The West's Biggest MISTAKE | Prof. Alastair Renfrew

## Introduction The prevailing Western narrative casts Moscow as an inherently expansionist power: hungry for territory, eager to redraw borders. Yet the conversation with Professor Alastair Renfrew compels a different reading. Far more than an ideology of conquest, centuries of Russian statecraft and memory are organized around one overriding imperative — survival. From the invasions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to the Second World War and the post‑Cold War order, security from encirclement and catastrophic attack has been the lodestar of policy. Recognizing that fact changes how we interpret Kremlin behavior, NATO enlargement, the wars in Georgia and Ukraine, and the shape of any realistic path back from the brink. ## Soviet Fears and Foreign Intervention To grasp contemporary Russian geopolitics, the conversation insists, you must go back to the chaotic years after 1917. What many call the Russian Civil War was not a purely internal struggle; expeditionary forces from Britain, France, Japan, the United States, Canada and others intervened between 1918 and 1922. That intervention — coupled with the repeated experience of invasions stretching back to Napoleon and the Crimean War — forged a political psychology in which “defense” and “survival” took precedence over exportable revolution. Renfrew stresses that Soviet policy in the 1920s and 1930s should be read through that lens. The turn to “socialism in one country” was not simply doctrinal; it was a defensively oriented response to a world that had once attempted to dismantle the Bolshevik state by force. Even where the Soviet Union supported foreign leftist movements, those actions were secondary to an overarching priority: preventing another existential encirclement. That history helps explain why, for leaders across the Russian political spectrum, security has repeatedly trumped other strategic objectives. ## The Lasting Impact of World War II The Great Patriotic War — the Eastern Front of the Second World War — amplified the defensive story and fixed it in national memory. The immense scale of Soviet sacrifice, the near‑annihilation posed by the Nazi invasion, and the existential character of the struggle made forward defense a non‑negotiable component of subsequent policy. For generations, the experience of 1941–45 has been the clearest proof that the only acceptable posture is one that prevents rapid, penetrating attacks and guarantees strategic depth. Renfrew highlights how this wartime trauma interacts with later leaders’ priorities regardless of their domestic politics. Whether one prefers to discuss Alexander I, Stalin, Gorbachev, or Putin, the common denominator is the prioritization of an order that minimizes the chance of territorial disaster. That explains why proposals for neutrality or collective security — epitomized by Gorbachev’s “common European home” — held such appeal inside Moscow; they promised the kind of guaranteed stability that would render decades of defensive paranoia redundant. The problem, Renfrew warns, is that such proposals were either misunderstood or ignored in the West. ## Georgia and the Provocation Trap A recurring dynamic described in the conversation is what might be called the “provocation trap”: steps taken by Western or Western‑aligned actors that, intentionally or not, reduce Russian security and then predictably provoke a defensive reaction that is labeled aggression. The 2008 Bucharest NATO summit looms large in this account. Russia had been signaling its desire for integration into a European security framework, but the decision by NATO leaders to keep open the prospect of Georgian and Ukrainian accession — even as Russia was present at the summit — marked a turning point. From Moscow’s perspective it was confirmation that enlargement would not stop at the fringes but could bring military alliance structures right up to Russia’s borders. Georgia in 2008 became a case study in how local crises can be escalated by this mismatch of intent and perception. Moves that NATO and some Western governments viewed as sovereign choices by Georgia were interpreted in Moscow as unacceptable encroachments into Russia’s strategic perimeter. The result was a confrontation that was described in the West as Russian aggression, but which also read as a defensive — even preemptive — measure to prevent longer‑term vulnerability. Renfrew uses this episode to caution against simplistic labels: provocation, misreading, and the failure of communicative empathy make recurrence likely. ## Who Gains From the War? One of the most uncomfortable questions posed by the exchange is forensic: who benefits from the continuation and escalation of conflict? Renfrew suggests that the winners are not obvious and that the costs and benefits are asymmetrical. Russia pays a heavy price in human life, economic pain, and political isolation; Ukraine suffers devastation