🚨 Most DANGEROUS Phase Of Iran War Has Just Begun | Prof. S. M. Marandi

## Introduction and situation in Tehran A dangerous new chapter in the wider Middle Eastern confrontation has opened, one whose repercussions will not be confined to battlefields but will ripple through global energy markets, shipping lanes, and food supplies. The conversation from Tehran paints a picture of a conflict that has passed beyond limited strikes and symbolic blows: it is intensifying, geographically widening, and entering a phase in which miscalculation could precipitate systemic economic shock. The exchange conveys that daily life in Tehran may appear ordinary—builders at work, people going about their routines—but beneath the surface a strategic leverage contest is unfolding, with the Strait of Hormuz at its center and the prospect of deliberate attacks on critical infrastructure looming over the calculus of all actors. The speakers report that despite ongoing strikes across the Persian Gulf region, urban centers such as Tehran have not yet been directly targeted in sustained bombardment; sensors and anti-aircraft actions have intermittently punctuated the calm. Yet what matters is not whether a city feels the strikes today but how regional control and deterrence are being reconfigured. Iran’s control over the Strait is no longer hypothetical: its operational posture and the recent history of the MOU have made the waterway a focal point of leverage. That leverage is what kept a previous round of conflict from spiraling into continuous, catastrophic bombardment—and relinquishing it now would invite a different, far uglier dynamic. ## Yemen, energy and global economic risks The conversation makes clear that one of the conflict’s most devastating aftershocks will be economic rather than strictly military. Attacks in the Red Sea, strikes on tankers by Yemeni forces, and the partial closure of the Strait of Hormuz together create shortages that ripple across commodity chains. The immediate consequence is rising oil prices, but that is only the most visible symptom. Petrochemicals, refined products, and inputs used in global agriculture—fertilizers chief among them—are also at risk. A shortage of heavy crude, which supplies diesel, can choke transportation and agricultural inputs worldwide. Diesel shortages, the speakers warn, are the kind of constraint that can grind entire economies. The scale of the possible disruption is underappreciated, according to the exchange. Even temporary disruptions can launch protracted effects: fertilizer shortages next planting season, compromised shipping insurance that raises costs for trade in non-energy commodities, and sustained price inflation leading into recession. One scenario sketched by the speakers is a slide from recession into depression if energy and trade chokepoints remain unresolved. Another, less severe, trajectory would see gradual normalization over years, provided the conflict de-escalates without critical-infrastructure attacks that would force mass displacement in Gulf countries and permanently damage production capacity. An important nuance raised in the conversation is that Iran’s actions are not motivated by a desire to wreck global markets but by constrained strategic choices. Iran faces a calculus: using the Strait as a blunt on/off instrument would inflict maximum pain but also hit friendly partners and allies whose economies Tehran prefers not to cripple. Hence the corridor approach—functioning like a faucet rather than a simple switch—seeking to preserve passage for designated vessels while denying it to those seen as complicit in the aggression. That selective interdiction, however, is messy in practice. Insurance rates, company risk aversion, and the physical danger posed by missiles and drones mean even an “open” Iranian corridor will carry far fewer ships than normal, with real costs for global trade and food security. ## Gulf states, diplomacy and escalation The role of the Gulf monarchies is presented as pivotal and paradoxical. Some of these states have maintained diplomatic channels with Iran; others are aligned closely with the United States. Delegations, back-channel messages, and occasional formal contact have continued even as military exchanges intensify. But these are episodic, fragile, and frequently undermined by external pressures. The conversation suggests that while delegations sometimes travel and discussions happen, the Gulf states have been constrained by security dependencies and the presence of foreign forces on their soil. This mixed posture makes them both targets and enablers. Several Gulf countries have permitted or hosted US assets that Iranian forces are now striking; in response, Iran has indicated it will target those facilities and infrastructure that aid the American military effort. The speakers underline a stark asymmetry: Gulf states are vulnerable economically and demographically. Many