Russia's Patience Is OVER. Iran War Starts Again. NATO Summit Joke. | Larry C. Johnson

## US-Iran MOU and Hormuz clash The recent exchange over the Strait of Hormuz has laid bare how fragile written understandings become when power politics and strategic signaling collide. The conversation centered on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that, on its face, assigned Iran a very specific set of responsibilities for guaranteeing the safe passage of commercial shipping through the strait for a limited period. The text of that MOU, as described in the discussion, is remarkably explicit: it places the onus on the Islamic Republic of Iran to make arrangements, using best efforts, to ensure free passage for 60 days, and it appears to empower Iranian authorities to enforce compliance through a registration and routing mechanism—the Persian Gulf Strait Authority Protocols (PGSA). The significance of that framework is double-edged. On one hand, giving Iran a designated role over the strait acknowledged geopolitical realities: the Islamic Republic controls significant chokepoints and possesses the physical capability to influence maritime traffic. On the other hand, once Tehran moved to operationalize the MOU through online approvals, designated Iranian routes, and explicit penalties for noncompliance, a political fault line opened. From the perspective laid out in the exchange, Iran’s enforcement of its PGSA—insisting on manifests, crew nationalities, cargo descriptions and adherence to prescribed lanes—was consistent with the letter of the MOU. Yet the United States and some Gulf actors treated this exercise of authority as a challenge to freedom of navigation and U.S. primacy in the region. The conversation illustrated how easily such arrangements can unravel. The U.S. reaction—threats, renewed sanctions, and military maneuvers—was read by one participant (Larry C. Johnson) as a direct violation of the MOU’s reciprocal commitments, particularly the clauses about refraining from initiating military operations. The immediate result: kinetic confrontations around the Omani lane and renewed shooting at ships that allegedly tried to “sneak through” the Iranian-designated routes. The broader implication is that a legalistic instrument like an MOU can rapidly be rendered irrelevant when parties either interpret it expansively or dismiss it outright. The Hormuz clash thus exemplifies how the mechanics of maritime governance become political bargaining chips once strategic distrust anchors policymaking. ## Oil risks and Iran’s next moves Shipping is not only a matter of law; it is economics writ on water. A key strand in the discussion focused on the asymmetric vulnerabilities tied to oil flows—especially sour crude—and how disruption in the Strait of Hormuz can cascade into immediate and long-term shortages. Even when ships keep moving, delays and the uncertainty of safe passage create bottlenecks. Tankers already en route may take weeks to reach destination ports, and refineries configured to process sour crude cannot quickly substitute with different grades. That technical detail—refineries designed for specific input types—matters politically because it constrains emergency options for buyers and gives the supplier(s) leverage. The conversation relayed a strategic logic Iran might pursue: rather than an all-or-nothing closure of the strait, Tehran can operate a calibrated “faucet” policy. Under that approach, vessels from states considered friendly or neutral would receive preferential treatment, while ships associated with states aligned with the U.S. or Israel would find themselves delayed or denied. Such selective access turns the strait into a leverage instrument, allowing Iran to inflict economic pain selectively without triggering a full-blown blockade that might invite broader military retaliation. This graduated control also dovetails with Iran’s force posture: use of targeted interdictions and measured strikes to signal resolve while avoiding escalation to general war. A more aggressive option, discussed as a plausible Iranian escalation, would be direct attacks on the support infrastructure that enables U.S. military operations—most conspicuously aerial refueling tankers and their basing locations. Destroying tanker aircraft on the ground or degrading refueling hubs would blunt the U.S. ability to sustain air campaigns in the region. That course of action is not costless; striking aircraft and military facilities risks broadening the conflict and undermines Iran’s political aims of avoiding an all-out war. Still, the strategic calculus is clear: disable the logistical means of U.S. force projection to raise the costs of continued kinetic pressure. The conversation suggested Tehran had both motive and the capability to undertake such strikes if it judged conventional deterrence insufficient. Economically, the immediate outlook is precarious. Even modest interdictions in the strait ripple into global fuel markets, especially if chokepoint control