Australia's Suicide Strategy: US Puppet, China Paranoid, Lost in SEA | Amb. Dr. Geoff Raby

## A world reshaped by great powers, and Australia stuck in a bind The exchange makes a stark claim: the world has decisively returned to an era of great-power politics, and Australia has bound itself so closely to the United States that it can no longer independently navigate an increasingly contested region. That framing — that formal rules and institutions have given way to raw power projection and strategic calculation — runs through the conversation. Amb. Dr. Geoff Raby’s reflections on the decline of the “so‑called rules‑based order,” the hollowing out of institutions like the World Trade Organization, and China’s consolidation of Eurasia present a consistent picture: the cushions that once softened great‑power competition are fraying just as Asia‑Pacific dynamics become more volatile. For Australia, the result is a policy architecture that talks about regional equilibrium while structurally undermining any hope of achieving it. ## The retreat of rules and the revival of power politics A central theme that emerges is the unraveling of institutional constraints on state behaviour. What had been called a rules‑based international order—thin as its legal commitments often were—functioned in practice as a way to channel and discipline great‑power rivalry. The discussion points to recent developments as proof that this discipline has been weakening. Where previously disputes could be managed through adjudication, negotiated frameworks, and reciprocal commitments, decisions are increasingly made by calculation of interest and capacity, not by recourse to norms or third‑party arbitration. That change is not merely rhetorical. Examples raised in the conversation underscore how the instruments that once institutionalized restraint have been eroded. The importance of law and normativity in international affairs was never universal or evenly applied; yet the dismantling of dispute mechanisms and the more open embrace of transactional diplomacy signal a structural shift. When great powers no longer feel constrained by mutually binding processes, international relations revert toward a balance‑of‑power logic, where the capability to coerce or concede territory and influence becomes the decisive variable. ## The WTO as a symbol — and casualty — of the old order The World Trade Organization is used in the discussion as a concrete emblem of how the old order is collapsing from within. The WTO’s dispute settlement architecture, and particularly the Appellate Body, represented an ambitious attempt to depoliticize trade friction and create a self‑enforcing system of rules. That mechanism enabled smaller and middle powers to hold larger states to account in ways that raw power politics cannot accommodate. Amb. Raby explains how the United States’ refusal to permit new appointments to the Appellate Body effectively neutered a cornerstone of trade governance. This is not a technical quibble; it is a signal that a dominant power can walk away from the very architecture it helped build when domestic politics or short‑term calculations make compliance costly. The consequence is a global trading environment where adjudicative remedies are weakened, reciprocal measures become the norm, and the predictability that underpinned decades of economic integration is compromised. For countries that relied on rules to shield them from great‑power pressure, that is a dangerous development. ## The United States: architect, wrecking ball, and strategic pivot A recurring observation in the dialogue is the contradiction in U.S. behaviour over recent decades. Historically, the United States invested heavily in building institutions that constrained not only others but itself—WTO rules, arms control treaties, and multilateral networks. Yet the same country has at times played the wrecking‑ball role, abandoning or hollowing out those instruments when they no longer appear politically convenient. That cyclical pattern complicates strategic forecasting. On one hand, the U.S. still has an interest in a stable order that protects its global position; on the other, domestic politics and transactional leadership styles can lead to abrupt policy reversals. The conversation points to the possibility that U.S. strategy will reorient — perhaps away from Europe and the Russia confrontation and back toward the Indo‑Pacific — but notes uncertainty about whether such a pivot will be coherent, sustained, or rules‑guided. The essential point is that smaller and middle powers cannot reliably assume that the U.S.