US Gulf Empire Collapses, Ukraine War Escalation in Kiev | Larry Johnson

The image that emerges from the exchange is stark: multiple crises — in Europe, the Gulf, and global energy markets — are converging to expose strategic overreach and miscalculation. What begins as localized pressure points have the potential to cascade into broader systemic failures: a grinding Ukrainian conflict that could reshape Europe’s security logic, an Iranian campaign that lays bare vulnerabilities in U.S. power projection, and an energy shock that will reverberate through supply chains and political economies. The discussion offers a through-line: powerful narratives in Western media and policy circles have masked on-the-ground realities, and that divergence matters because it shapes decisions under strain. If policymakers do not recalibrate perceptions to account for capabilities and limits, they risk steering events toward escalation they may not be able to control. ## Russia visit and Western narratives The conversation opened with on-the-ground impressions from repeated travel to Russia, challenging a popular Western trope: that the Russian state and economy are crumbling under pressure. Observers who equate the present Russian economy with the late-Soviet era overlook structural differences, notably Russia’s continued export capacity in oil and gas and its ability to adapt wartime logistics. Visits to Moscow and St. Petersburg revealed everyday continuities — functioning markets, public rituals of memory, and a civic sense shaped by historical trauma. That lived reality does not fit neatly into the “collapse” storyline that circulates in many Western outlets. The result is a troubling dissonance: policymakers and publics may be making decisions based on caricature rather than calibration. This misalignment of narrative and reality matters because it shapes expectations. If leaders believe an adversary is near collapse, they will lean toward riskier strategies under the assumption that pressure will induce capitulation. The evidence from city streets, working refineries, and wartime memorials suggests otherwise. Russia’s political culture — steeped in the Great Patriotic War’s memory and wary of NATO expansion — conditions both elite strategy and popular resilience. Underestimating this context risks misreading how Russian decision-makers and society will react under further military and economic stress. ## The risk of a wider war with Europe A central alarm in the conversation is the widening perception of an existential threat among Russians, and how that belief could transform deterrence into a spiral. Deterrence depends on credible signaling and restraint; when one side believes the other is moving inexorably toward confrontation, preemption and escalation become more likely. The exchange highlighted a grim strategic logic: Moscow may not seek to march into Europe, but if it faces attacks that emanate from European territory — in particular the manufacturing and supply nodes that underpin Kyiv’s war effort — it could respond by striking those functionality nodes in Germany, France, or the UK. This is a pivotal point. Western strategy has relied on gradual pressure, incremental aid, and the assumption that neither side will allow conflict to cross certain thresholds. But salami-slicing tactics — incremental escalation from co-located weapons production and logistical support — risk accumulating into a threshold-crossing event. The conversation painted a scenario in which rhetoric in Europe, institutionalized fear, and continued arms flows could create a self-fulfilling prophecy: by preparing for a wider war, European states might inadvertently make the conditions for one. The cure, the speakers suggested, is less bellicose grandstanding and more sober diplomacy — though the political incentives to maintain a hawkish posture complicate prospects for de-escalation. ## Ukraine’s battlefield prospects and the question of Kyiv On the battlefield, the discussion advanced a hard-nosed assessment: Ukraine is under increasing material strain, while Russian targeting has become methodical. A critical distinction was made between precision and indiscriminate destruction. Russian strikes on Kyiv, though frequent and intense, appeared calibrated to minimize civilian casualties while degrading military and logistical infrastructure. That calculus matters: the ability to continue operations while controlling collateral damage preserves strategic options, including attempts to partition and then offer plebiscitary choices for contested territories. Several operational trends were flagged. Cutting logistics and bridges, tightening a maritime blockade, and attriting front-line units combine into a strategic plan that could isolate and then bifurcate Ukraine. If Moscow controls the lines of communication from Sumy down to Kyiv and neutralizes Odessa as an economic gateway, the territorial coherence of the Ukrainian state becomes contested in a way that weapons