Iran Reveals War Goals. New Missiles Hit US & Israel | Prof. Seyed M. Marandi

The exchange recorded from Tehran cuts through euphemism and strategic caution to reveal a set of hard realities: this conflict is already reshaping the region’s military, economic, and political architecture. The conversation lays out why Iran feels it cannot settle for a temporary ceasefire, how its strikes are meant to recalibrate deterrence, and why Western miscalculation — including ideological drivers inside the U.S. — risks turning a limited campaign into a protracted confrontation. What emerges is not simply a catalogue of strikes and counterstrikes, but a battlefield logic that ties control of sea lanes, domestic legitimacy, regional alliances, and the very meaning of victory to a new order in the Gulf. ## Hormuz pressure and Gulf escalation The Strait of Hormuz is the strategic fulcrum of this conflict. The discussion describes how, even without a formal blockade, Iranian actions have effectively choked maritime traffic and rattled global energy markets. That leverage is deliberate: closing or constraining Hormuz imposes an economic cost on the United States and its partners by constricting oil flows and driving up prices. The conversation stresses that Tehran’s goal is not hairline maneuvers at sea for show, but to make the financial and logistical consequences of intervention intolerable for Washington and its regional clients. This is escalation by selective vulnerability. Iran’s missile and drone campaign extends the battlefield beyond airstrikes on its cities into a transregional contest over vulnerabilities — bases, tankers, and chokepoints. The logic is classic deterrence: impose a price that shifts the calculus of risk for outside powers. But it also carries a gamble. Sustained pressure on Hormuz risks broadening the war and injuring neutral shipping, creating economic shocks that will ripple across markets and political coalitions. ## End conditions and compensation A central contention in the conversation is that Iran will not accept a return to the pre-war status quo. Endgame scenarios discussed are not limited to ceasefires that leave American bases and allied arrangements intact; Tehran seeks a fundamental revision of regional relations. That includes concrete demands: the removal or redefinition of U.S. military footprints, reparations or compensation for civilian losses and infrastructural damage, and a guarantee against future interventions. The argument made is that without these conditions, any cessation would be merely a pause before another round of strikes. A lesson from history is invoked: short-term victories without structural adjustments can invite repetition. For Iranian strategists, the objective is to reshape deterrence so that future leaders in Washington cannot casually contemplate similar campaigns. Reparations and institutional guarantees are intended to translate battlefield success into durable security — a political settlement that reorders who can exercise coercion in the Gulf. ## Evangelical politics and holy war claims One of the more disquieting themes in the discussion is the role of ideological actors within U.S. policy circles. The conversation highlights the presence of Christian Zionist views among influential policymakers, insisting that for some in Washington, the conflict is filtered through apocalyptic or instrumental religious frames. When policy is driven, or informed, by actors who portray violence as divinely sanctioned or eschatologically useful, the prospect of restraint becomes uncertain. This ideological overlay matters for strategy. If decision-makers are indifferent to proportional civilian suffering or see broader regional subjugation as acceptable, then limited coercive signals can be misread as tolerable collateral for long-term objectives. The conversation stresses that Tehran reads these signals as existential threats, magnifying its own resolve. Whether one accepts the interpretation of deliberate apocalyptic intent or sees it as rhetorical extremism, the political effect is similar: it narrows the margin for negotiated compromise and hardens Iran’s insistence on comprehensive guarantees. ## Ground invasion and regional proxy risks The possibility of boots on the ground — whether American or by proxy forces — figures prominently in the exchange. The analysis is skeptical that the U.S. can or would deploy large conventional forces into Iran as in past decades. The logistical and political costs of such an undertaking are prohibitively high; the United States lacks the appetite and the allied funding that once underwrote large-scale invasions. What is more likely, the conversation argues, is limited deployments of special operations forces or increased use of regional proxies. That risk shifts the conflict’s character: localized incursions, clandestine operations, or incentivized rebel