and displacement; Europe faces soaring defense bills and energy insecurity. Yet strategic advantage can accrue to actors who profit politically and institutionally from crisis. There is, for instance, an institutional windfall for NATO and for Western defense industries when member states increase defense spending and deepen military ties. The war can also consolidate domestic political agendas that favor hardline stances and marginalize peacemakers. Renfrew’s analysis invites us to consider how the persistence of conflict may serve the political purposes of actors who thrive on a hostile, securitized environment — even when the ostensible goal of those actors is stabilizing the continent. Put simply: escalation can produce geopolitical rents for some even while producing ruin for most. ## Can Russia Avoid a Wider War? The final section of the discussion moves from history and diagnosis to the uneasy question of prevention: can Moscow be contained short of a wider conflagration, and can Europe find a way back to a stable security architecture? Renfrew argues that the path to peace requires realism and a willingness to listen — genuinely listen — to what Moscow is saying about its security needs. But he is skeptical that mere repetition of Russian positions will be sufficient. Communication broke down long before 2022; even earnest propositions for integration or neutrality were either misread or dismissed. What might a feasible settlement look like? The conversation points to arrangements that freeze or neutralize certain contested spaces, provide security guarantees that both sides can verify, and reduce the density of high‑value military assets on Europe’s most sensitive frontiers. Neutrality agreements for Ukraine, robust but balanced arms‑control frameworks, and confidence‑building measures offer partial answers. Yet Renfrew is blunt about the obstacles: political will in Western capitals, domestic pressures in Kyiv, and deep mistrust in Moscow complicate any negotiated outcome. There is also the structural danger of escalation by accident. The rearmament of Europe, while understandable, raises the stakes of tactical incidents. When large volumes of offensive weapons and tight timeframes for decision‑making converge, a localized clash can spin into wider war — an outcome that benefits no one. Avoiding such a spiral demands more than rhetoric; it requires concrete mechanisms for de‑escalation, cross‑communication between militaries, and third‑party mediation with real leverage. Conclusion Renfrew’s perspective reframes the West’s “biggest mistake” not as a single act but as a recurring failure of interpretation: mistaking defensive insecurity for imperial ambition. That error has concrete consequences. It has shaped policy choices, escalated crises, and produced a security architecture in which misperception is a constant hazard. If the West aims to reduce the risk of further war, the conversation suggests, it must do two difficult things at once: take Russian security concerns seriously

The West's Biggest MISTAKE | Prof. Alastair Renfrew They keep portraying Russia as a power-hungry mad-dog. But the truth is that whoever the leadership in Moscow (or St. Petersburg) was, the one thing all leaders wanted above all, was security. Security from centuries of invasion. Just how to communicate that to a West that is hell- bend on claiming the Kremlin is an expansionist power? Professor Alistair Renfrew of Durham University discusses the West’s long-running misunderstanding of Russian security policy. He examines Russian fears of invasion, the civil war intervention, NATO expansion, Georgia, Ukraine, the Minsk process, failed peace talks, and Europe’s rearmament. Renfrew argues that Russia’s policy is mainly defensive and warns that Europe is taking risks without a clear path to peace. Find Alastair on Substack: @alessandrodelguado & Alastair’s Novel: www.faktionbooks.com Support us here: Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com /shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:54 Why Russia Is Misunderstood 00:04:53 Soviet Fears and Foreign Intervention 00:09:50 Allied Intervention in 1918–22 00:13:16 The Lasting Impact of World War II 00:17:15 Why Russia’s Message Is Ignored 00:26:55 Georgia and the Provocation Trap 00:31:17 Minsk, Donbas and the 2022 Talks 00:35:11 Who Gains From the War? 00:42:59 Why Europe Is Rearming 00:49:58 Can Russia Avoid a Wider War? 00:53:42 Where to Follow Alistair Renfrew #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, today with Dr. Alistair Renfrew, a professor of English and Comparative Literature at Durham University. #Alastair Renfrew Alistair, welcome. Hello, delighted to be here, Pascal. #Pascal Glad to have you. You are another one of the wonderful minds that I recently met when we had this great conference in Pskov, Russia. And you have a different approach towards Russia, although you are also coming from Russian Studies and so on, but