Aaron Maté is one of the last remaining real journalists. For more than 2 decades, Aaron has confronted the most powerful institutions in the United States, taking on the US security state,...
Article
## The political cost of a conspiracy: why the conversation still matters
What emerges from this exchange is a diagnosis of a modern political pathology: a conspiracy theory that did far more than misdescribe the past — it reshaped institutions, misdirected political energy, and helped normalize militarized foreign policy. The conversation traces how an implausible narrative about presidential capture by a foreign power became the organizing lens for media, parts of the political class, and large segments of the progressive community. That lens did not merely divert attention; it rewired incentives, produced a shrugging culture of impunity, and stifled voices warning against escalation. Understanding that trajectory matters not only for historical clarity but for preventing repeat patterns that make war likelier and make democratic accountability rarer.
## The unraveling of Russiagate and institutional failure
The discussion argues that what began as allegations morphed into an orthodoxy embraced across a broad media-political spectrum. This was not the usual partisan sparring over policy; it was a wholesale reorientation of how critics approached power. Rather than attacking concrete policies, many opponents channeled their energy into proving a hidden collusion narrative. The result was paradoxical: a purportedly oppositional movement ended up parroting security-state claims and celebrating those very institutions when they promised to neutralize an electoral opponent.
That deference had real consequences. By treating intelligence pronouncements as decisive and uncontestable, debate narrowed and diplomatic options shrank. Domestic mobilization that might have pushed back against substantive harms — economic policy shifts, civil-liberties rollbacks, or militarized posture changes — was instead funneled into a scandal hunt that largely produced theatrical moments rather than durable reform. The conversation insists this was an emperor-has-no-clothes moment: a mass failure of critical judgment with structural effects on politics and policy.
## The Steele dossier, redactions, and the FBI’s opaque choices
Central to the discussion is the role of a now-infamous intelligence product and the way authorities relied on it. The narrative that the bureau’s decisions were free from this dossier, the conversation suggests, strains credulity. Newly disclosed documents reveal an agency still shielding its underlying rationale for escalatory steps, including why investigators widened probes to encompass a sitting president. Key passages that would explain factual predicates for those decisions remain redacted, leaving a public explanation that feels incomplete.
The effect of those redactions is twofold. First, they sustain doubt about whether the bureau acted on solid, corroborated information or on politicized, secondhand claims. Second, they impede a fuller public reckoning about institutional errors. When bureaucratic actors hide the basis for consequential investigative moves, trust erodes and accountability becomes harder. The conversation contends that without transparency, lessons cannot be learned and similar excesses can recur under new circumstances.
## From conspiracy to militarism: foreign-policy fallout and Ukraine
Perhaps the most consequential part of the story told in the exchange is how a domestic scandal morphed into a driver of foreign policy. The narrative that a president was soft on a rival power served as political leverage to constrain diplomacy and reward militarized responses. Even as some actors argued for engagement or restraint, they were painted as naïve or even treasonous. This vilification narrowed acceptable policy choices and helped normalize arming proxies, escalating tensions, and treating diplomacy as suspect if it deviated from a securitized script.
The conversation connects those dynamics to the trajectory of conflict in Eastern Europe. Escalatory steps taken by successive administrations — withdrawal from arms-control frameworks, increased weapon transfers, and brittle responses to regional crises — did not emerge in isolation. They fit a logic in which demonstrating toughness mattered more than mitigating risk. The upshot is a policy environment in which war is easier to choose than negotiated restraint, and where domestic political actors can weaponize accusations about foreign influence to foreclose alternative strategies.
## Silencing dissent: how antiwar voices were marginalized
A striking theme in the exchange is the sidelining of voices that cautioned against escalation. Intellectuals and journalists who argued for restraint or criticized the rush toward confrontation found themselves caricatured, excluded from mainstream platforms, or dismissed as apologists. This dynamic has long precedents in modern media systems — a set of pressures that reward conformity to a plausible bipartisan foreign-policy consensus and punish those who break ranks.
