to defend against them. So kind of absorb and do not change the strategy, which is military victory on the battlefield. Do not be baited into actually counterattacking Europe or, you know, with all of these attacks that are going on on the Russian heartland, including now Wildberries and other civilian infrastructure. What is your reading here? Also considering that the Russians seem to try to answer any kind of, I guess, unexpected attack that's coming from Ukraine, and that these wonder weapons also seem to somehow influence and make the Ukrainians feel very confident, at least the leadership. Over the weekend, we've had a large drone fair, a drone fair in Kyiv, and the Russians unsurprisingly bombed it. It seems just such a dumb thing to do. Yet, is it part of, like, this feeling of, oh, now everything is changing because of the weaponry? #Nicolai Petro No, I think that's just human stupidity and error. Because President Zelensky identified it as such, and the prosecutor general of Ukraine has begun an investigation for, the term would be, lack of attention to duty, lack of properly taking responsibility, taking proper responsibility for what you needed to be responsible for. So that was just foolishness in the industry. But to get back to Professor Brovkin's point, that makes sense from a military vantage point. But wars—no war can be analyzed purely from a military perspective. And this war is no different. A war has a military component, a political component, a psychological component, and an economic component. Now, people with their distinctive expertises, for example, a general versus a macroeconomist, would each emphasize the importance of their perspective. And they offer their advice. Ultimately, the commander-in-chief, the president, has to make the balancing decision and say, well, because of the economic impact, we must change our military strategy. Even if it's successful, it's not as successful compared to the losses that we are incurring in the economy. For example, and in terms of arguing whether the current strategy favors Ukraine or favors Russia, it's very much that sense of perspective. Ukraine's strategy has always been rather transparent, I think. They have, as I understand it, the analysts who speak most directly to this and not as spokesmen for the regime, -- 3 of 14 -- they say, we understand, given the discrepancy in size, resources, and money, that Ukraine cannot win a direct battle with Russia, a direct military confrontation. That's why that's not the strategy. The Ukraine strategy is to involve the West, hopefully directly. In other words, send troops so that this becomes a Western crusade on behalf of Ukraine, which Ukraine will assist in and be at the forefront of. But since we cannot successfully defeat Russia, but we are confident that Ukraine and the West together can, therefore the strategy has to be to involve the West directly in the battle, in the prosecution of the battle. And a series of Western leaders have tried to avoid that while getting all the benefits that it could from this bloodshed between Ukrainians and Russians. The upside for Europe is that Russia, militarily and hopefully economically, is weakened by this bloodletting and will be in a less prepared position to take advantage should the war end. Hopefully. And most importantly, that by drawing out the bloodletting, Europe's strategy is to give itself time to rearm. So the strategy is, until 2030, we will spend all this money, we will refurbish our militaries, and then it's not quite clear what the strategy will be. But in either case, Europe will have options because it will be strong enough to defend itself, and perhaps even strong enough to become directly involved in the battle in Ukraine if it chooses to do so, which it is not currently able to do because they don't have the manpower, they don't have the training, they don't have the logistics equipment, and they're simply not prepared. So Ukraine is doing a great service to Europe by dying in large numbers, but for the benefit of Europe, essentially. At least that's why Europe applauds and, I would say, is supportive of this war. Simple illustration of this: there is no negotiation. There's no interest in negotiation in Europe. There is no negotiator. There's not even talk. I mean, there's speculation about maybe having—but as opposed to 21 packets of sanctions, not a single designated negotiator in all these years on the part of Europe. So there is no interest, obviously, on the part of Europe. There is, however, interest in wrapping up the military preparedness. Yeah. #Pascal Yeah. So because if there was a serious interest in actually winding it down, then at least we would see some political process on whatever level to get some negotiations going. But we don't see any of that. So the idea is still to prolong the war because the war ultimately benefits this part. #Nicolai Petro And I remembered the point that I wanted—that you were asking about—that I was making about different perceptions. So that's the Ukrainian rationale or vision of military success. Russia's vision of military success, I believe, is, or has been to date, more modest. Because Putin has said, "Our objectives are the liberation of the four oblasts plus Crimea." That's it. That's it. In preparation for the Istanbul negotiations of April 2022, Russia would have been satisfied with Donetsk, Luhansk, and -- 4 of 14 -- Crimea when those negotiations were upended by the West and Boris Johnson intervened, saying, "We're behind you. Let's fight," which is st