becomes selective and unpredictable. The U.S. reliance on certain grades of oil—sour crude in particular—reduces its flexibility and heightens vulnerability to interruptions. Political signaling, like the U.S. decision to reinstate sanctions after a brief waiver period, only compounds the uncertainty and undermines trust-based mechanisms that previously allowed commercial life to continue despite geopolitical friction. ## NATO summit and Ukraine front While tensions simmered in the Gulf, the NATO summit in Ankara unfolded in parallel as a separate theater of strategic incoherence. The conversation characterized the summit as chaotic—an alliance grappling with material shortages, divergent member priorities, and a mismatch between political rhetoric and logistical reality. The scene described at the summit—promises to build complex air-defense systems without sufficient supply chains for key inputs like rare earths—captures an alliance strained by ambition outpacing industrial and resource capabilities. The result is performative unity rather than operational readiness. On Ukraine, the exchange underscored how the conflict has shifted in scale and narrative. What had been publicly treated by some as a “special military operation” is increasingly framed in Moscow as a full-fledged war, with attendant implications for Russian mobilization and strategy. On the ground, the Russians appear to be making substantive territorial gains, particularly in the Donbas region. The conversation highlighted that the remaining Ukrainian-held territory in key cities has shrunk to a sliver of the original contested area; tactical and operational momentum has been tilting in Moscow’s favor. This matters for NATO in several ways. First, the alliance faces the choice of deepening material commitment to Kyiv or accepting a de facto frozen or expanding front that Moscow deems acceptable. Second, the interplay between U.S. distraction in the Middle East and Western support for Ukraine complicates supply lines, spare parts availability, and training programs. Third, the strategic narratives of both wars feed each other; Washington’s posture in the Gulf affects credibility in Europe, and vice versa. The summit’s disconnect—grand strategic pronouncements paired with resource shortfalls—signals an alliance that can espouse deterrence but struggles to operationalize it across simultaneous theaters. ## Western claims and war escalation A recurring theme across the conversation was the credibility gap between Western claims and the realities that determine escalation dynamics. On one level, the West continues to frame Iranian actions as violations that justify punitive measures. From another vantage, Iran insists its conduct aligns with the written MOU and its own security prerogatives. The asymmetry lies in narrative control: each side can cite legalistic or moral arguments, but escalation thresholds are ultimately determined by capabilities, willingness to pay costs, and alliance cohesion. The discussion emphasized

Russia's Patience Is OVER. Iran War Starts Again. | Larry Johnson As the NATO summit delirium takes place in Ankara, the forces if war are pushing both Russia and Iran SIMULTANEOUSLY in to next rounds of escalation. Larry C. Johnson joins me today to discuss all of it. Links: Transition Protocol ENGLISH: https://www.youtube.com/@TransitionProtocol And Larry & Pepe‘s new foreign language channels here: (Only subscribe if you intend to watch there. Subs without views actively hurt channels) Chinese: https://www.youtube.com /@TransitionProtocolChinese Italian: https://www.youtube.com/@TransitionProtocolItalian Japanese: https://www.youtube.com/@TransitionProtocolJapanese Portuguese: https://www. youtube.com/@TransitionProtocolPortuguese German: https://www.youtube.com /@TransitionProtocolGerman French: https://www.youtube.com/@TransitionProtocolFrench Spanish: https://www.youtube.com/@TransitionProtocolSpanish Russian: https://www.youtube.com /@TransitionProtocolRussian Neutrality Studies substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Merch: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Donation: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Timestamps: 00: 00:00 Introduction and Transition Protocol 00:02:09 US-Iran MOU and Hormuz clash 00:08:48 Oil risks and Iran’s next moves 00:20:10 NATO summit and Ukraine front 00:28:48 Western claims and war escalation #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies, tonight again with the one and only Larry Johnson. Larry, welcome. So, are you back in Europe? No, no, I'm just adjusting to your time zone. Hey, somewhere it's morning, somewhere it's night. It's my coffee time here in Japan. But before we get started, I just want to show everybody that you too now have this wonderful YouTube channel in English called Transition Protocol, and you also have translated channels right here. Transition Protocol now also exists in Spanish, it exists in German, it exists in Chinese, Japanese. So any one of you, if