USA and Israel are Panicking | Ex-Spy Rainer Rupp

## Why Previous US Threats Against Iran Failed The persistent pattern of threatened strikes against Iran that never materialized tells us less about American impotence than about deterrence realities and political calculations that constrain the use of force. Across administrations from Bush to Obama and into the Trump era, the United States has on several occasions massed forces and spoken loudly about military options. Yet each time, escalation stalled. The central reason is not mere indecision but an awareness — voiced repeatedly in the conversation with Rainer Rupp — of the operational and strategic costs of coercive strikes against Iran. Iran’s nuclear dossier has been the pretext for much of the pressure: regimes that sign the Non‑Proliferation Treaty retain a right to enrichment for civilian purposes, and the International Atomic Energy Agency has repeatedly reported inspection access and monitoring as satisfactory. Rainer Rupp emphasized how the IAEA had physical and streaming surveillance of Iranian facilities, and international inspections undermined claims that Iran was secretively racing to a bomb. That technical and legal substrate made overtly preventive war politically harder to justify, even if domestic political audiences demanded decisive action. More important than legal niceties are the asymmetric and geographic realities. Iran’s geography — long coastlines with deep inlets around the Strait of Hormuz, complex littoral environments, and heavily defended approaches — favors denial and attrition against conventional expeditionary operations. Previous threats failed because senior military officers publicly warned about the formidable Iranian capabilities to make any large-scale coercive campaign extremely costly. The conversation repeatedly returned to a simple point: air power alone cannot shape political outcomes on the ground. History shows bombing often strengthens, rather than topples, adversary regimes. That lived experience has produced caution among professional militaries across decades and administrations. Finally, the political objective matters. If the aim is regime change or to prevent enrichment absolutely, the means required escalate quickly — from punitive strikes to occupation or sustained suppression. That escalation creates domestic and alliance frictions, places troops at risk, and burdens logistics and public opinion. Those seams have repeatedly frayed U.S. plans and turned loud threats into diplomatic posturing. ## Decapitation Strikes: Political Hawks vs. Military Realists A recurring theme in the exchange is the deep divide between political hawks who favor dramatic surgical options and military professionals who warn against them. Decapitation strikes — targeting top leaders or command nodes — have intuitive appeal: remove the head and you think you remove the body’s capacity to resist. For some policymakers, the attraction is precisely that simplicity. Rainer Rupp highlighted the temptation inside corridors of power to believe that killing a few top figures would end the confrontation, an idea reinforced by selective historical anecdotes of targeted killings. But military realism pushes back strongly. Professionals remember that removing individual leaders rarely produces predictable or stable political outcomes. Decapitation can harden resolve, produce martyrdom, and trigger rules of retaliation written into doctrine or culture. The conversation referenced how Iran explicitly declared it would treat attacks on its territory as a casus belli and had options to retaliate that would not resemble the limited punitive strikes imagined in Washington. Moreover, credible military practitioners understand that even a high‑precision killing risks broader escalation: retaliatory strikes, asymmetric attacks on U.S. or allied assets across the Gulf and Levant, and mobilized proxy forces. The cost-benefit calculus thus often militates against decapitation except under conditions of extraordinary certainty and supporting operations that rarely exist. There is also an ideological overlay. Rainer Rupp described how some civilian hawks, distant from battlefield contingencies and steeped in think‑tank analysis or political rhetoric, romanticize surgical options as low-cost, high-impact fixes. Military leaders, by contrast, conditioned by experience and institutional conservatism, tend to be risk-averse because they understand the downstream demands of occupation, logistics, and casualty aversion. This tension — between the allure of dramatic decapitation and the sober constraints of prosecution — is a persistent driver of failed threats. ## Can Trump Disengage Without Losing Face? The question of whether a leader whose political brand leans on strength can disengage without reputational cost recurs in crises, and the recent Iran episode is no exception. The conversation explored the paradox: a president characterized by high-stakes rhetoric and