Iran War Reaches India. Escalation Spreading | Kanwal Sibal

The sinking of an Iranian naval vessel in waters near the Indian Ocean has turned a technical military strike into a diplomatic crisis with wide-ranging consequences. What might have been treated as another episode in an escalating conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel instead landed squarely on India’s doorstep — both literally and figuratively — forcing New Delhi to confront the limits of its strategic autonomy. The exchange recorded with former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal reframes this incident not only as an affront to Indian ceremonial hospitality but as a symptom of deeper miscalculations by external actors whose actions now threaten the stability of the Indian Ocean littoral and India’s ability to pursue a balanced foreign policy. ## The Incident and Its Immediate Implications The facts discussed are stark: an Iranian ship, invited to participate in India’s biennial Milan naval gathering, was later struck and sunk while transiting the Indian Ocean — reportedly within the exclusive economic zone of a neighboring state — with significant loss of life. The ship had been part of an exercise explicitly designed to build maritime confidence among Indian Ocean states, and India had welcomed Iran as a guest. That sequence transforms a military operation into a diplomatic problem, because it involves an act of violence directed at a vessel that was, by intent, under India’s hospitality. Kanwal Sibal foregrounds the symbolic insult: the vessel had saluted India’s president and participated in a parade; it was not an anonymous warship in a combat zone. The timing and location therefore created acute political fallout in India, where opposition voices demanded a response and public sentiment leaned toward outrage. Beyond emotion, the episode raises concrete questions about information-sharing, operational deconfliction, and respect for host-nation sensitivities in contested spaces — all of which are now under strain. ## India’s Indian Ocean Posture and Strategic Doctrine India’s maritime strategy has long emphasized the Indian Ocean as a zone of commerce, connectivity, and responsibility. The conceptual architecture — exemplified by doctrines and initiatives such as SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) and Mahasagar (a broader vision of maritime stewardship) — positions India as a net security provider and a first responder for humanitarian contingencies. Milan, the naval exercise, embodies this cooperative posture: an inclusive forum aimed at fostering mutual confidence among littoral states rather than signaling exclusionary security blocs. Sibal underscores the contradiction between that approach and the behavior of major powers that have introduced open hostility into the maritime domain. India’s navy is significant in the region and has historically sought to reassure neighboring states about its peaceful intent. The sinking, therefore, is not merely an affront to protocol; it undermines the credibility of India’s inclusive narrative and complicates the operational environment in which India seeks to exercise benign influence. If war-making is normalized in what India has long treated as common waters, the very architecture of maritime confidence-building is at risk. ## Balancing Relations: Israel, the Gulf, Iran, and the United States India’s foreign policy is characterized by a complex web of overlapping relationships. Over recent decades New Delhi has deepened ties with Israel — an important defense and technological partner — even while simultaneously cultivating closer economic and strategic relations with Gulf states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, India has invested in infrastructure projects involving Iran (notably Chabahar port and energy collaborations), and maintains longstanding trade and geopolitical interests across West and Central Asia. The conversation with Sibal sketches how India has sought to thread this needle: extracting strategic benefits from Israel, building expansive trade and investment links with Gulf monarchies, and preserving channels of engagement with Iran where possible. But this balancing act was precarious even before the incident; U.S. pressure in previous years had already constrained Indian dealings with Iran, particularly around energy purchases and sanctions compliance. The sinking intensifies that dilemma by pitting New Delhi’s relations with the United States and its Gulf partners against the residual equities and strategic imperatives that tie India to Iran. Sibal is blunt: the U.S.