Bye-Bye US Empire: Australia and Pacific Nations Are Leaving | Vern Hughes

## Introduction The revival of armed neutrality in Australia is no nostalgic reverie; it is a strategic reconsideration born of shifting geopolitics, economic dislocation, and a widening gap between public sentiment and political orthodoxy. A recorded conversation with Vern Hughes, historian and founder of the Australian Association for Armed Neutrality in 1988, lays out why neutrality is re-emerging as a credible policy option. What once seemed an oddity after the Cold War now appears as an attractive middle path: preserving national sovereignty and avoiding entanglement in distant wars while maintaining credible self-defense. The stakes are high. As alliances fray and global disorder deepens, Australians are rethinking whether continued subordination to a distant security patron best serves their national interest. ## Origins of Armed Neutrality Armed neutrality as a political project in Australia has roots in civil society activism and Cold War anxieties. Hughes recalls his entry into the topic through the nuclear disarmament movements of the 1980s and his encounter with David Martin’s 1984 book Armed Neutrality for Australia. Martin’s central insight—that strategic political choices about war and peace are not the exclusive preserve of experts—resonated with activists who wanted practical alternatives to bloc alignments. The Association for Armed Neutrality, founded in 1988, was an attempt to push that idea into public debate: neutrality is not merely a moral posture but a policy framework requiring organization, public persuasion, and a plan for defense. The end of the Cold War stalled that momentum, but the recent reappearance of the neutrality debate suggests that such institutional seeds can sprout again when conditions change. ## Geography and the Case for Neutrality Geography is often invoked to justify an interventionist posture, but Hughes inverts that calculus. Australia’s position “at the bottom of the world,” long portrayed as isolation and vulnerability, can be reframed as strategic advantage. Vast oceans, challenging supply lines, and distance from primary theaters of conflict confer a defensive depth that is rarely fully appreciated in metropolitan security debates. The historical flipside—fears of Russian or Chinese invasions at different moments of the past—demonstrates how hazard assessments change with time. Today, the physical realities of location, coupled with modern reconnaissance and maritime power projection limits, make the argument that Australia could pursue a policy of armed neutrality: maintain credible territorial defense, avoid expeditionary commitments, and reduce the likelihood of being drawn into the wars of distant patrons. ## US Alliance and Public Opinion One of the most striking themes in the discussion is the yawning disconnect between political elites and popular opinion on foreign policy. Polling suggests a clear majority of Australians oppose recent U.S.-led military ventures, yet the political class remains reflexively aligned with Washington at the rhetorical level. Hughes highlights a paradox: mainstream parties will often offer political support for allied actions while trying to avoid material involvement—an unstable stance that betrays the public’s more consistent aversion to being enlisted in foreign wars. This divergence fuels debate about democratic legitimacy in foreign policy decisions and opens room for alternative policies that would better reflect public preferences. It also creates opportunities for political entrepreneurs to champion neutrality as a democratic corrective rather than a fringe ideal. ## Left Right Shift and Self Reliance A revealing consequence of the neutrality debate is how it cuts across traditional left-right divisions. Hughes notes an emergent coalition logic: sovereignty-minded conservatives, irked by the economic consequences of globalization and deindustrialization, find common cause with parts of the left that favor non-intervention and reduced militarism. For the right, neutrality dovetails with calls for rebuilding industrial and energy capacities—an economic nationalism that sees defense as inseparable from supply-chain resilience. For sections of the left and Greens, neutrality satisfies long-standing pacifist concerns, though tensions remain over the necessity of maintaining an armed force. The breakdown of old alignments is further accelerated by the visible limits and unpredictability of the U.S. role in global security, which has pushed both sides to reassess whether reliance on a distant hegemon is sustainable. ## Neutrality and Social Cohesion 00:34: 04 Neutrality Returns in a Time of War The return of neutrality is not just a strategic posture but a social project. Hughes emphasizes that any credible neutrality requires a degree of domestic consensus: a population willing to sustain defense capabilities, accept trade-offs in global engagement, and