US Naval Seizures In The Caribbean Are Only The Beginning | Amb. Chas Freeman

## Warfare on the High Seas & Breakdown of Norms The recent seizure of an oil tanker off Venezuela’s coast, discussed at length in the conversation with Ambassador Chas Freeman, is less an isolated law‑enforcement action than a symptom: the fraying of the legal and normative fabric that once governed interstate behavior on the oceans. Historically, the high seas were subject to rules designed to keep commerce open and protect neutral rights. What we are witnessing now — unilateral seizures justified by domestic sanctions, attacks on commercial tankers by state or proxy actors, and the selective invocation of maritime law — represents a return to an older, more violent era in which might and political convenience trumped broadly accepted legal restraints. Freeman’s argument is blunt: unilateral sanctions do not confer authority under international law to seize ships or confiscate cargo. When a great power treats its domestic legal orders as if they had global enforcement power, it corrodes the very norms that sustain predictable maritime commerce. Worse, when naval forces employ lethal force against suspected smugglers without transparent evidence or due process, those actions verge on criminality under established wartime and peacetime rules. The reluctance of mainstream media to interrogate the legal basis of such actions further normalizes behaviors that should be contested in public and diplomatic fora. Beyond legality, there is a strategic hazard. Naval seizures, drone strikes on commercial vessels, or the targeting of “shadow fleets” quickly expand the zone of conflict. What began as targeted pressure tactics can cascade into retaliation, convoying and private protection arrangements, and ultimately the militarization of sea routes that must remain international commons. The longer these precedents go unchallenged, the more likely the oceans will become an ever-more dangerous arena where the rulebook is improvised by the most powerful actors. ## US Strategy in Europe & The Decline of Diplomacy The conversation paints a picture of American policy that has grown increasingly transactional and performative toward Europe. Official documents that are titled “national strategies” read less like integrated plans and more like proclamations of American prerogatives — a Trump‑tinged Monroe Doctrine that insists on hemispheric immunity to European influence while demanding European backing for U.S. priorities elsewhere. This inversion is both provocative and unsustainable: allies expected to be junior partners in a geopolitical fashion show are unlikely to be dependable over the long term. Freeman also stresses the institutional decline behind the rhetoric. Where diplomacy once relied on professional cadres versed in patient negotiation and complex tradeoffs, much of contemporary foreign policy is replaced by political theater. High-profile photo‑op peace declarations, the insistence on primacy in NATO command structures, and congressional moves that limit presidential flexibility all reflect a preference for showy gestures over substantive negotiations. The result is strategic incoherence: rhetoric about de‑escalation sits beside policies that harden military postures and outlaw pragmatic bargaining. Europe’s response is telling — not only for its acquiescence at times, but for the deeper vulnerability the region displays in technology and energy. With critical supply chains and scientific leadership shifting eastward, European elites appear surprisingly passive, often adopting policies that undercut their economic resilience. The conversation’s portrayal of European politics is not merely a critique of leadership but a warning that diplomatic capacity has atrophied just when it is most needed. ## India, Russia, and "Political Theater" in Peace Deals A recurring theme is the proliferation of theatrical “peace” initiatives that substitute public spectacle for real negotiation. The conversation highlights how high‑visibility agreements between adversaries are often hollow: they paper over grievances without addressing root causes, leaving the parties to re‑engage in violence when the cameras leave. Such short‑term optics may garner praise and political capital, but they rarely produce lasting stability. This problem is particularly evident where great powers try to take credit for outcomes best solved by patient, multilayered negotiation. India’s sensitivities provide a case in point: New Delhi regards its disputes with Pakistan as bilateral matters. External actors boasting about brokering peace can inadvertently insult the parties and undermine local modalities for resolution. Similarly, the role of informal intermediaries — business figures, political cronies — as intermediaries in high‑stakes diplomacy is criticized in the conversation as an inadequate substitute for professional, well‑resourced foreign services. Freeman’s observation that diplomacy has been