Iran DESTROYS US Middle East Hegemony | Prof. S.M. Marandi

## Introduction and Marandi’s first assessment The exchange makes a striking claim: after roughly two and a half months of direct confrontation, Iran has not been routed but has instead secured a strategic position that challenges U.S. predominance in West Asia. That is not merely a description of battlefield attrition; it is an argument about political outcomes, geopolitical narratives, and the limits of projection for a superpower that has long relied on regional basing, client regimes, and allied airspace. Across the conversation, a recurring theme is clear: Iran fought with patience and a plan, while Washington and its partners misjudged both Tehran’s resilience and the political consequences of a wider conflict. The result is a profound reassessment of what “victory” and “defeat” look like in the region. ## Iran was “in no rush” after Trump’s surrender demand One of the clearest strategic motifs in the discussion is Iran’s deliberate tempo. When the U.S. leadership called for unconditional surrender and boasted of destroying Iranian capabilities, Tehran did not rush to retaliate in a desperate bid for instantaneous, demonstrable revenge. Instead, the conversation emphasizes that Iran used a pause to reorganize, rearm, and learn from early engagements. That restraint had several effects: it avoided escalation at moments that could have invited even heavier U.S. intervention, allowed Iran’s domestic infrastructure and underground production facilities time to recover, and created space for a diplomatic narrative that cast Tehran as the restrained party. The pause was tactical and strategic. It signaled both confidence and a longer game orientation—preparing for a campaign that Iran believed could last months, even into the next year. ## Iran vs. the wider US-led coalition The conflict was not just Iran versus the United States; it involved a broader coalition of state actors, proxies, and permissive environments. The conversation catalogs how U.S. forces, Israeli military capability, and the cooperation—sometimes tacit, sometimes explicit—of regional states combined into an anti-Iranian axis. Yet that axis had cracks. Several Gulf monarchies, nervous about becoming the theater for a direct U.S.-Iran clash, began recalibrating their posture. On the operational front, the conversation points to a mismatch between Western rhetoric about degrading Iran’s arsenal and the reality on the ground: Iranian missile and drone factories—many subterranean—survived and in some cases emerged more modern after the conflict’s first phase. The implication is structural: possessing territory and strategic depth in one’s backyard remains a decisive advantage against expeditionary forces, especially when home infrastructure is hardened and production can continue despite strikes. ## Strait of Hormuz, ceasefire terms, and Lebanon The Strait of Hormuz emerged as both a practical chokepoint and a symbol of leverage. Iran’s control—or at least its capacity to threaten passage—gave it bargaining power in negotiations over ceasefire terms and over the limited reopening of routes for certain Gulf regimes’ vessels. The conversation underscores a crucial diplomatic linkage: Iran conditioned maritime access on a broader ceasefire that included oversight of Lebanon and Gaza. Lebanon, it was argued, became the litmus test for whether a ceasefire was enforceable and meaningful. Israel’s continued operations in southern Lebanon—framed by interlocutors as ethnic cleansing of noncombatant populations—complicated any durable agreement. When Israel resumed intense operations, the fragile understanding over Hormuz access unravelled. This episode shows how intertwined theatre-level military actions are with maritime commerce and energy flows, and how local military decisions—Netanyahu’s campaign in Lebanon, for example—can upend region-wide arrangements that the United States hoped to stabilize. ## Why Iran is still negotiating Negotiation is often read as weakness in Western political discourse, but in the exchange it is portrayed as a facet of strategic strength. Iran’s willingness to engage did not mean a desire to avoid combat at all costs; rather, it was a calculated move to buy time, to rearm, and to demonstrate to global audiences that Tehran remained a responsible actor even as its adversaries escalated. The conversation insists that negotiation allowed Iran to consolidate gains, repair infrastructure, and produce more advanced weapons—especially after expending older stock early in the conflict. Moreover, being at the negotiating table was a way to win global legitimacy. Portraying itself as the restrained party resisting demands for unconditional surrender, Iran capitalized diplomatically even when tactical battlefield results were in flux. Put bluntly, restraint in the short term increased Iran’s strategic options in the medium term. ## Gulf states begin reassessing the war One of the most consequential shifts discussed is the change in posture among Gulf monarchies. Initially, many of these regimes lent political and logistical support to U.S.