performative dominance faces a domestic coalition that is both hawkish and isolationist. This contradiction creates an opening for non‑escalation, but one smoothed only by political maneuvering. There are a few paths out that preserve some face. One is the performative sortie: limited strikes described as punitive that allow a leader to claim action while stopping short of deep commitment. Rainer Rupp floated the possibility that a symbolic bombing of facilities in the desert could be framed as decisive. In practice, this play is risky — it must be sufficient to placate domestic audiences without provoking serious retaliation. Another route is to recast disengagement as strategic success: claim deterrence accomplished, sanctions tightened, or diplomatic pressure increased. For a leader with a permissive media ecosystem and loyal base, such rhetorical reframing can work. Yet domestic politics cut both ways. Trump’s political base includes isolationist strains that oppose new Middle East wars, while his broader coalition includes hardliners who equate strength with kinetic action. Exiting without a visible cost requires satisfying neither camp fully but convincing enough observers that restraint was the wiser course. The conversation highlighted that military leaders and regional partners might privately prefer a de-escalatory path; if these constituencies are marshaled, a president can pull back while limiting reputational damage. However, the temptation to "throw a few bombs" to claim victory remains a real and dangerous political pressure point. ## The Nightmare Scenario: Sinking Carriers & ICBMs The most alarming escalation pathways discussed are those in which conventional naval or missile contests rapidly spiral into forms of strategic provocation. The prospect that Iranian forces, using littoral swarm tactics or sophisticated anti-ship missiles, could damage or sink a U.S. carrier is not fanciful — it is a scenario that has informed operational planning for decades. Rainer Rupp invoked the human and symbolic consequences: a sunken carrier would be an ecological and strategic shock, a watershed event with enormous political pressure for retaliation. That raises the specter of disproportionate U.S. responses, including the hypothetical use of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in a conventional role. The conversation made two critical observations. First, using ICBMs for conventional strikes carries huge escalation risks. Ballistic launches in Russia’s arc could trigger strategic warnings, complicate nuclear command-and-control assessments, and potentially prompt dangerous automatic responses. Second, conventional use of strategic assets is often inefficient: high cost, imprecise benefit. An ICBM’s value is deterrence via nuclear capability, not as a blunt conventional penetrator. Employing strategic missiles for conventional punishment invites miscalculation without commensurate military payoff. Beyond the hardware, the nightmare scenario also includes m

USA and Israel are Panicking | Ex-Spy Rainer Rupp Former German Spy, Rainer Rupp analyses the weak US hand in West Asia and how the US manoeuvred itself into a corner from which only Russia can help it out again without losing face. Timestamps: 00:00:00 Why Previous US Threats Against Iran Failed 00:14:14 Decapitation Strikes: Political Hawks vs. Military Realists 00:19:18 Can Trump Disengage Without Losing Face? 00:23:53 The Nightmare Scenario: Sinking Carriers & ICBMs 00:28:34 Could the US Force NATO to Join a War Against Iran? #Pascal And now, Reimer, since it’s just the two of us, maybe we can go over your comparison again—the many times the United States has threatened Iran and nothing came out of it. You had other examples; 2007 was just one. There were other times when the U.S. was doing a build-up—like in 2012. #Rainer Rupp One was under Bush, the other under Obama, and the bigger one was under Obama in 2012. It was all again about the nuclear question. Iran has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but part of that treaty gives every country the right to enrich uranium to the level required for civilian purposes. And everybody who’s got cancer or something else—I mean, even here in Germany—we use enriched uranium in a number of medical applications, and it’s used elsewhere in technology too. And even, to a certain extent—if I’m informed correctly—even to help prevent food from perishing faster, and so on. Anyway, there are a whole lot of civilian applications for which you need enriched uranium. Now, the Israelis—and hence the Americans, in particular—the Israelis want to remain the only nuclear power in the Middle East. I mean, one can understand that they want to; understand does not mean approve. I can understand that they want to remain the only nuclear power in that area, which gives them some very special, let’s say, political clout in that region. Now, they want to have a full stop on Iran—that Iran should not enrich uranium