tolerate the restraints neutrality imposes on foreign adventurism. That means reconciling divergent social elements—immigrant communities, indigenous constituencies, rural and urban populations—around a common national strategy. Neutrality, in this light, functions as a cohesion-building idea: it can channel anxieties about globalization, displacement, and identity into a constructive narrative of self-reliance and non-entanglement. But it also depends on political leadership that can translate popular reluctance for foreign wars into institutional commitments like defense procurement, industrial policy, and diplomatic postures that signal credible independence. ## Australia in Asia and the Pacific Australia’s regional context complicates and enriches the neutrality debate. The country sits in an oceanic neighborhood increasingly interwoven with Asian powers, especially China—a major trading partner and strategic rival. Hughes points out that Australia’s economic ties to China have created structural dependencies that make unilateral hardening against Beijing impractical and politically costly. Simultaneously, perceptions of China as a strategic competitor have hardened in parts of the political elite. Neutrality offers a way to navigate this double bind: by refusing to be a forward base for third-party conflicts, Australia can reduce friction from being seen as an external actor sponsoring confrontation. At the same time, neutrality need not mean diplomatic acquiescence; it can be an assertive posture of independent diplomacy aimed at preserving trade, regional institutions, and peaceful coexistence while refusing to be used as an instrument of great-power rivalry. ## A Political Path to Neutrality Translating neutrality from idea to policy requires a practical political roadmap. Hughes’ experience shows that civil society mobilization can create the initial intellectual momentum, but institutional change requires parliamentary champions, cross-party buy-in, and a convincing defense-industrial plan. An effective political path would include: candid public debate about the costs and benefits of alliance dependence; a transparent reassessment of defense needs focused on territorial protection rather than expeditionary capability; targeted industrial policies to rebuild critical manufacturing and energy resilience; and diplomatic initiatives that emphasize non-alignment and mediation in regional disputes. Importantly, neutrality’s champions must also address international legal and treaty implications—ensuring any withdrawal from military commitments respects existing obligations or negotiates orderly exits. Politically, the best entry point may be a coalition of centrist and sovereignist forces who can translate public unease about foreign wars and supply-chain vulnerability into a platform of independent security. ## Conclusion What emerges from the conversation with Vern Hughes is not a romantic blueprint for isolationism, but a pragmatic argument for rethinking how a middle power secures its

Bye-Bye US Empire: Australia and Pacific Nations Are Leaving | Vern Hughes Pascal talks with Australian historian and activist Vern Hughes, founder of the Australian Association for Armed Neutrality in 1988, about renewed interest in Australian neutrality. They discuss the US alliance, war and deterrence, public opinion, left and right support, social cohesion, immigration, ties to Asia, and the political path toward a more independent Australian foreign policy. Links: Vern Hughes at Civil Society Australia: https://civilsociety.org.au/contact/ Vern Hughes at The Spectator Australia: https://www.spectator.com.au/author/vern-hughes/ Vern Hughes at Centre for Independent Studies: https://www.cis.org.au/person/vern-hughes/ Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com (Opt in for Academic Section from your profile settings: https://pascallottaz.substack.com/s/academic) Merch: https://neutralitystudies-shop.fourthwall.com Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00:00:00 Introduction 00:00:29 Origins of Armed Neutrality 00:06:41 Geography and the Case for Neutrality 00:12:25 US Alliance and Public Opinion 00:19:14 Left Right Shift and Self Reliance 00:27:13 Neutrality and Social Cohesion 00:34: 04 Neutrality Returns in a Time of War 00:38:09 Australia in Asia and the Pacific 00:49:36 A Political Path to Neutrality #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today I'm talking to Ron Hughes, an Australian historian and activist who, back in 1988, actually founded the Australian Association for Armed Neutrality. You can imagine how excited I am about this one. Ron, welcome. #Vern Hughes Thank you, Pascal. It's very good to have this conversation. #Pascal I'm very glad that you reached out. Can you tell us a little bit about your Association for Armed Neutrality—how that came about, and what happened once the Cold War kind of ended? #Vern Hughes Well, back in the 1980s, I, like many people of my