hollowed out resonates here: negotiating durable settlements requires expert mediators, detailed working groups, and sustained engagement on security guarantees, minority rights, resource sharing, and reconstruction. Where these elements are absent, ceasefires and public ceremonies become fragile bandages rather than foundations for reconciliation. ## Japan-China Tensions: The "Existential Threat" Comment The exchange turns next to East Asia, where talk of existential threats heightens the risk of miscalculation. The conversation draws attention to the inflationary use of language — labeling inter-state rivalry as “existential” can become a self-fulfilling justification for escalatory measures. When leaders treat territorial disputes as matters of national survival, they constrain diplomatic flexibility and prime domestic audiences for mobilization and confrontation. Japan’s posture toward China, and the U.S. role in that dynamic, exemplify this danger. The assertion that one state’s rise constitutes an existential threat to another narrows the room for compromise. It also incentivizes alliances and military planning premised on worst-case scenarios. Freeman’s perspective urges a tempering of rhetoric and a recalibration of policy away from existential framing and back toward granular crisis management mechanisms that reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation. Moreover, selective application of law, such as fishing for favorable clauses in international instruments while ignoring inconvenient parts, exacerbates mistrust. This debate over legalities in the South China Sea and other maritime disputes illustrates how normative frameworks can be weaponized rhetorically without producing the shared expectations that prevent crises. ## Historical Memory & War Guilt in Asia Memory politics and collective guilt also shape contemporary diplomacy in ways the conversation underscores but often go unaddressed in official analyses. The legacies of wartime conduct — particularly in East Asia — still inform national identity and bilateral relations. Narratives of victimhood and perpetration frame domestic politics and constrain leaders’ options in foreign policy. Ambassador Freeman’s remarks imply that failing to acknowledge or to productively process historical grievances fuels mistrust. When nations allow historical memory to harden into moral absolutes, they delegitimize conciliatory gestures and make mutual accommodation politically costly. Reconciliation, where feasible, requires honest engagement with the past, mechanisms for cultural exchange, and policies that decouple historical responsibility from contemporary strategic competition. The conversation thereby suggests that durable peace in regions like East Asia will depend not only on arms control and security arrangements but on cultural and educational work that reduces the salience of wartime guilt as a barrier to cooperation. ## US Involvement in Japan-China Disputes On the question of American involvement in Japan-China tensio

US Naval Seizures In The Caribbean Are Only The Beginning We are back with Ambassador Chas Freeman, a former US Assistant Secretary of Defense and as U. S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia who will give us an update in his take of what is currently going on in world affairs. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Goods Store: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 US Seizure of Venezuelan Tanker & International Law 00:03:12 Warfare on the High Seas & Breakdown of Norms 00:12:40 US Strategy in Europe & The Decline of Diplomacy 00:24:50 India, Russia, and "Political Theater" in Peace Deals 00:30:25 Japan-China Tensions: The "Existential Threat" Comment 00:40:40 Historical Memory & War Guilt in Asia 00:47:23 US Involvement in Japan-China Disputes 00:49:35 A "Minimum Viable Peace" for Taiwan 01:00:00 Conclusion #Pascal Hello, everybody. We are back with Ambassador Chas Freeman, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who will give us an update on his take on what is currently going on in world affairs. Ambassador Freeman, welcome back. #Chas Freeman Thank you, Pascal. Good to be with you. #Pascal Let's start with some very recent news — at least as we’re speaking today, on my December 12th and your December 11th. The United States just seized an oil tanker off the coast of Venezuela. To me, this is quite an escalation from where we were before, both in terms of international relations and in what’s going on with Venezuela. How do you interpret this act? #Chas Freeman Rather typically for our times, the American media are focused entirely on the pragmatic aspect of this — that it is an escalation of pressure against Nicolás Maduro and the government of Venezuela. But others, including myself, look at it with some dismay because it is essentially an act of piracy. It’ s the seizure of a ship for no reason. There’s a weak legal justification given for this — that the ship has allegedly been