you are also a professor of literature. And you kind of said that one of the things that irks you is that you think there's a lot of misunderstanding— not just Russophobia, but misunderstanding in the West about Russian foreign policy. Why don't we start there? Can you give us a little bit of your overview on the misunderstandings? #Alastair Renfrew -- 1 of 15 -- Yeah, I mean, Russophobia is clearly linked to this historical misunderstanding. You know, just a little bit of a kind of prelude to my background. I describe myself as an ex-Russianist. I was a Russianist for 20 years, and I'm someone who kind of lost interest in Russia, if I can be that frank. In the early 2000s, the rise of the statist, borderline authoritarian modern Russia wasn't nearly as interesting to me as either the Soviet Union or the transitional period. But what has kind of provoked my interest, and this is fairly obvious again recently, is the current conflict and the circumstances that led to it. And a kind of reconfirmation to me that, just as we have failed to do at various periods over the long history of relations, particularly between Britain and Russia—but I think it applies more broadly, both at the level of elites and at the level of public consciousness—we really don't understand Russia enough or its motivations. Now, to frame that specifically in terms of foreign policy, which was what your question was, the fundamental thing to communicate is that Western countries—Britain in the 19th century chief among them—have consistently interpreted a defensive strategy on Russia's part as an aggressive or expansionist policy. That, to me, is the heart of the matter. That explains, you know, many historical standoffs between Russia and the West, and we can perhaps talk about those in detail. But it also fundamentally explains how we got to where we've got to in the Ukraine conflict. Russia—and we can go back as far as you wish—I mean, this really is, as well as being the kind of cornerstone of foreign policy, I think it's also deeply ingrained in the Russian psyche, this defensive mentality, this sense that Russia, the Russian state, is perpetually under threat, encircled. And that produces a kind of entrenched attitude of mind, which is then interpreted outside Russia as a manifestation of aggression or territorial ambition. #Pascal I mean, this is, I think, very, very important because the view also of Stalin and of other leaders of the Soviet Union was that they were trying to expand, right? But what we see actually, also when we go to the archives—and others like Jeff Roberts and so on would back that up—is this inherent kind of defensive thinking of Stalin, of how to make sure that he would not be attacked from either side. Actually, if you go further into the 1930s, he was very worried about the Japanese, very, very worried, because it split his forces so much. And also later on, with the occupation of Eastern Europe, basically, it’s not something that he was content with as a status quo, right? Because it drains the Red Army, the forces—it spreads them so much. Today's Russia is portrayed, again, as being neo-Soviet and also a neo-Russian empire that just wants to expand its territory. But I think if you actually look at everything that the Russian foreign policy elite tells us, nothing could be further from their thinking. What they want is to secure the Russian borders. Can you maybe give us your interpretation? #Alastair Renfrew -- 2 of 15 -- I mean, absolutely. The period that you referenced there, the 1930s and the Stalinist period, that, of course, is prepared by the moment of 1917. And what most people outside Russia, even educated people, don't choose to recall, if they ever knew, is that the Russian revolutions of 1917 were followed by an extended conflict, sometimes referred to as a civil war, sometimes referred to as a revolutionary war. And during that conflict, Russia was invaded by expeditionary forces from Britain, Germany, France, Austria, the United States, Canada, and Japan. There was a significant Japanese force on Russian territory in the years between 1918 and 1922. And this prepares, you know, if we think in terms of kind of, you know, Marxist symbology, you know, the revolution is made nominally in the name of world revolution. And that policy quickly transforms into socialism in one country, which in itself is a manifestation of a defensive stance. And that defensive stance is a product of the sense of being encircled and embattled. And since the Civil War of 1918 to roughly 1921, 1922, Soviet foreign policy—we can talk about Soviet foreign policy as distinct from contemporary Russian foreign policy—was basically conditioned by a very realistic fear that the Western powers would continue to seek to undermine the stability, security, and unity of the Soviet Union. So that prepares almost everything that happened between 1921–22 and the outbreak of the Second World War. Everything during that period