How Trump's Tariffs Are Pushing the World to China | Cyrus Janssen @CyrusJanssen

## Preview & Intro A striking paradox runs through contemporary geopolitics: policies intended to punish China are accelerating the world’s pivot toward it. The recorded exchange with Cyrus Janssen sketches how a mix of American political shifts, tariff-driven protectionism, and decades-long commercial entanglement have combined to strengthen China’s economic centrality rather than weaken it. Far from a simple tale of coercion and retreat, what emerges is a layered narrative in which global supply chains, corporate incentives, and domestic political anxieties interact—producing results neither the architects of tariffs nor their loudest critics fully anticipated. The conversation refuses easy binaries. It reframes China’s rise as a product of reciprocal economic engagement, historical choices on both sides of the Pacific, and the logic of firms chasing market access and profit. Equally important, it situates recent U.S. tariff policy as both a symptom and accelerant: symptomatic of domestic discontent and elite capture, accelerant of geopolitical realignments that may entrench China’s position in the global economy. The following sections unpack that argument: the historical roots of China’s economic success, the lessons from tariff fights, probable responses by China and the BRICS group, and whether the United States will address the internal inequalities fuelling protectionist politics. ## The Origins of China's Economic Success China’s ascent did not spring from a vacuum. The conversation emphasizes continuity from early Communist-era thinking through Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatic reforms: a strategic choice to open, attract investment, and industrialize rapidly. Even under Mao, the idea of engaging with the United States for economic benefit existed; what changed was the political willingness to blend state direction with market incentives. Deng’s reforms of the 1980s marked the decisive shift—from ideological isolation to an embrace of manufacturing, export-led growth, and foreign direct investment. Crucially, Western firms played an active role in enabling that trajectory. Multinationals, American CEOs, and investors seeking lower costs and burgeoning markets built factories, transferred skills, and created ecosystems in which Chinese suppliers could learn and upgrade. This was not passive benefaction; firms pursued mutual gains. Apple, Starbucks, and countless other companies multiplied their reach by tapping Chinese labor, scale, and increasingly, Chinese demand. Over time, the country moved from low-cost assembler to sophisticated integrator and innovator in many technologies—solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles among them. The historical account complicates a popular reverse-causality claim—that China’s rise was a mistake imposed by U.S. policy. Instead, it portrays a co-evolution: American companies and policy choices facilitated growth, but Chinese state planning and industrial policy, combined with massive domestic markets and consistent investment in skills and infrastructure, enabled a rapid upgrade. Manufacturing proficiency seeded later innovation. The solar industry is a vivid case: once dominated by Western producers, it now sits largely within China’s supply chain because of deliberate industrial policy, scale effects, and continuous learning. ## Lessons from the US-China Tariff Wars Tariff battles are rarely the blunt instruments their proponents imagine. The recent American turn toward tariffs—high-profile, ideologically charged, and expansive in scope—was traced in the conversation to domestic political dynamics as much as to strategic considerations. Tariffs ride the wave of populist simplification: promises to “bring jobs back” and “make things in America” resonate because they map onto real economic dislocation and cultural anxieties. Yet the conversation warns that rhetoric does not translate neatly into economic reality. Empirically, tariffs change incentives for private actors. For firms embedded in global supply chains, tariffs raise costs and uncertainty; the predictable response is not mass reshoring to the U.S., but supply-chain diversification, substitution, or consolidation in lower-cost or friendlier jurisdictions. The effect documented by Cyrus Janssen and reflected in the exchange is that tariffs can accelerate “China-centrality” by pushing firms to relocate production within Asia while retaining China as a central hub for input, scale, and innovation. Moreover, tariffs against allies complicate alliances and can erode trust, prompting partners to seek alternatives within blocs like BRICS. A second lesson is political: tariffs act as signals. They signal a protectionist turn and, to foreign governments, an unpredictable trading partner. Once perceived as unreliable, U.S. trade policy loses leverage. That loss is costly: economic coercion depends on credibility. When credibility