have concentrated infrastructure along coastlines and limited domestic resource diversity; losing electricity grids or major hydrocarbon installations would produce immediate humanitarian and displacement crises. Iran recognizes this vulnerability, which amplifies the stakes of any campaign targeting critical infrastructure. The calculus for Gulf capitals, then, is bitterly practical—balancing the short-term security guarantees provided by outside military presence against the existential risk of becoming battlefields themselves. Diplomacy remains possible but tenuous. There are persistent informal contacts and occasional efforts to avoid direct confrontation, yet the conversation signals that these efforts are strained by both domestic politics in Gulf capitals and pressure from external patrons. If Gulf states were to decisively pivot toward reducing the American military footprint or negotiating limitations on US operations, pressure on Washington would mount—and the trajectory of escalation could change. Until such a pivot happens, the risk remains that incremental escalation will continue, widening the conflict and heightening economic spillovers. ## Why Iran is not striking Israel directly A key question addressed in the exchange is why Iranian retaliation has largely targeted US assets and Gulf-based hosts rather than conducting direct strikes against Israel. The answer offered is strategic restraint rooted in both practical and political considerations. Iran appears to prioritize degrading American regional capabilities and the network of local bases that enable operations against it. Striking Israel directly would open different, highly asymmetric risks and would likely not further Iran’s immediate objective of eroding the US military posture in the Gulf. Another dimension is proportionality and reprisal logic. Iran’s messaging, as conveyed in the conversation, is deterrence-oriented: responses have been framed as countermeasures against those facilitating the attack—primarily US forces and bases in neighboring countries. There is also a view that escalation against Israel could trigger broader conflagration, drawing in actors in ways that would not necessarily advance Iran’s strategic aims. This does not mean the option is absent; the participants stress that Iran retains long-range capabilities and relationships with non-state actors in the Levant, but for now the focus is on targets that present the clearest direct connection to US power projection. Finally, there is a reputational and political calculation. Iran wants to present itself as a state defending its sovereign rights and regional security against foreign intervention. Attacking Israel could be framed by opponents as an offensive expansion, rather than a response to external attacks facilitated by American logistics and bases. That narrative advantage matters in diplomatic and soft-power terms, especially when Iran is seeking to shape the parameters of any future settlement that would expand beyond the earlier MOU to include issues like the siege on Yemen and the situation

Most DANGEROUS Phase Of Iran War Has Just Begun | Prof. S. M. Marandi Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi joins Pascal Lottaz to discuss the reported war around Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on US bases, and growing pressure on Gulf states. They examine the risks to energy, trade, food supplies, and the global economy, as well as Iran’s ties with China and Russia. Marandi also argues that US policy is driven by failed assumptions and lacks a clear plan. Links: Seyed Mohammad Marandi on X: https://x.com/s_m_marandi Seyed Mohammad Marandi on Telegram: https://t.me/s_m_marandi Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and situation in Tehran 00:02:24 Hormuz and the end of negotiations 00:08:28 Yemen, energy and global economic risks 00:13:04 Iran’s shipping corridor in Hormuz 00:17:05 Gulf states, diplomacy and escalation 00:19:34 US options and critical infrastructure 00:24:25 Why Iran is not striking Israel directly 00:29:16 China, Russia and Iran’s war economy 00:35:46 Does the US have a strategy? 00:43:44 How long can the war continue? 00:47: 33 Where to follow Marandi and recommended books #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies today for an update from Tehran with our friend and colleague, Professor Saeed Mohammad Marandi. Saeed, welcome back. #Marandi Thank you very much for having me. It's always a great pleasure being with you. #Pascal Thank you very much for giving us these updates. They are very important because last time we spoke, actually, we weren't quite certain if the United States was serious in really going into a third round of the war, basically. It seemed a little bit early for that one, but it seems they've decided to do that. You've been under bombardment again in Iran for the last, I think, now almost 10 days. Thank you very much. #Marandi