shipments and Western rhetoric cannot easily remedy. The conversation posited a consequential forecast: if Russian forces move decisively toward Kyiv, Western narratives about Ukrainian viability will be jolted, forcing a re-evaluation of commitments and likely political fallout in capitals that have invested heavily in continued support. ## Hormuz, diesel, and a prolonged energy crisis Turning southward, the exchange underscored a grim truth about energy: physical damage to oil and refining infrastructure is not rapidly reversible, and the timing of repair cycles matters in a world of thin spare capacity. Claims that oil flows from the Persian Gulf have quickly returned to pre-crisis levels were treated skeptically. Ground reports point to substantial damage at pumping stations, terminals, and refineries — damage that can take years to remediate. Even if crude moves, refined products like diesel have their own supply chains and storage vulnerabilities; diesel degrades in storage, and refining capacity lost to attacks cannot be compensated overnight by floating crude alone. The implications are immediate and political. Modern economies, especially in Europe, rely on diesel for transport, agriculture, and heating. A winter with constrained diesel availability would intensify inflationary pressures, expose social fault lines, and complicate military logistics for countries dependent on overland supply. Moreover, strategic petroleum reserves are not a panacea: some products have shelf lives, and tapping reserves is a temporary fix that can leave states exposed to renewed supply shocks. In short, energy insecurity is not only an economic problem but a potential accelerant of geopolitical tensions. ## Iran, U.S. military vulnerabilities, and cascading effects A striking theme in the conversation was how Iran’s actions have revealed systemic vulnerabilities in U.S. military posture in the region. Bases and carriers, once pillars of American power projection, appear more exposed than doctrine suggests. Asymmetric tactics — missile strikes, maritime interdictions, and attacks on energy infrastructure — can multiply costs for a distant hegemon by forcing resource-intensive defensive measures and constraining freedom of movement. The strategic lesson is painful: platforms that look invulnerable in peacetime can become liabilities in a contested littoral, and the cost of defending far-flung outposts may exceed political appetite in a prolonged crisis. There’s also a cascading logic: when energy flows are disrupted and military options are limited by local vulnerabilities, the temptation to escalate elsewhere grows. Whether that means intensifying operations in Ukraine, leaning harder on China economically, or opening new fronts through proxies, escalation can be driven as much by domestic signaling and alliance politics as by clear military objectives. The conversation warned against underestimating the multiplier effect of damage to energy infrastructure: it both constrains the immediate operat

US Gulf Empire Collapses, Ukraine War Escalation in Kiev | Larry Johnson Why lose in one war if you can simultaneously lose two? That seems to be new strategy of the US empire as it is headed toward escalation but ultimately regional defeat in Ukraine and the Gulf. But is it real or just an elaborate scheme to lull us all into believing that the Empire is crumbling? Larry Johnson argues that Iran has exposed deep weaknesses in American military power, from vulnerable Gulf bases to overstretched aircraft carriers. Drawing on his recent Russia visit, he discusses Moscow’ s outlook, Ukraine’s battlefield prospects, and the danger of direct conflict with Europe. He also warns that damaged energy infrastructure could prolong shortages and inflation worldwide. The conversation examines China’s resilience, satellite navigation, Pakistan’s balancing act, and the potential consequences of renewed fighting between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement. Larry's Links: Sonar21: https://sonar21.com Larry Johnson Substack: https://larrycjohnson.substack.com Counter Currents YouTube: https://www.youtube.com /@counter_currents_channel Larry Johnson Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/user?u=80288936 Neutrality Studies Links: Neutrality Studies Substack: https://pascallottaz.substack.com Support Neutrality Studies: https://neutralitystudies.com/donate Neutrality Studies shop: https://neutralitystudies.com/shop Time Stamps 00:00 Larry’s Russia visit and Western narratives 05: 00 Russia, Europe and the risk of wider war 15:12 Larry’s prediction for Kyiv and Ukraine 19:05 Hormuz, diesel and a prolonged energy crisis 23:39 Will economic warfare against China backfire? 