–Israeli decision to put military pressure on Iran — and to do so in ways that affect Indian waters and forums — reflects a lack of sensitivity to regional implications. If India shows either support for Iran or overt alignment with the U.S. campaign, it risks alienating one pole of its own partnership architecture; either choice carries diplomatic and economic costs. The calculus is further complicated because Gulf partners, particularly the UAE, have been instrumental in India’s contemporary Middle East policy and economic outreach. ## Neutrality under Pressure: India’s Policy Choices Neutrality in this context is not passive indifference but a difficult posture of calibrated autonomy. India’s response to earlier crises — for instance, its refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine — demonstrated an appetite for independence in foreign policy that derives from both strategic interests and historical experience. Yet the current crisis tests that independence in new ways. The ship’s sinking functions as a forcing event: it compels India to articulate where it stands on the legitimacy of unilateral use of force, on norms of maritime sanctity, and on the political act of hosting another state’s warship. Sibal suggests that India’s prior behavior — inviting Iran to Milan, maintaining ties despite external pressure — signals a preference for a middle course. But he also notes the narrow margin for maneuver. An overt condemnation of the U.S. and Israel risks damage to defense cooperation, intelligence sharing, and broader strategic alignment. Conversely, accommodating the U.S. line could damage India’s ties with Iran and undermine its credibility as a regional interlocutor capable of engaging diverse actors. In short, neutrality is being squeezed from both directions: coercion from external players and domestic political expectations for a principled reaction. The dilemma also highlights the difference between neutrality as a moral stance and neutrality as a strategic necessity. For New Delhi, neutrality has historically been a tool to protect national interests — enabling trade, preserving supply routes, and maintaining strategic flexibility. The current environment, however, places moral and strategic pressures on the same fulcrum; doing nothing can be read as tacit approval by some audiences, while a strong action can foreclose future options. ## Regional Consequences and the Middle East–Indian Ocean Nexus The longer-term implications extend well beyond bilateral friction. The Indian Ocean’s security environment is intimately connected to stability in the Persian Gulf: trade, energy flows, and regional shipping lanes such as the Strait of Hormuz are mutually dependent. Disruption in one theater reverberates in the other. Sibal warns that the assumption underpinning the U.S. approach — that a decapitation or regime-change model could rapidly neutralize Iran’s strategic reach — is a profound miscalculation. Iran’s regional networks, demographic presence, and strategic depth mean that military coercion will produce persistent instability rather than a tidy political outcome. Moreover, the opening of hostilities and the possibility of prolonged conflict raise clear economic risks: insurance rates spike, ships pause commercial operations, and energy markets face sustained volatility. For India, a major importer of Gulf oil and

Iran War Reaches India. Escalation Spreading | Kanwal Sibal As Iran War spreads throughout the region, India finds itself between a rock and a hard place. With the US sinking an unarmed Iranian Navy vessel that was in the Indian ocean on the invitation of the Indian government, Washington put New Delhi into an extraordinarily difficult spot. Make an enemy of Iran or alienate the USA even further after India's defiance regarding Russian oil sanctions? Today I'm discussing with one of India's former Foreign Secretaries, His Excellency, Dr. Kanwal Sibal. Support us on Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Our shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop. fourthwall.com #Pascal Welcome back, everybody. Today, for the first time, we’re joined by His Excellency Kanwal Sibal, former Foreign Secretary of India and Chancellor of Jawaharlal Nehru University. Dr. Sibal, welcome. #Kanwal Sibal Thank you very much for inviting me. #Pascal Well, thank you very much for agreeing to this. You actually tweeted about the incident that happened last week, in which the United States sank an Iranian ship that was on its way back from a parade in India—on the invitation of the Indian government. On its way back, it was sunk by the United States, and I think over 80 sailors died. The U.S. also refused to rescue the survivors. Can you tell us your assessment of this affair and how impactful you think it is for India? #Kanwal Sibal You know, this exercise that India holds every two years is called the Milan exercise. In Hindi, “Milan” means getting together, or confluence. The entire exercise is about encouraging and establishing cooperative mechanisms on the ground in the Indian Ocean to promote peace and secure those very important lines of communication, because it’s through the Indian Ocean that your energy and trade flow—especially toward East Asia, which is absolutely critical. Now, there are so many countries with their navies, and India has a very strong