activity could stoke persistent low-intensity warfare. The discussion warns that encouraging Kurdish or Azerbaijani actors to push northwards, or enabling some Iraqi or Syrian militias, would be a strategic mistake. Iran is portrayed as having both popular and coercive tools at its disposal domestically and in its neighboring spheres; any proxy escalation would invite strong and possibly indiscriminate Iranian countermeasures, and could ignite internal fractures in neighboring states. ## Carrier groups and naval escalation The arrival of carrier strike groups into the theater is framed not as a decisive guarantee of control but as a testing of limits. Aircraft carriers are political and operational symbols; the conversation suggests that their presence is intended to signal resolve and to reassure partners. But carriers are also vulnerable to asymmetric weapons: missiles, drones, and swarming tactics that Iran has honed and is now demonstrating. The interlocutor’s view is blunt: if carrier groups close to Iranian waters, they change the risk calculus for blue-water operations. Iran would not necessarily seek to “sink a carrier” for grandiose reasons, but it would exploit any proximate vulnerability to assert a new balance. The implication is that naval power projection in the Gulf is no longer a simple overlay of U.S. dominance; it has become a contested domain where asymmetric tactics can impose real operational limits on conventional dominance. ## Gulf neutrality and regional order reset Alongside kinetic concerns, the discussion foregrounds a political reimagining of regional alignments. Tehran is said to expect new modes of engagement with Gulf states — not subservient relations but negotiated balances that acknowledge Iran’s strategic depth and red lines. The conversation implies that neutrality or more balanced policies by regional capitals would be preferable for stability but notes that many governments have positioned themselves as U.S. partners or as transactional actors. This moment forces a reconsideration of neutrality. For some Gulf states, neutrality may no longer be viable: economic exposure, ideological commitments, and security pacts with the U.S. or Israel complicate their choices. Yet the conversation holds that if Tehran achieves its strategic aims — disrupting the capacity of outside powers to coerce the region — the post-war order will be less permissive of heavy foreign footprints. The recalibration may not be symmetrical, but it could create space for new regional arrangements that limit third-party interventions. ## War sustainability and bombing limits Sustainability emerges as both a constraint and a strategy. The conversation repeatedly contrasts the intensity of Western air campaigns with Iran’s capacity to endure and strike back. Iranian missile and drone arsenals, the interlocutor argues, are sufficient to sustain prolonged exchanges that dwarf previous short confrontations. For Iran, longevity is strategic: time favors those with depth of territory, dispersed production, and political cohesion. At the same time, the exchange recognizes limits. Bombin

Iran Reveals War Goals. New Missiles Hit US & Israel | Marandi Tehran under bombardment, Iran’s leverage in the Gulf, and the price of ending the war all come up fast. I’m joined again by Professor Seyed Marandi in Tehran, and we talk through the strikes, the Strait of Hormuz, US military assets, and the hard question of what “victory” would even mean. Links: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch & Donations: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction and Tehran update 00:05:42 Hormuz pressure and Gulf escalation 00:10:04 End conditions and compensation 00:14:39 Evangelical politics and holy war claims 00:19:58 Ground invasion and regional proxy risks 00:24:36 Carrier groups and naval escalation 00:28:42 Gulf neutrality and regional order reset 00:33:00 War sustainability and bombing limits 00:35:44 Diplomacy channels and distrust of deals #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and I'm joined again today by Professor Saeed Marandi from Tehran. Professor Marandi has been on the channel many times before. I'm sure all of you know him, and he’ll give us an update today on what's going on in his hometown of Tehran. Saeed, welcome back. #Seyed M. Marandi Thank you very much for having me back, Pascal. #Pascal Always a pleasure. Professor Marandi, let me maybe ask you—or start with this: what's going on currently in Tehran? I mean, we've seen the bombing campaign over the last week, and it seems to have been horrible. It seems that, you know, the destruction is huge. Can you give us an update on what Tehran looks like at the moment? #Seyed M. Marandi Yes, and it's happening across the country. They’re bombing even small cities that are very far from the Persian Gulf region or any major centers. It seems that they