-led scaffolding will remain intact or constraining. ## China’s Eurasian preeminence and historical frames of security A major analytical thread is the interpretation of China’s intentions and posture. The argument made is less about inevitable imperial expansion and more about the consolidation of security and influence within Eurasia. Drawing on historical patterns, Amb. Raby suggests that China’s primary security mindsets have traditionally been continental and defensive: ensuring control over frontier regions and maintaining a buffer of compliant or tributary neighbours. The contemporary analogue, according to the conversation, is China’s deepening integration across Eurasia and its growing capacity to project power once its continental position is secure. This Eurasian consolidation matters because it changes Beijing’s strategic options. A China that can secure its periphery is less constrained to focus solely on border defense and more able to build a global maritime and economic reach. The analogy with U.S. historical development is instructive: as the United States consolidated the Western Hemisphere, it projected power across the Pacific. China’s modern trajectory toward naval build‑up and broader global presence may simply reflect parallel dynamics: security at home enabling global engagement. Yet the discussion also cautions against simplistic analogies; China’s aims may be framed foremost in terms of regime security and regional accommodation, rather than imperialist ambition modeled on 19th‑century European templates. ## Australia’s strategic dilemma: tethered, talkative, but tactically constrained Perhaps the most urgent theme for the Australian audience is the country’s apparent inability to independently shape its regional environment. The conversation highlights that Australia has bound its strategic posture tightly to U.S. alliances and initiatives—AUKUS, closer Quad cooperation, and other measures that signal alignment with Washington’s broader balancing effort. These ties create powerful security guarantees, but they also limit Canberra’s freedom to engage regionally on its own terms. The paradox is acute: Australian policymakers publicly advocate for a “strategic equilibrium” and good regional relations, yet the very policies designed to secure Australia—deepening military ties with the United States and enhancing interoperability—make regional nonalignment or balanced diplomacy practically impossible. The result is a credibility problem in the immediate neighborhood. Neighbours watch Australia’s force posture and alliance alignments and infer that Canberra is a U.S. proxy rather than an independent actor seeking genuine regional balance. This perception complicates Australia’s ability to broker or sustain the sort of accommodative arrangements that would reduce instability. ## Pathways forward: strategic realism, regional engagement, and the case for neutrality The conversation closes, implicitly, with questions about alternative approaches. If great‑power competition is the prevailing logic, what can middle powers like Australia do to avoid being consigned to the role of junior partner? The discussion suggests several, often uncomfortable, lessons. First, middle powers need to be candid about the limits of rules in the short term and prepare strategies grounded in strategic realism: assessing interests, capabilities, and the trade‑offs of alignment. That does n

Australia's Suicide Strategy: US Puppet, China Paranoid | Geoff Raby Today I‘m talking to Ambassador, Dr. Geoff Raby. Dr. Raby is an Australian economist who served as his country‘s Ambassador to China from 2007-2011. He currently runs a Beijing-based business advisory firm and he is a friend of Professor Hugh White, the brilliant Australian geopolitical analyst who was on this channel a few weeks ago. Dr. Raby published last November the book “Great Game on: The Contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy.” Today we want to talk again about Asia Pacific, China, and Australia as part of the puzzle. Book Links: Great Game On: https://www.mup. com.au/books/great-game-on-paperback-softback Other Books: https://www.amazon.com/stores /author/B001JXC578 #M3 We have so comprehensively tied ourselves to the Americans that we're unable to engage independently with our own region. And so, whilst the government talks about wanting strategic equilibrium in our region, wanting everyone to be on good terms and everything like that, strategically, it is impossible if you have an ascendant power and a dominant power, unless the ascendant and dominant powers come to some position of creating strategic space, which I don't rule out with Trump. But our problem is that Trump will not prosecute a values-based foreign policy. Quite clearly, he's not. So we have, for example, all of our actions, AUKUS, ramping up the Quad to summit level—all of these things show that we intend to achieve our security beyond our immediate region. And yet we talk the talk of this is where our security should be found. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Ambassador Dr. Geoff Raby. Dr. Raby is an Australian economist who served as his country's ambassador to China from 2007 to 2011. He currently runs a Beijing-based business advisory firm, and he is a friend of Professor Hugh White, the brilliant Australian geopolitical analyst who was on this channel a few weeks ago. Dr. Raby published last November the book "Neutrality, Great Game On: The Contest for Central Asia and Global Supremacy." Today we want to talk again about Asia-Pacific, China, and Australia's part as a piece of that puzzle. Ambassador Raby, welcome. #M3 Thank you. I'm happy to be here. #M2 -- 1 of 17 -- It's great talking to you because you're one of the international relations practitioners and not theoreticians, but you theorize about international relations in order to actually work in the field with your firm and previously as a diplomat. What is your interpretation of where the world stands in 2025 and where it is headed, especially in light of "Great Game On"? What's the most important thing to know about current world affairs? #M3 I think the most important thing is we've now, in a very dramatic way, moved to a world of great power relations. And this is a big change from where we've been under the Biden administration, and in fact, where we've been for the past 50 years. It's quite clear, even in the last couple of weeks—it's remarkable to watch in real time—we're witnessing the dissembling, dismantling of the so-called rules-based international order and returning to an order that's based on great powers and great powers asserting their will across the international system. #M2 About two years ago, I talked to an international lawyer here who pointed out that the whole term "rules-based international order" is kind of a trick of the U.S. to shift away from the ideas of international law. Because the rules-based international order, as Chas Freeman pointed out, is nowhere defined. But now we are moving away from that jargon into even newer territory. And is that territory, to you, one that will be more or less confined by, let's say, the norms of international law, the international norms of the world? #M3 Yeah, absolutely. And that's why I preface the mention of the rules-based order with "so-called," because different states see it quite differently. It has been U.S.-led, and it has set the norms for the international system. But I think there have been some key elements which have been set aside now, particularly, for example, the sanctity of borders and non-interference in other countries' affairs. By and large, since the Second World War, these things have been adhered to and followed more as norms, of course, than legally binding obligations. But there are other elements. You know, I was ambassador to the World Trade Organization for four years. I was very much involved with the original negotiations of the WTO. These were very much driven by the United States, particularly in creating the dispute settlement mechanism, which was a unique institutional creation. The U.S. invested heavily in that. Trump 1.0 set that aside, and Biden did nothing to rehabilitate it. So the WTO now is a very pale creature compared to what we had created in the 1990s. This is a huge change in the international system. But more recently, I mean, how President Trump has dealt with Ukraine single-handedly, indicating preparedness to concede territory that belongs to Ukraine, seeking mineral deals to offset U.S. military assistance—these -- 2 of 17 -- things are done outside any framework of rules. It's just an exercise of power. And this is what the new multipolar world, in my view, looks like. #M2 Can you explain that a little bit more? Because this is very interesting, the WTO issue, because the World Trade Organization is the outcome of the previous GATT agreement, right? The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade? Yes. And that itself is kind of a creation, a Cold War creation, or pre-Cold War, actually. It's part of what came out of the... I'm sorry, yes, yes. The Second World War, the reestablishment of rules or of an order to facilitate trade, especially among Western nations, right? Among the non-communist part of the world. And those rules were supposed to help this liberal idea of free trade, right? That was the name of the game. Can you explain that a bit more? #M3 Yeah, well, look, a bit of history as well. I mean, we came out of the failure of the U.S. Congress in the late 1940s to ratify that aspect of the Bretton Woods agreements. The Bretton Woods agreements created the IMF, the World Bank, and there was to be an International Trade Organization. But the U.S. Congress would not ratify that part of the Bretton Woods Agreement. It felt there was too much imposition on U.S. domestic policy. It reduced its freedom too much. So the GATT was a very clever diplomatic artifice where it wasn't a treaty as such. It was agreements amongst individual states one-on-one to adhere to certain commitments that they made in their tariff schedules. And it was very limited in its scope. It just dealt with trading goods, physical trading goods. The WTO basically was an achievement of U.S. diplomats and a triumph of U.S. politicians, liberal internationalist politicians, over the