falters, targeted sanctions and tariffs have less bite and more unintended consequences—like stimulating competitors to invest in domestic capabilities or to deepen intra-bloc trade to hedge against American pressure. Finally, tariffs often obscure more than they reveal about underlying economic problems. The conversation repeatedly returns to the distinction between symptoms and causes. Tariffs attempt to repair trade deficits and manufacturing decline without tackling the structural forces that produced them: automation, technological change, and deepening wealth concentration. In that sense, the tariff is a political balm that risks further distorting the economic landscape while delivering little on its promises. ## How China & BRICS Will Respond to US Trade Policy Anticipating strategic responses, the conversation highlights the BRICS platform and China’s policy playbook: scale, integration, and hedging. China has both the capacity and the incentive to offer alternatives to markets and supply chains that face U.S. trade disruptions. BRICS, as an aggregate of sizeable and growing economies, provides institutional cover for commercial reorientation—financing, currency arrangements, and investment initiatives that lower dependence on dollar-centric structures and Western-dominated markets. China’s likely responses are pragmatic rather than purely retaliatory. Rather than attempting a zero-sum blockade, China will deepen trade ties where mutual benefit is clear, expand infrastructure frameworks (financing, ports, logistics), and pursue technological self-reliance in critical nodes. The solar and EV sectors serve as templates: move up the value chain while leveraging scale economies and global demand. Where possible, China will also court allies and partners to create resilient, alternative networks: supply chains that source, produce, and distribute within a broadly Eurasian- and Global South-centric space. The conversation also notes tactical restraint. Escalation risks global economic pain that harms China as well, so calibrated responses—targeted tariffs, investment diversification, currency policy, and diplomatic initiatives—are more likely than reckless retaliation. At the same time, BRICS and like-minded partners will use the political moment to reinforce their own institutions (development banks, trade agreements), encouraging partners to lock in trade ties that bypass unilateral U.S. pressure. The end result is a more multipolar economic topology in which the U.S. loses some of its unilateral levers. ## Will the US Address Its Internal Wealth Gap? 00: 44:42 Comparing the Mood of the Working Class: US vs. China The political context feeding tariffs is as important as the trade mechanics. A central strand of the conversation focuses on domestic inequality in the United States: a concentration of wealth among a few tech megacaps and a political system increasingly responsive to moneyed interests. This inequality underpins populist narratives that scapegoat foreign competition rather than confronting the domes

How Trump's Tariffs Are Pushing the World to China today I’m talking to Cyrus Janssen, an international business consultant, entrepreneur and fellow youtube analyst with a very large channel, nearing 1 million subscribers. With over 10 years experience doing business in China, he posts shot-form analysis as well as longer interviews often focusing on China and BRICS developments. This is what we want to discuss today. Links: Cyrus' channel: @CyrusJanssen Neutrality Studies Goods Shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall. com Timestamps: 00:00:00 Preview & Intro 00:02:02 Background & Positive View on China 00:07:21 The Origins of China's Economic Success 00:13:00 Why the "Unfair Trade" Narrative is Popular in the US 00:20:46 Lessons from the US-China Tariff Wars 00:25:04 Is Trump Forcing Foreign Ownership of US Assets? 00:31:23 How China & BRICS Will Respond to US Trade Policy 00:36:51 How Chinese Companies Will Navigate the US Market 00:41:40 Will the US Address Its Internal Wealth Gap? 00: 44:42 Comparing the Mood of the Working Class: US vs. China 00:52:12 Is it Easy for Foreign Companies to Do Business in China? #M3 The way that our capitalist system is set up is that it has produced these exceptional billionaires who have a tremendous amount of power. I mean, if you look at what we call the Magnificent Seven stocks—this is your Amazon, Nvidia, Google, Facebook, Tesla, Microsoft, your biggest seven companies—they make up around 40% of the stock market. So, if you think about it, the entire US stock market is made up of about 40% from these seven stocks. And as you look at these CEOs, every one of them has hundreds of billions of dollars in net worth. And interestingly enough, most of them were on stage with President Trump during the inauguration. Unfortunately, especially in the United States, in our political system, it is a pay-for-play system. You have to have a tremendous amount of money to be successful