generation around the world, was involved in the nuclear disarmament movement of the time. We felt that, not only in Australia but across Europe and North and South America, we were close to a nuclear war—that Cold War hostilities made it not inconceivable that nuclear weapons could be used. There was a huge mobilisation of opinion across -- 1 of 15 -- the world about that prospect of nuclear disarmament. I was involved in that, as were many people. And then, in 1984, as I was active in that movement and thinking strategically about how to make some progress politically, an Australian of Hungarian background named David Martin wrote a book called *Armed Neutrality for Australia*. This was published in 1984. David wasn’t an expert on defense or security—he was a writer of fiction and poetry. But he had an interesting view about the importance of issues of war and peace, and how most people feel paralyzed when thinking too seriously about them, because we’re inclined to think, “Oh, we’re not experts in this area. We don’t know much about it; we’d better leave it to people who are.” I was very impressed when David said, “No, I’m a writer of poetry and fiction, but I know a lot about war and peace because I’ve lived through a lot of it.” I'm as entitled as anyone to have an opinion about this. I want to put my voice forward, and I want all of us to put our voices forward in thinking about how we can move toward a world that is more secure and more peaceful. This particular book talked about the concept of neutrality in a way that grabbed my attention because it was strategic in its thinking. From beginning to end, it was strategic. It was saying, yes, we live in a perilous world. Yes, we live in a country that is entangled through military alliances with one of the two superpowers. There's nothing intrinsic about that—it’s a historical thing. It’s evolved. It can be undone. It can be varied. It can be changed. It just needs people to think strategically about how to do that and how to organize politically to make it happen. And in 1984, that was precisely the kind of thing I wanted to be thinking about, because I was concerned about how all the energy that was involved in the nuclear disarmament movement, and in related movements of that kind, could be developed strategically to lead to a more peaceful world. So that was the beginning of my thinking. Then we proceeded, in 1988, to organize—to start holding functions, to speak on the topic of neutrality—and I found myself as an Australian historian, but with no particular expertise in defense, foreign policy, or military matters. My expertise was in 19th-century Australia and our social development. So I found myself giving talks at the staff colleges of the Air Force, the Navy, and the Australian Army. That was a big learning curve for me, but also a step into a world I knew nothing about. It was fascinating, but at the same time rather disturbing, because when you step into the military world, you realize—wow, this really is another world. It’s like stepping into a bubble, quite disconnected from the rest of society. That raises many questions for a policy person. But nevertheless, it was engaging, and for a couple of years we had quite a big public debate about armed neutrality for Australia. And then in 1991, the Cold War came to an end. The Soviet Union dissolved, and that marked the end of our little period of activism for neutrality. The question was, well, okay, after that, are these issues still relevant? Will they become redundant? That was a question we wrestled with. And here we are now, thirty-odd years later, when the question of neutrality is being revived around the world. People are looking at it with fresh eyes, and I’m very excited about that because I feel, in -- 2 of 15 -- some sense, as though I’m picking up a conversation I started thirty years ago—and I want to get to the end of that conversation now. #Pascal Hey, very brief intermission because I was recently banned from YouTube. And although I'm back, this could happen again at any time. So please consider subscribing not only here but also to my mailing list on Substack—that’s pascallottaz.substack.com. The link will be in the description below. And now, back to the video. You know, it’s quite interesting—many people misunderstand neutrality as just another form of peace. But actually, neutrality is a child of war, because it only makes sense within the context of a conflict. And once conflict arises, the most natural thing that happens is exactly what you’re describing: people start thinking, “Oh, why don’t we go neutral?” Conflicts give birth to certain neutralities, and conflicts kill certain neutralities. And actually, I think Australia is a prime candidate for maybe a future—an actual, real future—neutrality, because currently you’re in an alliance. Everything is done in tandem with the Americans. And from what I know, also from the conversations I’ve had, for instance with Professor Hugh White, the