has to be interpreted fundamentally in the context of a defensive strategy, rather than the rather cinematic sense that we're sometimes given of Russia or the Soviet Union as an expansionist power, hell-bent on exporting socialist revolution. It made certain movements in that direction through the Comintern, largely. And we know that there was support for, you know, trade union movements, socialist movements outside of Russia. But that's secondary to the defensive stance. The defensive stance is where we have to think—we have to begin to think differently about how we understand the motivations and the strategic priorities of Russia. During the Soviet period, before the Soviet period, I think that also held sway, and we can talk about that if you wish, but certainly since the Soviet period, certainly since the moment in 1998 when post-Soviet Russia realized once again that the Western powers, the NATO powers, were not necessarily its friend and ally in this process of transition from socialism to a market economy. #Pascal I mean, this is one of the fascinating things, right? In one of his final speeches, Gorbachev actually alluded—you know, he took over all of the jargon. He also said, like, you know, we haven't learned how to use freedom yet. Russia started using it—the Soviet Union first, and then Russia started using the language and the jargon of the West. But somehow then, at some point, had to understand that they would never be let into NATO and NATO would not dissolve. And that, of course, then creates the security problem all over again. And Gorbachev's great thing was the common European home, right? As in everybody secured together. And he had reasonable grounds to believe that this could work because he just saw how, over a period of 50, 60 years, these arch-enemies, France and Germany, made up with each other and -- 3 of 15 -- managed to become, you know, an economic unit basically. So it's not unfounded. Maybe you can speak to that. But before that, can you—because I actually belong to the people who were utterly unaware that between 1918 and 1922 there were expeditionary forces—can you talk a little bit about that? And, you know, it goes hand in hand, of course, with the first Napoleon and the Crimean War and then the First World War, you know, all of these waves where Russia was one of the targets of destruction. But I wasn't aware of the ’18 to ’22 one. Can you just explain that history a little bit? #Alastair Renfrew Well, again, the kind of popular understanding of the Russian revolutions—and this is understandable to a large extent—but the popular understanding focuses on immediate events on one night in October to go to the absolute heart of the matter. The reality of the Russian Revolution is that it was effectively fought until 1922. And the expeditionary forces that I refer to from the United States, Canada, Britain, France, and Japan—I think the Czechoslovak Legion played a minor role in the Siberian theater of conflict. This is how unlikely it seems to us. But the point is, one of the reasons to call that war a revolutionary war as opposed to a civil war is that a civil war implies that it's an internal conflict. And actually, the conflict wasn't an entirely internal conflict. The conflict is better characterized as a conflict in which foreign powers attempted to undo the success of the Bolsheviks—the political success of the Bolsheviks. And, you know, I should say that I'm not a historian, but I'm someone who has relied on historical sources in my own work. But if you look at historical maps of Russia between the moment of empire and the establishment of the Soviet Union, there are some quite dramatic maps which demonstrate how little territory the Bolsheviks controlled. You know, it's almost tiny, the part of the European heartland that was controlled by the Bolsheviks in 1919, 1920. And it's actually a miracle, in my estimation, that the Bolsheviks, the Reds, were ultimately successful in the Civil War. If you look at the dynamics of that conflict, a more likely outcome was victory for the White forces, including the expeditionary forces. So this, you know, people sometimes talk about the Russian psyche as being prepared by a long historical experience of invasion and encirclement. But here, deep into the 20th century, we have an example where Russia, in whatever form we conceive it—this kind of hybrid form between the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union—came very close to being conquered, effectively, by foreign forces. #Pascal Was it, I mean, in your estimation, was that actually just as dangerous at the moment, or even more dangerous than how far the Nazis came in ’41, ’42, when they almost reached Moscow? I mean, that was a huge land invasion, right? But the one around the 1920s was also pretty dramatic in that case, huh? #Alastair Renfrew -- 4 of 15 -- It was extremely dramatic. The difference between these two examples, of course, is that th