in American politics. Do I see this being addressed? No. Unfortunately, I see the gap only getting bigger. #M2 Hello, everybody. This is Pascal Lottaz from Neutrality Studies, and today I'm talking to Cyrus Janssen, an international business consultant, entrepreneur, and fellow YouTube analyst with a very large channel nearing 1 million subscribers. With over 10 years of experience doing business in China, Cyrus often posts short-form analysis as well as longer interviews, often focusing on China and BRICS developments. This is what I want to discuss with him today to get his take on where world geopolitics is headed. So, Cyrus, welcome. -- 1 of 19 -- #M3 Thank you so much, Pascal. I've been a big fan of the channel and I'm very honored to be here. Thank you. #M2 Thank you very much for taking the time. I mean, you have this special position in that you’ve spent a lot of time in China and you’ve experienced China firsthand over the last 15 years or so. I think I saw that you first went there in 2007, correct? You took a contrarian view early on, also regarding what was happening in Hong Kong during the protests in 2019. Maybe just give us a little more of your background—how it comes that you see China today in a more positive light than it is often portrayed in the West. #M3 Yeah, no problem. So, like you said, I first went to China in 2007, and I started my career there. This was just right after university—I graduated, and two weeks later, I bought a one-way ticket to Shanghai. That's where I started my career. You know, 2007 was a very pivotal time for China. This was really when China was starting to open up and become the superpower that we now see today. In 2007, the GDP grew 14.4%, so the economy was roaring. Of course, Beijing hosted the Olympics in 2008, and in Shanghai, we had the 2010 World Expo. So there was a really golden period of time when you could see the Chinese economy growing very fast. And of course, this was during the economic recession in the West, right? You know, the 2008 Great Financial Crisis started with the mortgage crisis in the USA. And so you started to see this very big shift, where there were a lot of companies coming to China. For example, I was working with the American Chamber of Commerce. We had hundreds and hundreds of American companies coming to China, doing big business deals. I mean, at that time, it was an amazing time to be in China, especially as an American, because it was really a golden opportunity to do business, to make a lot of money, and to foster this great relationship between the United States and China, working together. Of course, I think what's very sad about this is that as time went on, China started to get bigger and bigger, and there started to be a noticeable shift in the relationship between the United States and China. Unfortunately, I think the United States became a little bit too intimidated by the rise of China. If you go back to the early days, with George Bush and then also Barack Obama, the message was very much: "We don't fear a rising China, because if your economy is doing well, you can buy more American products. We can make money selling products to you—there's no problem." And then that attitude shifted toward China. -- 2 of 19 -- Well, we don't want you to grow too much because, you know, you're growing a little bit too fast now. And we want you to make sure that you're, you know, a distant second place from the United States, who should always be the world hegemon and we should always be number one. So there's very much this American protectionist mindset, very much this American exceptionalism that, you know, we should be the best and that we are the best. And so this really started to change a lot of things. And of course, you know, China has evolved a lot. And so, I mean, we've seen, you know, how China has changed. And I think, unfortunately, our media in the West has really portrayed China in a certain light that is often very different from what people actually experience. And so, of course, COVID in 2020 was a very difficult time for the entire world. This is really, I would say, the height of that, where a lot of people began to look at China and say, "This is China's fault that we had COVID." And then, of course, China closed its borders for the better part of four years. So it was a very difficult time for Westerners to start to get an understanding of China. And that was not a good time for China as well, because if you look back at China's history, when China was closed off to the world, that's when it was actually at its poorest. I think a healthy economy needs to have trade. It needs to have communication. It needs to have international visitors. So now we fast forward to 2025, and I think that we're seeing a revival of this. International tourism is growing very fast to China. Many Westerners are now discovering China through social media, by understanding what life is really like in China. And so I just always want to say that I never want