The conversation highlights how these dynamics are enforced: social sanctions, professional flak, and the loss of institutional invitations. The cultural costs of dissent are not merely rhetorical; they shape careers, marginalize expertise, and reduce the diversity of ideas available to the public. When prominent antiwar observers are pushed to the margins, the public debate narrows and the range of options that policymakers consider contracts. This is a problem not only for those who value peace in principle but for any polity that hopes to make prudent decisions in dangerous moments.
## The Democratic left, Gaza, and the politics of electoral discipline
The exchange turns from Russia and Ukraine to examine how similar pressures operated in the context of Gaza and electoral politics. What emerges is an analysis of the mechanics of party discipline: how a major party marshals certain trusted voices to steer dissident energy back into the fold. In this case, left-liberal figures who once enlivened progressive critique were deployed to blunt a revivified antiwar surge within their ranks by arguing that electoral choices should prioritize other domestic considerations and that the alternative would be worse.
The conversation reads this as a familiar pattern of risk-averse politics. Progressive activists faced a choice between punitive electoral pragmatism and principled opposition to military-supported violence. Many who were outraged by civilian suffering nonetheless accepted the party’s framing — in part out of fear that alternative leadership would be still more harmful on domestic policy. The result was a dampening of dissent and a preservation of the bipartisan consensus on using U.S. leverage in support of allied military campaigns.
Notably, the exchange points out an ironic twist: a change of leadership at the top of the ticket produced different immediate results on ceasefire pressure. The reality that electoral choices did not map neatly onto policy outcomes further complicates the moral calculus activists faced. The conversation suggests that the instrumental logic of “lesser evil” voting often fails to produce predictable foreign-policy benefits, and sometimes produces outcomes opposite to what voters were told to expect.
## Accountability, memory, and the politics of amnesia
Closing the loop, the conversation laments the near-total absence of accountability for the mistaken fever that gripped media and institutions. There were few, if any, public apologies and little introspection about the cascade of errors. Instead, the reputation economy of journalism and politics rewarded those who had amplified the dominant narrative. Awards and promotions continued, while dissenters remained marginalized. This selective amnesia has consequences: it teaches new generations that amplifying official or prevailing narratives bears low professional cost and that owning mistakes is optional.
The exchange urges a different approach. Transparency about past investigati
Transcript
Aaron Maté on Kash Patel, Russiagate, AOC,
and more
Aaron Maté is one of the last remaining real journalists. For more than 2 decades, Aaron has
confronted the most powerful institutions in the United States, taking on the US security state,
corporate media, and their allies who spread propaganda about matters of war and peace. Aaron
joins independent journalist Harrison Berger for a discussion about the continued relevance of
Russiagate, Kash Patel’s nomination to be FBI director, the progressive left’s abandonment of
antiwar politics, and much more. Aaron is the host of Useful Idiots with Katie Halper, a writer for The
Grayzone, and the author of his own very popular Substack http://aaronmate.net If you enjoyed this
interview, please consider contributing to my Locals page, https://harrisonberger.locals.com/, that
helps to fund the original independent journalism that I do. Thank you for watching!
#M3
Thank you so much for tuning in. This past weekend, I sat down with a veteran journalist, one of
the few consistent and principled journalists left, Aaron Maté. He's the host of Useful Idiots with
Katie Halper, and he writes for The Grayzone, and he is my guest today. We discussed a number of
important issues Aaron has covered in the past, which have in many ways become more relevant
than ever. FBI Director Christopher Wray faced intense criticism from partisan Democrats for his
criticisms of Russiagate. Kash Patel has long documented and criticized security state abuses of
power in the name of vanquishing Trump, and Aaron joins me to break that down. We also
discussed the impotence of left-wing anti-war politics in Congress today.
And we compared how Joe Biden and Donald Trump have handled the Gaza situation so far. If you
enjoyed this interview, please consider subscribing to my local page linked in this video's description.
That helps to promote and fund the original independent journalism that I do. Thank you and enjoy.