navy—perhaps, apart from the United States, which isn’t an Indian Ocean power, we have the strongest navy in the region. -- 1 of 17 -- So it has always been our endeavor to create confidence in the littoral countries—the Indian Ocean countries—about the positive agenda that the Indian Navy has to encourage mutual understanding and security. In other words, the whole aim of the exercise is to promote peace and understanding. Now, Iran was invited to this exercise, which includes a fleet review and a parade before our president, who accepts the salute, and the Iranian contingent also marched before her. So they were our guests. The Americans had also been invited, and they have participated regularly in the past. But this time, at the last minute, they withdrew. But as I understand it, their P-8 aircraft—their maritime surveillance aircraft, which is extremely powerful—did participate in the exercise. Now, it would appear that the Americans may have decided to withdraw at the last minute because the Iranian Navy was participating, and there was a U.S. armada massed around Iran in the Persian Gulf area. Since they had this maritime surveillance aircraft, I assume they could track the movement of the ship. When the ship left the Indian shore, the Indian port, and was in the EEZ of Sri Lanka, it was sunk. Eighty died, thirty were rescued, and others are missing because it had a larger contingent on board. Now, India, as I said, has been very active in creating this sense of mutual confidence in the Indian Ocean. We have a concept called *Sagar*, which in Sanskrit means “ocean,” but it stands for “Security and Growth for All in the Region.” And then we have *Mahasagar*, which means “great ocean,” which also projects India as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, because we have been the first responders whenever there’s been a tsunami or any kind of natural disaster, and so on. Our entire philosophy in the Indian Ocean is very different from what the Americans have done— bringing war to the Indian Ocean. Now, if they had sunk this ship close to the Persian Gulf, when it had almost reached home—and that is a war area, a conflict zone—then it would have presented a somewhat different picture for us. But doing it in our vicinity, in the context of what I explained, to my mind, is totally unacceptable. And the Americans didn’t take us into confidence. They knew this would embarrass us. Indian public opinion, especially the opposition, is very agitated that the Americans have done this and the government has not condemned it or even expressed condolences for the loss of lives. So this became a pretty hot political issue in India. So that’s the background. #Pascal And where does this put India now? The war—the United States and Israel actually started it just a couple of days after your prime minister, Narendra Modi, visited Israel. He tweeted very publicly about visiting his great friend Benjamin Netanyahu, and he was very open about it, really used it as a PR moment. Then, only a few days later, the US and Israel attacked Iran, and then this ship was sunk. So, is this now changing the way the Modi government can, or does, approach its relationship with either Israel or the United States? -- 2 of 17 -- #Kanwal Sibal Well, you know, with Israel, we've had a very long-standing relationship. They’ve been extremely helpful to us on the security side at critical moments. Since they also feel targeted by terrorism, we’ re on the same wavelength when it comes to dealing with and countering terrorism, because we’ve suffered from it for a long, long time. And in terms of equipment, material, and technologies that can help us fight terrorism, they’ve been very helpful in the past. They’re now a major source of defense equipment for India. In fact, their biggest defense partner in the world, in terms of Israeli arms exports, is India. And then there are other areas—agriculture and so on—where they have technologies from which India has benefited. So it's a longstanding relationship. At the same time, in the last few years, we’ve really deepened our ties with the Gulf countries, especially with the UAE, which has become our principal partner in the Gulf and the main hub of our policy there, along with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has also become a close partner, though somewhat less so. Both these countries have actually been cooperating with us in counterterrorism activities, especially the UAE. And then, as you know, there are all these projects of I2U2—India, Israel, the United States, and the UAE—in terms of future cooperation. This was at a time when it seemed that the Abraham Accords were gaining some traction. And Saudi Arabia has also been part of this larger remodeling of the Gulf in terms of its relationship with Israel. As you know, there’s the IMEC—the India–Middle East Economic Corridor—of which Saudi Arabia is a part. The initial concept was that it would go to Haifa and from Haifa to Greece, so Israel was part of