28:54 Iran and the vulnerability of U.S. military power 40:46 China, Iran and the changing strategic balance 44:12 Pakistan, Yemen and the Saudi stakes #Pascal Welcome back, everybody, to Neutrality Studies. Today for an update with the man in the hat, the cigar, and the Hawaiian T-shirt, our Larry Johnson. Larry, welcome. #Larry Johnson Hello, my friend. Good to see you, Pascal. #Pascal Good to see you, too. Larry, you recently were in Russia, and can you maybe give us a short update on what you've learned over there? We spoke already once about this, but I was wondering if what happened in the meantime with the increased attacks on Kyiv is somehow, again, throwing a new -- 1 of 16 -- light on what you've discussed over there already. And also in regard to the discussions in the Valdai Club that just happened last week, if something new came out that kind of, you know, rekindles what you've learned in Russia. #Larry Johnson Yeah, no, look, it was—this was my eighth trip. I had to spend time both in Moscow and St. Petersburg. You know, the Western narrative that the Russian economy is on the verge of collapse is—you know, you had Con Coughlin write this ridiculous piece in the Telegraph claiming, "Oh man, Russia's going the same way that the Soviet Union did under Brezhnev. It's, you know, spinning itself into oblivion with defense spending, and it's on the verge of collapse." Oh my God. I mean, that stuff is so delusional. And what's so disturbing about it is that so many people in the West believe it. And I did a rebuttal to Coughlin's article, pointed out that unlike the Soviet days, when they didn't really have this robust oil and gas industry, they do now. They're able to supply all their oil and gas, and despite Western claims, you know, Trump's insistence that Ukrainian attacks on the refineries have crippled Russia domestically, no one has it. I saw some gas lines in Moscow, but again, I'm not sure if those were unusual or normal because they weren't massive. You'd have this one narrow piece of highway that sort of follows a creek that runs from Kremlin up into the northeast corner. It's heading to RT, and they've got these little gas stations on the side that can handle two or three cars. So, you know, like I buy my gas at a place called BJ's. It's one of these massive shopping clubs. Well, they've got 14 stalls for cars, so they can handle a large number. And even there, I've seen in the past where you've had, you know, 20 cars backed up waiting to get gas, 40 cars. Well, you know, that's why I saw two or three or four cars here and there. The notion that Russia's diesel exports are dependent upon those refineries misses the point entirely. Most of the Russian oil that's exported and turned into diesel, that hasn't been touched. I mean, that's still flowing. That hasn't been disrupted at all. Putin's decision to essentially take the gloves off and turn this into a war footing as opposed to a special military operation has, I'd say, widespread support. And I was there, you know, my last weekend there was for the elections that took place on Friday, Saturday, Sunday, so 18th, 19th, and 20th. Then on the 20th, they had, you know, news media reported this massive drone strike, 160 drones. You know, I didn't hear a damn thing. I woke up in the morning to hear that report and went, "Oh." And I looked outside, and I could see some smoke still drifting. I was up in an area called Moscow City, which is about six, seven miles north of Red Square. And, yeah, there was some smoke in the—this was 9:30 in the morning—from the refinery that had been hit in southern Moscow. But within an hour, all that smoke was gone. And apparently they got the fire out pretty quick down at the refinery, because I was down in southern Moscow later that afternoon—didn't see any smoke, nothing. #Pascal -- 2 of 16 -- So, I mean, the situation for Moscow and for Kiev are simply incomparable, right? I mean, Kiev is getting hit and pounded like there's no tomorrow, which for the city there might not be if this continues much longer. But the narrative from the West still, to this day, to October 2026, is Russia's on the verge of collapse. Ukraine, you know, whatever it takes. And we keep supporting Ukraine, by which they mean just shoveling weapons in there and young men to the front to die over there in the east, busified. The busification keeps going on. So, I mean, it just seems to be getting more and more desperate, while at the same time now we in Europe also hear all of these rumors about, you know, a larger war with Russia. Everybody in Europe is now screaming the Russians are going to attack us. And Vladimir Putin himself had to say, "We are not planning on attacking anyone. Stop this stupid narrative." But this narrative is not ending. #Larry Johnson Russia is not going to just on its own attack Europe. They will attack weapons factories in Europe, in Germany, France, and the U.K., if those countries continue to produce weapons and then those weapons are used with, you know, they cause some significant damage inside Russia. At that point, Russia will hit those factories. #Pascal Right. #Larry Johnson Pepe Escobar and I had a good interview with General Apti Alaudinov. I'll be posting that later tonight as