at all—because they say once you start, you can’t really control where they go or where they stop. Fine. Therefore, in order to control that, we have the IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency. And they had free access in Iran. Not only free access—they were, of course, allowed to put cameras everywhere. Not just cameras to take still photos, but video cameras that were streaming all the time, connected via the internet. For how long have we had the internet now—20 years or longer? Twenty-five years or more. -- 1 of 9 -- I already had it in my office in 1993. Via the internet, they were connected so they could monitor all the comings and goings and the critical parts—being underground, of course—the critical parts of the enrichment facilities. Now, for that, you need a certain kind of centrifuge and so on, so even the purchase of centrifuges, with various special types, could be controlled, etc., etc. So it was, and the International Atomic Energy Agency repeatedly came out with statements saying everything was okay—no problem, Iran was not doing anything against what they had promised to do or what they were assigned to do. But, you know, international law doesn’t mean anything for the United States. It’s been proven many times, and for its protégé Israel especially, not either. So they wanted to stop Iran from the enrichment process. The Iranians were offered the option to have that done in some other countries and then import the ready-made material. But the Iranians said, no, no—we’ve been put so many times under sanctions and export restrictions, etc. We want to have our own capability and capacity. As a result, they tried to push Iran by force, putting a three-carrier battle group in front of the Iranian border—basically putting a gun to its head. On top of that, already under Obama, an additional demand was added: that the Iranians should stop developing medium-range missiles that could reach Israel. #Pascal Yeah. #Rainer Rupp And the Iranians said, “No way, no way. That’s our guarantee that we can hit back at Israel if they hit us.” And that’s still the order of the day. I mean, Trump wants no nuclear program and, of course, no missiles that can reach Israel. What Trump actually wants is for Iran to roll over, belly up—and, well, what they really want is regime change. And for that, they even reactivated this joke of the Shah’s son. #Pascal He looks like a joke. He looks like a joke. It’s like every time you see him, and then you see there’s an Iranian flag behind him, you realize it must have been somewhere in a bunker or something. I mean, it just looks bad. He looks bad. But yeah. Yeah. Hey, very brief intermission—because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I’m back, this can happen again anytime. So please consider subscribing not only here, but also to my mailing list on Substack. That’s pascallottaz. substack.com. The link’s going to be in the description below. And now, back to the video. #Rainer Rupp -- 2 of 9 -- No, I mean, from that point of view, nothing happened, because if you get—well, it was already 2012, that case. If you want, I can send you what I wrote at the time about it. Do you have the possibility of publishing it on your webpage? #Pascal I can. If you send it to me, I can circulate it—yes. #Rainer Rupp Yeah, if you're interested. I'm not pushing for it, but I can. And you can see how the U.S. military— there were a number of statements from high-ranking American officers, which I had collected at the time, especially from the chiefs of staff—said, “We don’t want to touch them because they have the capability to really hurt us.” Now, of course, in a normal, all-out war, the Americans would beat Iran, but at an incredible cost. It’s a well-known thing in warfare: if you only attack from the air, you don’t change anything on the ground. In fact, think about what the Allies destroyed in World War II— firebombs, big cities, etc. Attack, attack. Did that change the regime? I mean, did they hope it would change the regime? No. The population even kind of rallied around—maybe not knowing any better—rallied around the regime. The same thing happened in Iraq, or in other places where they bombed, or in North Korea, or when they bombed civilians in Hanoi, etc. Did that lead to the population saying, “No, no, we have to get rid of our leadership and have a revolution,” and so on? No, it didn’t. It’s this—this—it never happened, time and time again. But still, they keep doing it. So if they did, however, just bomb—like a long bombing campaign—no American in the Middle East would be safe anymore. #Pascal Right. And Israel, needless to say. #Rainer Rupp Not necessarily with Iranian missiles—that’s not enough. Because in 2012, within the first month, about 25,000 Iranians registered in a special office for suicide bombers. Wow. Yeah, to be sent around. Now think about it: how many Shiite minorities are there in the Middle East? Even in Saudi Arabia, you have a substantial