you're listening to this recording on Neutrality Studies in any other language but English, and you are interested in subscribing to Larry's channel, please check out the translation channel links that will be in the description box below. You can follow him there. Larry and Pepe, they're doing this wonderful channel, Transition Protocol, together with your host, Mr. Z. Right, Larry? #Larry Johnson Right, right. We were supposed to do one today, but because of events and a surgical experience for Dr. Z, we'll do it tomorrow. So it will be on air tomorrow. #Pascal -- 1 of 14 -- Right, right. #Larry Johnson Which is Thursday afternoon on the East Coast and Friday morning in Japan. #Pascal Exactly. Friday morning in Japan. And by the time the video goes up, it will probably be my afternoon. But that's it. Just again, if you're listening to this in Spanish, in German, or in any other language, you can find Larry's translated channel with Pepe Escobar on Transition Protocol. There's the Spanish version, the German version, and so on. The links will be in the description box below. And now let's start with our discussion, because a lot happened, Larry, didn't it? The U.S. is trying to bomb Iran again. #Larry Johnson Yeah. Well, the United States is in total, complete violation of the MOU. They violated the first paragraph. You know, I keep emphasizing that people need to read the MOU and look specifically at paragraph five of that MOU, because paragraph five stipulates that Iran is— in fact, let me just read it briefly. Upon signing of this MOU, the Islamic Republic of Iran—notice it doesn't say anybody else. It doesn't say U.S., it doesn't say Qatar, Saudi Arabia, no other Gulf country. It just simply says the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements, using its best efforts, for the safe passage of commercial vehicles with no charge for 60 days only through the Strait of Hormuz. So, no other country has been given that responsibility. What did Iran do? Iran created what are called the Persian Gulf Strait Authority Protocols, PGSA. It's a website, and if you have a ship that's going to transit the Strait of Hormuz, whether going in or coming out, you go online and fill out the application. They want to know the name of the ship. They want to know the name of the ship's captain. They want to know the country that owns the ship. They want to know what the cargo is on the ship. They want to know the nationality of the crew. So, in those protocols, Iran specifically says that, with regard to compliance, only vessels submitting compliant requests and receiving PGSA approval are permitted to transit. That applies to the whole strait. Ships must follow designated Iranian routes and instructions. Noncompliance, deviation, or lack of permission may result in denial of passage or a forceful response. So, you know, yesterday, Iran exercised a forceful response on four ships that were trying to sneak through the Omani lane in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran did what it is entitled to do under this MOU, under this protocol. And then the United States proceeded to violate the protocol by the MOU, because in the first paragraph of the MOU, it says that the United States and Iran declare immediate permanent termination of military operations, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or military -- 2 of 14 -- operation against each other. Well, the United States initiated a military operation against Iran. The MOU also said to refrain from the threat or use of force. Again, Trump spent the entire day making threats against Iran. So I, for the life of me, don't know why Iran doesn't just follow Trump's lead and say, oh, this thing is dead. This MOU no longer applies. Because the United States also, in violation of the MOU, has now reinstated oil sanctions on Iran. #Pascal When did they reinstate those? That's pretty recent, right? Because they lifted them for a short while. #Larry Johnson Yesterday. Yesterday. Yesterday. They gave a window, like a nine-day window, so it will go into full effect on the 17th. But they now say, no, we're withdrawing. You know those sanctions we waived? Well, they're back in effect. #Pascal My best guess here is that the Iranians, they know exactly what they're going to do. The response is already clear. The response is underway, right? They have fired back again at U.S. outposts in the Gulf. And they're just going to wait until the tantrum blows over because I don't think the United States has as much that it can do, has it? #Larry Johnson Well, it's not. Even though the press is playing up these strikes that have taken place yesterday and today as big strikes, I've heard from somebody who was involved with the planning of the strikes during the first 42 days of the war, and he just said, we're not even close now to doing what we did during the full-blown war. So while it looks bad and it's reported in the most alarming terms possible, it's not as bad. In fact, let me read you—he just specifically