OK, so, Aaron, thank you so much for coming today and being with me. It means a lot. Good to be
here. So I want to start off with something that you wrote about recently, earlier this month. It
involves Russiagate, which I think was really consequential. It really triggered a radical realignment
in our politics that I don't think we've fully reckoned with yet. You know, liberals who were once
opponents of the security state and its abuses and the violations of civil liberties began to worship
that same security state.
You know, they elevated trained liars like John Brennan to stardom because they promised liberals
the goods on Trump. The narrative that they presented, the security state by all accounts, originated
with the discredited Steele dossier, which you've written about at length. From the start, you were
one of maybe two or three journalists, including Glenn Greenwald, who expressed any kind of
skepticism toward that narrative. And you have a recent piece about the origins of Andrew McCabe's
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2017 FBI investigation into Trump, which formed part of the basis of Russiagate, along with the
2016 Crossfire Hurricane investigation. The piece is called "The FBI Is Still Hiding Key Russiagate
Details, Newly Released Documents Show." So can you just remind people how important
Russiagate was in American domestic politics and explain what it is that the FBI is still hiding about
these key events?
#M2
The importance of Russiagate, I think, can be gleaned from what you said at first, which is that
there's been no reckoning with it. And there's been no reckoning with it because everybody fell for
it. And so this really is an emperor-has-no-clothes moment where media across the spectrum, you
know, the major establishment outlets—CNN, MSNBC, New York Times, Washington Post—but also,
unfortunately, pretty much the entire progressive media spectrum, too, that I come from, with a few
exceptions, fell for it. And we're talking about one of the dumbest conspiracy theories of all time: the
idea that the president of the U.S. was being blackmailed by Russia while also engaging in a
sprawling conspiracy with Moscow to win the election.
It's so ridiculous. And it flew in the face not only of all the evidence that was actually apparent when
it came to the details of Russiagate that emerged from the Mueller inquiry and other investigations,
but also just from the real-life policies of the Trump administration. While Democrats and their media
allies were fantasizing about a conspiracy and blackmail arrangement between Republicans, Trump,
and Putin, Trump was escalating tensions with Russia radically by tearing up the INF Treaty, by
sending weapons to Ukraine that Obama wouldn't send, by trying to overthrow Russia's key ally in
Latin America, Venezuela, and on and on.
So, of course, there's been a reckoning with this because so many powerful people fell for what I
think is the dumbest conspiracy theory in U.S. history, certainly the most damaging and widespread.
And then look at the issue now. Now that Trump's returned to office, you haven't seen any big
protests yet. The resistance, there's a sense of it feeling deflated. I don't want to say it's entirely
deflated. But why is that? Well, one of the big reasons is that when Trump came into office, people
who bought into Russiagate channeled genuine opposition to Trump—and there's so much to be
opposed to Trump over—into this conspiracy theory. People forget about this now, but just think
about this.
There were bigger protests under Trump after he fired Jeff Sessions, a very right-wing Republican
and longtime senator, who was Trump's attorney general. There were bigger liberal protests against
the firing of Jeff Sessions than there were over Trump cutting taxes in a way that favored the
wealthy. Because when Trump fired Sessions—and again, it's hard to remember this now because
it's so far away and it seems so stupid—people really believed that this meant Trump was trying to
shut down the Mueller investigation because Jeff Sessions was fired. So literally, liberals went out
into Times Square and other liberal enclaves across the country to try to save the job of Jeff
Sessions, a far-right Republican.
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That's how dumb this thing got. So no wonder there's been no reflection. And one of the real-world
consequences, on top of undermining the resistance to Trump, was also escalating tensions with
Russia because it effectively criminalized diplomacy with Russia. Trump was talking about getting
along with Russia, but within the first few months of his administration, he abandoned that in the
face of this investigation and this widespread belief that he was really doing Russia's bidding, which
incentivized him to be a tough guy against Russia. That's exactly what his administration did, and
which helped lead to, by the way, a proxy war in Ukraine. It wasn't just the Biden administration's
policies that fueled that war.