really don’t care about what they’re striking. They’re hitting a lot of neighborhoods that are particularly crowded, where there’s nothing but apartment blocks or civilian infrastructure that has nothing to do with, let’s say, the military. They’ve bombed Iranian radio and television—the national radio and television complex—multiple -- 1 of 11 -- times. But the employees there are quite heroic, because we still have people working there. I went there a few nights ago for a program. I went to the building I thought I was supposed to go to, and it had been bombed. Then they took me to another place. And then, after my interview was finished, about an hour later, they bombed it again. Yeah, good. So this is what Trump and his allies and his proxies—and of course the Israeli regime—are doing. Last night in Tehran there was some heavy bombing, and I just posted or tweeted about a little girl in Tehran, a one-year-old whose body was being recovered, just so people could get a sense of what’ s happening. These people have absolutely no regard for life—just like in Gaza, just like in Lebanon, just like elsewhere where they carry out their dirty wars, like in Syria, or what we saw earlier in Iraq and Libya. There’s no humanity. And what is particularly disturbing is how, in the West, even those who oppose Trump in the mainstream media, have no issue with the immorality and illegitimacy of these strikes. And instead, they focus on demonizing Iran to somehow justify what is happening. Even those who oppose the war don’t oppose it in the sense of saying we’re committing crimes against humanity, or that we’re carrying out war crimes, or that our attack is illegitimate. No, at best they’ll say it’s a failed policy. But they won’t say that what we—the United States or the West—are doing is evil. Of course, nowadays the elites and the media in the West don’t necessarily reflect public opinion all that much anymore. But in any case, it’s still a force to deal with. A lot of blood has been shed. And you know, the thing, Pascal, is that on the battlefield they’re failing. The Iranians have been very effective in defending themselves against drones. And that is different from the previous 12-day war, even though the attacks are much heavier now because the Americans are involved, and they’re far more powerful than the Israeli regime. The Iranian missiles, as you can see—as everyone can see—are striking across the Persian Gulf region, where the United States has bases and assets. And of course, despite the heavy censorship in Iran and across the Israeli regime, Iranian missiles are causing devastation. But again, the important thing I want to remind your viewers before we start is that any destruction or disruption caused by Iran is a result of this illegally imposed war. Otherwise, Iran would love to have ordinary relations— business as usual—with oil flowing and trade with its neighbors. But this is simply something the United States can’t tolerate. #Pascal And there was this moment last weekend—I think on Saturday—when your president, Pezeshkian, actually apologized to the neighboring Gulf states and said, “Look, we wouldn’t attack you if it weren’ t for what’s happening because of the United States.” So what is the policy right now? I mean, in a sense, what else is Iran supposed to target besides the U.S. military assets in those countries? And recently, the U.S. also increased its bombings—hitting desalination plants and other purely civilian infrastructure. The oil fields were also targeted around Tehran, and I’ve seen your posts the other day about the acid rain, the oil rain, coming down from the sky. I mean, this is apocalyptic. And now -- 2 of 11 -- Iran strikes back at oil fields in Bahrain and so on. What options does Iran have at the moment to compel the United States and Israel to stop their bombing campaign? #Seyed M. Marandi Well, Iran isn’t officially closing the Strait of Hormuz, but it has effectively closed it. This is to put pressure on the United States. We saw how desperate Trump was to bring down the price of oil, because yesterday he basically lied and said the war is coming to an end, implying that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen and things would go back to normal—and the price of oil went down. But then the Iranians said this war isn’t ending anytime soon. They’re not going to accept a ceasefire. Obviously, Iran can’t accept a ceasefire, because if it does, we’ll just have what happened eight or nine months ago happen again in the future. They’ll just prepare for another war, and this will be an endless cycle. So the Iranians are saying, we have to finish this once and for all and make them pay a price so that they never try again to invade or attack Iran. Sort of like Saddam Hussein—when he invaded Iran and the Iranians expelled him from their territory, they continued the war. Why? Because they knew he