said that so far we're doing a very small campaign, if you can even call it that. This is nothing compared to the first 40 days. And to top it off, as I reported before, around June 17th, the United States deactivated the CATs, the Crisis Action Teams. These were 24/7 operations. They started about a week before the invasion, or the attack on Iran, on the 28th of February. The Crisis Action Teams sit in the operations centers at places like the Pentagon, the National Military Command Center, and CENTCOM. They have an operations center at JSOC. And once they stand up those CATs, they operate seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Well, now they're only operating eight to five. So the United States has not gone back to an actual war footing. #Pascal -- 3 of 14 -- So for all intents and purposes, this should be interpreted as another one of those violent forms of negotiation tactics in that case. It's like slamming the door or something like that. #Larry Johnson A little bit, but I think Iran's going to send—in my own view, Iran needs to send a very strong message to the United States. And you've got the tankers that are facilitating these. They're at Ben Gurion Airport. They need to take out those tankers at Ben Gurion Airport. Supposedly, some of the tankers landed at Al Udeid Air Force Base. Take those out. Any place a U.S. tanker is, destroy it. Because if you destroy those, you destroy the ability of the United States to refuel combat aircraft that are then able to attack Iran. #Pascal Tanker aircraft, the ones that refuel in midair. Correct. Like the F-35 jet, as an example. Do we know if the Iranians have the capability to locate these things? I mean, because they're big planes, but they're not that huge of targets. #Larry Johnson When they're on the ground, I'm talking about destroying them on the ground before they even take off. And they know exactly where those are. #Pascal So do you think that the trigger for this was that Iran was, with force, trying to prevent the United States from opening a second channel that bypasses this Iranian-controlled channel? What was the strategy of the U.S. there? #Larry Johnson Well, the U.S. is trying to make it into an issue to claim that Iran is violating the MOU, which, as I've read to you, they clearly did not. Everything they've done in terms of enforcing compliance with the PGSA that they put in place in tandem with the signing of the MOU, they've been in compliance. And the United States took it upon itself and said, no, you don't get to control what goes through the Strait of Hormuz. We get to control. Sorry. Paragraph 5 says very explicitly, Islamic Republic of Iran. It doesn't say Islamic Republic of Iran in consultation with the United States. It does not say that. So the U.S. is just declaring that it's got the right to do it, and it's doing it. #Pascal -- 4 of 14 -- What's your assessment of the situation for the economy? I mean, the Strait at the moment — as far as I... I didn't hear that it is closed again. The Iranians, as far as I know, didn't announce that nobody can pass through. But do we know how many ships are going through now? How much is that in comparison to before the war? #Larry Johnson It's still not up to pre-war levels. Right now, they're going through the Strait. On the Iranian channel, I count one, two, three, four, five, six ships headed out, and I count one, two, three headed in. So there's small activity, and those that are headed out are... One is called the Iolcus Ambition, which is a bulk carrier, and that's reportedly going to Oman. We've got the Yaron, which is a container ship. Destination is not available. The Berg 1, how about that? It's a crude oil tanker. It's going to Singapore. So you've got, let's see, what's this one? The JN Lucky, a chemical oil products tanker. It's going to the UAE. The Gas Warwick, it's an LPG tanker. It's going to Singapore. #Pascal Okay, so overall, I mean, the good news for the world economy is that this trade is operational, right? But this is, of course, I mean, if these strikes now continue, if the United States and Iran— I mean, this could be over tomorrow again, right? #Larry Johnson Well, here's the problem. So, number one, those tankers that are there, they're not going to reach port for 40 days. Right. So the shortage that exists now, it's not being fixed. They have to wait for those tankers to arrive. The really big problem, and I keep, you know, I've been fortunate that a couple of different people have reached out to me and explained this. The United States is a net importer of sour crude. And the reason it needs the sour crude is that the majority of the refineries that are there on the southern coast along the Gulf of Mexico are specifically set up to process sour crude. They can't just give them sweet crude. They can still produce aviation and diesel fuel, but the equipment is set up in an entirely different way. So the United States still is without that oil, and that's what Trump was talking about four o