anybody to be influenced by the media. I always want you to—if you've never been to Europe, or to South America, or to Asia, or China, wherever it is—go and experience it for yourself. I think that's always my message. And there's always a lot more than what the media is going to tell you. #M2 Oh, yes. And funnily enough, there are always certain themes that the media, or at least mainstream media, kind of tries to serve. And the current one is that China is that kind of threatening menace on the other side of the Pacific. But, you know, the idea that China is a problem didn't start yesterday, right? I mean, Obama declared in 2016 the great pivot to Asia. And I remember, you know, this narrative of the "China threat"—that thing is 15, 20 years old as well, at least. Yes, yes. And if we look at the discourse right now, what we find is that even people I admire very much, like John Mearsheimer and others, say, "Look, letting China into the WTO, the World Trade Organization, and letting it become a rich country was probably a bad decision by the United States." And I always ask myself, how come people frame China's rise as a function of US foreign policy? Tell me a little bit about your experience. The fact that China is good at business and is so pivotal today for the world economy—where did that come from, in your analysis? -- 3 of 19 -- #M3 Well, I think, you know, what's really interesting, Pascal, is if you actually go all the way back to Chairman Mao—so, Mao Zedong—I mean, Mao Zedong was actually very, very adamant about building a better relationship with the United States. So, you know, we go back 50, 60 years ago in China, and again, at this point, China was one of the top 10 poorest countries in the world. So this is quite an amazing period of time when we look back at this era. But even Mao Zedong was very adamant about opening China up and actually building some relationship. And he said, if we can work with the United States, we need the United States to come in here. We need them to invest, and we believe there's a lot of potential in China, but it will be to open up. Unfortunately for Chairman Mao, the United States government never wanted to talk to him because he was a communist. They just said, "There's no way we can have any dialogue with you because you are the enemy." And you have to remember, if you go back to this history, Chiang Kai-shek, who went over to Taiwan, was funded tremendously by the United States government. I mean, the US government poured in hundreds of millions of dollars backing Chiang Kai-shek. And there was actually a huge loss of face for the United States government, because at that time, they actually thought that Chiang Kai-shek had more power in mainland China. So they said, if we can really back Chiang Kai-shek, if we can give him hundreds of millions, he's going to be able to lead a revolution and establish China as a democracy. Then the United States will be able to exert our power and control over that region. But of course, Chiang Kai-shek was really nothing more than a mercenary in many ways. I mean, he was just all about the money. There was a nickname that they called him, you know, "Chang Cash My Check," instead of Chiang Kai-shek, because he really just made so much money off of the US government. But unfortunately, he had no power there. And so, very, very foolishly, the United States did not respect Chairman Mao. They did not realize that he really had the people's support and then, of course, was able to establish the China that we know now in 1949, establishing the People's Republic of China. But I think, as we— I wanted to lay that foundation down because, again, it has always been China wanting to open up. Of course, then we saw that with Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s, who really said, "Look, now we're going to really open up China and we're going to embrace these capitalistic measures." Deng Xiaoping came to the United States, wore the cowboy hat, started going around touring different facilities. And this was, again, the 1980s—still, China was not a rich nation at all, and it had this opportunity to grow. I think it really is a combination of both. I do think that the United States was very beneficial to China in its rise because it's about doing business. But what we always have to remember is that it's American CEOs and American companies who are going to China, building factories, building companies, and working with the Chinese people. -- 4 of 19 -- So, you know, it always strikes me as a very interesting conversation when I hear Americans today say things like, "We don't need China. We don't need to manufacture anything in China. We should have zero trade with China," where I'm like, hey, have you paid attention to the last 40 years? It's our American companies that go to China, right? It's our American companies that are wanting to expand there. And I would say, for example, let's take Apple—one of the most successful companies in history. It's been an