Shiite minority—everywhere in the Middle East. So that’s just… this particular aspect. If you come closer, you have the Strait of Hormuz. If you look at the geography, it’ s like Norway—with deep, deep shores. Not as high, but with deep shores and caves. And out of those, you can shoot missiles. From those, suddenly, little boats—a swarm of little boats— can come out. One of them might fire a squall. One of those, as they call it, shoots an underwater missile. Even if it makes a lot of noise, it goes 350 or 360 kilometers an hour. It’s very, very fast. It -- 3 of 9 -- targets very quickly. The Strait of Hormuz looks great, relatively wide, but it’s actually a very narrow navigable strait—sometimes only one and a half kilometers wide—where it’s deep enough for bigger ships to go through. That can be easily controlled. All kinds of mines and minesweepers can be fired at from the coast. In order to stop the shooting from the coast, the American Marines would have to go in and clear out every little fjord and so on. That would mean heavy casualties—if they could even do it. And even then, they’d have to stay there; otherwise, the Iranians would come back. But if they stay, they’ re vulnerable and will be attacked. So they’d have to move a bit further inland to secure the area, and those positions would be attacked again. You’d be drawn in and made more and more vulnerable. I mean, whichever way you look at it, you’ve got the losing card. #Pascal So it’s for boots on the ground, or for proximity warfare—that’s a nightmare scenario for the United States. For the military. For the military. And we already know they’re aware of this, and that they, for instance, told non-essential personnel at their base in Qatar to leave. Right. Although, of course, that could also be part of the cognitive warfare—massaging the idea that an attack is imminent. And, you know, it’s still possible that the United States believes, or at least Trump and his entourage believe, that if they’re just able to kill the Ayatollah... And maybe, let’s say, the prime minister plus the foreign minister—top rank—to do a kind of decapitation strike, the way Israel managed to kill Nasrallah in Lebanon. That, you know, that will suffice. You know, like with Venezuela: we showed them, we killed them, and now—mission complete. Is that something you could imagine they might be after? Although you already made it clear, the Iranians said, “If we’re being attacked, we will go all out, and we will not let you out of this.” So it’s not just going to be a small attack; it’s going to be war if anything hits our territory. #Rainer Rupp As I say, I cannot exclude the madness—I mean, of the United States, of the U.S. politicians. Looking back at my time at NATO headquarters, I had a lot to do with America, with high-ranking officers. I was a civilian, but on the military level my counterparts were at the rank of colonel or general. So I had quite a lot to do with the American military, and I was always struck by them. From the left in Germany, people always said, “Oh, these horrible American soldiers, the military.” No, no, no—by comparison to their political leaders, they were peaceniks. And it was really clear—quite clear. They knew war. Many of them had children in uniform; they were old enough to have children in uniform. They didn’t want war. Of course, they wanted to impress. I mean, again, Sun Tzu says the best war is the one you can win without a shot being -- 4 of 9 -- fired—if you impress the others so much by having the finest weapons, etc. That’s what they wanted, and to have even more of it, fine. But they were, by comparison to their civilian overlords, risk‑averse—luckily. I mean, I found that generally among the military, full stop. #Pascal That’s fascinating because, okay, the thing is, some of the civilian leaders in U.S. cabinets actually come from a military background—but those tend to be the ones who give the bloodiest speeches, who fit into that general warmongering profile that even a civilian like Mr. Pompeo brought, of course, to the first Trump administration. #Rainer Rupp Yeah, well, or what was the name of the guy with the big mustache? #Pascal What's his name—the national security guy, Mr. Walrus, yeah. #Rainer Rupp Mr. Bolton, etc. They didn’t have any military experience at the front, and so on. No, but for them, war is something they’ve probably only seen in Hollywood films, back home in the easy chair. And with their think tanks—well, I mean, I also prefer to read reports from a think tank I like, but I also read the others. But if we’re talking about think tanks like the Institute for the Study of War, run by rabid war fanatics, then of course they think everything’s fine. And you have to listen to the people in Congress—they still think they’re the hegemon, that they can dictate and get away with it. That’s the point. They don’t know the strengths and weaknesses of their own situation, or the growing strength of their opponents. #Pascal May I