U.S. Congress. It created a freestanding institution with its own secretariat and—this is the key thing—a dispute settlement mechanism that had the capacity to impose costs on members which did not conform to their obligations. Now, people make the mistake with the dispute settlement mechanism and think somehow it's a judicial body. It is, on one hand, but what it requires members to do is to bring their trade practices into conformance with their obligations. The enforcement mechanism is not an external punishment as such. It legitimizes other countries to impose tariffs on the country found in breach of its obligations, if you like, to restore balance to the original agreements that were struck in the WTO negotiations. #M2 Yeah, this is central because this is the problem of adjudication of grievances in international trade relations. It's as old as international relations itself, right? And having a mechanism to actually resolve grievances pragmatically in trade issues is important, and the WTO was such a mechanism. But now what happened is that the United States kind of checkmated its own mechanism by refusing -- 3 of 17 -- to appoint a judge to the Appellate Body. Can you explain that technical detail because it's really crucial? #M3 Yeah, well, the Appellate Body has, gosh, I forget exactly the number, eight or 12 judges. And they are appointed by consensus of the membership of the WTO. But there has to be consensus. In fact, everything that happens in the WTO is based on consensus. It's one thing the U.S. has always had trouble with because a small state can block a huge, powerful state if it won't join the consensus. But it doesn't really work that way, and the U.S. is still able to exercise power in the way it has done customarily. So with the Appellate Body, this panel of judges will look at a dispute. The participants in the dispute will argue their cases. There will be a judgment session, and then that body will authorize the aggrieved party to take certain measures in terms of increasing their tariffs or imposing other restrictions against the country found to be in breach of its obligations. But this introduced into the WTO, which made it unique among all other international bodies, what we call black letter law—a law that was enforceable, written down, and something that conformed very much to the U.S. legal system and the U.S. approach to legal matters, where things are less done by precedent and more by black letter law that's written down. Now, the whole thing was very much a U.S.-driven approach, a U.S.-driven agenda. And that's the great tragedy, of course, with the U.S. walking away from it under Trump, who, as you rightly said, refused to appoint an appellate judge, or I should say, refused to join the consensus for any new appointments to the Appellate Body. And the Appellate Body members have to retire after a certain amount of time. So the numbers in the Appellate Body just reduced and reduced because the U.S. has not yet joined a consensus to appoint new Appellate Body judges. #M2 It's really interesting how the United States goes through these regular cycles of building certain structures and then itself being the wrecking ball that tears them down. It's really fascinating because it also speaks, of course, to the way the power distribution in the international system is set up. On the one hand, countries have an interest in joining the U.S. in building structures, also with a goal of confining the U.S. a little bit, as in, okay, we give you this, but in return, we know the parameters within which you move. But then the wrecking ball comes and tears down the parameters again. #M3 Yeah, I mean, it's very hard to get to the point where you can build a structure with the U.S., given that everything has to be ratified through Congress. But if the U.S. is in a period of showing global -- 4 of 17 -- international leadership, that's possible. It can be done, as we have seen. The key thing is that it's not just the U.S. We need these rules to constrain the behavior of all great powers. And for most of us, most countries in the world, middle or small countries, we need to have some sort of constraints on the behavior of great powers. That's why, in my opening remarks, I began with the point that we are now back in a world of great power relations. This has been driven very much by Trump. #M2 But there's an argument to say that even under Biden and previously, even though people use the speech acts of rules-based international order, even though they use speech acts of international law, under the hood, they just don't conform to it. So the difference now is that we have an administration that doesn't use the hypocritical speech acts, but the game was the same even before. How do you see that one? #M3 I think it's much more nuanced than that. And I think the U.S. was prepared to restrain its actions in various ways through a whole lot of disarmament agreements, through the WTO. In many ways, the U.S. was prepared