was an aggressive person. They thought they had to weaken him so much that he would never attack Iran again. And the war lasted eight years. What was the result? Saddam never invaded Iran again. Instead, he went for Kuwait—something much smaller, something he thought would be easier to take. And now the Iranians are saying, no, this war is going to continue. And of course, they’ve kept the Strait of Hormuz closed, so the price of oil is gradually going to go back up because no oil is getting through or leaving the Persian Gulf. So this is one means. The second, of course, is Iran's missile and drone strikes—and we see that they continue. The Americans and the Netanyahu regime have been saying they've destroyed Iran's missile and drone capability, but the reality is that Iran has been firing more in the last couple of days than ever before, and with greater intensity and effect. So obviously, Iran is capable. And Iran has said, we're more than capable. Iran says we're prepared to go for a very long war. And the reason isn’t that we want a long war; it’s because this is the only way to make sure this doesn’t happen again. It has to end now—47 years of death and destruction and sanctions and intimidation and terrorism. You know, this is where we say, enough is enough. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link’s in the description below. And now, back to the video. What would ending the war for Iran mean? What would be the outcome under which Iran would say, “OK, we won. This is done. We’re done with it”? #Seyed M. Marandi -- 3 of 11 -- That's a very good question. It's something I sometimes think about. I know they have some models in the Supreme National Security Council about how this would end, or under what conditions it would end. But I think it depends on how it ends and what sort of negotiations take place. I don't think the Iranians will tolerate the kind of U.S. presence we've had in the past in this region, and I think they'll make that clear to neighboring countries. I also think the Iranians are going to demand a new form of relationship with their neighbors. They’re not going to accept the former status quo, and they’ll expect compensation for the death and destruction. Lots of people are dying, and lots of private property—including public property, too—is being destroyed, and it will continue to be destroyed. And of course, people—little children, women, men— are traumatized by the scenes and by their neighborhoods being devastated. This is far more intense than the 12-Day War. American capabilities are far beyond those of the Israeli regime. And of course, the capabilities of the Israeli regime are American and Western. The regime itself is small, weak, and incapable of doing anything on its own. So I think the model for future relations will change. Iran won't allow these countries in the Persian Gulf, or any of its neighbors—including Azerbaijan or the northern part of Iraq, which has been semi-autonomous—to function the way they have in the past. So a lot of things will change. But I also think this is going to be a catastrophic defeat for Trump. It will end his presidency because it did not go as planned, as we expected. I mean, if you've been following—and I'm sure you have—what I've been saying has effectively turned out to be correct. They will not have a quick win. I've been saying this for a couple of years now. I said that Iran will shut down the Strait of Hormuz, and they won’t be able to reopen it. Iran has the missile and drone capabilities to sustain a long war. And I’m no genius—if the United States had competent analysts, if they had gone through the facts and the information that exists, and if they had been listening not just to me but to many others who’ve been saying the same thing on your show and on other shows, we wouldn’t have had this war. But the fact is, the West is ruled by ignorant and arrogant people. It’s not just Trump—it’s administration after administration: Obama, Biden, Bush. It doesn’t matter. This is an empire that is arrogant. It is not only void of any morality whatsoever, as we've seen through the Epstein files, but also, in its arrogance, it refuses to comprehend—or is incapable of comprehending—the other. It sees the other as weak, as vulnerable, as broken. It believes its own propaganda about the other—that it's popular, that it's about to implode. So when they contemplate attacking, they say to themselves, “Well, we can deal with them easily. We can destroy them easily.” But I think now, when facing Iran, they’ve hit a brick wall. Iran is not Venezuela. Iran is not Iraq. It’s not Syria. It’s not Libya. It’s not Afghanistan. It’s not even Vietnam. And so I think this is going to break the U.S. empire. #Pascal -- 4 of 11 -- One of the scariest insights for me from last week is just how many evangelical nutjobs there are in the current U.S. government, including the