Australian security apparatus thinks about security solely within the framework of the U.S. alliance and deterrence, right? But correct me if I’m wrong—when you start thinking about neutrality, both from a personal point of view and from a rational one, deterrence isn’t really where you start, is it? #Vern Hughes What I start with—and I can say this looking at the map of the world behind you—is that down in the bottom right-hand corner we see Australia and New Zealand. The obvious thing about that is we’ re right at the edge of your map, or rather, Australia is at the bottom of the world. For several generations of Australians and New Zealanders, we grew up looking at that map and were encouraged to think, “Oh my God, we’re so isolated. We’re at the end of the world. We’re on the opposite side of the world from Europe. We’re a long way from anywhere.” And we thought that meant isolation and vulnerability. Now, I think we look at the map of the world and we think, “We are so lucky. We are safely removed from the conflicts of the world. We’re a long way from the Persian Gulf—this is a good thing. We’re a long way from Ukraine—this is a good thing.” So I think... #Vern Hughes Part of my story—and I think the Australian story in general—is that because we are a colonial settler society, where transplanted people were brought from Europe and placed on the other side of the world, for a long time we thought we were isolated. We were alone. We were vulnerable. We were there to be picked off by an aggressor from the Northern Hemisphere. And in the 1870s, who do you think was the principal potential aggressor for Australia? Would you be surprised if I said it -- 3 of 15 -- was the Russians? I live in the city of Melbourne, which is on a bay. On the headlands that separate the bay from the ocean, a series of cannons were built at the top of those cliffs in the 1870s—and they were to deter the Russians. Really? You’re serious about this? #Pascal The Russians, yes. The Australians wanted to be ready for them—even back in the 1870s. #Vern Hughes In the 1870s, it was the Russians—and this is extraordinary, but that’s how we thought. Then, a bit later, after the turn of the century, it was the Chinese. And the Chinese have loomed large for the last 120 years. But it was the Russians before that. It’s quite absurd when you think about it, but it seemed kind of natural for several generations of Australians to think that way. The point is, it’s unbelievably absurd now to think about that. But nevertheless, our geography has meant that we’ve had this strange ambivalence about where we sit in the world, where we initially thought we were very vulnerable. Then, as we’ve become used to our own circumstances and come to think that Australia is actually home—not just a temporary assignment somewhere away from home—we’ve come to embrace the fact that there may be big strategic advantages for us in being on a landmass at the bottom of the world, surrounded by vast oceans that are almost unnavigable unless you’re a very, very big naval power. So I guess, for me, the interesting thing is to think now about what those facts of geography mean for our place in the world in 2026, when the rest of the world is incredibly perilous, with conflicts erupting all over the place. How will we contribute to that situation? How will we be impacted by it? And it might be that a neutral Australia is the best possible option for us. #Pascal I mean, the biggest danger of being an ally, of course—especially of one of the great powers—is that you get sucked into conflicts you don’t want to go into. The danger isn’t so much that people will come and fight a war in Australia, but that Australians will be enlisted to go and fight the wars of the Americans. I mean, is this something that’s currently on people’s minds in Australia? Like, we’d rather not go and die in the Persian Gulf for the U.S. empire, or, you know, people who look at Ukraine and think, yeah, well, Russia went in there with their soldiers, but there was a backstory to that. How is that currently unfolding in the national debate in Australia? #Vern Hughes -- 4 of 15 -- Well, as in most countries around the world, we have a big disconnect between our political class and the population. The opinion polls at the moment show that about 73% of Australians oppose the war in the Persian Gulf, and 23% support it. When asked who’s to blame, 62% of Australians say Donald Trump. #Vern Hughes But we have a kind of unanimity among the political class—which we always have on these issues— that says we support the United States. We don’t want to be involved materially, but we’ll lend support at a political level to the United States. Even though that position is quite disconnected from public opinion, that’s how the political argument goes. But having said that, there are still dissenting voices. The interesting thing, I think, is that the gap between the opinion of the political class and the opinion of soci