well. And he just—it was very matter-of-fact. He says, "Look, we're going to be at war with Europe." He wasn't suggesting that Russia was going to go on the offensive against Europe, but he was just simply saying the combination of the rhetoric and their actions is going to create a situation in which we're going to have no choice. And that's what the Europeans need to be aware of. They need to, like, back off, take a deep breath, sit down, and accept Russia's offers to talk. #Pascal I heard exactly the same thing from Stas Krapivnik last night. It's like the Russians, through all ranks, and I think your discussions also with some of the Russian leadership, like Sergei Lavrov, confirmed that as well. The Russians, all ranks, are now getting ready to have a war because they think that the Europeans will make it inevitable. The Europeans are so ready and are in such a war frenzy and in such a mass formation moment that they're going to war with Russia, and Russia then having to defend Russia becomes inevitable. So we have this self-fulfilling prophecy now already on -- 3 of 16 -- the horizon. And the only way to avert that would be to change the narrative in Europe. But this seems to be just as far away as before. Although my question is, the European or NATO strategy has always been salami slicing, right? Salami slicing themselves into Russia, into deep strikes into Russia and so on. And at the same time, rely on this Article 5 kind of, you know, the boogeyman, saying like, "Oh, if you ever hit even just one facility in one of the NATO territories, then automatically Article 5, and everybody will latch on you, Russia." And Russia has actually tried to avoid that. But if now the calculus keeps changing and say, like, okay, war with Europe is inevitable, then what will be the strategy to manage that kind of problem of, like, all or nothing? Hey, just a very quick note. The best way to support this channel is by signing up for my free Substack. You can also help with a paid subscription there, or you can get some of our new merch on NeutralityStudies.com. Links below. See you there. #Larry Johnson Russia still will be very, let's say, precise in their strikes. You know, really, the strikes in Kiev have been going on for like two months, and they've been, you know, hundreds of missiles and drones every night, you know, day after day after day. What's remarkable: hardly any civilian casualties. Because with that amount of firepower, you would expect, if they were just firing indiscriminately, which they're not. So the Russians still have taken seriously to minimize civilian casualties, even in Kiev. Of course, that's one of the reasons now they're encouraging people: get out, because I think the next phase will be far more destructive. And they want the civilians to evacuate. We can't emphasize enough how the Great Patriotic War, the fight against the Nazis, still lives on today as an issue. On the 20th of September, I got to visit a private military museum. It is set up by the man who owns—he owns the equivalent of LexisNexis in Russia. It provides databases and legal documents for all law firms. So he's become quite wealthy with it. What he did with his money is he created this... It's a private museum, but it's open to the public, free of charge. So anybody can go there, and you can visit, and you don't have to pay an entrance fee. It's free. But he's got tanks, armored vehicles, staff cars, artillery pieces from World War I up through World War II and through the Cold War. So, you know, I got to climb around on a Sherman. They've got a Sherman tank, and all these tanks work. They've got functional engines. This Sherman tank was used in the movie Fury that starred Brad Pitt, and sitting right next to it is a T-34 tank. So I got to get inside that, and the Russian gentleman that was guiding me goes, “Want to start it?” And I go, “Hell yes.” So I got to start the T-34. What I learned from that is that any of the Soviet crewmen that served in tanks, particularly T-34s, in the Great Patriotic War, if they survived, they were deaf as a stone at the end of that war because it is loud. And I don't think they were wearing ear protection at the time. But at one point, this man, his name is Dimitri, took us in and he showed this board, and it had all these people on it. Well, there were his relatives, relatives who had died in that war. -- 4 of 16 -- He was remembering grandfathers and uncles on both sides of the family. And then he took us upstairs. They also had some exhibits, like the start to finish of World War II in Europe, and they brought it forward to modern day, when NATO was set up, the map of the NATO countries in 1958, and then what it is today. And the movement of NATO to the east is an unmistakable threat from the standpoint of the Russians. They have not forgotten that. And when you got Friedrich Merz popping off about the Fourth Reich, the Russians take that damn seriously because they lost 27 million people. And what's interest