It was also the Trump administration's policies, including, for example, pulling out of the
aforementioned INF Treaty and fueling the war that was going on between Ukraine and Russian-
backed ethnic Russians in eastern Donbass, rather than getting behind the Minsk Accords. And by
the way, Trump's first impeachment, which was largely done as a reaction to the failure of
Russiagate, what was that about? That was about Trump pausing weapons to Ukraine while Giuliani
was pressuring Ukraine to open up an investigation of the Bidens. And so Russiagate and the failure
of Russiagate also incentivized Democrats to double down with an impeachment that focused on
how Trump was endangering the U.S. by somehow pausing weapons to Ukraine.
So in short, all this fueled not just a deranged conspiracy theory, but militarism, which is exactly
what the neocons behind Russiagate were always about. So I'm sorry, that's a long-winded answer
to your question, which is, what is my recent article about? Well, I just said that early on in Trump's
presidency, he abandoned his calls for cooperation with Russia. But meanwhile, what was the FBI
doing? Well, the FBI decided after Trump was in the White House that one investigation of his
campaign's fictional conspiracy with Russia wasn't enough; there had to be a second investigation.
And this was a second investigation opened up in May 2017, just a few months after Trump was
inaugurated, into Trump personally, suspecting him of being a Russian agent, basically taking orders
from Russia to do Russia's bidding. Because for some reason, Andrew McCabe thought that this
already ridiculous investigation that was going on into Trump's inner circle wasn't enough. And why
did he decide to open up this investigation of Trump as a Russian agent while Trump was sitting in
the White House? Well, we don't know because the document that I got released by the FBI via a
Freedom of Information Act request is the opening document to launch that investigation. But the
part that lays out the factual basis for the probe is entirely redacted.
So the FBI, some years later, is still hiding why it felt it had grounds to investigate the sitting
president as a Russian agent. But McCabe has indicated publicly what prompted him: Trump had
just recently fired James Comey, and so McCabe thought to himself, well, why would he fire James
Comey unless he had something to hide about his ties to Russia? That was basically Andrew
McCabe's logic, which is just, you know, moronic doesn't begin to describe it. And elsewhere,
McCabe didn't admit this, but the New York Times reported that the Steele dossier was among the
concerns that also fueled McCabe here. And that made sense because contrary to what is now the
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prevailing narrative, and the New York Times recently just tried to recycle this claim, the FBI was
relying on the Steele dossier.
And the Steele dossier played a huge role in the investigation. In fact, I don't think the original
Trump-Russia investigation would have gotten launched without the Steele dossier because... The
official story, this is what you get from the FBI and the New York Times, was that the Steele dossier
had nothing to do with the FBI's decision to open up the original Trump-Russia inquiry, which began
on July 31, 2016. And they say the predicate was only the fact that they got this tip about a low-
level Trump campaign volunteer named George Papadopoulos, who suggested some kind of
suggestion, I'm quoting, that the Russians might be helping Trump. That's it. And that, they say,
was their grounds for opening up an investigation of a presidential campaign on suspicion of
conspiring with Russia. I'm sorry.
That doesn't pass the smell test. What does make sense is that by the time the FBI opened up that
investigation, their agents had already received the Steele dossier. Because weeks earlier, in early
July 2016, Victoria Nuland, a career neocon and major player in the Ukraine coup of 2014—which
Trump was not campaigning against, but Trump was certainly saying things on the campaign trail at
the time that would roll back that project of using Ukraine for war with Russia—because one of the
things that Trump said back in 2016 was that we don't want to have World War III with Russia over
Ukraine. So, Victoria Nuland, not liking what she was hearing from Trump, basically helped facilitate
an FBI agent going to meet with Christopher Steele in early July 2016 and getting a copy of Steele's
dossier.
And then that FBI agent circulated that dossier to other people in the FBI. But the FBI wanted to
believe that it had nothing to do with its decision weeks later to open up an investigation of Trump
as a Russian agent. I don't buy it, but that's just one of many glaring issues with how the FBI
conducted this probe and the fact that they're still hiding, years later, their decision to investigate a
sitting president as an agent of Russia.
#M3
I want to go back to something that you said toward the middle of your answer. It involves the
foreign policy implications of Russiagate.