-Israeli actions, either directly or by allowing basing and airspace access. Yet the conversation paints a region undergoing a learning process: the risk of becoming a target, the economic fallout from disruptions to energy routes, and domestic political backlash are prompting some states to distance themselves from being America’s frontline shock absorbers. Saudi Arabia and others signalled reluctance to allow unfettered U.S. use of airspace—a move that, if durable, could drastically limit the U.S. military’s operational flexibility in any renewed campaign against Iran. This realignment has broader implications: if the United States cannot rely on regional basing, its ability to sustain large-scale air campaign operations over Iran is significantly impaired. The result is a strategic constriction on U.S. options and a renewed regional sovereignty by Gulf capitals anxious to protect their regimes and economies. ## Iran prepares for war while Saudi Arabia recalculates While some Gulf states pull back, Iran was described as doubling down on preparedness. The conversation suggests Tehran is better equipped today than at the outset—its factories rebuilt and upgraded, its tactical doctrines refined, and its networks of asymmetric capabilities intact. Conversely, Saudi Arabia finds itself in a precarious middle: courting Israel and the United States on one hand, while recalculating the domestic and geopolitical costs of being a frontline partner. This tension matters. A Saudi posture that tilts away from the U.S. military posture undercuts coalition coherence; a Saudi posture that remains overtly allied with Israel risks becoming a target and alienating its own population and important regional partners. Iran’s relative readiness, combined with Gulf hedging, puts the U.S.-led coalition on the defensive in both practical and reputational terms. ## Trump’s China trip and Iran’s message to Washington / Extended blockade, shadow war, and Iran’s long-game strategy The conversation closes by situating the conflict within broader global currents. Donald Trump’s visit to China became a focal point for signalling: Tehran’s restraint and readiness are a message to Washington about limits and costs. The interlocutors argue that Iran is waging a layered campaign—a declared front of missiles and drones and an undeclared shadow war of proxies, denials, and economic leverage. An extended blockade or siege, they say, would simply extend the war into the economic realm, wreaking damage on global supply chains and energy markets while further exposing the limits of U.S. influence. Iran’s long-game strategy, as presented in the exchange, is not to win a single decisive battle but to create a durable deterrent posture. By preserving and modernizing its capabilities, leveraging regional partnerships and public diplomacy, and demonstrating the willi

Iran DESTROYS US Middle East Hegemony | Prof. S.M. Marandi The level to which the US has been beaten out of West Asia has yet to sink in. And although this war is not over, the strategic victroy Iran has reached after 2.5 months has surpased even the most optimistic assessments of Iran supporters. What does the Trump visit to China have to do with the way the war will continue, and what is the strategy of Tehran going forward? To answer this, I'm joined again by Professor Seyed M. Marandi from the University of Tehran. Subscribe on Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Upport on our shop: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com 00:00 Introduction and Marandi’s first assessment 00:51 Iran was “in no rush” after Trump’s surrender demand 04:40 Iran vs. the wider US-led coalition 08:30 Strait of Hormuz, ceasefire terms, and Lebanon 15:06 Why Iran is still negotiating 17:26 Gulf states begin reassessing the war 24:14 Iran prepares for war while Saudi Arabia recalculates 28:55 Iran’s parliament raises the 90% enrichment threat 37:44 Trump’s China trip and Iran’s message to Washington 44:46 Extended blockade, shadow war, and Iran’s long-game strategy #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today, again, with an update from Professor Saeed Marandi, professor at the University of Tehran. Saeed, welcome back. Thank you very much for inviting me. It's always a great pleasure, Pascal. It's great having you again. And it is May the 13th, Wednesday. It is around lunchtime in Tehran, and we are waiting for the visit of Donald Trump to China to meet Xi Jinping. And we are also hearing that apparently, in the negotiations, the United States has rejected all and any proposals that Iran made. Can you please give us a little bit of your assessment of where we stand today? #Marandi Yeah, sure. Well, we have to go back a bit, and that is to the beginning of the war, where Trump demanded unconditional surrender. And for a few