Yes, this time around they have not touched the internet connection, and therefore we don't have the sort of problems that we had during the 40-day war during Ramadan. But in general, if you go about Tehran, everything is normal. They haven't yet bombed the city of Tehran, although a drone -- 1 of 14 -- was downed over the city a couple of nights ago. And the fighting, although it's been going on for, I think, around 12 days now, it is quite intense in different areas in the Persian Gulf region, on both sides of the Persian Gulf and in Jordan. But so far, except for anti-aircraft fire a couple of nights ago in Tehran, we haven't felt anything here. So people go around their daily lives. There is an apartment building being built next door to where I am. I don't know if your listeners can hear it, but it's just normal builders building their buildings. Right now, though, we are entering a very sensitive time, as you know. Although Trump is never predictable, we can never say he's going to do anything for certain. Just like before, we felt that there's a high possibility that he would attack, but no one could say for certain because Trump is Trump. And now, since Trump has threatened to destroy Iranian territory, electrical power plants, and bridges, the war could escalate very suddenly and very badly for the global economy. But then again, we don't know if Trump will, as they say, TACO, or whether he will carry out these attacks, because he said that if Iran strikes any ships in the Strait of Hormuz, he'll start targeting bridges and power plants. But the Iranians have said that they will target any ships that disobey the Iranian naval commands. And in accordance with Article 5 of the MOU between Iran and the United States, the Strait of Hormuz was to be under the control of Iran. And the reason, of course, is obvious. That is what prevents the United States from assaulting and destroying Iran: Iran's control over that key waterway. We all remember, and I'm just going over what we all know, that before this war, Iran had no intention of controlling the Strait of Hormuz. I, in my adult life, I don't remember anyone ever even speaking about such a scenario in public. Of course, in private, it's now become clear that if this war was waged against us, Iran would move to shut the Strait of Hormuz and control it. But under normal circumstances, that wasn't the plan, and that wasn't anything that was discussed in the public sphere. So everything was normal back then. Then, when the war started, what prevented the United States from doing much greater harm was the fact that Iran took control of the Strait. That put enormous pressure on Trump and the U.S. economy. And that forced him to end the war and ultimately sign the MOU. So Iran is not going to allow the United States to undermine that leverage, because if that leverage is undermined, then the United States will bomb Iran day and night, destroy all of its electrical power plants, and know that it can get away with it. #Pascal So it seems to me that from Iran, we've heard a lot of comments, especially on Twitter from Mr. Arafati and others, that they consider the MOU as dead. It's gone, it's over, and that Iran will now work on implementing militarily what they were trying to do with the MOU diplomatically, which is expelling the United States completely from the region. And they won't entertain the thought of more negotiations again. Where are we on that end? Has Iran's patience now been used up and the -- 2 of 14 -- decision been made, okay, this is going to be a military solution? We'll keep pounding the American bases and whatnot, and in the end, we will degrade the ability of the United States to strike us in the first place. Is that where we are going? #Marandi Yes, for the time being, the Iranians are not interested in negotiations at all. And they are focused on destroying U.S. assets across the region, but now increasingly in Jordan and to the west of Saudi Arabia. Under heavy daily strikes, 24 hours a day, U.S. bases in Kuwait and Bahrain in particular are— the Americans have been forced to withdraw many of their assets, especially those that deal with the air campaign, and take them to Jordan and bases in Saudi Arabia to the west of the country. And then, I think probably to the U.S. surprise, the Iranians have begun striking those bases deep inside Saudi Arabia and in Jordan with devastating results. And we're seeing many of the satellite images of the bases being badly damaged. So the United States is now even thinking about going further away from Iran's border. So right now Iran is not interested. And ultimately, when there is an opportunity to bring about an end to the fighting, I think that the Iranian demands are going to be different from the MOU. They will probably demand certain things in advance. And I would assume that their demands would expand. And among them would definitely be the siege on