involved in transporting oil to Lebanon from Iran, with Hezbollah supposedly involved, and so forth — and that this therefore puts it under American sanctions. But American sanctions are unilateral; they have no standing under international law. They do not excuse the -- 1 of 16 -- seizure of the ship, and they certainly do not excuse the confiscation of the cargo, which President Trump has indicated is the likely result. So this is an escalation against Venezuela. It is also an act that is utterly illegal under international law. And it’s a reminder, if we needed one at this point in history, that the United Nations was founded on the assumption that the five permanent members and other members of the Security Council would enforce the Charter and international law — not exempt client states from the application of the law, and not ignore international law with respect to their own actions. Of course, I suppose the genius of this was mainly directed at preventing warfare among the permanent members of the Security Council and those they had defeated in World War II — Germany and Japan. But still, it’s been proven in recent years that there’s absolutely no attention whatsoever, by the United States in particular, to the particulars of international law, which we simply ignore and violate at will. #Pascal Can we maybe also talk about the larger context — that shipping in general is now obviously a target of warfare? I mean, this ship was first and foremost seized in international waters, which, even as a unilateral act, actually cannot be done, at least not under the current rules. There used to be a concept before the 19th century of prize courts and so on, where states would just seize each other’s ships, but that was already considered an act of war. And now we’re seeing that other oil tankers of the so-called shadow fleet — which isn’t really a thing, it’s just non‑British‑insured ships, tankers that transport oil from and to Russia — are being attacked by Ukrainian drones on the high seas. I mean, this is all highly problematic, since these are essentially international waters that must be open to anyone and everyone. #Chas Freeman Well, this is exactly why I mentioned the UN Charter and international law — because the UN Charter and international law have essentially been shredded in many respects. They’re invoked when someone wants to put forward legal arguments in particular circumstances. For example, the United States, even though it hasn’t ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, repeatedly cites it in the context of the South China Sea. That’s because it can find clauses that seem to support U.S. arguments against Chinese or other countries’ behavior. Of course, we behave selectively. Vietnam does exactly the same things China does, but we never mention that. We only criticize China. I might add that you’re in Japan, and there’s an island—or actually a bunch of rocks—called Okinotorishima, way out in the middle of nowhere. Japan cites that, because it’s got a structure on it that’s inhabited, as the basis for an exclusive economic zone over a huge area of the Pacific. And this is, of course, entirely inconsistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. But everybody cherry-picks the law to justify whatever it is they want to prove. -- 2 of 16 -- Actually, the only action against ships that I’ve seen recently that’s consistent with international law is the Yemeni attacks on vessels bound for Israel. They carry them out under the authority of the Genocide Convention, which places a positive duty on all countries to do what they can to prevent genocide. But of course, the United States actually spent a billion dollars trying to bring Yemen to heel in order to protect Israel and prevent those attacks on shipping. It didn’t work. And now, as you indicated, we’re seeing attacks on shipping in more and more contexts, and the whole fabric of law that once protected this kind of interaction between states has been dispensed with. #Pascal Is this, in your view, also an indicator of the shift in power and escalation? You know, in a stable system, acts like these that heavily infringe upon norms—especially the law of the sea—are just less likely. We haven’t seen those for the last 30 or so years. I mean, the example you gave with Japan and Takeshima and others is, in a sense, classic, because the Philippines has similar questions to China’s—whether islands generate an exclusive economic zone, while rocks and features don’t. So this is still within the bounds of what we’re used to when countries argue their cases. But seizing ships and blowing them up on the high seas, for Ukraine and so on—that’s new now, isn’t it? Or at least new for the last 30 or 40 years. #Chas Freeman Yes. We're in a period of the breakdown of global norms. It's interesting you mentioned that—the various claims in the South China Sea and so forth. Of course, there was a UN Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitral tribunal, which considered the question—precisely, only the question—of whether islands that are barely inhabitable or only artificially inhabitable could generate an economic zone, as opposed to a territorial sea, which they can do. And, of course, the tribunal had no authority to rule on issues of sovereignty, but its finding has been distorted to suggest that China has no valid claim to sovereignty. Maybe it doesn't, but the arbitral tribunal didn't address that question. And so we have, you know, as I mentioned, Okinotorishima is also an atoll—like the U.S. Johnson Atoll—which the United States claims generates an EEZ when it doesn’t. I mean, there’s nobody there. It’s not inhabited; it’s not inhabitable, except by entirely artificial means. So we have a breakdown here of law, where law is simply used as a tool of polemics and not heeded as guidance for action. I want to make a point that the epitome of this is really the latest U.S. National Security Strategy—which, of course, isn’t a strategy. It’s a collection of contradictory statements and praise of President Trump for his peacemaking efforts and other things. But it basically asserts a right of the United States, under a Trump corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, to ignore the sovereignty of every country in the Western Hemisphere while demanding that every other country respect American sovereignty. And we're seeing this play out with the boat murders off Venezuela, where the United States Navy is killing people on the basis of very flimsy suspicions— -- 3 of 16 -- no evidence produced, no due process. In any event, the killing of people carrying drugs is not justified under international law. The normal procedure, in our own manuals as well as in international conventions, is that if you suspect contraband is being transported, you board the vessel and search it. And if it is contraband, you can confiscate it, and you can bring legal charges against those transporting it. But you can’t just kill them—especially not after you’ve already killed most of them. Two of them were hanging on to debris, having survived the first attack for 45 minutes. There’s a positive duty under international law in those circumstances to aid the survivors, not to murder them. This was actually applied in a famous case where a U-boat captain failed to rescue survivors— in World War II, a German U-boat captain. So I think we’re seeing a complete breakdown of the fabric of international order that we’ve been accustomed to. #Pascal Yeah, and I mean, I'm very glad you're pointing this out. Even if all the accusations the United States leveled against these civilians in the Caribbean were true—even if all of it was true—the murder of these people would still be illegal under international law, and actually even under U.S. domestic law. And especially then, killing the survivors—I mean, it's horrendous. It's surprising to me that the U.S. media still labels this as “suspected breaches of the law,” like somebody shooting someone in the street in the head and then reporting a “suspected murder.” #Chas Freeman No, I mean, I think the press is behaving in a thoroughly, disgustingly irresponsible fashion. They're just acting as scribes for the government rather than as independent reporters. #Pascal May I ask about these national security strategies? On the one hand, it’s interesting because they also contain elements that are actually de-escalatory, especially with regard to Russia and China. On the other hand, at the very same time, we see that Congress is now working on a bill that would make it impossible for the U.S. to reduce its troop size in Europe and would, by law, require the U.S. president not to give up the lead—the military leadership of NATO. What’s the name? SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander in NATO, right? While, of course, the U.S. demands 5%—I mean, 5% of GDP—that NATO members should come up with. So, overall, there’s no real change in U.S. policy toward Europe, is there? #Chas Freeman What has happened is that the Trump administration, in this so-called strategy, has transformed European allies into auxiliaries in the struggle against China. That is to say, there’s no need for the -- 4 of 16 -- United States to consider the interests of Europeans or consult with them about anything, but it is the duty of Europeans to back the United States against China—and also to follow our lead in normalizing relations with Russia, which I think is a positive thing. But Europeans don’t seem inclined at all to follow that path. So there are additional features of this that are quite extraordinary. On the one hand, the United States, by reasserting the Monroe Doctrine, claims an exemption from any intervention by Europeans in the Western Hemisphere or any influence on American politics. But at the same time, it asserts the right to interfere in European politics to promote the interests of right-wing populist forces like the Alternative für Deutschland. I don't h