days, they were telling us how swiftly all of Iran's missile assets and drone assets were being destroyed, and that its Navy was destroyed, and Air Force was destroyed, and everything was destroyed. And then, after a few days, they started contacting Iran because they knew, even though in public they were saying one thing, in private they figured out this war wasn't going well. But the Iranians were in no rush. This is an important point because I want to get back to this — Iran was in no rush. Now, I'm not quite sure when the messages started. I think that I've heard that some types of attempts to contact Iran began after just a few days, but more formal attempts to contact Iran began after ten days. -- 1 of 17 -- It doesn't really matter. But the fact is that Iran wouldn't respond. And the Iranians really didn't begin responding until after a month of war. And the reason was because Iran had prepared itself for a very long war, a war that would last until next year. But then ultimately, Trump, as you recall, accepted the Iranian 10-point plan as the framework for negotiations. Now, Iran knew that he wasn't sincere. People in Iran look at his Truth Social posts. They look at his statements. He contradicts himself after five minutes, often, sometimes after ten minutes. He's not a person you can rely on. But for Iran, it was a symbolic victory. The world ridiculed Trump, and then it became so bad that his spokeswoman said, no, we threw that 10-point plan in the bin. But he posted it, and he accepted it. Now, the Iranians were not naive that Trump was going to implement the deal. And it wasn't just because of the acceptance of the 10-point plan that Iran accepted a halt to the hostilities. It was because Iran, too, wanted to prepare itself for the next stage of war. Again, going back a bit to a previous chapter where the Americans demanded unconditional—Trump demanded unconditional surrender—was the 12-day war, where they carried out a blitzkrieg attack. And then back then also, like this time, there were negotiations going on when the United States attacked the Israeli regime. And back then, the Iranians also accepted a ceasefire, even though they were winning the war. Some back then were wondering why Iran did that, but it was because the Iranians saw that during the 12-day war, they had many deficiencies, even though they won the war, and Netanyahu was seeking a ceasefire desperately. But Iran wanted to—Iran hadn't fought a war in decades. And that was also decades ago, in 1980. The Americans who pushed Saddam Hussein to invade our country gave him chemical weapons and so on. But back then, the Iranians swiftly prepared themselves because they knew that if that war continued, the Americans would ultimately enter, and Iran needed to prepare itself for a bigger war and learn from the experiences of the 12-day war. This time around, it was the same. The Iranians, they were fighting the entire empire. The United States brought its forces in, the Israeli regime using all the equipment that the Americans could give, and, of course, Iranian neighbors were assisting them—some directly, like the five regimes in the Persian Gulf and Jordan, some indirectly, like Afghanistan, Turkey allowing them to gather intelligence from their airspace and their bases in the country, and the Republic of Azerbaijan as well, in its own way. So this broad coalition—and of course the collective West was supporting Trump, even though they weren't directly fighting because they didn't have the capability to fight. They're weak, and also after Ukraine, they just don't have the punch that they may have had during the Cold War. But the Iranians, they needed to, after 39 days of battle, they too needed to rearm, regroup, repair infrastructure, repair the entrance points to the underground missile cities, the factories, and the drone cities. And now gradually we're seeing Western media admit partially what we've discussed before, that Iran's missile and drone capabilities are very much intact. In fact, it's not 70%. Iranians today are better equipped than they were before the war. And the reason is that their factories, -- 2 of 17 -- which are underground, are all intact, and that the Iranians at the beginning of the war, as you recall, were using mostly old missiles and old drones. They wanted to get rid of all those missiles and drones that they had in stock for well over a decade. But now, during the war and after the war, they've been producing the most advanced capabilities that they have. Excuse me. Yeah, and so the Iranians needed this ceasefire too. Or at least they preferred to have this ceasefire. They could have gone on, but they preferred to have a ceasefire to prepare themselves. For Iran, it's much less expensive than for the Americans because it's their own home turf. But also, it gave an opportunity for the international community to see that Iran was the side that was behaving responsibly. Before the 12-day war, Iran was negotiating with