Yemen—that must come to an end—and the situation in Gaza. Even though these two were in the MOU, they weren't named directly. They were alluded to. But in future, Iran, whatever happens to bring about an end to the fighting, the Iranian demands will be substantially different and broader. And Iran will be more demanding than during the MOU negotiations. Yeah. #Pascal Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on neutralitystudies.com. Links below. See you there. I mean, the way that this entire process is going, it seems to me that the war, or warfare, is just widening. It's just spreading. Yemen is now reportedly blocking their strait. I was mispronouncing, but I'll... And the Saudis now got apparently an agreement with the Americans that they can enrich uranium, which is bizarre at this moment. And the bases, the U.S. bases that are now hit in Jordan. And we've got now news that Jordanian public society is actually demanding that Jordan abolish its agreement with the United States for stationing troops. At the same time, Israel is still working its warfare with Lebanon. So, I mean, it seems to be gradually morphing into an old West Asian kind of war theater. How are you seeing that, especially about Yemen and Jordan? #Marandi -- 3 of 14 -- Oh, absolutely. Yemen has struck two Saudi tankers. And, of course, tankers are not going through the Bab el-Mandeb. And this, as we all know, comes as the Strait of Hormuz is closed. And thus the price of oil is going up. And, you know, one of the things that we are always focused on is the price of oil. But all sorts of other products that come from the Persian Gulf, the petrochemicals, which of course include helium alongside them, and even refined oil—all of these are now, their shortages are growing. And even agriculture across the world is going to be badly affected next year because of the shortages in this part of the world. So a lot of the harm that's coming people's way across the world is not quite visible yet to us. In other words, the long-term impact is growing, and it's very broad and extensive. But we're only focused on the oil shortage, which itself is extremely important, because heavy crude is used for diesel, and diesel is what makes the global economy turn. Light crude cannot replace diesel, or heavy crude, and so this is extraordinarily bad for the global economy. And if things continue as they are, I think we're heading for a global economic depression if this lasts for long. Or, if the United States carries out its threat to strike Iranian critical infrastructure, Iran will destroy the critical infrastructure of those countries that are assisting the United States, meaning Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the Emirates, and perhaps Oman because of their recent actions. And so if that happens, these countries will fall apart because they're just deserts for the most part, and they only have oil and gas. So 30 million people, perhaps more, will have to evacuate these countries. And Iran doesn't want to do this. Iran didn't start the war. Iran didn't escalate. But these countries are partners in crime. They're partners in this war. So if that happens, then the shortages will be permanent, and I think it will create an enormous shock in the market, which will almost immediately lead us to a global economic meltdown and an economic depression worse than the 1930s. Whatever happens, Pascal, it's going to get worse. But in some scenarios, it gets worse more slowly. In some scenarios, it gets worse very swiftly. In some scenarios, it can be reversed after a few years. In some scenarios, it will take maybe decades. #Pascal In the last discussion we had, we kind of came to the point, or to the conclusion, that from now on, Iran wouldn't just treat the Strait of Hormuz as, like, a binary on and off. It's not a switch anymore. It's more like a faucet, where Iran then decides, okay, which ships can go through, especially the ones that actually announce themselves and ask for permission to pass. There's now a Strait Authority that Iran set up. Is that still active at the moment? Because Iran then has this issue, right? On the one hand, a complete blockade and impact on the world price of crude is something that works as leverage. On the other hand, Iran, I suppose, would rather want not to damage the economies of its own friends, right? Especially the Chinese economy. But there's other countries as -- 4 of 14 -- well. I know that Iran and Japan have a passable relationship, actually, and at least in the past, they haven't had bad blood. So is it still possible for some ships to go through? And is Iran there using— what approach is Iran using for this? #Marandi Well, I can't say for certain what is happening right now in the Strait of Hormuz. I haven't been asking. But I've heard from two or three different people that a number of ships have been passing through daily through the Iranian corri