it. And you know, and I know, that behind the scenes, Israel and Saudi Arabia have had a very constructive and close dialogue. These have never been mentioned openly. Bahrain has also established diplomatic relations with Israel, along with the UAE. So we’ve had, therefore, the possibility of balancing our ties with both Israel and the Gulf countries, especially the UAE, where we signed the FTA with them within 90 days. And really, it has benefited both sides. Our bilateral trade has gone up to $70 billion, and by 2030 it will reach $100 billion. We are tied up with the UAE, and this region—especially the UAE—is focused on future technologies because their ambition has been to become a center for advanced technologies: AI, semiconductors, even space and everything else. They have the money, and they are now preparing for an era when they won’t have to depend on oil for development. So they’re developing a different model of growth in which India, their historical neighbor, has the capacity and the human talent to scale things up. There’s been a real synergy of interests, including in terms of food security. One of our biggest exports to this area is food. Anyway, we’ve been able to balance that. Iran has been an issue. But then there was tangible, visible progress in relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, which was brokered a little bit by China toward the end. They re-established diplomatic ties. There was a sense of confidence developing because Saudi Arabia, with its own development plans—the NEOM project, which is very, very ambitious, though it has been scaled down now—required peace in the Middle -- 3 of 17 -- East, in this region. Because if there was no peace, if there was a constant threat of conflict and war, then the investment that Saudi Arabia expected would not have come in, and so on. So now that model has broken down. Iran, because of the U.S.–Israeli war against it—which to my mind is totally, totally uncalled for and a very serious mistake—has suffered as a result. And it’s not in their hands to fix the kind of situation they’ve created in the short to medium term. This is going to be a huge problem for India. As we go forward, I can explain why that is. But we don’t have many cards to play, because this is a war that Israel has willed and the United States has willed—totally disregarding the interests not only of India, but of this entire region, and in fact the entire world, because these are global repercussions. They haven’t thought this through. They thought it would be like Venezuela: you go in, you abduct the head of state, and everything is solved—you have a quisling there who cooperates with you, and the regime stays but cooperates with you. This is not a model they could have followed in Iran at all. Complete misjudgment. #Pascal I share that assessment—complete misjudgment. But the question for India is, where does this leave its foreign policy? Because, okay, on the one hand, India has had very good relationships with all the U.S. allies in the region, and not a very close relationship with Iran, but I suppose a working one. India even invited the Iranians to participate in these, let’s call them confidence-building measures— to say, okay, even if we’re not very close, at least let’s have some working relationship with each other, even Navy to Navy. I mean, those are very important efforts to be made. And now that this war has started—and it’s clearly a blatant war of aggression, right?—in the same way that India, I think, saw Russia as the aggressor in the war against Ukraine, but then said, “We’re not going to impose sanctions,” and came under a lot of fire from the Europeans and the Americans for not doing so and continuing oil trade. India stood its ground. So where does this war put India? And do you think there’s again a ground for India to stand on—to say, “No, we’re going to defend our position now”? #Kanwal Sibal A couple of things. One is that we never took the line that Russia is an aggressor in Ukraine, because we are at a distance and can therefore objectively judge what triggered the Russian military intervention there. There’s a whole history that goes back to the time the Soviet Union collapsed and NATO began expanding progressively. I don’t have to go into that—everybody knows it. I was ambassador to Russia, so I have a good insight into what Russia’s concerns have been. In fact, I was there at a time when Bill Burns was the U.S. ambassador to Russia, and we engaged with each other. I know what his thinking is, which he has now revealed in his book *The Back Channel*, where he tried very hard to tell the U.S. government, “Please don’t open the door to Ukraine and Georgia for NATO membership.” This is not only the concern of the Kremlin; it’s the -- 4 of 17 -- concern of Russia. Anyway, bearing that in mind, I was ambassador in Russia when Putin delivered his Munich address in 2007, so I know a little bit. We never looked upon Russia as an aggressor in Ukraine, keeping in mind