the Americans, and the Israeli regime carried out a blitzkrieg attack. Before this war, we saw the same thing, and that worked very well for Iran because the entire globe saw that the Americans were aggressors. Even those people who don't follow the news like your viewers—your viewers are obviously people who are very much politically aware—but a lot of people, most people across the world, have less opportunity or less interest in following details. So these things are important in order to have people across the world, and even governments, despite Western pressure, gravitate in your direction. #Pascal Yeah. #Marandi So the Iranians used this opportunity to negotiate again. And again, the United States violated the ceasefire agreement. Iran was supposed to allow a certain number of ships through the Strait of Hormuz from the five countries that assisted the United States in the war—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates. We have to remember that the Strait of Hormuz was always open. It was never closed. But it was closed to these regimes. So the Russians, the Chinese—we saw Pakistani ships allowed to leave, Indian ships allowed to leave, even some of them which had come from the ports of these five countries, though with negotiations. But these five countries had engaged in war with Iran, so Iran was preventing them, for the most part, from leaving or exporting. For good reason. But in the negotiations, Iran was going to allow a certain number of these ships to pass through the Strait, and the Americans were supposed to impose a ceasefire across West Asia, which included Gaza, but most importantly Lebanon, because the Israelis have been slaughtering the Lebanese, as we see today. Just now, as we see today, the Israeli regime has told the families in six villages in Lebanon to evacuate because they want to level the town. And the ethnic cleansing is very open. Western media will not tell people what's happening, but they're ethnically cleansing the entire South, just like Gaza. -- 3 of 17 -- #Pascal Calling it an evacuation is just a beautiful term for saying, like, ethnic cleansing. Oh, they're caring about lives, therefore evacuation. No, no, this is an eviction order. And then obviously these places will be destroyed, as we have seen—even just normal houses, hospitals, and whatnot will all be razed to the ground, right? Make it uninhabitable, just like Gaza. #Marandi But you won't see this in mainstream Western media. Maybe one or two outlets will briefly say something or put out some article, but then the attention is definitely being drawn away elsewhere intentionally. This is a really fascinating point, and sorry for moving away from the question. I digress here. But in Gaza, Western media would always say, well, we cannot confirm anything because we don't have a presence. And that way they had an excuse to allow the Israelis to carry out the genocide. And here, the presence of Western media in Beirut is more than in any other Arab country. Historically speaking, they've always had a very strong presence in Beirut. I've lived in Lebanon, so I know these people. I've been to their offices. I've been interviewed. Here, they are no better. They're just as sinister because they know what's going on. They know that ethnic cleansing is taking place. They know that ambulance drivers and medics are intentionally being targeted every day. The Israeli regime has a particular fascination with targeting medics. And they've bombed well over 100 now. And just a few hours ago, they murdered a couple more. They're seeking out medics and ambulance drivers. So in Lebanon, they have a presence, they have fixers, they have producers, they have drivers, they know exactly what's going on. But they, again, hide it from the public. Or when they do say things, they say these are Hezbollah strongholds or Hezbollah targets, which they know is a lie. These are just neighborhoods and apartment blocks and schools and hospitals. But, you know, these journalists work for the Epstein class. They are agents of that class, so they're not going to tell the truth. Western media, legacy media, is completely controlled from, you know, The Guardian to Breitbart. It doesn't make a difference. I mean, fortunately, the last two and a half years have exposed this. But going back to the question, and I apologize. The Iranians used this opportunity for a ceasefire to allow some of those ships through, and there was supposed to be a ceasefire. And what happened? Netanyahu began carpet bombing Lebanon to wreck the ceasefire. And Iran said, well, we're not going to allow those ships to go then because this is a two-way street. You do something, we do something. Then ultimately they put pressure on Netanyahu to carry out a ceasefire, which failed, lasted very shortly, and he began slaughtering the Lebanese within 48 hours. But during that period, Iran said, okay, we'll allow those ships to go. -- 4 of 17 -- And then Trump, who had imposed a siege